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In this Thesis, I systematize, clarify, and expand the current theory of emotion based 
on the principles of predictive processing—the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion—so as to show the following: (1) as it stands, this view is problematic. (2) 
Once expanded, the view in question can deal with its more pressing problems, and it 
compares favourably to competing accounts. Thus, the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion stands out as a plausible theory of emotion.  
 
According to the predictive processing (PP) framework, all what the brain does, in all 
its functions, is to minimize its precision-weighted prediction error (PE) (Clark, 2013, 
2016; Hohwy, 2013). Roughly, PE consist in the difference between the sensory 
signals expected (and generated) from the top-down and the actual, incoming sensory 
signals. Now, in the PP framework, visual percepts are formed by minimizing visual 
PE in a specific manner: via visual perceptual inference. That is, the brain forms visual 
percepts in a top-down fashion by predicting its incoming lower-level sensory signals 
from higher-level models of the likely (hidden) causes of those visual signals. Such 
models can be seen as putting forward content-specifying hypotheses about the object 
or event responsible for triggering incoming sensory activity. A contentful percept is 
formed once a certain hypothesis achieves to successfully match, and thus supress, 
current lower-level sensory signals.  
 
In the interoceptive inference approach to interoception (Seth, 2013, 2015), the 
principles of PP have been extended to account for interoception, i.e., the perception 
of our homeostatic, physiological condition. Just as perception in the visual domain 
arises via visual perceptual inference, the interoceptive inference approach holds that 





Now, what might be called the interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV) holds 
that the interoceptive inference approach can be used so as to account for subjective 
feeling states in general, i.e., mental states that feel good or bad—i.e., valenced mental 
states. According to ITV, affective valence arises by way of interoceptive perceptual 
inference.  
 
On the other hand, what might be called the interoceptive inference view of emotion 
(IIE) holds that the interoceptive inference approach can be used so as to account for 
emotions per se (e.g., fear, anger, joy). More precisely, IIE holds that, in direct analogy 
to the way in which visual percepts are formed, emotions arise from interoceptive 
predictions of the causes of current interoceptive afferents. In other words, emotions 
per se amount to interceptive percepts formed via higher-level, content-specifying 
emotion hypotheses.  
 
In this Thesis, I aim to systematize, clarify, and expand the interoceptive inference 
approach to interoception, in order to show that: (1) contrary to non-sensory theories 
of affective valence, valence is indeed constituted by interoceptive perceptions, and 
that interoceptive percepts do arise via interoceptive perceptual inference. Therefore, 
ITV holds. (2) Considering that IIE exhibits problematic assumptions, it should be 
amended. In this respect, I will argue that emotions do not arise via interoceptive 
perceptual inference (as IIE claims), since this assumes that there must be regularities 
pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain. I will suggest that emotions arise 
instead by minimizing interoceptive PE in another fashion. That is, emotions arise via 
external interoceptive active inference: by sampling and modifying the external 
environment in order to change an already formed interoceptive percept (which has 
been formed via interoceptive perceptual inference). That is, emotions are specific 
strategies for regulating affective valence. More precisely, I will defend the view that 
a certain emotion E amounts to a specific strategy for minimizing interoceptive PE by 
way of a specific set of stored knowledge of the counterfactual relations that obtain 
between (possible) actions and its prospective interoceptive, sensory consequences (“if 
I act in this manner, interoceptive signals should evolve in such-and-such way”). An 
emotion arises when such knowledge is applied in order to regulate valence. 
iii 
 
Emotion and Predictive Processing: 




In this Thesis, I systematize, clarify, and expand the current theory of emotion based 
on the principles of predictive processing—the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion—so as to show the following: (1) as it stands, this view is problematic. (2) 
Once expanded, the view in question can deal with its more pressing problems, and it 
compares favourably to competing accounts. Thus, the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion stands out as a plausible theory of emotion.  
 
According to the predictive processing (PP) framework, the brain, in all its functions, 
is attempting to anticipate the information that the senses deliver, and thus reduce as 
much as possible the difference between the information that it anticipates and the 
information that it actually receives from the senses. This can be achieved in two ways: 
via perception or via action. In the PP framework, perception is then understood as 
emerging from the anticipation of the actual information that a certain sense delivers; 
while action emerges by changing the world so as to receive the information that the 
brain is already expecting.  
 
In the interoceptive inference view of emotion (IIE), and in the interoceptive inference 
theory of valence (ITV), this basic idea is extended to account for emotion per se and 
valence, respectively. Valence amounts to the positive and negative character that 
affective states have. For example, joy has a positive character, while fear has a 
negative character. Emotions per se consist in the affective states that we commonly 
consider emotions to be. For example, fear, anger, joy, and guilt count as emotions in 
this sense.  
 
ITV holds that valence emerges in a similar fashion as any sensory state emerges. That 
is, valence is something sensory. However, non-sensory signal theories of valence 
(NSS) have compellingly argued that valence cannot be understood as something 
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sensory. In this Thesis, I argue that, contrary to NSS, valence can indeed be understood 
as a sensory phenomenon. Therefore, ITV holds. 
 
On the other hand, IIE holds that emotions per se arise in direct analogy to the way in 
which, for example, vision arises. That is, emotions are perceptions. More precisely, 
emotions are perceptions of our physiological condition (our hear rate increasing, 
changes in blood circulation, etc.). IIE claims then that an emotion emerges as the 
brain anticipates the information that the interoceptive senses actually deliver (i.e., the 
senses that register changes in our physiological condition). In this Thesis, I argue that 
this view is problematic, simply because there are no emotions configured in our 
physiology. Thus, the brain cannot learn what interoceptive information to expect in 
respect to a certain emotion instead of another emotion. This is analogous to the claim 
that the experience of clouds do not arise from auditive perceptions, simply because 
different types of clouds (cirrus, cumulus, etc.) are not configured in the ‘auditive 
landscape’. Thus, the brain cannot learn what auditive information to expect in respect 
to a certain type of cloud (e.g., cirrus) instead of another type of cloud (e.g., cumulus). 
 
It seems then that the PP framework, even though it can account for valence, is without 
an account of emotions per se. In this Thesis, I suggest that the PP framework can 
indeed account for emotions per se. Remember that the brain has two ways achieving 
its only goal of reducing as much as possible the difference between the information 
that it anticipates and the information that it receives from the senses: perception and 
action. Now, common sense tell us that sensing (or perceiving) our bodily, 
physiological changes is part of our experience of emotion. Then, reducing as much as 
possible the difference between the interoceptive information that brain anticipates and 
the information that it receives from the interoceptive senses must be part of the story 
of how emotions emerge. We saw that it is unlikely that emotions emerge via 
perception, i.e., by simply perceiving our bodies. Then, if perception is not the way to 
go in this respect, we are left with action. I suggest that emotions arise via action. 
Remember that, in the PP framework, action emerges by changing the world so as to 
receive the information that the brain is already expecting. I suggest then that emotions 
arise by changing our physiology to its expected state via emotion specific actions in 
v 
 
the external world. For example, fear, as others have suggested, consist in actions 
relative to the avoidance of a dangerous stimulus. If this view is on track, the PP 
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In this Thesis, I systematize, clarify, and expand the current theory of emotion based 
on the principles of predictive processing—the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion—so as to show the following: (1) as it stands, this view is problematic. (2) 
Once expanded, the view in question can deal with its more pressing problems, and it 
compares favourably to competing accounts. Thus, the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion stands out as a plausible theory of emotion.  
 
According to the predictive processing (PP) framework, all what the brain does, in all 
its functions, is to minimize its precision-weighted prediction error (PE) (Clark, 2013, 
2016; Hohwy, 2013). Roughly, PE consist in the difference between the sensory 
signals expected (and generated) from the top-down and the actual, incoming sensory 
signals. Now, in the PP framework, visual percepts are formed by minimizing visual 
PE in a specific manner: via visual perceptual inference. That is, the brain forms visual 
percepts in a top-down fashion by predicting its incoming lower-level sensory signals 
from higher-level models of the likely (hidden) causes of those visual signals. Such 
models can be seen as putting forward content-specifying hypotheses about the object 
or event responsible for triggering incoming sensory activity. A contentful percept is 
formed once a certain hypothesis achieves to successfully match, and thus supress, 
current lower-level sensory signals.  
 
In the interoceptive inference approach to interoception (Seth, 2013, 2015a), the 
principles of PP have been extended to account for interoception, i.e., the perception 
of our homeostatic, physiological condition. Just as perception in the visual domain 
arises via visual perceptual inference, the interoceptive inference approach holds that 
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perception of the inner, physiological milieu arises via interoceptive perceptual 
inference.  
 
Now, what might be called the interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV) holds 
that the interoceptive inference approach can be used so as to account for subjective 
feeling states in general, i.e., mental states that feel good or bad—i.e., valenced mental 
states. According to ITV, affective valence arises by way of interoceptive perceptual 
inference.  
 
On the other hand, what might be called the interoceptive inference view of emotion 
(IIE) holds that the interoceptive inference approach can be used so as to account for 
emotions per se (e.g., fear, anger, joy). More precisely, IIE holds that, in direct analogy 
to the way in which visual percepts are formed, emotions arise from interoceptive 
predictions of the causes of current interoceptive afferents. In other words, emotions 
per se amount to interceptive percepts formed via higher-level, content-specifying 
emotion hypotheses.  
 
In this Thesis, I aim to systematize, clarify, and expand the interoceptive inference 
approach to interoception, in order to show that: (1) contrary to non-sensory theories 
of affective valence, valence is indeed constituted by interoceptive perceptions, and 
that interoceptive percepts do arise via interoceptive perceptual inference. Therefore, 
ITV holds. (2) Considering that IIE exhibits problematic assumptions, it should be 
amended. In this respect, I will suggest that emotions do not arise via interoceptive 
perceptual inference (as IIE claims), but rather they arise by minimizing interoceptive 
PE in another fashion. That is, emotions arise via external interoceptive active 
inference: by sampling and modifying the external environment in order to change an 
already formed interoceptive percept (which has been formed via interoceptive 
perceptual inference). That is, emotions are specific strategies for regulating affective 
valence. More precisely, I will suggest the view that a certain emotion E amounts to a 
specific strategy for minimizing interoceptive PE by way of a specific set of stored 
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knowledge of the counterfactual relations that obtain between (possible) actions and 
its prospective interoceptive, sensory consequences (“if I act in this manner, 
interoceptive signals should evolve in such-and-such way”). An emotion arises when 
such knowledge is applied in order to regulate valence. Let me unpack these claims.  
 
Predictive processing: its importance and ambitions  
 
Given its simplicity and enormous unifying and explanatory power, PP is becoming 
an increasingly attractive way of carrying out theoretical and experimental research in 
cognitive science. Now, PP is not just another compelling theoretical approach to some 
cognitive function. PP has the ambitions to constitute itself as an overarching paradigm 
shift in our understanding of the functionings of the mind/brain. The ambition is high. 
The principles of PP promise to give us a unifying account of all the seemingly 
disparate variety of mental phenomena, ranging from perception to action (Clark, 
2013; Hohwy, 2013).   
 
The very basics of key PP notions  
 
Roughly, in the PP framework, the traditional approach to perceptual processing is 
turned upside down. Traditionally, perception is considered to be a bottom-up driven 
process, in which sensory signals or features are accumulatively processed from the 
bottom-up until a coherent percept is finally formed. Contrary to the bottom-up 
approach, as I mentioned above, Bayesian PP accounts of perception hold that the 
mind/brain forms percepts in a top-down fashion, by predicting its incoming lower-
level sensory signals from higher-level models/hypotheses of the likely (hidden) 




Crucially, as top-down signals produced by generative models provide predictions of 
sensory effects, bottom-up signals provide PE, as defined above. PE is critical in the 
PP framework, not only because, from a more global perspective, PP holds that all 
what the brain does is to minimize its PE. The latter is also crucial in the PP framework 
since during online processing, PE is used as feedback for updating and improving 
models or hypotheses and, in the long term, as a learning signal that improves models’ 
predictions.  
 
Importantly, in order to minimize PE, the system needs to determine the reliability of 
PE across all levels of the perceptual hierarchy. That is, the precision of incoming 
signals also needs to be inferred. Precisions determine, in a context-sensitive manner, 
which aspects of the signal are ignored (as they are deemed to be unreliable, or too 
variable), and which aspects of the signal are amplified (as they are deemed to be 
reliable). Thus, in contexts where the input is deemed to be unreliable, top-down 
hypotheses will be assigned more weight than usual. For example, think of a case in 
which the auditive stimulus amounts to white noise. In this sort of context, audition 
will then be driven almost completely by stored expectations, at the expense of what 
the world has to say via auditive PE: you begin hearing that song you heard this 
morning, and perhaps a conversation. In this kind of case, the incoming auditive PE is 
estimated to have too little precision, and thus top-down expectations are assigned 
significantly more weight. Hallucinations thus take place. In other contexts, the input 
will be deemed reliable. Think of the situation in which someone tries to read a very 
small footnote in good lightning conditions. In this case, those aspect of the input 
which encode information relative to the letters will be given more weight. In these 
latter type of cases, PE will be taken to be informative, and it will then be used to guide 
the current hypothesis-selection process and, in the long term, learning.  
 
Now, as Hohwy (2013) remarks, as the process of model/hypothesis selection and 
revision in light of precision weighted PE unfolds, and learning thus takes place, 
generative models manage to extract the causal regularities from the world. In other 
words, priors are learned from experience, and over time they recapitulate the 
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regularities that configure the structure of the world. This is what allows the system to 
issue successful predictions of the worldly causes of incoming signals, and thus 
minimize PE.   
 
Lower levels of the cortical hierarchy encode regularities that operate at fast time-
scales, which capture variant aspects of experience. On the other hand, higher levels 
encode increasingly more complex regularities that operate at slow time-scales, which 
capture relatively more invariant aspects of experience. 
 
Importantly for this Thesis, in the PP framework, action plays a key role during percept 
formation, and it operates under the same imperative toward PE minimization. Action 
takes here the form of active inference. Active inference consists in changing the 
environment so as to obtain sensory data that fits considered predictions or hypotheses. 
As Seth (2015a) remarks, active inference can take place not only so as to conform to 
current expectations, as it occurs during motor behaviour by making proprioceptive 
data fit proprioceptive expectations (by significantly increasing the precision of 
proprioceptive predictions), so that ‘desired’ (or expected) movement occurs. Active 
inference can also take place during percept formation (i.e., during perceptual 
inference), in order to confirm, disconfirm and disambiguate perceptual hypotheses. 
As Seth (2015a) notes, this requires storing representations of the counterfactual 
relations that obtain between (possible) actions and its prospective sensory 
consequences. This is what Seth calls ‘knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies’.  
 
The latter aspect of active inference will be key in this Thesis, as I will argue that 
emotions arise via ‘external interoceptive active inference’. More precisely, as I 
already mentioned, I will defend the view that a certain emotion E amounts to a 
specific strategy for minimizing interoceptive PE by way of a specific set of stored 
representations of interoceptive sensorimotor contingencies—“if I act in this manner, 
interoceptive signals should evolve in such-and-such way”. (However, even though 
they operate under the same principles of PE minimization, active inference and 
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perceptual inference differ in an obvious functional respect: they exhibit different 
direction of fit. While perceptual hypotheses have mind-to-world direction of fit—
hypotheses attempt to match incoming signals—active inference has world-to-mind 
direction of fit—the system attempts so find signals that fit predicted signals.)  
 
Rationale and importance of extending PP to emotions and affective valence  
 
PP is already doing explanatory work in a wide variety of psychological domains. 
However, PP was conceived and developed as an account (and re-conceptualization) 
of perceptual processes. That is why its principles have been mainly applied in the 
explanation of mental phenomena that, in some way or another, can be readily 
understood as perceptual in nature – e.g., visual perception, binocular rivalry, illusions 
and delusions, etc. (for a review, see, e.g., Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005, 2009).  
 
Now, according to the Jamesian view of emotion (James, 1884), emotions can be 
understood as perceptions of bodily, interoceptive changes. Considering that the 
Jamesian view that emotions can be understood as a perceptual process has recently 
seen a resurgence of interest in emotion research (e.g., Prinz, 2004), an obvious next 
step for PP’s explanatory ambitions is to apply its principles in accounting for emotion.  
 
For PP’s explanatory ambitions, developing a successful PP account of emotion is not 
only interesting for the simple fact that emotions drive our lives: they are the mental 
phenomena that we personally care most about. But developing a successful PP 
account of emotion is also interesting for more theoretical reasons. In this respect, 
developing a successful PP account of emotion can play a pivotal role in accounting 
for other higher-level mental phenomena. For example, it is widely agreed that moral 
judgments are dependent on emotional processes (e.g., Greene, 2001; Haidt, 2001; 
Nichols, 2004; Pizarro, 2000; Prinz, 2007). If that is the case, a successful PP account 
of emotion could inform a major part (if not all) of a PP account of moral judgment. 
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The same can be said of other mental functions dependent on emotion, such as, for 
example, decision-making, social cognition, motivation, and self-control. It could also 
inform explanations of certain mental dysfunctions dependent on emotional processes, 
such as, for example, borderline personality disorder, psychopathy, and alexithymia-
related disorders. More interestingly, mental life is affective to the core. Therefore, 
developing an account of emotion is mandatory for PP’s ambitions of constituting 
itself as an overarching, unifying framework in cognitive science.  
 
To date there is no fully developed PP account of emotion on offer. Nonetheless, A. 
Seth (Seth, 2013; Seth et al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013) and J. Hohwy (2013, pp. 
242-244) have recently offered a first sketch of how such extension might go. Taking 
into account the fact that PP mainly works as an account of perception, and that 
perceptual views of emotion have been recently compellingly defended, those first 
sketches have suggested a PP version of the perceptual, interoceptive view of emotion. 
According to this kind of view, emotions are perceptions of distinct bodily changes. 
Resting on the plausibility of some of the commitments of this kind of view, those first 
PP accounts of emotion see emotion as arising from predictive interoceptive 
inferences—more precisely, from interoceptive perceptual inference.  
 
Seth’s (and Hohwy’s) proposal: the interoceptive inference view of emotion  
 
According to the interoceptive inference view of emotion (IIE), emotions arise from 
interoceptive hypotheses about the causes of incoming interoceptive signals. In this 
view, in direct analogy to the way in which visual percepts are formed (Seth, 2015a), 
for an emotion to arise, emotion models/hypotheses need to supress from the top-down 
incoming interoceptive inputs. Mismatches between predicted interoceptive signals 
and actual inputs result in interoceptive PE signals that cause to replace the considered 
perceptual interoceptive hypothesis. Analogously to vision, even though finding a 
fitting interoceptive hypothesis requires that the whole system constantly contributes 
to that task across all levels of the interoceptive hierarchy, as Hohwy remarks, in IIE, 
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emotions are “reduced to basic interoceptive states” (Hohwy, 2013, p.243) and our 
perception of them: “emotion arises as a kind of perceptual inference on our own 
internal states.” (Ibid. italics are mine). Emotions result then via interoceptive 
perceptual inference simpliciter, just as visual percepts result via visual perceptual 
inference simpliciter. In other words, according to IIE, emotions are interoceptive 
percepts which are formed guided by an emotion-hypothesis. The claim is that, once 
interoceptive afferents are triggered by some external event, the winning emotion 
perceptual hypothesis ‘explains away’ that interoceptive activity initially triggered by 
such an external event. In this manner an interoceptive percept is formed, which 
exhibits the content of such a wining perceptual emotion-hypothesis.  
 
IIE is problematic  
 
In this Thesis, I argue that IIE is problematic. Perceptual, interoceptive theories of 
emotion exhibit problematic assumptions. Being IIE one of such theories, it is also 
misguided. More specifically, remember that in the PP framework, the generative 
models from which hypotheses are put forward extract the regularities that configure 
the structure of the world. This, in order to be able to issue successful predictions about 
worldly (hidden) causes of incoming signals. In other words, priors are learned from 
experience (via model/hypothesis selection and revision in light of precision-weighted 
PE), and over time they manage to recapitulate the regularities of the world (Hohwy, 
2013). According to IIE, emotions result from interoceptive predictions. Where do 
interoceptive priors come from? From the causal regularities that obtain in the inner 
world, i.e., in the physiological landscape. Thus, IIE is committed to the assumption 
that there must be causal regularities pertaining to emotion in the physiological 
domain. However, I will show that this is not the case: there are no bodily, 
physiological regularities relative anger, fear, joy, sadness, etc. There are no emotions 
configured in the physiological landscape. Then, it is unlikely that emotion models get 
to encode interoceptive expectations in the way required by IIE. Therefore, IIE should 




Interoceptive inference and the interoceptive inference theory of affective valence  
 
Even though Seth and Hohwy, in their discussion of ‘interoceptive inference’, refer to 
typical instances of emotion as the explanandum (e.g., anger, fear, joy), the 
interoceptive inference approach to interoception can also be considered as an account 
not of emotions per se (anger, fear, joy), but of affective states more generally. That 
is, of subjective feeling states: mental states that feel good or bad. In other words, the 
interoceptive inference approach to interoception can also be considered as an account 
of valence. This is clear from the fact that, in this respect, Seth quotes the work of 
Damasio (1994) and Gu & Fitzgerald (2014) on decision making, which relies on 
‘subjective feeling states’ more generally, rather than on emotion per se (and the latter 
work is indeed based on the interoceptive inference approach). In fact, outside 
philosophy, ‘emotion’ is usually used to refer to that more general sort of mental state 
(i.e., affect) (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Seth and Hohwy would certainly agree 
then that their treatment of ‘interoceptive inference’ is not meant to be an account of 
emotion per se exclusively, in the restricted sense in which the term ‘emotion’ is used 
in philosophy. Their treatment of ‘interoceptive inference’ is meant to apply also to 
affective states more generally, such as, for example, hunger and thirst (in fact, they 
do mention that kind of mental states in their treatment of ‘interoceptive inference’). 
Then, the interoceptive inference approach can also be taken to be an account of 
affective states in general. Or more precisely, of the affective aspect of ‘subjective 
feeling states’, of mental states that feel good or bad. Now, the essential component 
part of all affective states is valence (or affective valence). Valence is what makes 
affective mental states, such as hunger, pain and joy, states that feel good or bad, 
positive or negative. That is, valence is what makes certain mental states affective in 
the first place. Thus, the interoceptive inference approach also counts as an account of 
valence, or affect in general. In this respect, the claim put forward by the interoceptive 
inference approach is that the affective aspect of subjective feeling states—i.e., 
affective valence—arise by minimizing interoceptive PE, in direct analogy to the way 
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vision operates. That is, affective valence results from a perceptual, interoceptive 
process. Let’s call this the interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV).  
 
The perceptual hypotheses in question, insofar as they are interoceptive perceptual 
hypotheses, predict sensory, interoceptive activity. Thus, in ITV, valence properties 
count as sensory, interoceptive representations. In ITV, affective valence must be seen 
then as a sensory, perceptual phenomenon—also, considering that everything in the 
PP machinery seems to be sensory, in PP valence properties should also be constituted 
by sensory processing. 
 
This poses a major challenge to ITV. What might be called non-sensory signal theories 
of valence (NSS) (Prinz, 2004, 2010; Carruthers, 2011) have compellingly showed that 
valence cannot be understood as a perceptual phenomenon. So any account that models 
valence on perception seems to be doomed to fail. Contrary to ITV, valence seems not 
to be a sensory representation. ITV seems not to be tenable.  
 
Roughly, NSS holds that valence amounts to a motivating inner signal that “marks” 
mental states as good or bad, welcome or unwelcome. These views also share the claim 
that valence is not a sensory/perceptual state, and, being just a signal, it neither 
amounts to an amodal (or multimodal) representation of any kind (e.g., a concept). In 
other words, the valenced aspect of a sensory experience is regarded as something that 
“attaches” to the sensory experience itself, the latter being something distinct from the 
former. That is, valence and bodily perception are independent phenomena. Therefore, 
contrary to ITV, what makes mental states feel good or bad—i.e., valence—is not a 
sensory/perceptual phenomenon of any kind. In Prinz’s version of NSS, valence 
amounts to inner-reinforcer signals that command the maintenance or cessation of 
certain (perceptual representations of) patterns of bodily changes. Similarly, according 
to Carruthers, valence amounts to a non-sensory signal that combines with perceptual 
representations of stimuli in different modalities, making the latter attractive or 
repellent for the agent. Thus, in both versions of NSS, interoceptive perception is 
11 
 
something distinct, separate from affective valence, the latter being a non-sensory 
component in the furniture of the affective mind. Affective valence is not then 
grounded in the interoceptive system. Now, considering that NSS can accommodate 
more desiderata than current competing accounts on the nature of affective valence 
(such as the approach/avoidance and the evaluative view), and it can explain the 
intuitiveness of the latter, NSS is quite explanatorily powerful. ITV faces a pressing 
problem: valence seems to be independent from interoceptive perception.  
 
This worry that affective valence cannot be constituted by sensory processing (which 
includes the minimization interoceptive PE via interoceptive perceptual inference), as 
the interoceptive inference approach must claim, has not yet been identified and 
addressed by proponents of the interoceptive inference approach to affective 
phenomena (Seth and Hohwy). As there seems to be a gap between perceptual 
processing and valence, the yet emerging view that affective valence arises via 
interoceptive processing must begin to deal with the worry in question.   
 
The dilemma faced by the interoceptive inference hypothesis (and troubles for PP’s 
ambitions)  
 
Then, the PP framework faces a dilemma. On the one hand, IIE cannot account for 
emotion per se, since it counts as a perceptual, interoceptive theory of emotion. This 
kind of theories exhibit deeply problematic assumptions. Being an interoceptive theory 
of emotion, those assumptions are also shared by IIE. On the other hand, the 
interoceptive inference approach can also be taken as an account of the affective aspect 
of ‘subjective feeling states’, i.e., of valence. This is what I called above ITV. As such, 
the interoceptive inference approach counts as a perceptual, interoceptive theory of 
valence. In other words, ITV is committed to the view that valence is a sensory, 
interoceptive phenomenon. However, this kind of theories have been compellingly 
discredited by NSS (Prinz, 2004, 2010; Carruthers, 2011). According to NSS, valence 
is not a sensory/perceptual phenomenon of any kind, but rather a signal that only 
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“attaches” to sensory representations, the former being independent from the latter. 
Thus, insofar as ITV counts as a perceptual, interoceptive theory of valence, it cannot 
either account for valence, the defining property of affective mental states. Therefore, 
the PP framework seems to lack the resources to account for emotion, and also to 
account for the essence of affect (i.e., valence). Mental life is affective to the core. If 
PP cannot account for that aspect of mentality, it simply fails as an overarching, 
unifying framework in cognitive science. This is a major drawback for PP ambitions.  
 
The proposal: thesis in a nutshell  
 
There is a way out of this dilemma. I aim to systematize, clarify, and expand the 
interoceptive inference approach to interoceptive processing proposed by Seth (and 
Hohwy) in order to defend two intertwined claims. Firstly, I will show that, contrary 
to NSS’s tenets, valence is indeed constituted by interoceptive perceptions, and that 
such process results from PE minimization. ITV holds.  
 
In this respect, I argue that Prinz’s and Carruthers’s arguments against the view that 
valence is a perceptual phenomenon are misguided, and that NSS exhibits problematic 
assumptions on its own. Very roughly, and leaving secondary arguments for later, 
firstly, contrary to Carruthers’s tenets, I show that the evidence that he presents does 
not suggest that felt arousal—which, as he rightly maintains, is uncontroversially 
grounded in interoception—needs to be considered as a separate construct than 
valence. Nothing in Carruthers’s arguments precludes then that valence is grounded in 
interoception.  
 
Secondly, the main worry that Prinz puts forward against the view that valence is a 
perceptual phenomenon—which, as such, can be felt—is that the wide variation in the 
way in which positive (or negative) feelings feel indicates that they do not share a 
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common perceived felt aspect, namely, positive (or negative) valence. Thus, valence 
is not something perceptual, i.e., something that can be felt.  
 
I show that the PP framework offers a nice way out of this problem. As I mentioned 
above, in the PP framework, the assessment of the precision of PE, which is identified 
with attention, occupies a central role in the whole PP inferential machine. Remember 
that precisions determine which aspects of the signal are ignored (as they are deemed 
to be unreliable), and which aspects of the signal are amplified (as they are deemed to 
be reliable). Thus, in contexts where the input is deemed to be unreliable, top-down 
hypotheses will be assigned more weight than usual. In other contexts, the input will 
be deemed reliable. In these latter type of cases, PE will be taken to be informative, 
and it will then be used to guide the current hypothesis-selection process and, in the 
long term, learning.  
 
Precisions, together with accuracy, play a key role in determining which contents 
become phenomenally conscious. Roughly, models from which perceptual hypotheses 
are put forward exhibit more accuracy in case they better represent the causal structure 
of the world, as the more PE is minimized. Importantly, as Hohwy (2012) suggests, 
perceptual states become conscious in case they exhibit a relatively significant degree 
of both, accuracy and precision. Now, our expectations of precision depend on context. 
Among other things, this implies not only that, during percept formation, precisions in 
different modalities are differentially inferred, but that, depending on context, 
precisions differ within the same modality for different sensory features.  
 
The key is to consider precisions as key for dealing with Prinz’s worry. ITV can 
straightforwardly explain the rich variation in our experience of positive (and negative) 
feelings by appealing to the context-dependent variation of precision-weighting for 
different sensory attributes during interoceptive percept formation. Thus, depending 
on context, certain interoceptive attributes can be amplified, while others ignored 




On the other hand, the experience of emotion is accompanied in a phenomenologically 
unified way by experiences across many modalities. Then, ITV can also explain the 
rich variation in question by appealing to the context-dependent variation of precision 
weighting across the different modalities that play a role during the valenced 
experience of emotion. That is, precisions determine which aspects of the whole 
multimodal stream of sensory input are to be ignored, and which aspects of the signal 
will be amplified. Moreover, precisions can be differentially assigned at each level of 
the perceptual hierarchy. Thus, the same bounded interoceptive features that compose 
an interoceptive percept can be, depending on context, differentially attended. In this 
manner, bodily experience can exhibit some variation.  
 
Finally, not only the arguments of the defenders of NSS against the view that valence 
is a perceptual phenomenon are misguided, NSS is also problematic on its own. While 
Carruthers’s version is committed to an ill-motivated dissociation between valence and 
arousal; Prinz’s version implies an implausible neural basis for valence, and assumes 
an implausible dissociation between motivation and interoception. This leaves the door 
open for the view that interoceptive percepts formed via interoceptive perceptual 
inference can indeed account for affect in general (i.e., it can account for valence). In 
fact, several strands of empirical evidence (and some theoretical considerations) 
suggest that this is the case. The proposed view can reply to objections, and satisfies 
agreed desiderata for a theory of valence.  
 
However, the second horn of the dilemma presented above turns out to be more 
difficult to deal with. IIE seems not to be able to account for emotions per se. 
Interoceptive, perceptual theories of emotion are indeed doomed to fail—as there are 
no significant regularities pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain. There are 
no emotions configured in the physiological landscape. So a PP account of emotion 
should not model emotion as interoceptive perceptions. Contrary to IIE’s claim, 
predicting interoceptive signals during perceptual inference cannot be then what is 
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primary in emotion generation. Thus, Seth’s (and Hohwy’s) IIE lacks a way to account 
for emotions per se.  
 
This might sound rather puzzling. On the one hand, forming an interoceptive percept 
by predicting interoceptive signals cannot be what is primary in emotion generation. 
On the other hand, common sense (and also experimental research) tells us that every 
time we experience an emotion, however, this experience is accompanied by 
interoceptive, bodily feelings. Of course, this is no real puzzle. This simply suggests 
that, even though having an emotion does not consist in perceiving interoceptive 
changes, having an emotion does involves some type of process that must be 
intertwined with interoception. In other words, something more that interoceptive 
percept formation is needed so as to account for emotion, and it must be something 
closely intertwined with interoceptive, bodily perception. It is at this juncture that the 
second claim proposed in this Thesis comes forward.  
 
The second claim I will defend is that ‘interoceptive inferences’ can indeed account 
for emotion. However, this demands amending Seth’s proposal in a key respect. I agree 
with IIE’s claim that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE—after all, 
common sense (and also experimental research) indicates that interoception is part of 
emotion generation. I think that this more general claim is on the right track. However, 
I will propose that, contrary to IIE, emotions do not arise by minimizing interoceptive 
PE in the specific way proposed by IIE. I will propose that emotions, instead of arising 
via interoceptive perceptual inference, arise via interoceptive active inference. In other 
words, emotions are not about forming an interoceptive percept of a certain sort. 
Rather, emotions are strategies for changing an interoceptive percept that has already 
been formed (via interoceptive perceptual inference). That is, emotions are specific 
strategies for regulating valence (affect). Now, interoceptive percepts (i.e., valence) 
inform about our homeostatic condition. Then, emotions are better seen as specific 
strategies for regulating homeostasis.  
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More precisely, I will suggest that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via 
what I will call external interoceptive actions. Here the task consists in minimizing the 
discrepancy between an already formed interoceptive percept that informs about 
current homeostatic condition and the hard-wired goal (or expectation) of stable 
homeostasis. Such discrepancy amounts to high-level interoceptive PE. External 
interoceptive actions consists in changing the external environment in order to change 
such an interoceptive percept. Insofar as external interoceptive actions are a form of 
active inference, they require representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. 
Roughly, counterfactual knowledge of the way in which interoceptive signals will 
evolve, if certain actions ensue. Insofar as external interoceptive actions require 
representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’, emotion models need to store such 
kind of knowledge. I will defend the view that emotions are specific forms of ‘external 
interoceptive actions’: A certain emotion E amounts to a specific strategy for 
minimizing interoceptive PE by way of a specific set of stored knowledge of the 
counterfactual relations that obtain between (possible) actions and its prospective 
interoceptive, sensory consequences (“if I act in this manner, interoceptive signals 
should evolve in such-and-such way”). An emotion arises when such knowledge is 
applied in order to regulate valence. In this sense, emotions are specific strategies for 
regulating affect by way of specific forms of action-guiding stored knowledge. As long 
as emotions are not identified here with interoceptive perceptions, this view does not 
require there to be regularities pertaining to emotion in the inner milieu. Therefore, if 
the proposed view holds, PP’s ambitions are safe: interoceptive PE minimization can 
account for affect and emotion, the core of our mental life.  
 
The suggested view turns out to be a promising view, insofar as it avoids the problems 
of the main kinds of theories of emotion, and it satisfies the desiderata for theories of 
emotion. Then, the suggested view sets the basis for an especially dedicated, focused 
treatment of the view that emotions arise via external interoceptive active inference, 





Global argumentative steps: Chapter’s structure  
 
In order to delimitate the kinds of affective phenomena of main interest in this Thesis, 
in Chapter 1, after discussing the construct of affect (Section 1.1.), I distinguish 
between different kinds of affective states (Section 1.2.). Each of them constitute 
distinct possible explanatory targets. The main distinction drawn here is that between 
affect in general and emotions per se. In Section 1.1., I defend the claim that valence, 
rather than arousal, stands out as the paramount defining construct in affect. Valence 
is the essence of affect, to put it that way. Affective mental states are mental states that 
are positive or negative, and valence is precisely the construct that endues mental states 
with such a polarity. Now, there are several kinds of affective mental states, among 
them: moods, drives, hedonic states, and emotions. Emotions per se are affective states 
directed at core relational themes. It is also important to have in mind the distinction 
between emotion generation and emotion regulation. Roughly, the latter phenomenon 
consists in changing an emotion once it has already been formed; while the former 
phenomenon consists in forming an emotion in the first place. A theory of emotion is 
generally taken to have as its explanandum the generation of emotion rather than its 
regulation. Then, as any other emotion theory, a theory of emotion based on the PP 
framework must also have emotion generation, rather than emotion regulation, as its 
explanatory target. The generation of emotion episodes is then the focus of this thesis.  
 
In this Thesis I argue that IIE can be amended in such a way so as to become a 
promising view, which compares favourably to the main theories available on the 
nature of emotion. Then, it is relevant to discuss those aspects in which competing 
theories turn out to be unsatisfactory, and those aspect in which they result satisfactory. 
A theory of emotion that has the resources to avoid those aspects in which other 
theories fail, and to accommodate their advantages, should be taken to be on a 
promising track. So, in Section 1.3., I briefly present the main families of emotion 
theories, and discuss their problems and merits. This will give us a sense of those 
aspects that should be taken into account when developing a satisfactory view on the 




There are three main families of emotion theories, namely, perceptual theories, 
cognitive theories, and action or agential theories. Perceptual theories account for the 
bodily feelings characteristic of affective states quite well. However, they struggle 
with accounting for the intentionality of emotion. Moreover, insofar as there are no 
patterns of bodily changes able to configure emotions in the physiological landscape 
(Barret, 2006b; Quigley & Barrett, 2014), it is unlikely that emotions could arise by 
simply perceiving bodily changes, among other reasons (Section, 1.3.1.). On the other 
hand, cognitive theories straightforwardly account for the intentionality of emotion. 
However, cognitive theories can hardly account for the phenomenology and 
motivational aspect of emotion. Finally, action or agential theories also struggle with 
accounting for the intentionality of emotion. However, agential theories directly 
account for its motivational aspect. Even though currents versions of the agential 
theory exhibit some issues, I think that they are, in general, on the right track. The PP 
view on emotion to be suggested in Chapter 7 draws significantly on current versions 
of the agential theory. However, this variation over IIE does also integrate the insights 
of the main families of emotion theories mentioned above. As I will argue, the 
expansion of Seth’s view suggested in Chapter 7 turns out to be satisfactory in that 
sense: A predictive processing view of emotion has the resources to integrate the 
insights, and avoid the problems, of the different approaches to emotion. 
 
IIE is the first attempt of accounting for emotion in PP terms. IIE accounts for emotion 
generation by extending, in a direct fashion, the process by which visual percepts are 
formed to the case of interoceptive percept formation. That is, according to IIE, 
emotions are interoceptive percepts of a certain sort. Then, in Chapter 2, in order to 
better grasp IIE, I begin by presenting the PP account of visual (exteroceptive) percept 
formation. (Section 2.1.). Visual percept formation (and exteroceptive percept 
formation) is the most paradigmatic case of the workings of PP. I emphasize in this 
Section those aspects of predictive processing that make it especially interesting as an 
account of perceptual processing. Particularly, (a) the role of precisions (Section 2.4.), 
(b) the importance of cross-tall between modalities across all levels of the perceptual 
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hierarchy, and the constant influence of high-level multimodal and amodal knowledge 
(Section 2.6.), (c) the role of stored knowledge about ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ 
during active inference (Section 2.5.2.), and (d) the fact that, via learning, the cortical 
hierarchy recapitulates regularities in the world (Section 2.7.).   
 
In Chapter 3, I present, systematize, and clarify Seth’s (and Hohwy’s) proposal that 
interoception operates under principles of PP. Importantly, for expository and 
systematization purposes, I think that a distinction should be made. This is the 
distinction between the interoceptive inference approach to interoception, the 
interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV), and the interoceptive inference view 
of emotion (IIE). In the interoceptive inference approach to interoception, the 
principles of PP have been extended to account for interoceptive processing 
simpliciter, i.e., the perception of our homeostatic, physiological condition. Now, what 
might be called the interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV) holds that the 
interoceptive inference approach can be used so as to account for affective states more 
generally. That is, it can be used to account for subjective feeling states: mental states 
that feel good or bad. Remember that valence is what makes affective states affective 
in the first place. Valence is the essence of affect. ITV holds then that the interoceptive 
inference approach can be used so as to account for valence: Valence arises via 
interoceptive inference. On the other hand, what might be called the interoceptive 
inference view of emotion (IIE) holds that the interoceptive inference approach can be 
used so as to account for emotions per se (e.g., fear, anger, joy). In this Chapter, I limit 
myself to presenting the interoceptive inference approach to interoception: How do 
the principles of PP apply to interoceptive processing? This will set the basis to better 
grasp the main commitments of IIE (and ITV)—in the Chapter that follows (Chapter 
4), I present and problematize IIE.  
 
However, I begin this Chapter by discussing to some extent the notions of 
‘interoception’, ‘interoceptive percepts’, and ‘homeostasis’. Discussing these notions 
is key for my purposes. In the first place, the interoceptive inference approach to 
interoception, ITV, and IIE are articulated in terms of these notions. Then, discussing 
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them is helpful for fully grasping the underlying commitments of ITV and IIE, and 
also their implications. In the second place, these notions play a major role in the 
claims defended in this Thesis, so they will be recurring themes in the Sections and 
Chapters to come.  
 
Several trends of evidence and theoretical considerations point to the claim that the 
principles of PP readily apply to interoceptive processing. The interoceptive inference 
approach to interoception is thus well motivated. After motivating this claim in Section 
3.2., I present, systematize, and clarify the interoceptive inference approach to 
interoception. In this respect, I highlight three inferential strategies by which 
interoceptive PE can be minimized: interoceptive perceptual inference, internal 
interoceptive active inference (or ‘internal interoceptive action’), and external 
interoceptive active inference (or ‘external interoceptive action’). Distinguishing 
between these kinds of strategies is essential for the view proposed in this Thesis. I 
will defend the view that valence (affect) results from interoceptive perceptual 
inference; while emotions result from external interoceptive actions. Importantly, the 
latter require stored representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. Let me briefly 
unpack the main aspects of these strategies.  
 
Interoceptive perceptual inference amounts to issuing and updating hypotheses from 
the top-down, so that the generated interoceptive predictions fit the incoming 
interoceptive signal. Here the task consists in forming an interoceptive percept that 
informs about the homeostatic, physiological condition of the organism. This is 
achieved by suppressing from the top-down incoming interoceptive signals, and thus 
minimizing interoceptive PE: the difference between the incoming interoceptive 
signals and the interoceptive signals expected and generated from the top-down. Here 
the content of the percept is determined by the content of the hypothesis that manages 
to successfully fit incoming signals. Just as in the case of visual percept formation via 
perceptual inference, in the interoceptive case, once an interoceptive percept is formed, 





Just as in the case of vision, in the case of interoception, PE can be also minimized by 
changing the input so as to fit the hypothesis (i.e., changing the inner world—and thus 
incoming interoceptive signals—so as to fit the model), instead of changing the 
hypothesis to fit the input (i.e., changing the model to fit the inner world), as in the 
above strategy. That is, interoceptive PE can be also minimized via active inference. 
Contrary to the above strategy, in this sort of strategy, the direction of fit is world-to-
mind, i.e., changing the (inner) world so as to fit the distal, hard-wired goal (or high-
level expectation) of maintaining homeostasis. Note that this presupposes that an 
interoceptive percept that informs about a deviation from homeostatic balance, or a 
certain physiological change, has already being formed. As I mentioned above, this 
takes place via interoceptive perceptual inference. When such a homeostatic imbalance 
is thus detected, this triggers, what might be called high-level interoceptive PE: the 
difference now between the expected “goal state” of homeostatic balance and the 
current interoceptive percept that informs of a homeostatic deviation. Now the 
organism needs to change its inner world so as to fit the hard-wired goal (or 
expectation) of maintaining homeostasis. The main task of the interoceptive system is 
not now forming a percept, but rather bringing physiological variables to their goal 
state by minimizing high-level interoceptive PE. This calls for interoceptive action.  
 
As I mentioned above, in the case of interoception there are two kinds of strategies of 
active inference, namely, interoceptive internal actions, and interoceptive external 
actions.  
 
Interoceptive internal action consist then in changing physiological inputs so as to fit 
an interoceptive goal state (or expected state of physiological balance). In order to 
achieve this, “physiological policies” (autonomic reflexes) are engaged. They consist 
in making use of resources that are already available within the organism, such as 
secreting vasopressin (this requires transiently assigning low precision to interoceptive 
PE). However, internal interoceptive actions rarely can rectify homeostatic imbalances 
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by themselves (Craig, 2015). Here is when external interoceptive actions come into 
play.  
 
External interoceptive actions consist in modifying the external environment, and your 
situation in it, in order to rectify homeostasis. Interestingly, for ‘external interoceptive 
action’ to occur, interoceptive predictive models at higher levels require to encode, as 
Seth (2015a) notes, counterfactual knowledge of the sensory consequences of action. 
More precisely, knowledge of the counterfactual relations between, on the one hand, 
particular exteroceptive states, motors states, and changes to the environment, and, on 
the other hand, the interoceptive activity that they would ensue. Such stored links 
between exteroceptive and interoceptive signals allow the system to know which 
interoceptive states can be obtained via which exteroceptive (and proprioceptive) 
states. This permits that an action can be found that achieves to cause the desired 
interoceptive goal-state that homeostasis demands.  
 
After systematizing and refining the manner by which the principles of PP apply to the 
case of interoceptive processing simpliciter, in Chapter 4 I present and critically 
discuss IIE. That is, the claim that emotions per se arise from successfully minimizing 
interoceptive PE via interoceptive perceptual inference. In other words, the claim that 
emotions amount to interoceptive feelings, or interoceptive, bodily perceptions of a 
certain sort. To date, even though still first sketches, the most developed interoceptive 
inference theories of emotion are due to A. Seth (Seth, 2013; Seth et al., 2012; Seth & 
Critchley, 2013) and J. Hohwy (2011, 2013). In this Chapter, I present Seth’s IIE and 
Hohwy’s IIE, and critically discuss their proposals. As I mentioned above, I argue that 
IIE is problematic as there are no causal regularities pertaining to emotion in the 
physiological domain. Therefore, IIE should be amended. Interoceptive perceptual 
inferences are not in the driver’s seat when it comes to emotion generation.  
 
However, as I mentioned above, the interoceptive inference approach can also be taken 
to be an account of affective valence. In this respect, the claim put forward by the 
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interoceptive inference approach is that affective valence arises by minimizing 
interoceptive PE via interoceptive perceptual inference. This is what I called the 
interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV). Contrary to non-sensory signal 
theories of valence (NSS), I think this view is on the right track.  
 
Then, in Chapter 5, in order to show that affective valence is likely to be a perceptual 
phenomenon, I begin by briefly characterizing valence (Section 5.1.), and introduce 
widely agreed desiderata for a theory of valence (Section 5.2.). Then, in Section 5.3., 
I present Prinz’s and Carruthers’s versions of the non-sensory signal theory of valence 
(NSS) (Sections 5.3.1. and 5.3.2., respectively), and their explanatory advantages 
(Section 5.3.3.). Remember that NSS holds that the valenced aspect of a sensory 
experience is regarded as something that “attaches” to the sensory experience itself, 
the latter being something distinct from the former. In Prinz’s version of NSS, valence 
amounts to inner-reinforcer signals that command the maintenance or cessation of 
certain perceptual representations of patterns of bodily changes. Similarly, according 
to Carruthers, valence amounts to a non-sensory signal that combines with 
representations of stimuli in different modalities, making the latter attractive or 
repellent for the agent. As I will show in Section 5.4., NSS faces decisive problems on 
its own (see above), which makes NSS a poor candidate for a compelling, plausible 
theory of valence. Thus, the door is open for the view that valence is a sensory item in 
the furniture of the perceptual predictive machine posited by the PP framework.  
 
In Chapter 6, I defend the view that valence properties are indeed a sensory, 
interoceptive phenomenon. That is, while in Chapter 5 I argue that the case for NSS is 
rather weak, in Chapter 6 I argue for the view that valence is indeed a sensory 
phenomenon. Once affective valence is taken to arise via interoceptive inference, the 
view that valence is a sensory phenomenon can reply to the objections made by 
defenders of NSS. Thus, affective valence is likely to be a perceptual phenomenon. 
ITV seems to hold. 
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In order to show that, I critically discuss some of the main possible ways in which 
valence properties can be understood in the PP framework (Section 6.1.). Even though 
each of these views exhibits some difficulties, they all point towards a more global PP 
view on the nature of valence. All these views point towards the claim that valence 
amounts to an interoceptive percept, formed via interoceptive perceptual inference, 
that informs about positive and negative homeostatic changes (Section 6.2.). 
Theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that the different aspects involved in 
this claim might be the case (Section 6.3.). In Section 6.4., I show that the view in 
question can reply to the objections typically faced by views that, as the one defended 
here, identify valence with mental states that can be felt—e.g., (dis)pleasure. Finally, 
in Section 6.5, I show that this view on the nature of valence satisfies desiderata for a 
theory of valence. 
 
However, as I mentioned above, IIE cannot account for emotion per se, since there are 
no regularities pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain. Even though PP can 
account for valence (affect)—as I argue in this Chapter—this leaves PP without an 
account of emotion. This is major drawback for PP ambitions.  
 
In Chapter 7, I will suggest that the PP approach to interoception can indeed be used 
to account for emotion per se. This requires amending IIE. As I mentioned above, I 
will argue that, rather than via interoceptive perceptual inference, as IIE holds, 
emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via external interoceptive actions. Here 
the task consists in minimizing the discrepancy between already formed interoceptive 
percepts and the hard-wired goal (or expectation) of stable homeostasis. As we saw, 
external interoceptive actions require stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’. I defend the view that a certain emotion E amounts to a strategy for 
minimizing interoceptive PE by way of a specific set of representations of 
‘sensorimotor contingencies’. As I already mentioned, according to this view, 
emotions are individuated by the kind stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor 




I begin this Chapter by briefly motivating the view that emotion might be forms of 
action (rather than forms of perception) (Section, 7.1.). Then, after presenting the claim 
that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via external interoceptive actions 
(Section 7.2.), I discus the idea that the kind of stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’ required for external interoceptive actions can be taken to consist in 
emotion-specific action-oriented representations, encoded at higher levels of the 
cortical hierarchy. Insofar as these representations (or ‘chunks’ of the generative 
model) encode abstract (Section 7.3.) sets of knowledge about the same category in 
the world, they can be taken to consist in emotion ‘concepts’ (Section 7.2.2). The latter 
have both, mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit (Section 7.4.). In Section 
7.5., I highlight the way in which the suggested expansion of IIE can account for those 
aspects that should be taken into account when developing a satisfactory view on the 










































1. Delineating the explanatory target 
 
In this Chapter, I aim to delimitate the kinds of affective phenomena of main interest 
in this Thesis. Each of them constitute distinct possible explanatory targets. The main 
distinction drawn here is that between affect in general (or ‘subjective feeling states’) 
and emotions per se. I defend the claim that valence, rather than arousal, stands out as 
the paramount defining construct in affect. Valence is the essence of affect (Section 
1.1.). Now, there are several kinds of affective, valenced states. Among them, emotions 
per se. Emotions per se are affective states directed at core relational themes (Section 
1.2.). I also distinguish between emotion generation and emotion regulation, and 
between emotion states and emotion episodes. A theory of emotion is generally taken 
to have as its explanandum the generation of emotion episodes. That is the explanatory 
target of this Thesis. Then, in Section 1.3., I discuss some of the main kinds of views 
on how emotion episodes are generated, namely, perceptual theories, cognitive 
theories, and action theories (and also hybrid theories). I briefly discuss those aspects 
in which these different global approaches turn out to be unsatisfactory, and those 
aspect in which they result satisfactory. This will give us a sense of those aspects that 
should be taken into account when developing a satisfactory view on the nature of 
emotion.   
 
1.1. Characterizing affect: valence as the essence of affect 
 
1.1.1. What is affect? Valence at a certain degree of activation 
 
Affect is the psychological construct in virtue of which certain mental states count as 
being part of the affective realm. In other words, disparate kinds of mental states, such 
as moods, emotions, and drives, have in common that they all have affect as a 
necessary component part. In other words, affect is the construct that characterizes 
subjective feeling states of all kinds—‘subjective feeling states’ amount to mental 
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states that feel good or bad at a certain intensity level (more on this below)—making 
the latter affective mental states in the first place.  
 
Affect is a central construct in the sciences of the mind. It is usually posited under the 
label ‘emotion’ in theories about a wide range of phenomena, such as moral judgment 
(Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001), decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005), 
attention (Pessoa, 2008), drives (Craig, 2002), vision (Barrett & Bar, 2009), etc. (see 
Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). However, properly speaking, ‘emotion’ refers to a 
more circumscribed kind of affective state (more on this below). That is, emotion 
amounts to just one type of affective state, among many others. Emotion is not itself 
then the kind of construct that defines the whole affective realm. Affect is such a 
construct.  
 
Then, what is affect? Affect is the mental state that arises as the physiological, bodily 
changes that an organism constantly undergoes are continually detected by the central 
nervous system. As Barrett and Bars remark, “psychology refers to these internal 
bodily changes as ‘affective’” (Barrett & Bars, 2009, p. 1325). 
 
“In English, the word ‘affect’ means ‘to produce a change’. To be affected by something 
is to be influenced by it. In psychology, affect refers to a specific kind of influence—
something's ability to influence a person's body state. Sometimes, the resulting bodily 
sensations in the core of the body are experienced as physical symptoms (such as being 
wound up from drinking too much coffee, fatigued from not enough sleep or energetic 
from exercise). Much of the time, sensations from the body are experienced as simple 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure with some degree of activation, either alone or as an 
emotion (figure 1; see Russell & Barrett 1999; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau in press). At still 
other times, bodily changes are too subtle to be consciously experienced at all.” (Barrett 
& Bars, 2009, p. 1327-1328) 
 
As it is pointed out in the above quotation, detected bodily changes give rise to mainly 
two kinds of states. On the one hand, physical symptoms, such as, for example, fatigue, 
agitation, breathing, muscle tension, and stomach motility. On the other hand, the more 
diffuse feelings of pleasure and displeasure (i.e., feelings of valence) with some degree 
of activation or deactivation (i.e., arousal level). However, note that physical 
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symptoms, even though they are, at the personal level, more circumscribed, easily 
located feelings, which pull attention to specific regions of the body, they are 
intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant at certain level of activation or deactivation. This 
evince that affect is characterized by the latter kinds of states. In other words, even 
though during the experience of ‘physical symptoms’ their physical location and 
physical characteristics are predominantly attended, they always feel good and bad at 
a certain degree of activation, even though this ‘feeling’ might not be significantly 
attended, lying thus at the background of experience. That is, detected bodily changes 
always give rise to the more diffuse feelings of pleasure and displeasure (i.e., feelings 
of valence) with some degree of activation or deactivation (i.e., arousal level). Thus, 
affect can be better characterized by the states of valence and its degree of activation. 
In fact, it is widely agreed that affect amounts to valence and arousal (Barret & 
Russell, 1999; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Prinz, 2004)1. Affect consists then in a 
mental state that feels good or bad (valence) at a certain intensity level (arousal)2.  
 
1.1.2. Characterizing valence 
 
Valence can be characterized in the following way. Certain emotions are agreeable, 
while other emotions are disagreeable. That is, there are positive emotions and 
negative emotions. For example, joy, pride, love, and amusement typically are positive 
emotions; while anger, fear, guilt, and contempt typically are negative emotions. 
Emotions are classified in this way in virtue of the character of its valence. Certain 
emotions are positive emotions since they have as a component positive valence; and 
certain emotions are negative emotions since they have as a component negative 
valence3. Not only emotions have valence as a component. Given that valence is the 
key construct in affect, all affective phenomena are valenced. For example, drives or 
                                                             
1 Certainly, so as to characterize the minimal components that configure affect, other dimensions have 
being proposed. However, these proposals all include valence at a certain degree of activation as a 
defining, non-negotiable component of affect (see Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009).  
2 I characterize ‘affect’ as mental states that feel in a certain way only for introductory purposes. As 
we will see in coming Chapters, affect (i.e., valence) can take place outside consciousness.  
3 Note that this way of characterizing valence leaves open the possibility that a certain emotion type E 
can have different valence value on different occasions.   
30 
 
motivations also exhibit such a positive and negative character as, for example, hunger 
and thirst, which are negatively valenced. Also moods are valenced, as depression and 
anxiety, which typically have negative valence as a component. 
 
More generally, ‘valence’ refers then to the positive and negative character exhibited 
by the mental states that belong to the realm of the affective. Just what such positivity 
and negativity consists of will depend on which theory of valence turns out to be the 
case. For example, according to the hedonic theory, valence amounts to (dis)pleasure, 
and according to what might be called the behavioural theory, valence amounts to 
approach/avoidance actions (or dispositions to behave)—in Chapters 5 and 6 I deal 
with issue of which theory of valence turns out to be the most promising. 
 
1.1.2.1. Valence is a descriptive, psychological construct 
 
Let me clarify a point of potential controversy. Valence is not only part of our folk 
psychological understanding of the nature of emotion, but it is also a construct that 
plays a fundamental role in the scientific study of emotion (see, e.g., Barrett, 2006; 
Russell, 2003; Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015), to the point that, for some theorists, 
valence is one of the main building blocks of emotion (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 2003). 
So note that the notion of valence in which I am interested in this Chapter/Thesis is a 
non-normative notion that plays an explanatory role in psychology. Thus, contrary to 
what a few researchers have pointed out (e.g., Charchland, 2005; Picard, 1997; 
Solomon, 2001), when it is said, in the affective sciences, that an emotion is positive 
or negative (i.e., that it has positive or negative valence) it is not being said that such 
an emotion is positive or negative in the sense of being good or bad normatively, in 
any epistemic, ethical or prudential sense. Valence is neither an ethical nor a prudential 
construct; it is a psychological construct that plays a role in affective sciences. This 




1.1.3. Characterizing arousal 
 
Now, arousal refers to the degree of activation exhibited by affective mental states. 
Arousal is widely taken to consist in a single dimension, ranging from low activation, 
as in the case of meditative calmness, to high activation, as in the case of euphoria 
(e.g., Barrett & Russell, 1999). Properly speaking the kind of activation in question is 
not the same as the intensity that an affective state can have. Think of depression. A 
state of depression can be very intense, as when the depressed subject lies on the couch 
the whole day just looking at the tip of her shoes. However, in this kind of case, the 
subject finds herself in a state of deactivation, so her arousal level is supposed to be 
low. In this respect, intensity might be seen as the saliency that the characteristic 
aspects of the affective state in question can exhibit at a certain time. Thus, in a state 
of intense depression, its typical features, such as lack of motivation, a sense of 
helplessness, and suicidal thoughts, become particularly salient. However, even 
though those features become very salient for the subject, there is a constant state of 
deactivation. Thus, intensity and arousal should be seen as different constructs.  
 
1.1.3.1. Problems regarding the construct of arousal: arousal is not general 
sympathetic activation 
 
1.1.3.1.1. Heart-rate as a fair way to operationalize arousal 
 
Arousal, understood as degree of activation, has been traditionally taken to depend on 
the excitation of reticular activating system in the brain stem (Carruthers, 2011; see 
Colman, 2015). Thus, in this sense, arousal has been traditionally seen as general 
physiological activation (or general sympathetic activation). Insofar as it is seen as 
general sympathetic activation, besides electrodermal and other cardiovascular 
responses, arousal is usually operationalized by measures of increased (high 
activation) and decreased (low activation) heart rate. I think this is a somehow 
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acceptable way to operationalize arousal. Intuitively, affective states that we take to be 
high in terms of activation, such as fury and euphoria, consistently exhibit increased 
heart rate; while affective states that we take to be low in terms of activation, such as 
sleepiness and calmness, consistently exhibit decreased heart rate. Moreover, affective 
sates that differ only in terms of their degree of activation (i.e., states with the same 
valence value), such as the cases of anger and rage, seem to involve corresponding 
differences in heart rate. Empirical evidence supports this intuition, as people who are 
comparatively more sensitive to their own heart activity report experiencing more 
“intense” emotional experiences (Wiens et al., 2000). 
 
1.1.3.1.2. Electrodermal activity as a problematic measure of arousal 
 
Other measures associated with sympathetic activation have been used to 
operationalize arousal – in the sense of arousal that is relevant here, namely, as the 
degree of activation that affective mental states exhibit. One of such measures is 
electrodermal activity (EDA) – also known as ‘sympathetic skin response’. EDA 
tracks sweating, which is triggered by certain kinds of sympathetic activation. Insofar 
as EDA is considered to be the result of sympathetic nervous system activity alone, 
EDA has been taken to be a proper indicator of general sympathetic arousal (e.g., 
Critchley, 2002). However, I think that this is not a good way to operationalize arousal, 
insofar as the latter is taken to be a critical dimension of affective states. This is the 
case since, intuitively, many cases of affective states that exhibit high activation or 
intensity do not seem to involve significant increases in sweat glands activity. That is, 
in many cases one can be in an increasing state of strong pleasantness or 
unpleasantness, and at the same time undergo rather insignificant sweat glands 
activity. For example, think of the mystic’s elation arising from her sense of oneness 
with the universe, or the strong amusement that results from a comedian’s joke, or the 
great pride of a father in the graduation of his child. Examples abound. Moreover, 
affective states that differ in terms of their degree of arousal, such as the feelings of 
confidence and gladness (Russell, 1999), do not seem to involve corresponding, 
consistent differences in sweating. Certainly, if we take heart rate as the most 
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acceptable way to operationalize arousal, counterexamples can also be found, but they 
do not proliferate as in the case of EDA. 
 
1.1.3.1.3. Arousal is not general sympathetic activation 
 
It could be thought that, instead of operationalizing arousal by just one measure, 
arousal can be better operationalized by a set of joint measures. Thus, in conjunction 
with heart rate, EDA, and other measures usually taken to be indicatives of 
sympathetic activation, they could all be jointly taken to indicate the degree of arousal 
exhibited by a certain affective state. However, this approach is doomed to fail. 
Physiological measures commonly used to operationalize arousal, such as the ones 
above, simply do not show significant co-variation with each other (Bernston & 
Cacioppo, 2007; Lacey, 1959, 1967), in such a way that they could be jointly taken to 
reflect the activity of a unified construct, namely, arousal. Crucially, this observation 
has led to dismiss the construct of general sympathetic arousal promoted by arousal 
theory—and which supposedly underlies “fight-or-flight” responses. Roughly, 
according to the latter theory, there is a single mechanism that controls all 
sympathetic/autonomic effectors during affective states high in activation, namely, the 
arousal mechanism. As I mentioned above, such a mechanism is commonly considered 
to be realized in the reticular formation of the brainstem. A key prediction of this 
approach is that physiological measures of sympathetic activity should significantly 
co-vary within and across individuals. However, as we saw above, that turns out not 
to be the case (Bernston & Cacioppo, 2007; Cacioppo et al., 2000; Lacey, 1959, 1967). 
The notion of general sympathetic arousal does not then pick up a real 
psychophysiological kind. Let me insist, there is no such thing as general sympathetic 
arousal. Taking into account that arousal, understood as the degree of (de)activation 
exhibited by affective states, is typically identified with general sympathetic 





Even more, organism always find themselves in a constant stream of changing 
affective states (see, e.g., Barrett, 2006a). Thus, if arousal, understood as general 
sympathetic activation, is a key construct in affect, then it should be constantly 
occurring. However, general sympathetic activation is not a state that constantly 
occurs. Think of, for example, a bad posture. After a while, being in a bad posture 
brings forth a bad feeling at a certain level of “intensity” or activation. In other words, 
being in a bad posture typically elicit an affective state. In this kind of case, note that 
there is no general sympathetic activation, even though such a resulting feeling counts 
as an affective state that exhibit a certain degree of “intensity”. Thus, arousal, 
understood as a key construct of affect, should not be identified with general 
sympathetic activation.  
 
1.1.4. Valence as the ‘mark’ of affect 
  
In fact, as some argue, “’arousal’ is not a particularly useful overarching construct” 
(Cacioppo et al., 1991, p. 326). This is the case since, among other reasons, the 
measures commonly used to operationalize arousal “[provide] ambiguous information 
about the associated psychological event” (Cacioppo et al., 1991, p. 326), making it 
explanatorily unappealing compared to other constructs and reconceptualizations (see 
Cacioppo et al., 1991). Along similar lines, Cochrane (2009) has argued that the 
‘arousal’ dimension of affect overlaps to such an important extent with the dimensions 
of valence and other dimensions, that he considers that we can simply dispense with 
such a construct: 
 
“I identify the arousal/activation dimension as the main culprit for the observed 
overlapping. Applying a dimension of activation to emotions is like applying a dimension 
of ‘being coloured’ to colours. It is far too general. Although the degree of arousal is 
highly applicable to emotions, it is not doing much conceptually useful work for us. Thus 
I would be more prepared to jettison this dimension than the dimension of valence.” 




In a word, the construct of arousal does not seem to be doing much explanatory work 
in affective sciences. Besides that, the received view of arousal as general sympathetic 
activation is deeply problematic. Thus, a proper characterization of affect should not 
rely on such a construct.  
 
This begins to suggest that valence, rather than arousal, is the key, preponderant 
construct in the structure of affect. Accordingly, in order to understand the nature of 
affect, theoretical efforts should be devoted to understand the nature of valence. 
Arousal might still be a theoretically useful aspect of affect, if it is taken to be 
something different than general sympathetic activation (I am not taking sides in the 
debate on whether arousal should be eliminated), but valence stands out as the 
paramount defining construct in affect, which is clearly not the case for arousal. 
 
This insight is by no means arbitrary. Privileging valence over arousal as the mark of 
affect is by now a common practice in the affective sciences. For example, according 
to Ben-ze’ev, possessing an inherent positive/negative component (or inherent 
evaluative component) is necessary for a mental state to count as affective rather than 
non-affective (Ben-ze’ev, 2010, p.54). Along the same lines, for Charland “the 
question of valence is […] probably the most important criterion for demarcating 
emotion from cognition and other related domains” (Charland, 2005, p.84). Deonna 
and Teroni (2012) regard valence as key construct for understanding emotional 
phenomena, while simply ignoring arousal—the same can be said of Prinz’s (2004) 
work. According to Fridja (2009), “affect refers to pleasure and pain and the processes 
underlying them” (Fridja, 2009, p.267-268), and considers arousal to be a separate 
construct than affect. Moreover, valence, but not arousal, consistently appears as the 
primary component in reports of emotion within and across cultures (e.g., Bottenberg, 
1975; Bush, 1973; Galati et al., 2008; Herrmann & Raybeck, 1981; Lutz, 1982). 
Moreover, the valence dimension of affect is practically always present in reports of 
affective states (see, e.g., Barrett, 1998). However, the arousal dimension does not 
systematically appear in reports of affective states. Relatedly, when subjects must draw 
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distinctions between affective states, they always do it in terms of valence. However, 
this is not the case for arousal (Feldman, 1995).  
 
Furthermore, privileging valence over arousal is also motivated by the default intuition 
that positive and negative affective experiences themselves, intrinsically, can differ in 
“intensity”, being “intensity” an intrinsic property of positive and negative affective 
experiences, just as, for example, lower and higher pitches themselves, intrinsically, 
can exhibit quiet or loud volume (‘loudness’), being loudness an intrinsic property of 
pitch. Thus, instead of being a separate construct than valence, arousal could be taken 
to be a property of valence. For example, arousal could be seen as the “volume” that 
valence can take. Thus, valence is the key axis of affect, while arousal only a way in 
which valence can occur.  
 
Now, remember that affect is characterized as the detection of internal bodily 
changes—“psychology refers to these internal bodily changes as ‘affective’” (Barrett 
& Bars, 2009, p. 1325). Then, it could be argued that arousal, rather than valence, is 
the key construct in affect, since autonomic responses (i.e., inner bodily changes) are 
widely assumed to reflect arousal (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 2000; Lang et al., 1993). For 
example, it has been shown that skin conductance levels increase in line with the 
experienced degree of arousal, and that this occurs independently of valence value 
(Bradley & Lang, 2000). However, it is simply not the case that autonomic activity 
reflects purely arousal. In fact, distinct autonomic measures function independently 
from each other, and they function even in opposition to each other in certain cases 
(Bradley & Lang, 2000). A classical explanation of this independence and functional 
segregation of autonomic activity is to incorporate the valence dimension (Cacioppo 
et al., 2000; Russell & Barrett, 1999). It is widely agreed that, for example, cardiac 
activity, heart rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance duration reflect affective 
valence (see Cacioppo et al., 2000). Also the startle response and also facial EMG 
indicate valence rather than arousal (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). It is simply not the 




Thus, considering all the above, valence, rather than arousal, is the key, preponderant 
construct in the structure of affect. Valence is the ‘mark’ of the affective. As we saw, 
the notion of arousal as general sympathetic activation does not work, and as a defining 
dimension of affect it looks doubtful. Moreover, as we saw, arousal fails to be a useful 
construct in affective sciences. Then, if we want to understand affect, valence is the 
construct that needs to be elucidated.  
 
1.1.4.1. Against valence scepticism  
 
However, even though, as I commented above, valence is widely taken to be the ‘mark’ 
of the affective, some argue that the construct of valence also looks doubtful. Solomon 
(2001) has argued that, considering that ‘valence’ is used in many differing, orthogonal 
ways, valence is not a unified construct, and that, consequently, emotion research 
could just simply dispense with the notion of valence. For example, Solomon notes 
that if we take negative valence to be identical with suffering, then we have that 
negative emotions (which are supposed to be unified by their shared valence 
component) should all involve suffering. However, different emotions involve 
suffering only in different senses of the term ‘suffering’. The suffering of guilt, 
Solomon maintains, seems so different to the suffering of jealousy. Valence seems not 
to be a unified phenomenon. However, if in the literature there are many different, 
orthogonal ways of using the term ‘valence’—as Solomon critically remarks—it is 
simply because we have many competing theories of valence. Just as the fact that there 
are many different, orthogonal ways of using the term ‘attention’ (given that there are 
many competing theories of attention) does not imply that psychology should dispense 
with this construct, the fact that there are many competing theories of valence does not 
imply that there might not be a theory of valence that successfully captures the 
distinction between positive and negative affective states. In fact, as Cochrane (2009) 
argues, making sense of the evaluative polarity captured by the notion of valence 
appears to be mandatory precisely because, as I mentioned above, “valence 
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consistently comes out as the primary factor” in statistical analyses of emotion reports 
(Cochrane, 2009, p. 387). In other words, contrary to Solomon, given that valence is 
ubiquitously present in our thinking about affective phenomena, rather than abandon 
the notion altogether, “it would be more appropriate to specify the concept more 
exactly, so that possible differences in interpretation do not confound experimental 
results.” (Cochrane, 2009, p. 387). I will defend a view on the nature of valence in 
Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
1.1.4.2. Let’s focus on valence (though there is no need to completely eliminate the 
construct of arousal) 
 
Privileging valence over arousal as the mark of affect should then be taken to be 
justified. There is no such thing as general sympathetic arousal, and arousal, 
understood as activation, seems not to be playing an explanatory role in affective 
sciences. However, as I mentioned above, common sense does tell us that affective 
states do seem to exhibit some sort of “intensity” together with their positive or 
negative character. There is no need to dispense completely with the notion of arousal. 
The only lesson to be drawn from the above discussion is that the view that arousal, 
understood as the “intensity” that affective states can have, amounts to general 
sympathetic activation needs to be dropped.  
 
As valence is the defining component of affect, and “intensity” seems to be something 
that affective states can have, such an “intensity” could be taken to be a property of 
valence, as I mentioned above. In this sense, arousal could be seen as the ‘volume’ 
taken by valenced, affective states. Anyway, there is no need to settle the issue of the 
nature of arousal in this work, as the goal of this Section is to point to the fact that 
valence is the mark of affect, rather than arousal. Then, in order to understand the 




However, as I commented above, intuitively, heart rate seems to be a somehow 
acceptable way to operationalize such “intensity”, which, as I argued, cannot be taken 
to be identical to general sympathetic activation. Thus, I will take heart rate as an 
acceptable way to operationalize arousal, whatever the latter might be. I mainly take 
heart rate as an acceptable way to operationalize arousal, even though arousal is not 
the central construct in affect, since key studies for a competing view on the nature of 
valence use heart rate as the key measure of arousal (Chapter 5), and, for the sake of 
argument, I will concede that heart rate can work in that respect. Perhaps, as I 
suggested above, arousal is a property of valence, the ‘volume’ that valence can take, 
and that this property is determined by heart rate. Anyway, I leave as an open question 
the issue of the nature of arousal, or the “intensity” that affective states can have4.  
 
1.2. Taxonomy of the affective space: emotions per se as the explananda 
 
I will then assume the reality of valence, and take it as the construct that best 
characterizes affect5. Thus, affective mental states are mental states that 
characteristically exhibit valence (and arousal), i.e., a positive or negative character (at 
a certain level of “intensity”). There are several kinds of affective states. That is, 
mental states that can be taken to be inherently valenced. Together they demarcate the 
realm of the affective. In what follows, I briefly characterize the main kinds of 
affective states6, so as to distinguish them from the kind of affective state that 
constitutes the target of this Thesis, namely, emotions per se. Since in the literature 
relevant for the affective sciences the label ‘emotion’ is usually employed to refer to a 
wide range of disparate affective phenomena, distinct from emotions per se (see 
Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009), this Section serves the purpose of avoiding possible 
                                                             
4 In this thesis I do not deal with the issue of how many dimensions affect exhibits (or of whether 
there are such dimensions at all). For the purposes of this Thesis, it suffices to point out that valence is 
the central, defining dimension of affect. I also do not deal with issue of whether positive and negative 
valence are independent (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001) or are inversely related as they lie 
along a continuum (Russell, 1980). None of these issues will be relevant for the argument developed 
in this Thesis.   
5 For a defence of the notion of valence, see Prinz (2010).  
6 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, as the purpose of this Section is to single out ‘emotions per 
se’ as the theoretical target of this Thesis. 
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confusions regarding the kind of mental state that needs to be accounted for by a view 
on the nature of emotion. 
 
Let’s get down to business. Emotions per se are typically understood as short-lived 
affective states directed at core relational themes. Let me briefly explain. Emotion 
episodes are short-lived. The emotion episodes of a certain type that an organism 
undergoes usually last from seconds to minutes. It is extremely rare that an emotion 
episode of a certain type lasts hours, and it is very hard to even imagine scenarios in 
which a certain emotion episode can last for more than that. Emotions are directed at 
core relational themes (Lazarus, 1991). It is widely agreed that emotions are 
individuated in virtue of what they represent in the external milieu. Emotions are 
meaningful. Emotions have the function of informing the precise way in which the 
environment/organism relation is significant for the organism’s well-being (Lazarus, 
1991; Prinz, 2004). Emotions represent such a relation. In the terminology of emotion 
theory, emotions represent core relational themes (CRT) (Lazarus, 1991). CRT 
individuate emotions. CRT can be seen as the external conditions that each emotion 
type has the function of discriminating (Prinz, 2004). For example, the external 
condition every single instance of anger discriminates consists in a demeaning offense; 
while the external condition every single instance of fear discriminates consist in 
danger (Lazarus, 1991). In a word, a CRT is a property of the particular eliciting event 
that prompted an emotion, in virtue of which the mental state that takes place amounts 
to a certain specific emotion type and not to another emotion type. Prototypical cases 
of emotion include, for example, anger, fear, guilt, joy, and pride.  
 
Now, moods are one kind of affective state, distinct from emotion, which sometimes 
figures under the label ‘emotion’ in the non-philosophical literature. However, 
emotions and moods are different kinds of affective states. Roughly, moods are 
typically understood as long-lasting affective states that lack a specific intentional 
object, but that promote certain associated patterns of thought and action. Prototypical 
cases of moods are depression, anxiety, and irritability. Moods are not about specific 
object or events. For example, one is never in an irritable mood about the neighbour’s 
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dog. In this sense, moods are ‘free-floating’ states, unanchored to intentional objects. 
That is why, as Deonna and Teroni remark, “attributions of moods (e.g., Alison is 
grumpy) are informative and complete without specification of any object, whereas 
attributions of emotions (e.g., Alison is angry) may, as we have seen, be informative 
but remain incomplete as long as the object is not specified” (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, 
p.4). That is, by knowing that Alison is grumpy one knows that she is not evaluating 
some specific event in any sort of way; she just finds herself feeling in a certain way, 
disposed to think and act ‘grumpyly’. Moods, contrary to emotions, are long-lasting 
states that seem to last for a fair amount of time. One can be in an irritable mood for a 
whole day, or even a week, or months. Finally, even though they do not inform about 
external events (e.g., core relational themes), moods promote characteristic ways of 
thinking and acting (as emotions also do). Think of depression. Depression promotes 
negative thoughts, and biases a number of cognitive functions towards the negative  
(Ohman et al., 2001; Sizer, 2000). Mood are not the explanatory target of this Thesis.  
 
Hedonic states are another kind of affective state, distinct from emotion, which 
sometimes confusingly figure under the label ‘emotion’ in the non-philosophical 
literature. Hedonic states consist of pleasure and its opposite, namely, displeasure. 
Hedonic states are typically taken to be simple “phenomenological qualities” which 
present as good (or bad) and attractive (or repellent), independent of any sort of 
content.  
 
“That pleasure is in itself objectless is sometimes supposed in theorizing in behavioral 
neuroscience, as well (e.g., Robinson and Berridge, 1993, pp. 261ff.). The same 
assumption is the basis for the psychologist and emotion specialist James Russell’s notion 
of core affect, which places an in-itself objectless feeling good at the ground level of the 
construction of more complex positive emotion (Russell 2003).” (Katz, 2016) 
 
On the other hand, hedonic states are typically taken to be parts of emotion (and 




“I will refer to drives and motivations and pain and pleasure as triggers or constituents of 
emotions, but not as emotions in the proper sense. No doubt all these devices are intended 
to regulate life, but it is arguable that emotions are more complex than drives and 
motivations, than pain and pleasure” (Damasio, 1999, p. 341). 
 
Pleasure and displeasure are typically identified with positive and negative valence, 
respectively (see, e.g., Deonna & Teroni, 2012, pp. 14-15; Prinz, 2004, pp. 167-168; 
Colombetti, 2005). In this sense, hedonic states are not emotions themselves, but rather 
constituent parts of emotion that determine the good and bad feelings characteristic of 
emotion. In this respect, and as Katz remarks in the very first lines of his entry on 
pleasure,  
 
“Pleasure, in the inclusive usages important in thought about well-being, experience, and 
mind, includes the affective positivity of all joy, gladness, liking, and enjoyment – all our 
feeling good or happy.” (Katz, 2016) 
 
Hedonic states are not then emotions themselves, but rather they seem to be objectless 
constituents of emotion. Hedonic states are not the explanatory target of this Thesis.  
 
Another kind of affective state, distinct from emotion, which sometimes confusingly 
figures under the label ‘emotion’, are drives or homeostatic motivations. Examples of 
homeostatic motivations include sexual desire, hunger, thirst, itch, pain, and 
temperature. This kind of affective states are undisputable cases of states that track 
homeostatic imbalances, such as, for example, lack of nutrients in the case of hunger. 
That is why homeostatic motivations, contrary to emotions, are typically taken not to 
represent external events. Homeostatic motivations are directed at internal events 
related to fundamental physiological needs.  
 
Interestingly, homeostatic motivations, such as hunger, do not simply consist in 
negatively/positively valenced states that represent internal events. We do not simply 
call the bad feeling of an empty stomach ‘hunger’. Hunger includes an urge to eat. 
That is why homeostatic motivations are negatively (positively) valenced states which 
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represent internal events together with certain action tendencies to modify the external 
environment. In the case of hunger, an urge to eat, go to the fridge, put food in your 
mouth, etc. The fact that homeostatic motivations include such kind of action tendency 
as a component part will be important for this Thesis, as I will put forward the view 
that emotions per se can be understood under the model of homeostatic motivations. 
Anger is much closer to hunger than we are used to think. Anyway, drives or 
homeostatic motivations are not the explanatory target of this Thesis.  
 
As we saw, there are several kinds of affective states. I presented the main ones above. 
The kind of affective states that constitutes the explananda of this Thesis are emotions 
per se. That is, short-lived affective states directed at core relational themes, i.e., 
organism-environment relations, such as danger and loss. 
 
Now, there is also a further distinction within the emotion category that might be 
useful. This is the distinction between emotional states and emotional episodes 
(Schroeder, 2006, p. 257-258). Emotional states correspond to enduring dispositions 
to undergo certain emotions (e.g., being afraid of spiders, being angry at one’s social 
circumstances). Emotional episodes correspond to occurrent, short-lived emotions 
(e.g., finding yourself afraid of a particular spider at a certain moment, getting angry 
at a particular instance of discrimination against you). They are occurrent self-
contained states (even though they can certainly be bounded with other mental states 
forming thus an unitary whole, in the same way that, while watching TV, visual and 
auditive states become bounded together forming thus an unitary experience). In this 
Thesis, I am interested in emotional episodes rather than in emotional states. Emotional 
episodes are what Prinz calls ‘state emotions’ (Prinz, 2004, p. 179-182), and what 
Deonna and Teroni call ‘episodes’ (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, p. 8). Emotional states 
are close to what Prinz refers to as ‘non-occurrent attitudinal emotions’ (Prinz, 2004, 
p. 179-182), and to what Deonna and Teroni call ‘emotional dispositions’ (Deonna & 




It is also important to have in mind the distinction between emotion generation and 
emotion regulation. Roughly, the latter phenomenon consists in changing an emotion 
once it has already been formed; while the former phenomenon consists in forming an 
emotion in the first place. The generation of emotion episodes is the focus of this 
thesis.  
 
The distinction between generating and regulating a mental state can be naturally 
applied to all kinds of affective states, including affect itself. That is, there is affect 
regulation, emotion regulation, drive regulation, mood regulation, etc. At least from a 
theoretical point of view, there seems to be a functional difference between forming a 
certain mental state and changing such a state once it has already being formed. Think 
of moods. It looks obvious that one thing is a depressed mood arising in you (mood 
generation), and another thing is to attend to therapy so as to change that state and feel 
better (mood regulation). However, note that, interestingly, the distinction in question 
seems to blur in the case of drives or homeostatic motivations. Think of hunger. 
Hunger does not simply consist in the detection of a lack of nutrients and the negative 
feeling that results out of that. As we saw above, hunger also includes the urge to 
change that state as a constituent part. In fact, we call ‘hunger’ precisely to the urge to 
get some food so as to change the state of hunger itself. In other words, the episode of 
hunger itself seems to arise as we are urged, and try to modify the episode itself. 
Homeostatic motivations seem to be generated as the attempt to regulate them takes 
place. Here the distinction between generation and regulation is blurred.  
 
This insight is key for my purposes. In this Thesis, I suggest that emotional episodes 
amount to specific action strategies for regulating affect, in the same way that it can 
be held that a component part of what it is for a mental state to be an episode of hunger 
amounts to specific ways of regulating a certain negative affective state (i.e., the urge 
to eat so as to change the bad feeling of an empty stomach). So the view I suggest in 
the concluding Chapter of this Thesis is that generating an emotional episode consists 
in regulating affect (i.e., valence) in a distinctive sort of way: via emotion-specific 
knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. This sort of action-oriented 
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representations are engaged so as to minimize high-level interoceptive prediction error 
(“if I act in this sort of way, interoceptive signals should evolve in such-and-such a 
way”). This claim should not be confused with the claim that emotion generation 
amounts to emotion regulation, since the claim is that what is being regulated during 
an emotion generation episode is affect, not an emotion per se7. In the view suggested 
in the concluding Chapter of this Thesis, emotion generation consists in affect 
regulation; while emotion regulation would consists in engaging a control system to 
prevent the unfolding of the emotion-specific, action-oriented representations used so 
as to control valence (i.e., a “don’t activate those representations” system). Emotions 
amount to valence plus emotion-specific knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.  
 
1.3. (Competing) Types of approaches to emotion generation and desiderata  
 
As we saw, the explanatory target of an emotion theory amounts to the generation of 
emotion episodes, in the more circumscribed sense in which I characterized emotion 
episodes per se above. In what follows, I briefly present the main types of naturalistic 
approaches to the generation of emotion episodes. I organize these approaches in three 
general or global categories, namely, perceptual theories, cognitive theories, and 
action theories (and also hybrid theories). There are certainly other ways in which the 
different types of approaches to emotion theories can be classified. However, I prefer 
this way of classification scheme mainly for the following reasons.  
 
In the first place, this classification scheme maintains the spirit of previous 
classifications (e.g., Deigh, 2010; Prinz, 2004; Scarantino, 2014), in the sense that it 
captures the main aspects typically considered to be key during emotion generation. 
Emotions are typically considered to be complex affective states. For example, during 
jealousy, we typically feel in some kind of way, i.e., we perceive our bodies changing 
                                                             
7 Then, the proposed view differs from currents attempts to dissolve the distinction between emotion 




in some manner. We also seem to think and reason in certain kinds of ways, e.g., 
coming to believe that someone is threatening a (possible) valued romantic partner. 
During jealousy we are also moved to act in a certain manner, for example, 
aggressively letting know the third party that one has a special interest in the person in 
question.  
 
In the second place, this classification scheme achieves to directly relate to the three 
distinct global functions (or “boxes”) of the traditional way of conceiving the more 
general architecture of the mind. In such a conception, we have three separate kinds of 
systems, namely, perceptual systems (input systems), cognitive systems (central 
systems), and action systems (output systems). Thus, the three above mentioned more 
general aspects of emotion fit the three separate “boxes” of the traditional conception 
of the architecture of the mind. The three distinct kinds of approaches to the generation 
of emotion episodes understand then emotions as being primarily dependent on one of 
such three supposedly distinct, separate “boxes”. Interestingly, as it has being 
emphasized by philosophers working under the predictive processing framework (see 
Clark, 2016; Hohwy, 2013), these more global functions can be seen as operating 
under the same principle of prediction error minimization (Chapter 2). As we will see 
(Chapter 2), in the predictive processing framework, cognition seems to dissolve into 
perception, and action results from an inferential, ‘belief-like’ process that operates 
under the same principle than perception, even though action still exhibits a functional 
difference with perception relative to their direction of fit. Thus, insofar as it dissolves 
the traditional three “boxes” into the same inferential principle of prediction error 
minimization, a predictive processing view on the nature of emotion has the potential 
of integrating the insights of the three distinct kinds of approaches to the generation of 
emotion episodes. Thus, this classification scheme also serves the purpose of 
highlighting this potential advantage of a predictive processing view on the nature of 
emotion.  
 
To sum up this point, one of the reasons for preferring to classify the general 
approaches to emotion in the global categories of perceptual theories, cognitive 
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theories, and action theories (and also hybrid theories), is that it highlights the 
traditional distinct, separate “boxes” that configure the traditional tripartite ‘division 
of labour’ of the mind, together with capturing salient aspects of emotion. Insofar as 
the predictive processing framework dissolves such a division to an important extent, 
a predictive processing view of emotion is then particularly well positioned to integrate 
the insights of these three approaches, while avoiding their typical problems. I will 
suggest such a view in Chapter 7, by expanding on Seth’s interoceptive inference view 
of emotion.  
 
Now, in order to make patent how the more plausible view on emotion that emerges 
out of the predictive processing framework (Chapter 7) integrates the insights and 
avoid the typical problems of the above mentioned approaches to emotion, in 
presenting the latter I show how they succeed and fail in explaining key aspects of 
emotion. That is, I will briefly discuss those aspects in which competing approaches 
to emotion turn out to be unsatisfactory, and those aspect in which they are satisfactory. 
This will give us a sense of those aspects that should be taken into account when 
developing a satisfactory view on the nature of emotion. As I will argue, the expansion 
of Seth’s view suggested in Chapter 7 turns out to be satisfactory in that sense.  
 
Let me make one last point before introducing the main three general approaches to 
emotion theories. Typical episodes of emotion generation and their regulation are 
complex, most of the time involving many aspects. For example, certain movements, 
facial expressions, thoughts, motivations, concomitant perceptual experiences in 
different modalities, action tendencies, etc. However, the goal of an emotion theory is 
to single out the minimal essential components of emotion, and to determine in which 
way these components interact so as to generate an emotion. The goal of an emotion 
theory is not then to determine which aspects typically contribute causally to the 
generation of an emotion. In other words, the fact that emotions typically involve many 
aspects does not mean that all of them, even though they interact, are proper parts of 
the mechanism that constitutes emotion. That is why the different general approaches 
to emotion theories that I will present below hold that one of the aspects typically 
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involved during emotion (perceptions/feelings, thoughts, or action tendencies) has 
primacy in respect to the constitution of emotion. In doing so, they relegate the other 
aspects typically involved during emotion to mere antecedent causes or effects of 
emotion. This is a wise move. Including too many of the aspects typically involved 
during emotion as proper constitutive parts of emotion risks obscuring that which is 
essential to the nature of emotion. An over-encompassing approach risks including 
aspects that might properly belong not to the generation of emotion, but rather to the 
regulation or expression of emotion, or even to the background preconditions that 
support the emergence of emotion rather than constituting them. In other words, it is 
desirable for a philosophical theory of emotion not to put too much meat into the oven, 
to put it this way. Let’s get down to business.  
 
1.3.1. Perceptual theories 
 
Common sense tends to regard emotions as feelings. Going through an episode of fear, 
our intuitions indicate, consists in feeling in some sort of way. Now, leaving common 
sense intuitions behind, it will be assumed in this Thesis that phenomenal 
consciousness is populated by nothing over and above percepts; there are no 
phenomenal qualities beyond sensory, perceptual representations. This assumption 
simply denies that there can be non-sensory representational vehicles with qualitative 
character (see Prinz, 2012). If emotions are feelings, and considering that phenomenal 
consciousness (feelings) is populated by nothing over and above percepts, emotions 
must be perceptions of some sort. Our common sense intuitions indicate that that which 
is felt during an emotional episode is our bodies reacting in some way. More precisely, 
our “guts” reacting. That is, that which is felt during an emotional episode is our 
physiology changing in some way: heart rate changes, sweating, temperature changes, 
blood concentrating in different part of the body, our viscera reacting, etc. Thus, 
emotional experience is the conscious perception of our bodies reacting in some sort 
of way. This is precisely what the, so-called, feeling theory of emotion defends (James, 
1884). Considering that phenomenal consciousness (feelings) is populated by nothing 
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over and above percepts, the feeling theory of emotion counts as a perceptual theory 
of emotion. 
 
In the naturalistic tradition in the philosophy of emotion, perceptual theories of 
emotion hold that emotions are constituted by the perception of bodily changes. 
Interestingly, the claim is not that emotions cause the bodily changes that are then 
perceived. To borrow the classical example, it is not that sadness makes us cry, as folk 
psychology has it. In this respect, the perceptual theory of emotion reverses the order 
of causation assumed by folk wisdom. The claim is that an emotion is constituted as 
the bodily changes which have being triggered by some external event are perceived.  
 
Naturalistic perceptual theories of emotion, in the sense here considered, are also 
called pure somatic theories, to borrow Prinz’s label (Prinz, 2004). Pure somatic 
theories, as nicely characterized by Barlassina and Newen (2014), hold that “(i) bodily 
changes play a causal contribution in emotion generation, and (ii) emotions are entirely 
constituted by the perception of such bodily changes.” (Barlassina & Newen, 2014, p. 
640).  
 
As I mentioned above, the feeling theory of emotion (James, 1884) counts as a 
perceptual theory. More precisely, the feeling theory counts as a pure somatic theory. 
In the feeling theory of emotion, the conscious perception of certain emotion-specific 
patterns of bodily changes entirely constitute the emotion. However, the feeling theory 
understands the perception of emotion-specific bodily changes as the conscious 
perception of such changes. After all, this is what makes it a feeling theory.  
 
Among other difficulties, the feeling theory faces a decisive problem. Emotions can 
occur outside consciousness (see also, Ledoux, 1996; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; 
Winkielman et al., 2005; for discussion see Deonna & Teroni, 2012, pp. 16-18). If 
emotions are perceptions, and percepts can occur outside phenomenal consciousness, 
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as priming and subliminal-perception studies show (e.g., Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; 
Winkielman et al., 2005; Wen et al., 2007), then emotions should be able to occur 
outside consciousness.  
 
We can then extract the following desideratum:  
 
A theory of emotion must explain the fact that emotions can occur outside 
consciousness.  
 
Damasio’s version of the pure somatic theory does not face this problem (Damasio, 
1994, 2003). According to Damasio, emotions amount to perceptions of bodily 
changes. However, contrary to James’s view, such perception needs not to be 
conscious. As in any other sensory modality, bodily perception can also occur outside 
consciousness. On the other hand, Damasio emphasizes that, also as in any other 
sensory modality, perceptual representation of the body can be activated without actual 
bodily changes taking place (Damasio refers to these as ‘as-if’ bodily changes). Just 
as visual representations can take place without actual retinal stimulation by light-
reflecting objects, bodily representations can take place without the actual stimulation 
of interoceptors by physiological changes.  
 
Even though this version of the pure somatic theory avoids the problem faced by the 
feeling theory, it fails to account for a key aspect of emotion. As I commented above 
(Section 1.2.), emotions are meaningful. Emotions have the function of informing the 
precise way in which the environment/organism relation is significant for the 
organism’s well-being (Lazarus, 1991; Prinz, 2004). Emotions represent such a 
relation. Emotions represent core relational themes (CRT) (Lazarus, 1991). CRT can 
be seen as the external conditions that each emotion type has the function of 
discriminating (Prinz, 2004). For example, the external condition every single instance 
of anger discriminates consists in a demeaning offense; while the external condition 
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every single instance of fear discriminates consist in danger (Lazarus, 1991). In a 
word, a CRT is a property of the particular eliciting event that prompted an emotion, 
in virtue of which the mental state that takes place amounts to a certain specific 
emotion type and not another emotion type. Although they amount to relational 
properties, CRT are external events (Prinz, 2004, 2007). The problem for Damasio’s 
account is that it is hard to see how bodily perceptions simpliciter could account for 
the fact that emotions represent external events. How is it that perception of the body 
could be about dangers, losses, and demeaning offenses? The body, without further 
add-ons, simply does not seem to be meaningful in the required sense. 
 
We can then extract the following desideratum:  
 
A theory of emotion must explain how emotions are meaningful. That is, 
it must explain how emotions can represent core relational themes.  
 
Prinz’s version of the pure somatic theory offers a way out of this problem (Prinz, 
2004). In Prinz’s view, if certain conditions obtain, bodily perceptions can represent 
core relational themes (CRT). Let me briefly explain. Relying in naturalistic theories 
of content, Prinz holds that perceptions of bodily changes get to represent CRT just as 
any mental item gets to represent something in the world. According to the naturalistic 
theories of content that Prinz considers (e.g., Dretske, 1981, 1986), a mental state C 
represents c in the world in virtue of the fact that c causally co-varies with C in a 
reliable way, and has the function (by evolutionary or learning history) of causally co-
varying in that way. Thus, if a certain specific pattern of bodily, physiological changes 
A systematically co-varies with a certain CRT a, and has the function of doing so, then 
A represents a. Prinz holds that, given that CRT relative to, so-called, ‘basic emotions’ 
causally co-vary with certain emotion-specific patterns physiological changes (and 
have the function of doing so), the latter represent the former. Thus, in Prinz’s view, 
emotions get to represent CRT by the registering physiological states that causally co-
vary with latter. 
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For example, in this view, an episode of sadness takes place in the following way. In 
the external environment something valuable is lost, let’s say, a soft and warm hoodie. 
The closet without this hoodie is exteroceptively perceived. Such exteroceptive state 
triggers several physiological changes. These physiological changes are registered by 
an interoceptive perception. This interoceptive perception results directly from the 
physiological modifications in question. However, such interoceptive state is 
indirectly caused by the irrevocable loss that initially triggered the emotional episode. 
The interoceptive state that constitutes sadness carries information about an 
irrevocable loss by being sensitive to certain physiological changes. Sadness is the 
perception of those physiological changes. Therefore, this view implies that emotions 
are individuated both by the specific pattern of physiological states each of them 
involves, and by the CRT with which those physiological states causally co-vary (and 
have the function of doing so).  
 
Then, note that emotions can be taken to have two kinds of content. In this respect, 
Prinz introduces the distinction between the real and nominal contents of emotion. 
Real contents are external things, namely, the CRT that indirectly cause emotions; 
while nominal contents amount to the physiological changes that cause emotions. 
Physiological changes are proximal causes, while CRT are distal causes. Interoceptive 
percepts have then both, physiological causes and its associated external causes. The 
interoceptive percepts that constitute emotion inform about real contents by registering 
nominal contents, that is, via patterns of physiological changes. 
 
Thus, this view implies that for each, so called, ‘basic emotion’ there must be a specific 
pattern of physiological changes (Prinz, 2004, pp. 72-74). In other words, every ‘basic 
emotion’ has its own physiological signature, which represents its own particular CRT.  
 
The problem with this view is that, as I will discuss in Section 4.1., there are no patterns 
of bodily changes able to individuate emotions (Barret, 2006b; Quigley & Barrett, 
2014). There are no systematic causal regularities linking CRT and patterns of 
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physiological changes. In other words, there are no emotions configured in the 
physiological landscape. Thus, emotions do not arise by simply perceiving bodily 
changes. Certainly, if there were such kind of causal regularities linking individuating 
patterns of physiological changes and CRT, Prinz’s view would be quite compelling. 
However, as we will see in Section 4.1., evidence to that effect is not compelling.  
 
We can then extract then the following desideratum:  
 
A theory of emotion must explain how emotions can arise without there 
being emotions configured in the physiological landscape, taking into 
account the fact that there typically is a bodily aspect to the 
phenomenology of emotion, and that phenomenal consciousness is 
populated by nothing over and above percepts.  
 
1.3.2. Cognitive theories 
 
As we saw, emotions are directed at external events, such as for example, the 
dangerousness of a dark dead-end street, or the offense of a thief stealing your bike. 
Typically, when an individual determines that external events like those obtain, the 
emotions of fear and anger take place, respectively. In other words, when someone 
thinks of a situation in a certain way instead of thinking about that situation in another 
way, different emotions take place. For example, someone might think of a stock-
market crash as a loss, but someone else might evaluate that the stock-market crash is 
actually one more step towards her goal of world collapse. This kind of case shows 
that different emotions ensue as one thinks of a certain situation in different ways. 
Emotional episodes typically involve thoughts and evaluations of this sort. This has 
led some researchers to conclude that cold cognition is essential for emotional episodes 




As I will understand it in this work, a cognitive theory of emotion holds that emotions 
are identical to certain kinds of thoughts. This is what Prinz has called a pure cognitive 
theory (Prinz, 2004). A paradigmatic pure cognitive theory is the judgment view of 
emotion (e.g., Solomon, 1976, 2003; Nussbaum, 2001). The latter can be characterized 
as the view that a certain emotion E is identical to the judgment that the core relational 
theme characteristic of E obtains. For example, anger is constituted by the judgment 
that a demeaning offense has taken place, and fear is constituted by the judgment that 
the faced situation is dangerous. Judgments about core relational themes constitute 
emotion.  
 
The claim that emotions amount to beliefs or judgments captures well the intentionality 
of emotion: emotions are about core relational themes. Concepts are the 
quintessentially intentional states. Insofar as beliefs or judgments about dangerousness 
and offensiveness are constituted by the concepts DANGER and OFFENSE, the emotions 
of fear and anger, respectively, inherit their intentionality from the judgments or beliefs 
that constitute them. Thus, cognitivism straightforwardly accounts for the 
intentionality of emotions. However, the judgment view has difficulties in accounting 
for the fact that emotions are also motivational states that impel courses of action, as 
it is very hard to see how judgments or beliefs by themselves could have the required 
motivational force. 
 
Note that the perceptual view also struggles in accounting for the motivational power 
of emotions. Perception, insofar as it has mind-to-world direction of fit, informs us 
about events in the world, rather than telling us what to do in order to modify our 
position in the world. That is why, for example, Prinz’s account needs to add a further 
component into emotion, besides bodily perception, so as to account for the 
motivational force of emotion. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 5, for Prinz 
valence is such a component. According to Prinz (2004, 2010), valence amounts to a 
non-sensory (and non-conceptual) signal that commands the cessation or continuation 
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of the bodily changes that take place during emotion. Thus, emotions impel course of 
action in the world only indirectly, i.e., by impelling to change inner states8.  
 
We can extract then the following desideratum:  
 
A theory of emotion must account for the fact that emotions have 
motivational force.  
 
There is another kind of view that it is usually classified as a cognitive theory, since it 
holds that a certain emotion counts as the emotion it is in virtue of the fact that it 
essentially involves certain cognitive states. That is, states which are composed of 
concepts: high-level mental states that have relatively abstract contents. Following 
Scarantino (2014), the view in question can be called Belief and Desire (B&D) 
Cognitivism (e.g., Green, 1992; Gordon, 1987; Marks 1982). This view holds that 
emotions are constituted by specific set of beliefs and desires. For example, having 
anger consists in the belief that a demeaning offense is taking place, and the desire to 
modify the conditions of the situation. 
 
This sort of view appears to do better in accounting for the motivational aspect of 
emotion, since desires (combined with relevant beliefs) are typically taken to have 
motivational power—though see Schroeder (2004); also see Scarantino (2014) for an 
argument to the effect that this view fails to account for the motivational aspect 
characteristic of emotion. However, there appears to be no way in which this view 
could plausibly account for a non-negotiable aspect of emotion, namely, the bodily 
phenomenology of emotion. Beliefs and desires by themselves simply lack the 
required phenomenology, considering that, as I commented above, phenomenal 
                                                             
8 See Scarantino (2014) for a discussion on why this indirectness fails to account for the motivational 
aspect of emotion.  
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consciousness is populated by nothing over and above percepts, as I am assuming in 
this Thesis (for discussion, see, e.g., Prinz, 2012, pp.149-168).  
 
We can then extract then the following desideratum:  
 
A theory of emotion must account for the fact that emotions are 
intrinsically bodily felt. 
 
1.3.3. Action theories 
 
As one undergoes an emotional episode, one typically has the urge to act in some sort 
of way. This is a deeply rooted common sense intuition about what does it take to have 
an emotion. People punch other people in bursts of anger, people run away in fright, 
hold hands out of love, and smile in pride. Sometimes these urges impel us to do little 
or nothing at all—which are also things we do. For example, mostly in social 
situations, in the middle of an episode of fear or anger, people tend to just stay there 
as if nothing had happened. Also some negative emotions which are low in terms of 
“activation”, such as sadness, tend to motivate the disengagement of overt behaviour, 
rather than promoting the active modification of relevant aspects of the environment.  
 
Common sense tell us that as one undergoes an emotional episode, one also typically 
engages in mental actions. For example, during an episode of indignation triggered by 
a governmental moral transgression, one can begin to imagine oneself taking control 
of the government residency so as to slap the prime minister in the face (Frijda, 1986).  
 
This common sense observation that emotions are closely tied to action has led some 
researchers to regard this aspect as the primary aspect of emotion, at the expense of its 
perceptual (felt) and cognitive aspects. They propose what might be called an action 
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theory of emotion, or an agential theory. Action theories hold that emotions are 
identical to action (inaction) tendencies of a certain sort.  
 
This primacy of the agentive aspect of emotion has been defended throughout the 
history of emotion research. Dewey (1895) held that emotions inherently involve a 
readiness to act in context-sensitive ways, rather than feeling in some sort of way. 
Behaviourists (including philosophical behaviourists) also stressed the close link 
between emotion and behaviour. For example, Ryle (1949) held that emotion terms 
are used by people to designate ‘liabilities’ to do certain things; rather than to designate 
inner states, such as feelings or thoughts. That is, emotion words refer to the likelihood 
that someone will act in a particular way, the way characteristic of the relevant emotion 
type. For Ryle, such ‘liabilities’ consist then in dispositions to behave in an emotion-
specific manner. Along similar lines, Skinner (1953) held that emotions are nothing 
but probabilities of behaviour given certain circumstances. In this view, jealousy 
consists, let’s say, in the increased probability of attacking physically or verbally the 
third-party, and insulting the partner and then immediately asking for forgiveness, 
among other behaviours characteristic of jealousy. Watson (1919) goes even further in 
its behaviouristic approach by claiming that emotions are overt behavioural responses 
to reinforcing stimuli. More recently, the agential aspect of emotion has also been 
emphasized in current neuropsychological research. For example, Panksepp (1998) 
argued that ‘basic emotions’ are hard-wired inner states that enable behavioural 
strategies which are inherited from our ancestors. A key theoretical antecedent of all 
these views are Darwin’s insights on emotion. Darwin (1859) famously held that 
different emotion types involve distinctive expressive behaviours. As Barrett (2006a) 
remarks:  
 
“Darwin (1859/1965) argued that emotion categories are distinguished by expressive 
behaviors. Researchers who seek to define emotion in terms of species-general aspects 
have embraced the idea that distinct behaviors occur in the service of distinct emotional 
states. Because humans share some of their neural circuitry with other animal species (be 
they primates or rodents), researchers assume that it makes sense to define emotion by 
what these species all have in common: emotional behavior. And the often-used 
assumption is that there is one behavior for each putative emotion circuit.” (Barrett, 
2006a, p. 42) 
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Then, these early agential theories of emotion, in some way or another, tend to 
maintain that each emotion type has a characteristic set of instrumental behaviours. 
This assumption is quite problematic. Empirical evidence shows that there are simply 
no specific set of behaviours for specific types of emotion (see, e.g., Barrett, 2006a). 
Different sets of instrumental behaviour are involved in the same emotion type, and 
the same type of behaviour is involved in different types of emotion. Such assumption 
is even problematic from a common sense point of view. An episode of fear might 
involve running away, but it also pretending to be cool, changing your clothes, 
freezing, lighting a cigarette, closing the window, etc. During anger, one might punch 
someone, but also lighting a cigarette, close a window, yell someone, whispering 
something, etc.  
 
We can then extract then the following desideratum:  
 
A theory of emotion must explain the close connection between emotion 
and action, without identifying emotion types with specific sets of 
instrumental behaviours. 
 
The most endorsed agential theory of emotion is due to Frijda (1986, 2010). 
Importantly, this version of the agential theory avoids the above problem. According 
to Frijda, emotions amount to types of action tendencies. The latter can be understood 
as the readiness to act in a certain manner, in such a way that the actions in question 
take control precedence over other processes (see Scarantino 2014). Interestingly, the 
kind of actions that Frijda has in mind are defined at a rather abstract level of 
granularity. This is what allows Frijda’s view to avoid the problem mentioned above. 
The kind of actions that Frijda has in mind are described at the level in which the goal 
that these actions aim at are defined by the peculiar type of relationship with the world 
with which each emotion, for being the emotion that it is, needs to deal. For example, 
the action tendency of anger consists in “a tendency to regain control or freedom of 
action—generally to remove obstruction” (Frijda, 1986, p. 88); while the action 
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tendency of fear consists in making oneself inaccessible to the relevant stimulus so as 
to avoid it. Action tendencies are goal-states relative to which the agent has the 
motivation to accomplish. That is, action tendencies do not consist in the readiness to 
execute specific sort of behaviours. Specific sorts of behaviours respond to situational 
factors rather than to the type of emotion in question. There are many ways to act so 
as to regain control or freedom of action to remove an obstruction (the action tendency 
of anger): punch someone, but also lighting a cigarette, close a window, yell someone, 
whispering something, and so on. The action tendency of fear is making oneself 
inaccessible to the relevant stimulus so as to avoid it. This can be achieved by 
executing actions that overlap with the sort of behaviours that could be involved in the 
action tendency characteristic of another emotion type. For example, running away, 
pretending to be cool, crying, changing your clothes, freezing, lighting a cigarette, 
closing the window, etc. In a word, Frijda’s view avoids the above problem by 
individuating emotions by action tendencies which engage with the world in a peculiar 
fashion, characterized at a rather abstract level of granularity, rather than by specific 
behaviours.  
 
The problem with this view must be patent by now. Remember that emotions are 
meaningful, in the sense that they are about core relational themes (CRT). In this sense, 
emotions inform about CRT. Emotions have then a mind-to-world direction of fit. In 
Frijda’s view, emotions are identified with action tendencies, which as such have a 
world-to-mind direction of fit. They inform then about nothing, but rather they 
command how the world should be. It is very hard to see how emotions, in Frijda’s 
account, can then get to be about CRT. If fear amounts to the action tendency to make 
oneself inaccessible to the relevant stimulus so as to avoid it, how is it then that fear 
gets to be about danger? It is difficult to see how the action tendency view could 
explain the intentionality of emotion.  
 
Scarantino (2014) has offered an agential view of emotion, in line with Frijda’s view, 
that is able to deal with this problem, namely, the motivational theory of emotion 




An emotion is a prioritizing action control system, expressed either by (in)action 
tendencies with control precedence or by action reflexes, with the function of achieving 
a certain relational goal while correlating with a certain core relational theme. 
(Scarantino, 2014, p. 178) 
 
MTE refines that which is already in place in Frijda’s account, but it also expands the 
latter so as to show how an agential view of emotion can deal with the fact that 
emotions are intentional states. MTE refines Frijda’s account by proposing a two-level 
control structure that allows to account for some motivational phenomena involved in 
emotion, which other accounts fails to explain. However, at this juncture, the more 
relevant point on which to focus is how MTE expands Frijda’s agential theory so as to 
account for the intentionality of emotion. MTE accounts for the latter phenomenon by 
embracing a teleosemantic view of content. Roughly, according to the latter, a mental 
state M represent a certain event E in virtue of the fact that M has the function of being 
triggered by E. Emotions, Scarantino claims, have the function of being triggered by 
CRT. However, emotions, being action tendencies, they also have the function of 
achieving the goal that define action tendencies. That is, they also have a motivational 
function.  
 
“According to MTE, what explains the intentionality of emotions is that they are (in) 
action tendencies or action reflexes with the informational-cum-motivational function of 
achieving relational goals while correlating with core relational themes. On this view, 
fear is about dangers because it is a prioritized avoidance tendency/reflex with the 
informational-cum-motivational function of achieving the relational goal of one’s own 
safety while correlating with dangers.” (Scarantino, 2014, p. 178) 
 
That is, in the case of fear, the past effects of achieving the goal that defines the action 
tendency of fear, namely, achieving one’s own safety, in the presence of danger, 
explains why fear was selected for.  
 
I think that this view is generally on track. However, let me point to a few potential 
problems of it, which a PP version of the agential theory might be better positioned to 
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avoid. In the first place, MTE is silent about why emotions have the motivational force 
they have. In the second place, remember that there are differentially valenced 
emotions. That is, some emotions feel good, while other emotions feel bad. This 
polarity is constitutive of emotion. MTE offers no clue as to what is it that makes 
certain emotions positive and other emotions negative. Without a view on the nature 
of valence motivated within the framework of MTE, the latter, as it stands, seems to 
lack a way of accounting for the polarity in question. That said, as I mentioned above, 
I think that MTE is, in general, on the right track. The PP view on emotion to be 
suggested in Chapter 7 draws significantly on MTE, while integrating the insights of 
the other families of positions in emotion research. Very roughly, I will suggest that 
emotions amount to action strategies for regulating valence. This, in order to minimize 
high-level interoceptive PE, i.e., the discrepancy between the expectation of stable 
homeostasis and the homeostatic state about which the interoceptive percept that 
constitutes valence informs. I think that this view satisfies desiderata, and avoids the 
problems exhibited by the types of views presented in this Section. 
 
1.3.4. Hybrid theories 
 
There are few types of theories that instead of emphasizing only one of the aspects 
commonly associated with emotion, they incorporate more than one aspect into the 
mechanism that constitutes emotion. Let me briefly present them, as the view on the 
nature of emotion that I will suggest in Chapter 7 can be taken to be part of this family, 
although the view I will suggest also emphasizes the agential aspect of emotion, as the 
action theories just presented. Now, some approaches to emotion tend to include all or 
almost all of the aspects commonly associated with emotion. However, in this Chapter, 
I prefer not to include these approaches. I do not include these approaches, because, as 
I mentioned above, it is desirable for a philosophical theory of emotion not to put too 
much meat into the oven. That is, the goal of a philosophical theory of emotion is not 
to list all the aspects that typically contribute in emotion-related phenomena, and show 
how they are mutually relevant to each other. The goal of an emotion theory is to single 
out the minimal essential components of emotion generation.  
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1.3.4.1. Appraisal theories 
 
Appraisal theories are usually regarded as cognitive theories, since in these theories 
cognition is the driving force of emotion generation (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 
1991; Scherer, 1984). However, appraisal theories do not identify emotions with 
cognition, while including affective states. According to appraisal theories, emotions 
arise as a certain kind of thought (i.e., appraisals) trigger some sort of affective state, 
either physiological changes, feelings, etc. Emotions are not identified with appraisals, 
but rather appraisals cause emotions. Even more, appraisals individuate emotions. That 
is, the affective states which are caused by appraisals count as a certain emotion in 
virtue of being caused by them.  
 
What then are appraisals? Appraisals consist in evaluative inferences or judgments 
about the way in which a certain situation is relevant for the goals and interests of the 
organism. These evaluative inferences are usually considered to be hierarchically 
organised in different dimensions. Each dimension reflects different aspect of the 
organism-environment relation. For example, appraisal theorists generally agree that 
among such dimensions are the following. Firstly, the organism needs to determine 
the relevance of the situation, and whether the situation is compatible with her goals. 
Secondly, the organism needs to infer who is responsible for the relevant situation. 
Finally, the organism needs to determine the extent to which she has the resources to 
cope with the situation. Depending on what the organism judges in those respects, a 
certain type of emotion, instead of another type of emotion, takes place. For example, 
anger results in case the organism judges that the situation is incompatible with her 
goals, that someone else is responsible for bringing about the relevant situation, and 
that she is able to cope with the situation.  
 
Insofar as in this kind of view cognition is in the driver seat in respect to emotion 
generation, appraisal theories straightforwardly account for the intentionality of 
emotion. However, note that in appraisal theories, cognition is not part of the 
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mechanism itself that constitutes emotion. In appraisal theories, cognition is a 
necessary cause of emotion. That is why this kind of view is usually called etiological 
cognitivism. In this kind of view, given that appraisals lie outside the mechanism of 
emotion, it fails to show how is it that emotions themselves can be meaningful. That 
is, if none of the components of the mechanism that constitute emotion account for the 
intentionality of emotion, then it seems that, in this view, emotions are not themselves 
about CRT. The fact that emotions themselves are meaningful, i.e., that emotions 
themselves are about core relational themes, is a non-negotiable aspect for a 
philosophical account of emotion (see, e.g., Prinz, 2004, Deigh, 2010). Thus, this point 
puts philosophical pressure on standard appraisal views.  
 
1.3.4.2. Two-factor theories 
 
Two-factor theories (Schachter & Singer, 1962) are also usually classified as a 
cognitive theory, since in these theories cognition is the driving force of emotion 
generation. However, two-factor theories do not qualify as a pure cognitive theory, 
because besides including a cognitive component in the mechanism that constitutes 
emotion, these views also include a felt bodily component (e.g., arousal). According 
to Schachter and Singer (1962), emotions amount to cognitive interpretations of the 
physiological changes that constitute arousal. In this view, once the latter is triggered 
by an external situation, high-level abstract knowledge is brought forth in order to label 
such an arousal state with an emotion term. Or to put it this way, cognition is brought 
to categorize the arousal state triggered by the external event via emotion concepts. 
Thus, emotions exhibit two-factors: bodily perception (arousal) plus cognition.   
 
Contrary to appraisal views, the two-factor approach includes the cognitive aspect as 
part of the mechanism that constitutes emotion. Thus, in this view, the intentionality 
of emotion is accounted for by something that is part of emotion itself. Moreover, 
besides accounting for the intentionality of emotion, this view also accounts for the 
felt bodily aspect of emotion: that which is labelled or categorized are precisely the 
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felt bodily changes that, according to Schachter and Singer, constitute arousal. 
However, this view struggles in accounting for the agential aspect of emotion. Labels 
do not mandate courses of action, and arousal by itself is action-neutral. Two-factor 
views are silent as to how emotions have the motivational power they have.  
 
I do not take the above observations to be conclusive arguments against the families 
of positions presented in this Section (Section 1.3.). The aim of this Section is simply 
to provide an overview of the main families of emotion theories. This, in order to 
highlight those aspects in which they are standardly considered to be problematic, and 
those aspect in which they result satisfactory. Now, the predictive processing 
framework is beginning to provide a unifying account of all the seemingly disparate 
variety of mental phenomena. As I mentioned above, in the predictive processing 
framework, cognition seems to dissolve into perception, and action results from an 
inferential, ‘belief-like’ process that operates under the same principle than 
perception—even attention emerges naturally from the inferential perceptual 
machinery posited by PP (Chapter 2). Thus, insofar as it dissolves the traditional three 
“boxes” into the same inferential principle of prediction error minimization, a 
predictive processing view on the nature of emotion has the potential of integrating the 
insights of the main families of emotion theories. However, the predictive processing 
framework exhibits some issues when it comes to accounting for emotion (Chapter 4). 
In the concluding Chapter of this Thesis (Chapter 7), I suggest a way in which the 
current PP view of emotion can be amended in such a way so as to become a promising 
view, which compares favourably to the main families of positions in emotion 
research. It compares favourably since, insofar as PP is a unifying, integrative 
framework, it has the resources to incorporate the advantages and avoid the typical 
problems of perceptual, cognitive, and agential views.   
 
To sum up, in this Chapter we saw that valence, rather than arousal, stands out as the 
paramount defining construct in affect. The explanatory target of this Thesis amounts 
to one specific kinds of affective state, namely, emotions per se. Then I discussed some 
of the main kinds of general views on how emotion episodes are generated. I classified 
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these approaches to emotion in the global categories of perceptual theories, cognitive 
theories, and action theories (and also hybrid theories). I briefly discussed those 
aspects in which each of these global approaches to emotion turn out to be 
unsatisfactory, and those aspect in which they result satisfactory. This will give us a 
sense of those aspects that should be taken into account when developing a satisfactory 
view on the nature of emotion. As I will argue, the expansion of Seth’s view suggested 
in Chapter 7 turns out to be satisfactory in that sense. A predictive processing view of 
emotion has the resources to integrate the insights of and avoid the problems of the 
different approaches to emotion. In the coming Chapter, I present the basics of the 
workings of the predictive processing machinery. I emphasize how the principles of 
predictive processing apply to vision, as Seth’s view on the nature of emotion is based 













































2. The basics of the predictive processing framework 
 
The interoceptive inference view of emotion (IIE) (Seth, 2013, 2015a; Seth et al, 2012; 
Seth & Critchley, 2013; Hohwy, 2013) is the first attempt of accounting for emotion 
in line with the principles of predictive processing (PP). IIE accounts for emotion 
generation by extending, in a direct fashion, the process by which visual 
(exteroceptive) percepts are formed to the case of interoceptive percept formation. Just 
as in the PP framework visual perception arises via visual perceptual inference, Seth 
holds that the perception of our homeostatic, physiological condition arises via 
interoceptive perceptual inference. In this view, emotions arise from interoceptive 
predictions of the causes of current interoceptive afferents. Emotions are then 
interoceptive percepts of a certain sort. Thus, IIE defends a version of the perceptual 
theory of emotion (Chapter 1). 
 
Considering that IIE holds that emotions arise in direct analogy to the way in which 
visual (exteroceptive) percepts are formed, in this Chapter, I present the way in which 
perception operates in the PP framework, with a special emphasis in visual perception 
(and exteroceptive perception more generally). Importantly, I limit myself to 
presenting only the more fundamental aspects of the principles of PP. I present also 
those aspects that are particularly relevant for the argument I develop in this Thesis, 
but that do not form part of the more typically emphasized aspects of the architecture 
of the PP machinery—such as the notion of ‘knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies’. I also leave the computational and mathematical details aside, as I deal 
only with the more ‘conceptual’ side of the framework. I think that presenting only the 
more conceptual aspects of the principles of the PP machinery allows to pose the 
challenges of this new framework in a way that converges with philosophical 
discussion on the nature of emotion. Finally, in this Thesis, I simply assume that the 
PP framework is mostly correct. In this respect, I am interested in assessing how much 
the PP framework can do. Particularly, how much it can do for our understanding of 
emotion (can the predictive processing framework account for emotion?). In order to 
do this, the framework needs to be assumed to be in place. Thus, I will exclude from 
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my exposition the motivations of the framework, and the growing evidence that is 
beginning to accumulate, suggesting that the PP framework is substantially on track. 
This work has already been done in an outstanding way in recent works by Clark 
(2016) and Hohwy (2013). I refer the reader to these works for a review of the evidence 
and the motivations of the framework.   
 
I begin by presenting the PP account of visual (exteroceptive) percept formation 
(Section 2.1.). Visual percept formation (and exteroceptive percept formation in 
general) is the most paradigmatic case of the workings of PP. I emphasize in this 
Section those aspects of PP that make it especially interesting as an account of 
perceptual processing. Particularly, (a) the role of precisions (Section 2.4.); (b) the 
importance of cross-tall between modalities across all levels of the perceptual 
hierarchy, and the constant influence of high-level multimodal and amodal knowledge 
(Section 2.6.); (c) also the role of stored knowledge about ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’ during active inference (Section 2.5.2.); and (d) the fact that, via 
learning, the cortical hierarchy recapitulates regularities in the world (Section 2.7.).  
 
2.1. The predictive processing framework  
 
Predictive processing (PP) was mainly conceived and developed as an account (and 
re-conceptualization) of perceptual processes. Roughly, and leaving mathematical and 
computational details aside, in the PP framework, the traditional approach to 
perceptual processing is turned upside down. Traditionally, visual perception is 
considered to be a bottom-up driven process, in which incoming visual signals or 
features are accumulatively processed from the bottom-up until a coherent visual 
percept is finally formed. The idea here is that the input that the visual system receives 
from the world of middle-sized, light-reflecting objects consists in a rich signal that 
manages to represent such objects and their features. This signal is passively processed 
in a step-by-step manner, from earlier regions to higher level regions in the brain. 
Earlier regions process simple features, and as the flow of information is passed to 
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higher level regions, the analysis of the input becomes more complex. In the sense that 
several features that where initially processed in an individual manner become merged 
together in the complex objects that we visually perceive. Thus, in this account, 
changes in the configuration of the input stimuli drives modifications in perception, as 
visual perception is driven by the features of the input stimuli that the visual system 
captures. 
 
However, bottom-up approaches can hardly deal with the ambiguous inputs that we 
get from the world. Incoming low-level sensory signals underdetermine their external 
cause. That is, a certain object (or event) can cause different effects in different senses, 
and it can also cause different effects in the same sense. Moreover, different objects 
(or events) can cause the same effect in a certain sense modality. In this sense, there is 
no linear, one-to-one mapping relation between causes and effects. The effects that the 
objects and events in the world have in our senses when they impinge our early 
processing regions are typically ambiguous between candidate causes. To take a 
classical example, convex objects give rise to retinal activity which is ambiguous 
between different kinds of causes. Such retinal activity can be caused by either a 
convex object that receives light from above, or by a concave object that receives light 
from below. Consider also a more colloquial case. Certain retinal and early activity 
can be highly ambiguous between, and compatible with, all the following worldly 
causes: a dog, a stuffed dog toy, a few pairs of brown shoes arranged in the form of a 
dog, a fox, a goat, a design chair, etc. Ambiguity in the incoming sensory signal 
regarding possible worldly causes is a characteristic issue with which perception needs 
to deal.  
 
2.1.2. Perceptual inference 
 
Considering that low-level sensory signals underdetermine their external cause, and 
contrary to the bottom-up approach, Bayesian PP accounts of visual perception hold 
that visual percept formation takes place via visual perceptual inference. That is, the 
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brain forms visual percepts in a top-down fashion by predicting its incoming lower-
level sensory signals from higher-level models of the likely (hidden) causes of those 
visual signals. These models can be seen as putting forward content-specifying 
hypotheses about the object or event responsible for triggering incoming visual 
activity.  
 
The models in question can thus be seen as storing probabilistic knowledge that allows 
them to link external causes and inputs. In order to do the latter, these models specify 
hypotheses that could be informally characterized in the following way: “if in fact the 
(hidden) external cause is an E, these lower-level effects or sensory signals are most 
likely to be expected”. These hypotheses consider the likelihood that the considered 
external causes would produce the encountered lower-level sensory effects, given 
stored knowledge of the priors (i.e., already maintained ‘beliefs’ about) of such 
external causes. The selected hypothesis is the one with higher posterior probability.  
 
Importantly, the selected hypothesis determines the content of the experienced percept. 
That is, the content of the visual hypothesis that best fits the array of incoming visual 
signals is the hypothesis that inherits its content to the resulting visual percept. This is 
the hypothesis that, among competing hypotheses, does best at reducing the difference 
between predicted signals and actual incoming signals (more on this below). So, let’s 
say that the visual system is considering two hypotheses. The hypothesis that a dog is 
likely to be causing the incoming visual signals, and the hypothesis that a cat is causing 
such signals. If the dog-hypothesis is better suited than the cat-hypothesis to fit 
incoming visual activity, then the percept of a dog is formed, instead of the percept of 
a cat. The visual experience of a dog then arises.  
 
Now, having stored probabilistic knowledge of the expected activity of the relevant 
lower layers, the models of the world that the brain harbours predict lower-level 
sensory activity by generating those expected states in the relevant lower layers of the 
perceptual hierarchy. A contentful percept is formed once a selected hypothesis 
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achieves to generate the sensory activity that successfully matches, and thus supresses, 
current lower-level sensory signals (see Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013).  
 
“What we have so far is an internal model that generates a hypothesis—we might call it 
a fantasy—about the expected sensory input. This is the generative model, which has a 
number of different parameters that together produce the fantasy (hypothesis) down 
through the hierarchy. A particular fantasy might do a fine job at matching the incoming 
sensory input, and thus should determine perception.” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 54) 
 
Context and background knowledge are important here. Remember that low-level 
sensory signals underdetermine their external cause. Many external causes could be 
giving rise to the same low-level sensory effects. Therefore, in order to successfully 
predict the presence of, for example, a dog in the environment, the perceptual system 
has to rely on the relative probability of a dog-encountering in the particular kind of 
situation in which the organism finds itself. Top-down signals, acting as priors 
extracted from background knowledge, provide this kind of context-fixing 
information, which is active previous to encountering the dog in the environment 
(more on this below). To use a very colloquial (but clarifying) example, let’s say that 
there is a dog in the world. The light reflected by the dog triggers visual activity in 
early regions of processing. Such activity is ambiguous between its causes in the 
world. Using the same example as above, let’s say that the visual system is considering 
two hypotheses. The hypothesis that a dog is likely to be causing the incoming visual 
signals, and the hypothesis that a cat is causing such signals. Considering that you find 
yourself in the house of a dog-lover person, the hypothesis that there is a dog in front 
of you exhibits higher anterior probability than the cat-hypothesis. To put it 
colloquially, in this sort of situation, the visual system tells itself, “if it is a dog, instead 
of a cat, I expect more likely such and such sensory signals, and not these other ones, 
because dogs, but not cats, tend to cause such signals in contexts like this”. It then 
generates these expected signals in lower levels of the visual hierarchy. Then it asks 
itself “Am I getting a good match?” As I commented above, if it is getting a good 
match, then the percept of a dog is formed. If it is not getting a good match, the 
hypothesis (model) needs to be updated until a better hypothesis about the causes of 
the incoming signals is put forward (perhaps there was no dog after all). 
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2.1.3. The perceptual hierarchy 
 
Importantly, in the PP framework, lower levels of the hierarchy encode regularities 
that operate at fast time-scales, capturing variant aspects of experience. On the other 
hand, higher levels encode increasingly more complex regularities, which operate at 
slow time-scales, capturing relatively more invariant aspects of experience. For 
example, in the case of vision, low levels of the visual hierarchy encode regularities 
such as the details of edges and the changing contours of objects as one moves 
(represented in V1), which have small receptive fields. While high levels of the visual 
hierarchy encode relatively more invariant information, such as those represented in 
the temporal lobes, which have wider receptive fields, such as the enduring face and 
body of someone you know. Now, the higher-levels of the hierarchy are not modality 
specific (i.e., amodal and multimodal), and encode even more abstract, slow time-scale 
regularities, not directly related to regularities pertaining to the domain of just one 
modality. For example, regularities such as, for example, that good people keep a 
promise.  
 
2.1.4. Prediction error 
 
Crucially, as top-down signals produced by the generative models of the world provide 
predictions of sensory effects, bottom-up signals provide prediction error (PE). The 
latter notion is of most importance. According to PP, all what the brain does is to 
minimize its prediction error. PE consist in the difference between the sensory signals 
expected (and generated) from the top-down, and the actual, incoming sensory signals.  
 
PE is critical in the PP framework, not only because, from a more global perspective, 
PP holds that all what the brain does is to minimize its PE. The latter is also crucial in 
the PP framework since during online processing, PE is used as feedback for updating 
and improving models or hypotheses and, in the long term, as a learning signal that 
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improves the predictions of our stored models of the world. Once updated in this way, 
a generative model can specify more accurate predictions. Then, in the PP framework, 
the perceptual system is engaged in the task of ‘explaining away’ or suppressing the 
sensory signals that fit the model predictions. If there is a match between the generated 
predictions and the incoming sensory inputs, the matched information coming from 
the bottom-up is suppressed. The remaining non-matched information (i.e., prediction 
error) is allowed then to ‘go up’ through the perceptual hierarchy. This, for the sake of 
online-feedback purposes, and, in the long term, learning. Thus, in the PP framework, 
PE is what really counts as the input to the system.  
 
“These predictions, as it were, query the world and dampen down predicted sensory input. 
The result is that only prediction error is propagated up through the system in a bottom-
up fashion, and aids in revision of the model parameters (so we need to re-label the 
bottom-up sensory input, associated with the light grey, upwards arrows in Figure 5, 
‘prediction error’). The functional role of the bottom-up signal from the senses is then to 
be feedback on the internal models of the world” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 47) 
 
In this respect, the idea is that PE signals play the role of shaping stored priors, so that 
the percepts which are formed by generating expected signals and minimizing PE 
achieve to successfully represent the world. In this sense, PE plays the role of 
preventing that organisms perceive whatever that their brains expect. PE functions as 
an objective corrective signal triggered by regularities in the world. Thus, expectations 
are controlled by the world via PE. In other words, sensory evidence constrains the 
kind of expectations that get to be built by the brain.  
 
The task of minimizing PE by ‘explaining away’ incoming sensory signals is carried 
through, in a coordinated fashion, at each level of the perceptual hierarchy. Adjacent 
levels are connected to each other so that the best hypothesis at one level becomes PE 
for the level above. Thus, the PP framework posit a cascade of information interchange 
between levels, ranging from the higher levels, which encode relatively more invariant 




2.1.5. Inferring precisions 
 
Now, the variability of PE in different contexts must be taken into account, so as to 
veridically revise models and to efficiently sample the world, and thus minimize PE. 
In order to determine whether a certain perceptual hypothesis fits the incoming sensory 
data well enough, it is required that the system has prior expectations about the 
variability of the incoming signals, given context. In other words, PE minimization 
demands the system to determine the context-dependent reliability of PE across all 
levels of the perceptual hierarchy: the precision of incoming signals also needs to be 
inferred. Otherwise, the perceptual hypotheses that a certain model puts forward could 
not be satisfactory in guiding adaptive behaviour—i.e., in getting the world right.  
 
“What determines such inference about variability is which expectations for variability 
we have in different contexts. This can be put in the model-fitting terms used earlier. 
Recall that, in an attempt to fit a statistical model to a set of data, the error between the 
model and the data should be minimized. But if there are no prior expectations about the 
variability of the data set (the inverse of which is the same as its precision), then there is 
no way to reasonably decide how much or how little fitting is enough. If this decision is 
not optimal, then predictions on the basis of the model will not be good.” (Hohwy, 2013, 
p. 65) 
 
In order to minimize PE satisfactorily, the brain needs to extract from the world 
regularities relative to precisions, so that it can use them later to improve PE 
minimization across levels. That is, the brain needs to infer from context in which 
cases PE is likely to be reliable. In other words, inferring precision amounts to a kind 
of metacognitive process, in which the brain engages in inference about perceptual 
inference.  
 
Now, precisions determine the relative influence that top-down expectations have 
relative to the incoming input. Precisions modulate the balance between top-down and 
bottom-up influences. Thus, in contexts where the input is deemed to be unreliable, 
top-down hypotheses will be assigned more weight than usual. In these cases, top-
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down hypotheses drive almost completely the processes of percept formation, ignoring 
thus the input to an important extent.  
 
“The fundamental purpose for precision processing is to enable the activities of internal 
models of the world to be driven by reliable learning signals: if there is confidence in a 
signal then it should be allowed to revise the hypothesis and if there is less confidence 
then it should tend to carry less weight. The assessment of confidence should therefore 
impact on the strength of the prediction error message being passed up through the 
system. Precision expectations are thus thought to be realized in systems that regulate the 
gain on prediction error units in the brain (Feldman and Friston 2010). The more precision 
that is expected the more the gain on the prediction error in question, and the more it gets 
to influence hypothesis revision. Conversely, if the reliability of the signal is expected to 
be poor, then the prediction error unit self-inhibits, suppressing prediction error such that 
its signalling is weighted less in overall processing.” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 66) 
 
For example, think of a case in which the situation does not afford to rely on the 
incoming stream of sensory data. Let’s say that you find yourself driving in a foggy 
day. This is a typical kind of context in which the visual information one receives from 
the world is quite ambiguous and noisy. Then, as you drive, the visual system reduces 
the amount of weight given to the stream of visual input, relative to the amount of 
weight given to the input in normal conditions. Visual perceptual inferences are then 
driven almost completely by stored expectations, at the expense of what the world has 
to say via visual PE: you begin transiently seeing car lights in front of you when they 
are actually lampposts at some distance, or you transiently see a curve when there the 
pavement is actually simply a bit wet. Illusions then take place.  
 
A more radical example of a poor sensory signal is the effect known as ‘sensory 
deprivation’. Very roughly, during sensory deprivation people are exposed to a major 
reduction of stimuli. For example, white noise in the auditive case, or diffuse bright or 
no light at all in the case of vision. After a while, people begin undergoing 
hallucinations, such as different kinds of sounds—from beepings to conversations and 
music—and different types of visual images, ranging from coloured patches to faces 




These sort of more radical examples of an impoverished signal are cases in which, 
given that a major variability in the signal is to be expected, the gain on PE signals are 
dampened down to the extent that it is practically completely ignored. This determines 
that prior expectations are inferred to have an extraordinary high precision. That is, the 
visual system (or the auditory system) gives to its top-down predictions significantly 
more weight than it does in normal conditions. Remember that PE plays the role of 
impeding that one perceives whatever that one expects, by functioning as a corrective 
signal triggered by, and dependent on, regularities in the world. Expectations are 
controlled by sensory evidence. Therefore, in the absence of such a corrective signal, 
the poor sensory signal involved in the example in question gives rise to the 
hallucinations characteristic of the sensory deprivation effect.  
 
In other contexts, the input will be deemed to be reliable. In these latter cases, PE will 
be taken to be informative, and it will then be used to guide the current hypothesis-
selection process and, in the long term, learning.  
 
“Bottom-up prediction error is favoured from units that “feed” well-performing 
prediction units. That is, an evolving prediction error signal that can continually be 
explained away well by a particular hypothesis can be assumed to be reliable and should 
thus be weighted more in the message-passing economy.” (Hohwy, 2013, p.61) 
 
Interestingly, note that precision-weighting is remarkably functionally similar to 
attention. In fact, in the PP framework, precision-weighting is identified with attention 
(Friston, 2009). Precisions determine which aspects of the sensory stream are going to 
have more or less gain, and this across all levels of the perceptual hierarchy. In other 
words, precisions determine where, and to what degree, perception focuses.  
 
“The complex, precision-weighted play between top-down prediction and bottom-up 
prediction error messaging marks out a particular functional role. Expectations of 
precision modulate where and how the perceptual system is focused. In particular, it 
determines which signal is given preponderance and it determines the extent to which 
there is a worldly focus, rather than an internal, more general, thoughtful or meandering 




The PP framework solves then the underdetermination between (hidden) worldly 
causes and sensory effects (accessible to the brain) by building expectations about 
sensory inputs. Given that the regular structure of the world brings about sensory 
inputs which do exhibit repeatable patterns (i.e., it is not just noise), the latter allow 
the system to build expectations about subsequent sensory activity. Such expectations 
are compared to the latter sensory activity, and the resulting precision-weighted 
difference (PE) can be quantified. If there is a satisfactory match, the model from 
which the prediction was generated is capturing the relevant aspect of the world. If 
precision-weighted PE is significant, then the parameters of the models are revised 
(and learning thus takes place).  
 
The inferential predictive machine sketched above, in which one level attempts to 
predict the activity of the level below so as to minimize precision-weighted PE, is 
repeated throughout all the several levels of the perceptual hierarchy. In case that, at a 
certain level of the perceptual hierarchy, priors do not achieve to predict the incoming 
signal, the resulting PE drives predictions at the level above depending on how much 
weight is assigned to such PE. If the latter is assigned a significant weight, then 
predictions at the level above need to “diligently” deal with such resulting PE, to put 
it this way. However, if the resulting PE is assigned little weight, then model revision 
takes place at the same level or at levels below. Thus, during perceptual inference, 
expectations about precisions (attention) determine the way in which model revision 
takes place across the hierarchy.  
 
2.1.6. Two ways of minimizing prediction error  
 
Crucially, PE can be minimized via two different strategies, which differ in their 





2.1.6.1. Perceptual inference 
 
Perceptual inference is the strategy of PE minimization described above. As we saw, 
in the PP framework, visual percepts are formed by minimizing visual PE in a specific 
manner: via visual perceptual inference. Perceptual hypotheses have mind-to-world 
direction of fit—models or hypotheses are changed so as to attempt to match incoming 
signals. During perceptual inference, hypotheses about the worldly causes of sensory 
input are adjusted so as to fit current incoming data.  
 
2.1.6.2. Active inference 
 
The other manner in which PE can be minimized is action. More precisely, PE can 
also be minimized via active inference. The latter consists in changing the environment 
so as to obtain sensory data that fits considered predictions or hypotheses. Active 
inference has world-to-mind direction of fit—model’s parameter are kept constant and 
the system selectively samples the world so as to obtain signals that fit predicted 
signals. 
 
“It follows trivially that the upshot of the brain’s prediction error minimization activities 
is to increase the mutual information between the mind and the world—to make the states 
of the brain as predictive as possible of the sensory input caused by events in the world. 
This account has largely suppressed a very obvious point, namely that the mutual 
information can also be increased by making the sensory input from the world more 
predictive of the states of the brain’s model, that is by changing the input to fit the model 
rather than changing the model to fit the input.” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 76) 
 
As I commented above, the predictions that a certain model puts forward become more 
successful as the more they achieve to match the stream of sensory input. In this 
manner, the brain achieves to fulfil its only task, namely, minimize PE. Considering 
that modifying sensory input is quite helpful in achieving such a fit, the brain should 
be constantly acting so as to minimize PE. That is, the brain should be constantly 
79 
 
changing the sensory array in order to fit its expectations about incoming sensory 
activity: changing the world to fit the mind. Triggering the sensory stream that is in 
line with prior expectations can be achieved either by moving oneself around so as to 
change the relative position of the sensory organs, or it can be achieved by altering the 
sensory input itself. Action is key for minimizing PE.  
 
Now, in order for purposeful behaviour to ensue, the kind of PE signals that needs to 
be minimized amounts to signals proprietary of the proprioceptive domain. That is, in 
order to act, the brain needs to build a model of the musculoskeletal system. Moreover, 
it must learn the sensory consequences that action has in the proprioceptive system 
itself. Thus, the brain needs to store counterfactual knowledge of the way in which 
sensory signals would evolve in case the organism were to act in such and such a way. 
When this counterfactual knowledge is activated, it triggers a large proprioceptive PE 
signal. The latter consist in the difference between the actual proprioceptive state of 
the organism and the counterfactually expected (‘desired’) proprioceptive signals. In 
order to minimize this, let’s say, ‘self-generated’ PE signal, the body must move in 
such a way as to bring about the expected proprioceptive states. In other words, the 
brain brings action about by simply triggering proprioceptive PE, and by minimizing 
the latter. No motor commands are part of the story.   
 
“The mechanism for being a system that acts is thus nothing more than the generation of 
prediction error and the ability to change the body’s configuration such that the antecedent 
of the counterfactual actually obtains and error is suppressed. Action therefore does not 
come about through some complex computation of motor commands that control the 
muscles of the body. In simple terms, what happens is instead that the muscles are told to 
move as long as there is prediction error. The muscles of the body are thus at the mercy 
of the prediction error generated by the brain’s model of the way the world is expected to 
be like but isn’t. Prediction error is then the simple mechanism that controls action.” 
(Hohwy, 2013, p. 82) 
 
As it is typically described, this manner of bringing about action can be seen as some 
sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. The proprioceptive system prophesies that it will be in 
certain sensory states, and by simply entertaining this prophesy the organism will find 
itself in those sensory states by generating proprioceptive PE. However, just as in any 
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sensory domain, proprioceptive predictions can go wrong. In this case, the 
musculoskeletal system will not end up in a position in which it gets the predicted 
proprioceptive signals. This will trigger another round of proprioceptive PE, which 
needs to be minimize by engaging the reflex arcs that will eventually put the body in 
the position that the proprioceptive system prophesises.  
 
Expectations of precisions play a major role in this whole story. As we saw, action is 
brought about by triggering proprioceptive PE. Then, considering that the brain is 
exclusively devoted to the business of minimizing PE, the proprioceptive system has 
two options available, namely, either minimize proprioceptive PE via proprioceptive 
perceptual inference, or minimize it via proprioceptive active inference. In other 
words, instead of intervening the proprioceptive landscape so as to fit the 
counterfactual proprioceptive expectations about sensory input, the brain could simply 
change its proprioceptive expectations so as to fit the actual incoming proprioceptive 
signals. In this latter manner, the brain can perfectly well achieve its only task of 
minimizing PE. However, note that the latter option implies that action does not ensue, 
but rather a proprioceptive percept of the current state of the musculoskeletal system 
gets to be formed. In order for movement to occur, expectations of precisions need to 
be added to the story. Attention to proprioceptive PE plays a key role during action. 
Action arises as counterfactual proprioceptive input is inferred to have significantly 
higher precision than actual proprioceptive input. That is, the actual proprioceptive 
input is ignored. Thus, perceptual inference does not drive proprioceptive PE 
minimization, and action can then occur.  
 
Crucially, as Seth (2015a) remarks, active inference can take place not only so as to 
conform to current expectations, as it occurs during motor behaviour by making 
proprioceptive data fit proprioceptive expectations (by significantly increasing the 
precision of proprioceptive predictions), so that ‘desired’ (or expected) movement 
occurs. Active inference can also take place during percept formation in exteroceptive 
modalities (i.e., during perceptual inference), in order to confirm, disconfirm and 
disambiguate perceptual hypotheses—this is what Seth calls ‘epistemic active 
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inference’ (Seth, 2015a). As Seth (2015a) notes, and as mentioned above, this requires 
storing representations of the counterfactual relations that obtain between (possible) 
actions and its prospective sensory consequences (“if I act in this manner, sensory 
signals should evolve in such-and-such way”). That is, representations of 
sensorimotor contingencies. Active inference requires then this kind of counterfactual 
knowledge.  
 
The idea is that during perceptual inference in non-proprioceptive modalities, agents 
sample the external world based on a certain perceptual hypothesis about the cause of 
incoming sensory activity. The hypothesis in question is the hypothesis that, among 
competing hypotheses, exhibits higher posterior probability. That is, the best current 
hypothesis. This hypothesis is used to predict the sensory signals that would take place 
in case the hypothesis under consideration obtains, and certain actions ensue. Agents 
then carry out these action to determine whether the considered hypothesis actually 
obtains. Thus, the brain needs to determine which of the hypotheses that exhibit a 
significant anterior probability seems to best account for current incoming lower-level 
sensory activity. This hypothesis, which has now a relatively higher posterior 
probability, is the one used to guide the active sample of the world. These actions serve 
the purpose of determining whether the newly triggered sensory activity is compatible 
with the considered hypothesis. This strategy allows the system to reduce the 
uncertainty about maintained hypotheses. If the expected sensory activity obtains, then 
the hypothesis in question is confirmed. However, if the expected sensory activity does 
not obtain, the considered hypothesis is disconfirmed, and another competing 
hypothesis is ‘put to the test’, to keep the scientific metaphor.  
 
“The situation is then this. Perceptual inference allows the system to minimize prediction 
error and thus favour one hypothesis. On the basis of this hypothesis the system can 
predict how the sensory input would change, were the hypothesis correct. That is, it can 
test the veracity of the hypothesis by testing through agency whether the input really 
changes in the predicted ways. The way to do this is to stop updating the hypothesis for a 
while, and instead wait for action to make the input to fit the hypothesis. If this fails to 
happen, then the system must reconsider and eventually adopt a different or revised 
hypothesis. For example, if the highest posterior goes to the hypothesis that this is a man’s 
face seen in profile, then the system may predict that by moving visual fixation down 
towards the chin, a sample will be acquired that fits with this hypothesis. If it does, then 
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this further enhances the probability that this is a man’s face; if it does not fit then the 
system may have to go back and revise the hypothesis such that it expects the cause of its 
input to be, say, a woman’s or a child’s face.” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 79)  
 
As counterfactual knowledge of the sensory consequences of action are required across 
all levels of the cortical hierarchy, representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ 
must also be found across all levels—as any other kind of predictive knowledge 
posited by PP. Thus, representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ can be low-level 
or high-level depending on how variant or invariant are the regularities that they 
encode. For example, low-level, fast-changing regularities include the very fast eye 
movements that occur during fixation, known as ‘microsaccades’. Microsaccades have 
a time-scale that varies between 2 and 120 arcminutes. Higher in the hierarchy are the 
so-called ‘drifts’, which occur in between microsaccades. Slower actions can include 
arm movements, or walking a few steps. Even slower time-scale actions can include 
actions such as taking a bus, or waiting for the night to fall. 
 
This shows that, in the PP framework, perception and action influence each other in a 
constant cycle. Even more, perception and action operate under the same principle of 
PE minimization. That is, perceptual inference and active inference are two ways of 
doing the same thing, namely, minimizing PE. However, this does not imply that 
perception and action amount to the same thing, that perception confounds with action 
in such a way that there is no fundamental distinction to be made between the two. 
Even though perception and action operate under the same principle of PE 
minimization, they are functionally distinct. While perceptual inference has mind-to-
world direction of fit, active inference has world-to-mind direction of fit. This is not 
just a trivial difference that does not reflect something that exerts a causal difference 
in the workings of the machinery of the brain. The difference in direction of fit in 
question is key in this respect. As we saw above, regarding the need of assigning a 
high gain to counterfactual proprioceptive PE units during active inference for 
movement, while ignoring actual proprioceptive PE, the machinery of the brain must 
observe the distinction between perceptual inference and active inference. In other 
words, the brain must keep functionally separated the task of updating its models of 
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the world and the task of sampling the world on the basis of an already selected 
model/hypothesis—otherwise, in the proprioceptive case commented above, 
movement cannot occur.  
 
This point will be key in this Thesis, as I will argue that in order for an emotion to 
arise, it is not sufficient to minimize interoceptive PE via interoceptive perceptual 
inference, as the current PP view of emotion holds. I will suggest that, even though 
interoceptive perceptual inference is certainly required during emotion, the driving 
component of emotion amounts to interoceptive active inference. As long as there is a 
relevant functional difference between perceptual and active inference, that is, as long 
as they do not conflate in the same kind of process, the view I will suggest it is not 
trivial in this regard: it significantly alters the current PP view on emotion.   
 
2.1.7. Interaction across levels and modalities  
 
Remember that context and background knowledge are important during perceptual 
inference. During percept formation in a certain modality—e.g., vision—there is a rich 
interaction across all levels of the visual hierarchy. This interaction operates in both 
directions, from the bottom-up and top-down. 
 
The interaction in question occurs in such a way that fast-changing regularities are key 
in the selection of top-down hypotheses. For example, regularities governing shades 
bias the selection, for example, of the bird-hypothesis over the plane-hypothesis, given 
certain sensory signals—or also expectations relative to the shape of an object 
modulate activity in V1. On the other hand, top-down hypotheses are key in recovering 
low level sensory activity. For example, the encoded low time-scale regularity that 
birds beat their wings controls the low level dynamics relative to the way in which 
wings movement changes the contour of the bird. Furthermore, in case there is a learnt 
association between a certain cue in one modality and another cue in another modality, 
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cross-modal modulation also occurs (see Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). For example, 
wine colour likely modulates expectations about its taste (see Clark, 2016, p.55).  
 
More interestingly, the interaction in question also spans the higher levels not only of 
the visual hierarchy, but also the higher levels of the whole hierarchy, beyond the 
visual ‘channel’: the amodal and multimodal higher levels that encode relatively more 
invariant regularities. To take a typical example, amodal /multimodal, higher level 
regularities about the strength of a bird can be used to modulate activity of the lower 
levels of the visual hierarchy, in order to extract regularities about the fast-changing 
regularities governing the sound of a birdsong (Friston & Kiebel, 2009).  
 
“Regularities can be ordered hierarchically, from faster to slower. Levels in the hierarchy 
can be connected such that certain slow regularities, at higher levels, pertain to relevant 
lower level, faster regularities (for example, slow regularities about aussie rules footy 
word frequency during the yearly news cycle pertain to faster regularities about the words 
I end up reading; if I know the slower regularity then I am less surprised by the occurrence 
of those words). A complete such hierarchy would reveal the causal structure and depth 
of the world—the way causes interact and nest with each other across spatiotemporal 
scales.” (Hohwy, 2013, pp. 27-28)  
 
By connecting the different levels of the hierarchy in this manner, in the PP framework 
percepts can be seen as arguably inheriting the depth of the nested causal structure of 
the world (which the cortical hierarchy recapitulates). In a word, in the PP framework, 
in order to form a percept in a certain specific modality, the whole system operates 
across all levels of the cortical hierarchy (for interesting examples, see Clark, 2016, 
pp. 86-87).  
 
2.1.8. Recapitulating the structure of the world 
 
Importantly, via learning, models manage to recapitulate the structure of the world. 
This will be key for my argument (Chapter 4). As Hohwy (2013) remarks, as the 
process of model/hypothesis selection and revision in light of precision-weighted PE 
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unfolds, and learning thus takes place, visual models manage then to extract 
regularities of their proper domain, namely, light-reflecting middle-sized objects. 
More generally, in this manner, generative models manage to extract the causal 
regularities from the world. In other words, priors are learned from experience (i.e., 
exposure and training), and over time they recapitulate the regularities that configure 
the hierarchically nested structure of the world9. In this manner models get to represent 
the world, so that as a certain model continues to improve its capacity to minimize its 
prediction error, the structure of the world gets to be better represented by the model 
(this is what is called the model’s accuracy). This is precisely what allows the system 
to issue successful predictions of the worldly causes of incoming signals, and thus 
minimize PE.  
 
Let’s remember the example of the song of a strong bird above. In this example, 
amodal /multimodal, higher level regularities about the strength of a bird can be used 
to modulate activity of the lower levels of the auditive hierarchy, in order to extract 
regularities about the fast-changing regularities governing the sound of a birdsong. 
 
Crucially, note that, in this example, for stored knowledge about the size and strength 
of a bird to strongly modulate, and thus shape the modality-specific representations of 
sound, there must be a regularity governing specific bird sounds and their size and 
strength, so that type of size and strength can predict type of sound (i.e., they are not 
probabilistically independent phenomena). Stronger birds must tend to sing more 
loudly. If this obtains, the cortical hierarchy can then, via learning, come to extract this 
regularity in the world. Thus, once recapitulated, this stored regularity can be exploited 
to predict the modality specific bird sounds in question from contextual knowledge 
relative to bird strength. In other words, the high-level ‘strong-bird hypothesis’ shapes 
percepts in the auditive channel in a certain way, since certain auditive signals, instead 
of other auditive signals, are expected given this hypothesis. Where do these priors 
(expectations) come from? From regularities in the world, via exposure and training 
                                                             




(i.e., experience). This stored expectation recapitulates then regularities in the world. 
Considering that this sort of expectations are built from experience, by extracting 
regularities in the world, their formation requires that there must be a regularity 
governing bird-strongness and type of sound, so that the former predicts the latter (i.e., 
they are not probabilistically independent phenomena).  
 
Let me insist. For a certain piece of contextual knowledge K to modulate certain low 
level modality-specific activity M, the cortical hierarchy must built a ‘prediction-
enabling’ association between K and M, so as to be able to predict M from K. Via 
learning, this regularity must be extracted from the world and recapitulated by the 
cortical hierarchy. Then, on the assumption that, via learning, the cortical hierarchy 
recapitulates the structure of the world, this can be put on more general terms. In order 
for a specific chunk of amodal/multimodal higher-level knowledge about H to 
systematically shape certain modality-specific lower-level representations about L, the 
following condition must be met: There must be a regularity governing H and L, so 
that H predicts L (i.e., they must not be probabilistically independent phenomena).  
 
Or to put it in slightly different terms. The expectations about which sensory activity 
to expect given a certain object O that the model for O encodes are learned from 
exposure to O during training (i.e., experience). Then, if in a certain domain (e.g., 
detectable vibrations domain) there are no regularities about O’s, the model for O 
cannot get to encode this kind of sensory expectations about O’s for that domain.  
 
This point will be key for my argument to the effect that the current version of the PP 
theory of emotion, the interoceptive inference view of emotion, is problematic. As I 
will argue in Chapter 4, there are no regularities pertaining to emotion in the 
physiological domain. Thus, it is unlikely that emotions arise by simply minimizing 




To sum up, according to the PP framework, the brain, in all its functions, is engaged 
in the single task of minimizing its precision-weighted PE. This can be achieved in 
two ways. The brain can minimize its precision-weighted PE either via perceptual 
inference or via active inference. PP holds that percepts are formed via perceptual 
inference. That is, the brain forms percepts in a top-down fashion via the predictive 
generation of sensory signals in lower-levels. Such sensory signals are produced by 
higher-level models of the likely external causes of the lower-level sensory signals in 
question. Models are updated and improved through precision-weighted PE signals 
that result from that ‘portion’ of the incoming signals that did not match with the 
predicted/generated signals. Perceptual inference has mind-to-world direction of fit. 
On the other hand, the brain can also engage in active inference in order to minimize 
its precision-weighted PE. Active inference consists in changing the environment so 
as to obtain sensory data that fits considered predictions or hypotheses. Active 
inference requires knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies: representations of the 
counterfactual relations that obtain between (possible) actions and its prospective 
sensory consequences. Active inference has world-to-mind direction of fit.  
 
In both kinds of strategies of PE minimization, the latter is minimized by way of a 
cascade of predictions that span the whole cortical hierarchy. Lower levels of the 
cortical hierarchy encode regularities that operate at fast time-scales, which capture 
variant aspects of experience. On the other hand, higher levels encode increasingly 
more complex regularities that operate at slow time-scales, which capture relatively 
more invariant aspects of experience. The different levels of the cortical hierarchy 
constantly interact, so that there are top-down and bottom-up influences that contribute 
in recovering regularities about the world. Finally, priors are learned from experience 
(i.e., exposure and training), and over time they recapitulate the regularities that 
configure the hierarchically nested structure of the world. That is, via learning models 
extract regularities in the world. This is allows the brain to issue successful predictions 





























3. Predictive processing and interoception 
 
In this Chapter, I present, systematize, and refine Seth’s (and Hohwy’s) proposal that 
interoception operates under principles of PP. In this Chapter, I limit myself to 
presenting the interoceptive inference approach to interoception, independently of the 
question of what is the nature of emotion: How do the principles of PP apply to 
interoceptive processing simpliciter? This will set the basis to better grasp the main 
commitments of IIE—in the Chapter that follows (Chapter 4), I present and 
problematize IIE. The aim of this Chapter, then, is to present and discuss the main 
theoretical groundwork needed to unfold the coming discussion relative to the PP 
account of emotion and affective valence.  
 
However, I begin this Chapter by discussing the notions of ‘interoception’, 
‘interoceptive percepts’, and ‘homeostasis’ (Section 3.1.). Discussing these notions is 
key for my purposes. In the first place, IIE is articulated in terms of these notions. 
Then, discussing them is helpful for fully grasping the underlying commitments of IIE 
and ITV, and also its implications. In the second place, these notions play a major role 
in the claims defended in this Thesis, so they will be recurring themes in the Sections 
and Chapters to come.  
 
Then, in Section 3.2., I motivate the view that the principles of PP readily apply to 
interoceptive processing. After motivating this view, I present, systematize, and refine 
the interoceptive inference approach to interoceptive processing. In this respect, I 
highlight three inferential strategies by which interoceptive PE can be minimized: 
interoceptive perceptual inference, internal interoceptive active inference (or ‘internal 
interoceptive action’), and external interoceptive active inference (or ‘external 
interoceptive action’) (allostatic action). Distinguishing between these kinds of 
strategies is essential for the view proposed in this Thesis. Remember that IIE claims 
that emotions arise via interoceptive perceptual inference simpliciter, and that I expand 
IIE so as to claim that external interoceptive actions is what drives emotion generation. 
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Importantly, the latter strategy require stored representations of ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’. I discuss these notions in Section 3.3.  
 
3.1. Interoception, interoceptive percepts, and homeostasis 
 
3.1.1. Interoception and interoceptive percepts 
 
Interoception consists in the perception of all aspects of the physiological condition of 
all tissues of the body (Craig, 2003). Interoception tracks several physiological 
variables via different sets of receptor types, or interoceptors, located all over the body. 
Interoceptors, most of which are polymodal – i.e., they are receptive to several 
physiological variables (Dworkin, 2007) – track changes in physiological variables 
such as, for example, metabolic rate, plasma concentrations of salt, cardiac perfusion, 
build-up of carbon dioxide in the bloodstream, steroids, temperature, inflammatory 
cytokine levels, endocrine activity, mechanical stress, thermal activity, extracellular 
fluid osmotility, lactate, concentrations of glucose, barometric pressure, muscle 
tension,  stimulation of mucosa, and levels of insulin or cortisol, among other variables 
(Craig, 2015; Dworkin, 2007). That is, the kind of variables relative to which the 
spinothalamic pathway is sensitive (Craig, 2003). In other words, interoception 
consists in the perception of the autonomic, hormonal, visceral and immunological 
homeostatic changes (and their physiological effects) that together constitute the 
physiological state of the organism (see also Barrett, 2015).  
 
Let me digress. By characterizing ‘interoception’ in this way, I am taking sides with, 
what might be called, a moderately restrictive characterization of interoception—or, if 
you are more optimistic, a moderately inclusive characterization of interoception. Let’s 
call it simply the moderate view of what counts as ‘interoception’. Ceunen and his 
colleagues (Ceunen et al., 2016) have brought attention to the fact that, in the relevant 
literature, there are two main kinds of views on what counts as interoception: 
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restrictive and inclusive views. Restrictive views (e.g., Dworking, 2007; Sherrington, 
1948) consider that only the perception of activity originating in the viscera counts as 
interoception. Such activity ultimately results from the triggering of visceroceptors. 
On the other hand, according to Ceunen et al., for inclusive views, ‘interoception’ 
refers to the phenomenological experience of a body state, which ultimately results 
from activity in the central nervous system (CNS), independent of the kinds of 
receptors that trigger such an activity. If the resulting experience is felt as a bodily 
experience, then it counts as an interoceptive experience. Ceunen et al. consider that 
this kind of experience is multimodal, as it arises from “the integrated cross-modal 
CNS perception of the body state” (Ceunen et al., 2006, p.743). They consider that 
interoception is multimodal, since key regions in which interoceptive features are re-
represented, such as the mid-insula and the anterior insula, integrate the latter with 
exteroceptive sensory states (vision, audition, etc.) (Craig, 2008). Interoception is the 
phenomenological experience of the body, but only insofar as the latter is integrated 
with information from all modalities.    
 
I think that both views go too far. The restrictive view is too restrictive; while the 
inclusive view is too inclusive. The restrictive view fails to consider that, as it will be 
discussed below, the function of interoception is to track the physiological changes 
that define the homeostatic system of an organism. The function of interoception is to 
track homeostatic afferent information (Craig, 2015). All tissues of the body, and not 
just the viscera, are innervated by interoceptors that convey homeostatic afferent 
activity to the lamina I spinothalamic tract, known as the homeostatic pathway (Craig, 
2015). Therefore, since all tissues of the body are innervated by interoceptors, and thus 
trigger homeostatic afferent activity, the restrictive view is not appropriate in light of 
anatomical and functional criteria.  
 
The inclusive view holds that ‘interoception’ refers to the phenomenological 
experience of the body, which results from the integrated cross-modal perception of 
the body, independent of the kinds of receptors and specific sensory-channels 
involved. This view fails to consider that, for example, vision also exhibits the kind of 
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integration that Ceunen et al. consider. In fact, cross-modal sensory integration is a 
characteristic phenomenon of cortical organization at its higher levels, regarding all 
modalities or sensory channels. As Craig remarks: 
 
“Progressive re-representations that combine feature extraction and cross-modality 
integration are present in the serial processing streams observed in the visual, auditory, 
and parietal somatosensory cortical regions and are consistent with the evolutionary 
development of new processing regions in primate cortex” (Craig, 2008, pp. 279-280).  
 
Certainly, at higher levels, interoceptive representations, just as sensory/perceptual 
representations in any modality, are integrated with representations coming from other 
modalities. However, we do no say from this that, for example, vision is multimodal 
or cross-modal in the sense that Ceunen et al. emphasize. That is, we are not inclusive 
about vision, nor audition, etc. There are no a priori reasons to claim that interoception 
is sui generis in this respect. On the other hand, the inclusive view relies too strongly 
in phenomenology as a criterion for demarcating what counts as interoception. 
Generally speaking, such a criterion by itself tends to produce faulty classifications 
(see, e.g., Macpherson, 2011). In the case at hand, it is not hard to find cases in which 
the relevant experience is exteroceptive, but it is felt as a bodily experience. For 
example, the experience of touch inside the mouth is felt as a bodily experience. 
However, touch is uncontroversially classified as an exteroceptive modality. The 
inclusive view is too inclusive.  
 
It is also sometimes claimed that certain representations in the somatosensory system 
count as interoceptive representations, besides the uncontroversial interoceptive 
representations that result from the insular pathway (e.g., Khalsa et al., 2009; 
Barlassina & Newen, 2014). I think that including the somatosensory pathway from 
skin afferents to the somatosensory cortex as part of the interoceptive system is also 
too inclusive. Among other anatomical differences, this somatosensory pathway—the 
dorsal column-medial lemniscal pathway—is constituted by large-diameter sensory 
fibers from mechanoreceptors in the skin, contrary to the homeostatic pathway (the 
spinothalamic pathway), which is constituted by small-diameter fibers (Craig, 2015) 
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that innervate all tissues of the body. There is an important anatomical difference then 
between the somatosensory pathway and the insular pathway. There is also a 
functional difference. Activity in the somatosensory pathway results eventually in the 
experiences of discriminative touch and limb position. Both these sensory experiences 
are uncontroversially classified as exteroceptive and proprioceptive, respectively. 
Thus, I will align with what I called above a moderately restrictive characterization of 
interoception.  
 
Adopting either the restrictive or the inclusive view has consequences for the nature 
and scope of the claim put forward by the interoceptive inference view of emotion 
(Seth, 2013; Seth et al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013; Hohwy, 2013), and 
consequently, for expansions of the latter, such as the one suggested in Chapter 7. The 
main claim put forward by the interoceptive inference view is that emotions arise from 
interoceptive perceptual hypotheses about the causes of current interoceptive afferents. 
In this view, in direct analogy to the way in which visual percepts are formed (Seth, 
2015a, Seth & Friston, 2016), for an emotion to arise, emotion models/hypotheses need 
to supress from the top-down incoming interoceptive inputs. 
 
On the one hand, adopting the restrictive view amounts to the adoption of a notion of 
interoception already abandoned by the scientific community (for discussion, see 
Craig, 2015). Therefore, if the interoceptive inference view (and expansions of the 
latter) is read as embracing the restrictive conception of interoception, then its claim 
would be a non-starter. There is much more to interoception than just visceral 
perception (does any interoceptive theory of emotion wants to exclude from bodily 
perception, for example, temperature increases in the face?). 
 
On the other hand, adopting the inclusive view of what counts as interoception leads 
to the trivialization of the interoceptive inference view of emotion as it has been put 
forward. This is the case, since, if the inclusive view is adopted, the claim put forward 
by the view in question would amount to the claim that emotions arise as prediction 
94 
 
errors from different modalities (including exteroceptive modalities) are minimized 
via emotion multimodal perceptual hypotheses. As long as the inclusive view 
trivializes the notion of interception by conflating it with integrated multimodal 
perception, but with an special focus on the body, the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion risks stop being an interoceptive view of emotion, properly speaking: it risks 
becoming a multimodal view of emotion. That is, it would end up holding something 
distinct from what it aims to claim, namely, that in direct analogy to the way in which 
visual percepts are formed (Seth, 2015a), for an emotion to arise, emotion 
models/hypotheses need to supress from the top-down incoming interoceptive inputs. 
 
Now, the above should not be taken to imply that a multimodal view is implausible. It 
might turn out to be the case that some sort of multimodal view better captures the 
nature of emotion. It should certainly be explored. However, in this Thesis I am 
interested in discussing the interoceptive inference view insofar as it amounts to a PP 
version of the perceptual, interoceptive view of emotion. According to the latter, even 
though multimodal and abstract knowledge typically causally contributes in emotion 
generation, emotions only arise as interoceptive perception takes place, in direct 
analogy to the way in which vision operates (more on this in Section 4.4.4.). End of 
digression.  
 
3.1.2. The interoceptive system as a perceptual system 
 
The interoceptive system is certainly a sensory/perceptual system: it has evolved 
transducers and processes for capturing information about the inner physiological 
milieu, and its fined-grained representations can be centrally integrated for the purpose 
of action (see Matthen, 2015; Picciuto & Carruthers, 2014; Ritchie & Carruthers, 
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2011). I take Ritchie & Carruthers (2011) to have successfully shown that this is the 
case: the interoceptive system is a sensory/perceptual system10. 
 
As any other sensory system, the interoceptive system is a dedicated input system. As 
such, it uses disparate kinds of mental representation, and it has its own sensory code 
(Prinz, 2002). That is, the interoceptive system is sensitive to particular kinds of inputs, 
distinct from the inputs to which, for example, the visual system is sensitive. And this 
inputs are processed in their own proprietary: the ‘interoceptive code’.  
 
The end products of sensory processing are sensory/perceptual representations of the 
stimuli that cause such processing, i.e., percepts. Insofar as interoception is a sensory 
system, it then gives rise to percepts—and of a distinctive sort, namely, percepts of the 
physiological inner milieu commented above: interoceptive percepts.  
 
3.1.3. Interoceptive percepts and phenomenal consciousness  
 
In line with the standard view, I take percepts to be representations constituted by 
bundles of bounded sensory features. For example, in the case of a visual percept of a 
dog, many features, which are processed in different brain structures at different time 
scales, are coherently bounded together so as to form a unitary perceptual 
                                                             
10 The interoceptive system likely comprises a collection of interoceptive sensory modalities. Ritchie 
& Carruthers (2011) do not go through the trouble of arguing for a specific view regarding which 
might be the correct list of such distinct interoceptive modalities. In fact, no philosophical work has 
been done on this issue yet. What Ritchie & Carruthers (2011) do is to consider the interoceptive 
system as a whole and show, by focusing on different aspects of it, that it satisfies criteria for counting 
as a sensory system rather than as another kind of mental mechanism (e.g., a purely motivational or 
cognitive mechanism). They do not consider each candidate single interoceptive modality (or some of 
them) and show that each of them (or some of them) is indeed a distinct individual modality, by 
showing how each of them (or some of them) satisfies all the just mentioned criteria. They neither 
discuss the issue of what makes a (candidate) single interoceptive modality the individual modality it 
is. Then their argument must be taken to only show that the interoceptive system as a whole is a 
sensory/perceptual system. I am agnostic as to what is the correct list of interoceptive modalities and 
sub-modalities. This ultimately depends on what is the better way to individuate the senses (see 
Macpherson, 2011; Mathen, 2015). Since nothing in my argument will depend on these matters, I will 
leave such discussion for another occasion. 
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representation of a dog: an oval-like shape, borders and edges that compose four legs, 
colours that attach to all these parts, a moving tail, contours that define a face, etc. 
 
Let me briefly digress. I align with the default view in cognitive science that percepts 
and mental images (i.e., the products of imagery) are, structurally, basically the same 
kind of mental entity. They certainly arise under different conditions (during online 
and offline processing, respectively), and they might exhibit, in many occasions, 
differing degrees of granularity. However, to put it this way, both percepts and mental 
images are the same kind of mental end product: representations constituted by bundles 
of bounded sensory features. Even though I will be concerned here mainly (if not 
exclusively) with percepts, for convenience I will use ‘percept’ to refer to both percepts 
and mental images. End of digression.  
 
It will be assumed in this Thesis that, under normal conditions of neural operation, 
phenomenal consciousness is populated by nothing over and above percepts, i.e., 
experience is restricted to percepts. Percepts can occur outside phenomenal 
consciousness, as priming and subliminal-perception studies show (e.g., Naccache & 
Dehaene, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2005; Wen et al., 2007). However, when 
consciousness arises, it is exhausted by percepts: consciousness does not outstrip 
percepts (see Prinz, 2012)11. That is, it will be assumed that there are no phenomenal 
qualities beyond sensory representations—independently of the issue of whether the 
latter can also have abstract contents. Note that the claim in question simply denies 
that there can be non-sensory representational vehicles with qualitative character (for 
discussion, see Prinz, 2012, pp. 149-168).  
                                                             
11 The escape clause at the beginning of the paragraph is meant to cover cases of agnosia (particularly, 
visual agnosia). In such cases, there is consciousness without optimally formed percepts (Prinz, 2012). 
That is, agnosia patients seem to experience “broken percepts”: bundles of features which are not 
optimally bounded together. However, note that the case that their consciousness is populated by 
“broken percepts”, since their perceptual mechanism is malfunctioning after a stroke or other kind of 
lesion, bolsters the view that sensory features bounded together (i.e., percepts) is the material out of 
which the brain gets consciousness. There seems to be no cases of consciousness without percepts (or 





I am also assuming that there is unconscious perception, i.e., that coherently bounded 
sensory representations or percepts can occur outside phenomenal consciousness (so 
they cannot be reported) during online processing. As studies of subliminal perception 
show (e.g., Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2005; Wen et al., 2007), 
presented stimuli can be semantically processed, and thus represented, without being 
phenomenally conscious for the agent. This is evidenced by the fact that, after 
presentation, those stimuli can have a consistent impact on the subsequent behaviour 
of the agent. In these cases, a percept is formed—even though it does not need to be a 
rich, full in details percept or sensory representation—but it does not reach 
consciousness. The same holds for percepts in all modalities, as the brain conserves 
the same principles of organization across its sensory systems, and there is no a priori 
reason to exclude interoception (for a discussion of this assumption, see Block, 2011). 
 
3.1.4. Interoceptive percepts are coherently unified representations that track 
cascading whole-body physiological changes that constantly evolve through time 
 
Now, what sort of physiological activity is tracked by the interoceptive features that 
constitute interoceptive percepts?   
 
As I mentioned above, interoception tracks several physiological variables. 
Importantly, once a local physiological change relative to a certain variable takes 
place, cascading changes are triggered in the activity of many variables and effectors 
all over the body landscape. These local physiological changes and effectors 
coordinate and modulate each other in parallel and across levels in a mutually 
constraining, network-like fashion (Craig, 2015, p.20; Dworkin, 2007). For example, 
muscle afferent activity in a certain tissue modulates cardiovascular activity; and 
changes in lactic acid and deprotonated phosphate in certain tissues modulates muscle 
sympathetic nerve activity and vasodilatory effect of metabolic product (Dworkin, 
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2007). Also the activity in certain thermoreceptors (a type of interoceptor) linearly 
modulates respiratory parameters, which in turn constrain heartbeat, circulatory 
activity, tissue metabolic rate, thermogenic, brown adipose tissue, compartmental 
vascular perfusion, panting, and sweating. In turn, each of these changes triggers a 
cascade of mutually constraining physiological changes on their own in a constantly 
evolving cycle (Craig, 2015; Diesel et al., 1990). Thus, by constraining and modulating 
cascading physiological changes in other variables across the body landscape, each 
local physiological change in a certain variable configures a novel shape in the whole-
body physiological landscape.  
 
It has been claimed that interoceptive percepts are better seen as a multimodal percepts 
that integrates sensory representations coming from all modalities, including the 
exteroceptive modalities (Ceunen et al., 2016). However, as I argued above (Section 
3.1.1.), such an inclusive view of interoception is too inclusive, as it conflates the 
notion of interoception with the notion of integrated multimodal perception. After all, 
physiological perception (interoception) occurs whether or not it is integrated with 
what the organism is currently seeing or hearing.   
 
3.1.5. The interoceptive hierarchy 
 
Distinct types of interoceptors—which are mostly polymodal— located in different 
tissues all over the body landscape track these constantly evolving cascades of 
mutually constraining local physiological changes. This information is received by the 
brain12. As it is the case with sensory/perceptual systems in general, the interoceptive 
system is likely to be hierarchically organized (see Chapter 2). After initial processing 
in functionally specific interoceptive thalamic sensory regions – e.g., VMpo, VMb, 
MDvc –a somatotopically organized interceptive primary sensory region represents 
local physiological changes as they occur in different tissues of the body (Craig, 2010). 
                                                             
12 Not all interoceptors project to the cortex. Some of them work only locally (Craig, 2015).  
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To take a speculative example, at these levels of the interoceptive hierarchy, 
representations track the rapidly evolving activity of different fibers located in 
different parts of the heart, and in different parts of other organs and tissues. That is, 
at these levels of processing, the rapid activity of restrictive receptive fields is 
represented.  
 
Good candidate structures for realizing these levels are the posterior and middle insula, 
which constitute a primary interoceptive cortex (Craig, 2015), roughly analogous to 
V1 in the case of vision. These regions receive visceral inputs from regions such as 
the nucleus of the solitary tract, and from the lamina-1 spinal tract, which form part of 
a functionally specific interoceptive pathway (Craig, 2002). 
 
As is the case with respect to standard sensory systems, such as vision, the 
interoceptive system must also exhibit levels of processing where comparatively more 
invariant features are encoded, such as for example, features pertaining to the rate of 
the whole heart, and also features pertaining to the more global physiological condition 
of other single organs and tissues. There must also be levels of processing that 
represent even more invariant features, such as for example, the physiological 
condition of the whole body. Candidate structures involved in realizing these latter 
levels of processing include, for example, regions of the insula, regions of ACC, and 
regions of the amygdala, among others (Craig, 2015; Prinz, 2012, pp.65-66).  
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, where I presented the PP framework, forming world revealing 
percepts requires finding a stable solution across all levels of the perceptual hierarchy. 
The same should hold for inner-world revealing percepts. Interoceptive percepts then 
merge features that track changes in several kinds of cascading, mutually-constraining 
physiological variables all over the body, giving rise to a coherent and unified 
representation of the physiological condition of the whole body at its different time-
scales. In other words, interoceptive percepts provide a global, hierarchically 




The insular cortex is key for interoceptive percept formation. The insula is a complex 
structure, composed of several subregions. All of those subregions serve the function 
of representing “visceral” activity (Deen et al., 2011). Interestingly, the insula is a 
structure that is richly interconnected with regions involved in reward processing, 
exteroception, motor control, and cognition (Medford & Critchley, 2010; Deen et al., 
2011). Thus, even though the insula is an interoceptive structure, it is highly sensitive 
to information coming from other senses, cognition, reward systems, proprioception, 
etc. Particularly relevant here is the anterior insula (AIC), which is highly sensitive to 
exteroceptive information and realizes a whole body representation of the 
physiological condition of the body (Craig, 2015). In AIC, interoceptive percepts are 
integrated with such exteroceptive representations. As we will see below, taking into 
account all sorts of information is a critical part of the process of interoceptive percept 
formation via perceptual inference. This makes then the insula, particularly AIC, a key 
region for instantiating predictive interoceptive inference during percept formation 
(Seth, 2013). On the other hand, AIC is critical for the conscious representation of the 
inner milieu (Craig, 2015). Thus, considering that consciousness is restricted to 
percepts, this supports the claim that the anterior insula is critical for interoceptive 
percept formation.  
 
However, even though the anterior insula is critical for interoceptive percept 
formation, it should not be seen as necessary and sufficient for interoceptive percepts. 
Damasio (Damasio et al. 2013) reports that a patient with a major bilateral lesion in 
the insular cortices exhibits normal bodily experience. Thus, interoceptive percepts are 
likely to be realized in a distributed manner, across all subcortical and cortical regions 







3.1.6. Interoceptive percepts as ‘multimodal interoceptive percepts’ 
 
Insofar as interoceptive percepts incorporate coherently unified features that represent 
changes in several kinds of cascading, mutually-constraining physiological variables 
all over the body, they can be taken to be multimodal interoceptive representations: 
they track physiological changes for which there are distinct types of sets of 
interoceptors. For ease of exposition, from now on I will refer to these representations 
simply as ‘interoceptive percepts’ instead of as ‘multimodal interoceptive percepts’ 
(see also footnote 10). 
 
3.1.7. Representing proximal physiological changes via interoceptive percepts: the 
content of interoceptive percepts 
 
Insofar as the interoceptive system is a sensory/perceptual system, it represents. As I 
mentioned above, I take Ritchie & Carruthers (2011) to have successfully shown that 
the interoceptive system is a sensory/perceptual system, and that its final products do 
count as truly representational. That is, the interoceptive system issues proper 
percepts13. 
 
                                                             
13 I am assuming that such final products are proper sensory representations. I am aware that in some 
corners of the cognitive science community it is held that sensory processing, and cognition more 
generally, does not harbour representations (Varela et al., 1991; Chemero, 2009). Enactivists 
emphasize that it is unlikely that the mind’s job is to recover a mind-independent world in the way 
that a mirror captures the things that get to be in front of it. Minds evolved so as to act within its own 
ecology, to put it that way. What an organism is able to do specifies what she perceives, and vice-
versa. The mind and its own ecology mutually specify each other. As long as sensory representations 
are taken to be mirrors of an agent-neutral world, sensory representations should certainly be looked 
with suspicion. I think these insights are on the right track. However, they do not speak against 
representations. There is no need to take representations as mirrors of an agent-neutral world. In fact, 
representations are arguably action-oriented (Clark, 1997; Millikan, 1996). That is, they jointly 
encode aspects of the world and specify relevant actions. In line with the insights of enactivism, the 
aspects of the world that they encode are better seen as capturing the task-relevant, ecologically salient 




Now, it is natural to hold that what the end products of interoception represent are the 
physiological changes that impinge our interoceptors. On the one hand, the mental 
states that are the final product of interoception causally co-vary with such 
physiological changes. Moreover, they have the function of representing those 
physiological changes in order to maintain homeostasis (Craig, 2015)—they are used 
by the organism for that purpose. Then, by the lights of any family of naturalistic 
theory of content – either a causal or a consumer theory – what the end product of 
interoceptive processing represents are the physiological changes involved in 
homeostasis maintenance (more on this below).  
 
Besides the argument above, the claim that interoceptive representations have 
physiological changes as contents is supported by the fact that interoceptive states such 
as pain and orgasm do exhibit such kind of content, as Tye (1995) has successfully 
shown. For example, part of the content of pain is, roughly, tissue damage; while part 
of the content of orgasm is, roughly, muscle contractions in certain pelvic regions. On 
the other hand, all sensory systems typically have content: vision, audition, touch, 
taste, proprioception, etc. It would be simply arbitrary then to exclude the interoceptive 
system (see also Schroeder, 2001) (for discussion, see Block, 2006) (more on this 
below, in Section 6.3.2.).  
 
Now, external sensory modalities such as audition, vision and touch, besides 
representing proximal stimuli, they (mainly) represent distal stimuli. For example, 
vision represents both the patterns of light that impinge our transducers, and medium-
sized objects in the external environment (e.g., a dog), respectively. However, in the 
case of interoception there seems to be no proximal/distal distinction (Ritchie & 
Carruthers, 2011, p. 357). Then, the interoceptive system seems to only represent the 
physiological changes that impinge our interoceptors; it does not represent more distal 
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objects beyond the skin14. Interoceptive percepts then represent the inner world: 
patterns of constantly evolving physiological changes.  
 
3.1.8. Interoceptive percepts represent changes 
 
Note that interoceptive afferents respond to changes in physiological variables, not to 
the properties of physiological variables as such. That is, interoceptive afferents 
respond to increases and decreases in the activity of physiological variables; they do 
not signal an indication of the precise quantitative value taken by a certain variable at 
a certain time. Interoceptive percepts then are better seen as representing physiological 
changes. Importantly, whole-body increases and decreases in the activity of 
physiological variables occur as the organism (or some of its parts) attempts to keep 
its overall physiological workings within a certain range of viability.  This process is 
known as homeostasis, and it will prove to be a key notion in the coming Sections and 
Chapters.   
 
3.1.9. Homeostasis and its network-like nature 
 
In the sense that will be relevant in this work, homeostasis basically consist in 
maintaining an optimal overall physiological regulatory level, or balance, able to keep 
the entire organism’s body within its limits of viability. The interoceptive system, 
which tracks whole-body physiological changes, evolved for maintaining homeostasis 
(Craig, 2015). Interoceptive percepts represent then the physiological changes that 
occur during homeostasis regulation. In other words, interoceptive percepts represent 
                                                             
14 Prinz (2004) holds that interoceptive representations also track distal properties, namely, core 
relational themes. However, Prinz’s argument for that claim it is based on a dubious hypothesis, as I 
will argue in Chapter 4. Then, and to borrow Prinz’s terminology, interoceptive percepts do not have 




the physiological changes that configure a homeostatic system. Thus, interoceptive 
percepts inform us how we are faring in maintaining homeostasis.  
 
Now, contrary to what is usually assumed without argument in the philosophical 
literature (e.g., Corns, 2014), homeostasis does not operate in a “thermostat-like” 
fashion: single, segregated variables (e.g., osmotic pressure) each being separately 
regulated to a certain static built-in value, which supposedly each variable individually 
has (Craig, 2015, p.20; Dworkin, 2007):  
 
The brain does not contain a collection of thermostats, each controlling a separate 
condition, and there is no single, overarching command center that controls all functions. 
For instance, thermoregulation is now recognized to involve a redundant set of 
anatomically distinct neural mechanisms at several levels of the neuraxis that are the 
products of successive evolutionary improvements. These mechanisms control multiple 
effectors, such as tissue metabolic rate, thermogenic brown adipose tissue, compartmental 
vascular perfusion, panting, sweating, shivering, and behaviour. […]Furthermore, 
thermoregulation interacts with a variety of homeostatic conditions, such as energy 
metabolism, salt and water regulatory hormones (renin, aldosterone, atrial natriuretic 
peptide), sweat and saliva production, cardiac and respiratory functions, renal filtration, 
and most important, behaviour (cold-seeking or heat-seeking). For example, a single 
intravenous injection of hypertonic saline in a rabbit, rat, or human simulating 
dehydration and salt imbalance will raise the blood pressure and cardiac output (after 
transient decreases) but reduce the metabolic rate, respiration, and core temperature; all 
of these effects can be viewed as responses that conserve water. Yet it will also raise the 
core temperature threshold for sweating, a heat defence mechanism, and at the same time 
increase cold-seeking/heat-escape behaviour in either a thermoneutral or a warm 
environment; notably, these effects would seem contradictory in a “thermostat” model. 
(Craig, 2015, p.20-21). 
 
As I mentioned above, once a local physiological change relative to a certain variable 
takes place, cascading changes are triggered in the activity of many variables and 
effectors all over the body landscape, which mutually constrain each other in a 
network-like fashion. Multiple whole-body variables are then orchestrated by central, 
autonomic and endocrine processes, so that changes in one variable coordinate 
compensatory changes in other variables; each of which is adjusted in turn by another 
set of physiological changes in a constantly evolving cycle. Thus, by constraining and 
modulating cascading physiological changes in other variables across the body 
landscape, each (homeostatically relevant) local physiological change in a certain 
variable configures a novel shape in the whole-body physiological landscape. 
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Homeostasis requires then coordinating many effectors and variables in parallel all 
over the body, so that an overall, whole-body adaptive physiological balance can be 
achieved. 
 
This constantly evolving whole-body physiological landscape that results from the aim 
of maintaining homeostasis gets nicely illustrated by borrowing Damasio’s waterbed 
analogy: “when someone walks on it [a waterbed] in varied directions: some areas are 
depressed, while others rise; ripples form; the entire bed is modified as a whole […]” 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 135). Interoceptive percept represent then this ever-evolving wide 
landscape of local changes as they take part on a whole-body network of further 
compensatory changes.  
 
Since the regulation of a certain local physiological change mobilizes a wide range of 
mutually-constraining whole-body physiological changes in other variables in a 
constantly evolving cycle, the achievement of homeostatic balance is then not best 
described by the thermostat metaphor, where the regulatory target amounts to a single 
variable that is individually regulated to a rigid regulatory level. The network-like 
nature of homeostasis maintenance also implies that homeostatic regulatory levels are 
flexible to a certain degree. There still is a regulatory level toward which homeostatic 
processes aim. Nonetheless, the fact that homeostasis involves multiple dynamic 
processes that negotiate changes across many variables implies that oscillations around 
this level are rather broad and set to change (Bernston & Caccioppo, 2007)—that is 
why some researchers prefer to use the term ‘heterostasis’. Then, contrary to the 
thermostat view of homeostasis, there is no single set-point, but rather a collection of 
dynamic functions that “interact to maintain an optimal use of energy in the body 
across all conditions at all times” (Barrett, 2015, p. 422). Moreover, the network-like 
nature of homeostasis—i.e., local changes determining changes in many other 
variables in the whole-body landscape—also implies that any triggered physiological 
change in some variable is homeostatically relevant, insofar as it will trigger further 
changes in other variables, modifying thus the shape of the whole-body physiological 
landscape. It is no surprise then that variables such as blood pressure seem to have no 
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set-point: it varies significantly during the day of a normal adult depending on the 
demands implied by changes in other variables (Sterling, 2004). 
 
3.1.9.1. Two ways of rectifying homeostatic imbalances: internal and external actions 
 
Importantly, in order to overcome a homeostatic imbalance, an organism has two kinds 
of actions available. They might be called internal actions and external actions. The 
former consist in automatically executing “physiological policies” by making use of 
resources that are already available within the organism. For example, as when an 
organism deals with an increase in effective osmotic pressure of plasma (which is one 
of the ways whereby the feeling of thirst can be eventually triggered), the body 
responds by secreting vasopressin, stimulating the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone 
system, reducing renal solute and water excretion, among other whole-body 
“physiological policies”. These are internal actions. In the case of internal actions, 
when physiological changes move in the direction of going beyond viability limits, 
homeostatic balance is rectified then by triggering internally accessible physiological 
resources.  
 
On the other hand, an organism can deal with an increase in effective osmotic pressure 
of plasma by modifying her environment, for example, looking for a beverage. These 
are external actions—sometimes also referred to as ‘allostatic actions’ (Gu & 
Fitzgerald, 2014; Sterling, 2004; Seth, 2015a). Homeostasis drives behaviour. External 
actions require motivation. Regions of the interoceptive pathway encode urges to 
change physiological changes already in early stages of interoceptive processing. The 
main regions involved are the brainstem, the hypothalamus and ACC, which receive 
projections from interoceptors’ activity via the parabrachial nucleus, and are heavily 
interconnected with interoceptive regions likely involved in realizing interoceptive 
percepts. This makes plenty of evolutionary sense, for, let me insist, in many cases the 
only way in which certain physiological imbalances can be corrected is by acting in 
the world. Then, the interoceptive system includes motivations that impel the 
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behavioural responses required to maintain homeostasis (it is no coincidence then that 
mental states such as hunger, thirst, cold, etc. are known as ‘motivations’).   
 
3.1.9.2. Homeostatic regulatory standards 
 
Maintaining homeostasis can be taken to be a hard-wired goal of biological systems 
(e.g., Friston, 2010; Friston & Stephan, 2007). Goals set standards according to which 
something can be evaluated. Thus, body landscapes can be taken to be good or bad, 
positive or negative, according to whether they tend to approach or deviate from the 
aimed-at (flexible) regulatory level of homeostasis maintenance, respectively.  
 
By this I do not mean to claim that body landscapes can be taken to be positive or 
negative in case they tend to promote or threaten homeostasis: given that homeostasis 
maintenance works in a network-like fashion, departures from a homeostatic norm in 
certain variables triggers compensatory physiological changes in other variables. The 
latter changes involve sacrificing regulatory balances for the sake of avoiding even 
major imbalances in target variables. In this kind of case, such compensatory changes, 
in a sense, can be taken to promote homeostasis maintenance. However, insofar as they 
deviate from its aimed-at homoeostatic range of levels, they do not count as positive 
body landscapes in the sense I intend.  
 
To sum up, the interoceptive system gives rise to interoceptive percepts. The latter 
amount to bundles of coherently unified interoceptive features that proximally 
represent the constantly evolving cascade of whole-body physiological changes 
involved in homeostasis maintenance. Physiological changes can be positive or 
negative relative to homeostatic standards. Homeostatic imbalances can be rectified 




3.2. Motivating PP as applied to interoception  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the PP framework has been mostly applied to the 
explanation of exteroceptive percept formation, in particular to vision (e.g., Rao & 
Ballard, 1999). In this and other exteroceptive (and motor) domains, PP has proven to 
be explanatorily successful and surprising, showing thus that the hypothesis of the 
predictive mind is on the right track. Indeed, the fact that PP offers compelling 
accounts in those domains at several levels of processing—including the retina 
(Srinivasan et al.,1982), thalamus (Jehee & Ballard, 2009), and sensory cortex (Rao & 
Ballard, 1999)—suggests that the computational principles of PP constitute a general 
solution of the nervous system.  
 
This begins to suggest that the process by which interoceptive percepts are formed is 
quite likely to be also governed by the principles of predictive processing (PP). Indeed, 
as Seth (2015a) and Hohwy (2013) remark (see also Friston et al., 2013), the PP 
framework applies much more naturally, and fundamentally, to the interoceptive 
processes that take place during homeostasis maintenance. The PP framework is then, 
to say the least, a more than promising approach to the nature of the workings of 
interoceptive percept formation. Let me briefly explain some of these claims.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, PP holds that the brain forms percepts by minimizing the 
difference between the actual sensory signals it receives from the world and the signals 
it predictively generates in a top-down fashion on the basis of its models of the most 
likely worldly causes of such incoming signals. This difference is known as ‘prediction 
error’ (PE). As we saw in Chapter 2, the brain is engaged in the single task of 
minimizing PE, so that both perception and action result from the brain’s best attempts 




Importantly, PP can be taken to be the brain’s evolved perceptual and behavioural 
strategy for inferentially dealing with the more fundamental task of complying with 
the free energy principle (Friston 2005, 2009, 2010). Roughly, according to the latter, 
organisms must ensure that they maintain themselves within expected bounds of 
‘surprisal’. In other words, in the PP framework, perception and action “emerge as a 
consequence of a more fundamental imperative towards avoiding ‘surprising’ events” 
(Seth, 2015a, p.5). Roughly, a certain organism is in a ‘surprising’ state in case it is 
outside the subset of possible states that are most probable for such organism to be 
in—considering the way the organism in question is constituted—simple because there 
is low probability of finding such organism in that state, given its constitution.   
 
Now, a defining characteristic of biological systems is that they maintain homeostasis, 
i.e., they regulate their inner physiological milieu so as to keep it within viability 
bounds (see Friston, 2010, p.1). ‘Surprising’ states, in the sense defined above, reflect 
conditions incompatible with homeostasis. That is, avoiding ‘surprising’ events 
roughly amounts to avoiding putting the organism away from homeostatic balance. 
This is the case arguably because ‘surprisal’ is a measure that is quantified relative to 
the constitution of an organism, and the latter, in turn, determines the kinds of 
transactions with the environment in which it is most probable to find the organism in 
question. Thus, “the long-term (distal) imperative—of maintaining states within 
physiological bounds—translates into a short-term (proximal) avoidance of surprise” 
(Friston, 2010, p.2). In a word, organisms require minimizing ‘surprisal’ so as to stay 
within its peculiar limits of physiological viability: “low free-energy systems will look 
like they are responding adaptively to changes in the external or internal milieu, to 
maintain a homeostatic exchange with the environment” (Friston & Stephan, 2007, p. 
428). However, organisms cannot estimate ‘surprisal’ directly, so they need to rely on 
the PP strategy of PE minimization in order to achieve finding themselves in low 
‘surprising’ states (i.e., states compatible with homeostasis). Then, considering that 
the function of interoception is to track physiological changes so as to maintain 
homeostasis, minimizing interoceptive PE is a more fundamental task than minimizing 
exteroceptive PE, given the imperative of keeping ‘surprisal’ quantities low. In fact, 
110 
 
that is why minimizing exteroceptive PE (via perceptual inference and action) 
“emerges as a consequence of a more fundamental imperative towards homeostasis” 
(Seth, 2015a, p.3), or if you want, it “emerges as a consequence of a more fundamental 
imperative towards the avoidance of “surprising” events” (Seth, 2015a, p.5). Thus, PP 
straightforwardly, and fundamentally, applies to interoception, given the deeper 
background of the free energy principle. 
 
Compared to exteroceptive (and motor) processes, PP research on interoception has 
been scarce and still remains more speculative – probably because it is technically 
more challenging to gather evidence in the interoceptive domain, since interoceptive 
processes involve deep structures in the brain, and homeostatic processes are highly 
complex. However, early research on homeostatic physiological regulation recognized 
the need of mechanisms that hint some of the elements that PP incorporates into its 
architecture. For example, already Cannon recognized the need of mechanisms able to 
anticipate visceral activity by way of learned responses, so as to rectify physiological 
imbalances (Cannon, 1928). Also control architectures that include a predictive 
forward model that estimates visceral activity based on learned responses have been 
long recognized as key for homeostatic regulation (e.g., Dworkin, 1993).  
 
More interestingly, as Seth (2013) remarks, various strands of current evidence suggest 
that interoception operates under the principles of PP. Firstly, contrary to the 
assumption that interoception works in a feed-forward, bottom-up fashion, 
interoceptive regions in the brain, besides constantly exchanging information across 
levels, exhibit significant top-down projections to physiological control regions in the 
brainstem and spinal cord (Critchley & Harrison, 2013). Secondly, as I mentioned 
above, AIC is a key region of interoceptive representation that instantiates (together 
with other regions) a level of sensory/perceptual processing at which interoceptive 
representations can become conscious (Craig, 2015). Neuroimaging studies show that 
AIC is involved in expectation processing and responds to prediction errors in cases 
of homeostatically relevant phenomena, such as pain perception (Ploghaus et al., 1999; 
Seymour et al., 2004), affective touch (Lovero et al., 2009), itchiness (Holle et al., 
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2012), and in cases of affective responses to external situations (Xiang et al., 2013). 
Finally, there is evidence of interoceptive PE signals in interoceptive regions, such as 
the dorsal middle and posterior insula, in the case of inspiratory load during exercise 
in professional athletes (Paulus et al., 2012), and during threat processing in the case 
of elite war fighters (Paulus et al., 2010).  
 
Furthermore, several studies on pain, which amounts to a homeostatic affective state 
grounded in interoception (Craig, 2002, 2003, 2015), suggest that it does not simply 
result from bottom-up feed-forward processing. For example, there is evidence that 
top-down modulation attenuates the strength of incoming nociceptive signals, 
suggesting that there is in the case of pain a phenomenon similar to signal suppression 
in the way postulated by PP (Calejesan et al., 2000). It has been also shown that 
contextual factors, expectations, and attentional phenomena can shape the processing 
of pain (Jepma & Wager, 2013; Wiech et al., 2008; Ploghaus et al., 1999). 
 
To sum up, the process by which interoceptive percepts are formed is quite likely to 
be governed by the principles of PP, for it follows rather directly from the fact that PP 
is a case of the free-energy principle, and some strands of evidence suggest that it 
might be so. 
 
3.3. The workings of interoceptive (predictive) inference 
 
Before presenting Seth’s and Hohwy’s versions of the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion in the next Chapter, in the coming Sections I systematize and refine the ways 
in which the principles of PP operate in the case of interoception in general. That is, in 
the coming Sections, I systematize the workings of interoceptive inference, 
independently of whether or not they can be used to account for emotion per se.  
 




The view that interoceptive and homeostatic processes are better understood along PP 
lines has been mainly proposed by A. Seth (Seth, 2013, 2015a; Seth et al, 2012; Seth 
& Critchley, 2013)—see also Hohwy (2011, 2013). According to Seth, the 
interoceptive processes that occur during homeostasis maintenance take place via 
predictive interoceptive inference. More precisely, according to Seth, in direct analogy 
to the way exteroceptive percepts are formed (Seth, 2015a; Seth & Friston, 2016), the 
subjective feeling states characteristic of interoceptive processing arise by way of 
interoceptive perceptual inference. That is, subjective feeling states arise by 
minimizing interoceptive prediction error (PE) via interoceptive inferences of the 
likely causes of incoming interoceptive signals. Let’s call this view the interoceptive 
inference approach (IIA).  
 
Importantly, insofar as drives (or homeostatic motivations), such as hunger and thirst, 
are quintessentially states that result from interoceptive processing, I will consider 
those kinds of states in my exposition of the interoceptive inference approach to 
interoception as representative of the kind of subjective feeling states that result from 
interoceptive processing. The issue of whether emotions per se and valence as such 
can be understood as arising via interoceptive inferences will be discussed in the next 
Chapters. 
 
Allow me now to clarify a minor terminological issue. Even though Seth phrases IIA 
in terms of subjective feeling states, IIA should be understood as an account of 
interoceptive percept formation—percepts, remember, can occur outside 
consciousness (i.e., they can be unfelt). IIA should be understood in this way since IIA 
basically amounts to the direct extension to interoception of the process by which 
percepts are formed in the exteroceptive domain (e.g., vision). In other words, IIA 
basically amounts to the working of visual inference during visual percept formation, 
but applied to interoception. However, given that percepts generally take place in 
consciousness (i.e., they are typically felt), it is not misleading if IIA is taken as an 
account of subjective feeling states. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that IIA is 
113 
 
an account of inner feelings only insofar as it is an account of interoceptive percepts—
which can occur outside consciousness, as I commented above.  
 
How does interoceptive inference work in the IIA framework? According to IIA, 
subjective feeling states (or interoceptive feelings) arise via interoceptive inference in 
the following way. Firstly, actual physiological changes take place. This can occur 
under several conditions. For example, actual physiological changes can be triggered 
by (non-centrally triggered) autonomic control signals (e.g., the reduction of renal 
solute and water excretion), and more indirectly by demands of the musculoskeletal 
system (e.g., having to run away) and by external conditions (e.g., snow falling). These 
occurring physiological changes produce actual incoming interoceptive signals that 
need to be ‘explained away’. Such signals need to be ‘explained away’ by a hypothesis 
about their cause in the physiological domain. For example, let’s say that it is snowing. 
Certain physiological changes take place, for example, peripheral vasoconstriction. 
They cause certain incoming interoceptive signals. The latter need to be ‘explained 
away’. A good hypothesis (one with high prior probability and likelihood, so with high 
posterior probability) is that such signals are being caused by low body temperature 
(cold). Incoming signals are successfully explained away. The experience of cold 
arises, i.e., the felt interoceptive percept of cold is formed. 
 
Let me briefly digress. Remember that the above actual incoming interoceptive signals 
need to be ‘explained away’ (so as to minimize interoceptive PE) because this is the 
manner in which the brain can achieve its distal goal, which is reducing this other 
quantity, distinct from PE, namely, ‘surprisal’. Also remember that ‘surprisal’ can be 
taken to be at optimal (low) levels in case the organism stays in ranges of physiological 
balance. Then, ‘explaining away’ actual incoming interoceptive signals is the 
proximal, immediate goal that interoceptive inferences need to achieve, just as the 
proximal goal that visual inferences need to achieve is ‘explaining away’ incoming 
visual signals. While minimizing ‘surprisal’, or keeping an overall physiological 
balance in the long run, is the distal, long-run goal that the brain, in all its functions, 
including interoception, needs to achieve. Then, even in the case of visual inference 
the distal goal can be taken to be minimizing ‘surprisal’. Also note that the direction 
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of fit relative to the task of  ‘explaining away’ actual incoming interoceptive signals is 
mind-to-world, i.e., finding an hypothesis that successfully models the way the (inner) 
world is. On the other hand, note that the direction of fit relative to the distal goal of 
keeping an overall physiological balance is world-to-mind, i.e., changing the (inner) 
world so as to fit an expectation of homeostatic balance (i.e., keeping surprisal low) 
(more on this below). End of digression.  
 
Now, according to Seth, actual incoming interoceptive signals are met, and compared, 
with signals generated from the top-down. These latter signals amount to predictions 
about the likely interoceptive signals that should be actually taking place, given a 
content-specifying model of the likely causes of such signals. These models then can 
be seen as putting forward hypotheses about the causes of incoming signals (e.g., “if 
it is hunger, I expect these interoceptive signals to be taking place. Let’s generate those 
signals. Do they match incoming signals?”), and they are hierarchically organized in 
several layers of processing, where the layer above attempts to predict the activity of 
the layer below. In a word, models of the likely causes of incoming interoceptive 
signals specify predictions by generating from the top-down the expected activity in 
lower layers of processing, and this strategy is repeated across all levels of 
interoceptive hierarchy.  
 
Importantly, the comparison of actual incoming interoceptive signals and the 
interoceptive signals generated from the top-down gives rise to interoceptive PE. The 
latter amounts then to the difference between expected and actual signals. The task of 
the brain during interoceptive inference is to minimize this difference by suppressing 
or ‘explaining away’ from the top-down its incoming signals, or by acting so as to 
change its inputs, as we will see below. This resulting PE is used to refine current 
predictions, so as to issue better predictions able to successfully minimize occurring 
interoceptive PE. PE signals are also used as a learning signal to improve, in the long-
run, the models responsible of generating predictions. According to Seth, in direct 
analogy (Seth, 2015a; Seth & Friston, 2016) to the case of vision (and exteroceptive 
processing more generally), where a visual percept is formed when visual PE is 
successfully minimized, subjective feeling states arise when interoceptive PE is 
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successfully minimized. The content of the resulting experience or percept is specified 
by the content of the predictions generated from the top-down. At the higher-levels, 
the models that contribute in specifying interoceptive hypotheses encode not only 
interoceptive information, but also encode multimodal and amodal information. This 
sort of information contributes in linking interoceptive states with exteroceptive states. 
In other words, the brain uses all it has so as to minimize interoceptive PE and thus 
form an interoceptive percept: amodal high-level contextual knowledge, and 
knowledge from other modalities that laterally feed interoceptive hypotheses. These 
pieces of knowledge inform interoceptive inference across all levels of the 
interoceptive perceptual-hierarchy.  
 
However, note that during interoceptive PE minimization, amodal and multimodal 
knowledge serve interoceptive ends: finding the better interoceptive hypothesis. In 
other words, forming an interoceptive percept requires meeting incoming interoceptive 
signals alone, and this is achieved by generating from the top-down interoceptive 
signals—i.e., signals proprietary of the visual channel won’t do the job of suppressing 
interoceptive incoming data. Let me insist, only once the bottom-up activity 
proprietary of the interoceptive channel is ‘explained away’, an interoceptive percept 
is formed. Then, even though the models that contribute in specifying interoceptive 
hypotheses encode, besides interoceptive information, also multimodal and amodal 
information, such non-interoceptive information is used for the sake of finding the 
interoceptive signals that better match the incoming signals proprietary of the 
interoceptive channel. So during interoceptive PE minimization, amodal and 
multimodal knowledge serves interoceptive ends: influencing the interoceptive data 
that eventually will meet activity in the lower layers of the interoceptive channel, so 
as to minimize interoceptive PE.  
 
As we will see below, the anterior insula (AIC) is key for interoceptive percept 
formation, not only because is thought to be critical region for comparing top-down 
and bottom-up interoceptive signals, but it is also sensitive to exteroceptive and 
proprioceptive information during interoceptive inference (Seth, 2013, 2015a; Seth et 
al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). This is analogous to the case 
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of vision—remember that IIA is built on the direct analogy to visual percept formation 
via visual PE minimization (Seth, 2015a; Seth & Friston, 2016). In the case of vision, 
forming a percept requires meeting incoming visual signals alone (to put it this way, 
one does not need to hear so as to see). Remember that sensory systems are dedicated 
input systems. Certainly, in the PP framework, during visual percept formation, 
amodal knowledge and knowledge from non-visual modalities contribute across all 
levels of the visual hierarchy. However, they contribute by constraining the kind of 
visual activity that is generated from the top-down so as to successfully ‘explain away’ 
the incoming signals proprietary of the visual channel. If these signals proprietary of 
the visual channel are not ‘explained away’, no world revealing visual percept gets to 
be formed. This is an aspect of the PP framework that is not usually stressed, but I 
think is critical to have it in mind when it comes to philosophically determine the more 
theoretical consequences of the framework. This aspect of the PP framework will be 
key later (Chapter 4) when evaluating the interoceptive inference view of emotion 
(IIE). 
 
Expectations about precisions play a key role during this whole process. Precisions is 
the quantity that reflects the inferred reliability of the signal. Remember that depending 
on how reliable the signal is inferred to be, precision estimations control the balance 
between the weight that top-down and bottom-up influences have at different levels of 
the perceptual hierarchy. If the signal is deemed to be unreliable, top-down predictions 
are given increased weight relative to bottom-up influences. However, if the signal is 
deemed to be highly reliable, bottom-up influences are given more gain relative to top-
down predictions. Importantly, precisions are encoded by post-synaptic 
neurotransmission, and remember that, in the PP framework, this process amounts to 
attention. Expectations about precisions then determine the balance between bottom-
up and top-down influences during percept formation (and action, as we will see 
below). This latter point will prove to be important in Chapter 6, when it comes to 
dealing with some objections to the hypothesis that valence is grounded in the 





3.3.1. On the causes of interoceptive signals 
 
IIA is then the view that, in direct analogy to the way in which exteroceptive percepts 
are formed, subjective feeling states arise by minimizing interoceptive prediction error 
(PE) via interoceptive inferences of the likely causes of incoming interoceptive signals. 
Thus, we must assume that instead of determining what it is the object or event in the 
external world that is likely causing incoming signals, as in the case of exteroceptive 
inference, during interoceptive inference the causes that need to be determined amount 
to the causal regularities that obtain in the inner world. That is, the physiological 
changes that take place during homeostasis maintenance. To put it this way, given that 
interoceptive signals (after transduction) are directly triggered by physiological 
changes in the ‘inner environment’ (such signals are precisely what the interoceptive 
system evolved to track), the causes that need to be inferred by interoceptive models 
and hypotheses must be physiological in nature. After all, patterns of changes in the 
physiological landscape are the kind of thing that causes interoceptive input. I take this 
to be obvious. Remember that sensory systems are dedicated input systems. Insofar as 
the interoceptive system is a sensory system, it is sensitive to particular kinds of inputs, 
distinct from the inputs to which, for example, the visual system is sensitive. The 
physiological inner milieu is precisely the domain to which the interoceptive system 
is responsive. This is particularly the case, if we embrace what I called above the 
‘moderate view’ about what counts as interoception (Section 3.1.1.) 
 
Certainly, as long as exteroceptively represented external objects and events can cause 
physiological changes via learned associations between a certain external cue and a 
certain specific physiological pattern (e.g., seeing a nutritious slice of pizza can cause 
the physiological changes characteristic of hunger), the indirect or distal causes 
(nutritiousness) of certain current incoming interoceptive signals could be taken to be 
external objects and events.  
 
However, note that in order to infer such indirect or distal cause (nutritiousness) from 
incoming interoceptive signals alone a condition must be met. Such condition is that 
there must be causal regularities governing the presence of a certain specific external 
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object (or event) and the occurrence of certain specific physiological changes able to 
directly trigger interoceptive signals (after transduction). Without such regularities, 
interoceptive activity simply cannot be informative about external causes. In other 
words, subjective feeling states have proximal causes, but they can have, under certain 
condition, indirect or distal causes. Physiological changes are proximal causes, while 
external events are distal causes. Bodily, interoceptive percepts have then both, 
physiological causes and its associated external causes. The interoceptive percepts that 
constitute subjective feeling states inform about distal causes by registering proximal 
causes, that is, via patterns of physiological changes. Importantly, a certain distal cause 
has an associated proximal cause that informs about the latter only insofar as there is 
a causal regularity linking the two (for an analogous approach applied instead to the 
content of emotion, see Prinz, 2004). To put it this way, “blindfolded”, an organism 
can determine that something external is nutritious only by accessing what 
interoceptive percepts informs about. In a word, the causes responsible for 
interoceptive input, and which need to be inferred by interoceptive inferences, can 
certainly be external. 
 
This granted, it must be recognized that this sort of causal regularities that link specific 
external objects and specific physiological changes are rare. That is why we are rarely 
informed about the identity of external objects and events from just feeling our bodies 
(from felt interoceptive percepts)15. Certainly, during the formation of interoceptive 
percepts, determining (via exteroceptive inference) the identity of the external, indirect 
cause of incoming interoceptive signals can contribute in assigning prior probabilities 
to interoceptive hypotheses about the direct physiological cause of such signals. For 
example, let’s say that certain interoceptive signals are caused by certain pattern of 
physiological activity. Visually determining that a likely indirect cause of such signals 
is the slice of pizza in front of you will increase the prior probability of the hunger-
                                                             
15 Certainly, it is ridiculous that an interoceptive percept could inform about the external causes that 
typically trigger exteroceptive receptors, such as a dog approaching or a loved one dying. 
“Blindfolded” we cannot tell that there is a pizza on the table by only accessing interoceptive percepts, 
even though food systematically triggers very specific interoceptive perceptions (those that constitute 
hunger). The claim is that nutritiousness or dangerousness (which are external things, even though 
relational properties (Prinz, 2004, 2007)) are the external things that an already formed interoceptive 
percept informs about. 
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hypothesis compared to the thirst-hypothesis. But note that in this sort of case 
determining the external cause of incoming interoceptive signals occurs via 
exteroceptive inference, so that the proximal, physiological cause of incoming 
interoceptive signals can be better inferred. Anyway, it might worth taking into 
account that, as I just mentioned, incoming interoceptive signals can also be indirectly 
triggered by external objects or events. When causal regularities linking specific 
external objects and specific physiological changes obtain, the cause to be determined 
by interoceptive inference can be external (but this is rare). 
 
That said, however, there is an important point to have in mind at this juncture, so as 
to avoid becoming confused. We are dealing here with the manner by which subjective 
feeling states are formed. That is, we are not dealing with the task of forming an 
exteroceptive percept by making use of the information provided by incoming 
interoceptive signals or by already formed interoceptive percepts. For example, 
forming the visual percept of a salad by using interoceptive information relative to 
hunger so as to determine that incoming visual signals are better explained by the 
salad-hypothesis than by the grass-hypothesis (since in that way the salad-hypothesis 
increases its prior probability relative to the grass-hypothesis). This latter kind of task 
is the one with which, for example, Pezzulo (2014) deals. 
 
On the other hand, we are neither dealing with the non-perceptual task of determining 
the identity of the cause responsible of the already formed percepts that currently 
populate one’s mind. This task consists in explaining the origin of one’s already 
formed percepts, rather than forming such percepts in the first place. In this task, one 
infers the origin of such percepts so as to make sense of them, without shaping their 
configuration. They become some sort of fixed explanandum, to put it that way. The 
task here is merely explaining or making sense of current bodily, interoceptive 
experience. Consequently, an interoceptive percept has already being formed. Let me 
exemplify. You are experiencing thirst. That is, you already formed an interoceptive 
percept. You (or, better, your brain) now try to infer whether that thirst experience 
(i.e., interoceptive percept) was caused by that last night extra drink or by that salty 
lunch. Both hypotheses amount to external phenomena. Note that any hypothesis that 
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gets to be selected will leave the percept in question (thirst) just as already is. Thus, 
this amounts to a case of explanation (or making sense of) of an already formed 
percept, rather than to a case of percept formation (the interoceptive percept was 
already formed). This is analogous to the following case. Imagine you walk into your 
office one morning and see that things on your desk are not in the order you left them 
the night before. You consider two explanatory hypotheses: a burglar came in during 
the night, and the hypothesis that the cleaning guy came in very early this morning. 
Note that any of the considered hypotheses, if selected, will not change the already 
formed percept of your desk being in such and such a way (your desk looks the same, 
you are just trying to know what happened that it looks that way). In this sort of cases, 
inferring causes plays the role of making sense of already formed percepts, rather than 
the role of forming percepts in the first place16. 
 
In a word, according to IIA, subjective feeling states arise by minimizing interoceptive 
PE via interoceptive inferences of the likely causes of incoming interoceptive signals. 
Those causes belong to the physiological domain, but incoming interoceptive signals 
can also be indirectly triggered by external objects or events, as long as there are causal 
regularities that link such external events to certain physiological changes, so that 
formed interoceptive percept can result informative about external, indirect causes (but 
this is rare). So, let me insist, what are the causes that must be inferred by interoceptive 
models? The physiological regularities that obtain in the inner milieu, and, only 
indirectly, external events systematically related to certain physiological happenings 
(but this is rare).  
 
3.3.2. Strategies for minimizing interoceptive PE 
 
The aim of this subsection is to systematize the ways in which interoceptive PE can be 
minimized. This will require systematizing and refining the ways in which the 
strategies for minimizing interoceptive PE have been described in the literature 
(Hohwy, 2011, 2013; Seth, 2013; Seth et al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013). This will 
                                                             
16 Certainly, in this sort of case, once a certain explanatory hypothesis has been selected so as to 
account for an already formed percept, it can influence further percept formation. If this occurs, we 
are not then dealing with the task of merely explaining already formed percepts.  
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prove to be useful for gaining some clarity on the aspects of the interoceptive process 
of interoceptive PE minimization that are the most relevant for the view on the nature 
of valence and emotion to be defended in the coming Chapters. I will show there how 
different strategies of interoceptive PE minimization serve different functions during 
emotional episodes. Very roughly, I will argue that the valence component of emotion 
results from interoceptive PE minimization via perceptual inference; while the main 
driving component of emotions per se consists in interoceptive PE minimization via 
(external) active inference.   
 
There are three kinds of strategies by which interoceptive PE can be minimized. These 
kinds of strategies are analogous to the ones used during exteroceptive inference 
(discussed in Chapter 2), namely, perceptual inference and active inference. However, 
in the interoceptive domain, there are two kinds of strategies of active inference 
available, not just one kind of strategy as in the exteroceptive domain. As it is to be 
expected, these two kinds of strategies of active inference parallel the distinction made 
above regarding the ways in which homeostatic imbalances can be rectified. As I 
discussed above, homeostatic imbalances can be rectified by internal actions and 
external actions. The former consist in automatically executing “physiological 
policies” by making use of resources that are already available within the organism 
(e.g., centrally generated autonomic control signals). External actions consist in 
modifying things in the external environment so as to deal with a physiological 
imbalance. Then, interoceptive PE can be minimized via, what might be called, 
interoceptive perceptual inference, interoceptive internal actions, and interoceptive 
external actions. Let me unpack these strategies. 
 
3.3.2.1. Interoceptive perceptual inference 
 
Interoceptive perceptual inference is the strategy I presented above. It is the kind of 
strategy of interoceptive PE minimization by which interoceptive experience arises. 
More precisely, by which subjective feeling states arise. Remember that phenomenal 
consciousness is populated by nothing over and above formed percepts. Thus, 
interoceptive experience must arise via the process responsible for percept formation: 
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interoceptive perceptual inference. The task of interoceptive perceptual inferences 
consists then in forming an interoceptive percept that informs about events in the inner 
milieu. Interoceptive perceptual inference consists in updating hypotheses so that the 
generated predictions fit the incoming signal. In this sort of strategy the direction of fit 
is mind-to-world, i.e., finding a hypothesis that successfully models the way the (inner) 
world is (or, more precisely, a hypothesis that models the ecologically relevant aspects 
of the way the inner world is).  
 
In this kind of strategy, minimizing interoceptive PE is achieved in the following way. 
Let’s say that certain physiological changes are triggered, such as, for example, an 
increase in plasma osmolarity levels, a decrease in blood volume, and a decrease in 
blood pressure, among other physiological changes—these physiological changes 
amount to the physiological regularities that consistently occur during thirst. They 
cause interoceptive signals at the lowest levels of the interoceptive hierarchy. 
Considering that it is already 2pm, and that sounds of cooking utensils come from the 
neighbour’s kitchen, the interoceptive system is already expecting hunger to take 
place, so it puts forward the hypothesis that it is likely that hunger is causing the 
incoming signals—remember that at the highest levels interoceptive models encode 
multimodal and amodal information that allow them to make these links between 
exteroceptive phenomena (sounds and time of the day) and expected specific 
interoceptive signals. The interoceptive signals expected for the hunger hypothesis are 
then generated from the top-down, such as, for example, signals relative to decreasing 
glucose levels, increasing fatty acids levels, and decreasing body temperature, among 
other physiological changes. Let’s say that even though some interoceptive activity 
was successfully predicted, interoceptive PE is significant and it exhibits an inferred 
high precision-weighting. Then, certain incoming interoceptive signals still demand to 
be ‘explained away’, to put it this way. 
 
Now, in this kind of strategy, given that PE has not been successfully minimized by 
the hunger-hypothesis, the interoceptive system must put forward another content-
specifying hypothesis that might better match the incoming signal17. In other words, 
                                                             
17 This does not need to occur serially, as different hypotheses can be rehearsed in parallel. 
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interoceptive models are updated so as to put forward a content-specifying hypothesis 
that fits the inner world, instead of another competing hypothesis that involves a 
different content. Let’s say that this time the interoceptive system goes for the thirst-
hypothesis. It generates then from the top-down the interoceptive activity expected for 
thirst: signals relative to an increase in plasma osmolarity levels, a decrease in blood 
volume, and a decrease in blood pressure, among others. This hypothesis achieves to 
match the incoming signal, so the latter is successfully ‘explained away’. 
Consequently, according to IIA, a subjective feeling state arises. Remember that in the 
PP framework, the content of the experience or percept that results from successfully 
‘explaining away’ incoming data is specified by the content of the predictions 
generated from the top-down. Thus, the subjective feeling state that arises in this 
scenario corresponds to the feeling of thirst, or the percept corresponding to thirst.   
 
3.3.2.2. Interoceptive active inference 
 
Just as in the case of vision, in the case of interoception, PE can be also minimized by 
changing the input so as to fit the hypothesis (i.e., changing the inner world so as to fit 
the model), instead of changing the hypothesis to fit the input (i.e., changing the model 
to fit the inner world), as in the above strategy. That is, interoceptive PE can be also 
minimized via active inference. In this sort of strategy, the direction of fit is world-to-
mind, i.e., changing the (inner) world so as to fit the expected activity.  
 
As I mentioned above, in the case of interoception there are two kinds of strategies of 
active inference, namely, what might be called interoceptive internal actions and 
interoceptive external actions.  
 
3.3.2.2.1. Interoceptive internal actions 
 
Interoceptive internal actions operate in the following way. Let me continue with the 
example of thirst above. As we saw, once the initial incoming interoceptive signals 
triggered by the physiological regularities systematically involved during thirst are 
successfully ‘explained away’ by the thirst-hypothesis, and consequently interoceptive 
124 
 
PE is minimized, the experience of thirst takes place. That is, the felt percept that 
constitutes thirst is formed.  
 
Remember that such incoming interoceptive signals need to be ‘explained away’ (so 
as to minimize interoceptive PE) since this is the manner by which the brain can 
achieve its distal goal, which is reducing this other quantity, distinct from PE, namely, 
‘surprisal’. Also remember that ‘surprisal’ can be taken to be at optimal (low) levels 
in case the organism stays in ranges of physiological balance. Then, ‘explaining away’ 
actual incoming interoceptive signals is the proximal, immediate goal that 
interoceptive inferences need to achieve (in all its kinds of strategies); while 
minimizing ‘surprisal’, or keeping an overall physiological balance in the long run, is 
the distal,  long-run goal that the brain, in all its functions, including interoception, 
needs to achieve.  
 
Now, states of thirst (formed via interoceptive perceptual inference) are incompatible 
with the distal goal of maintaining homeostasis. Organisms have the hard-wired 
expectation of stable homeostasis. Interoceptive states of thirst differ from the 
‘desired’ interoceptive states that an homeostatic balance requires. So once an 
interoceptive percepts that constitutes the feeling of thirst is formed (via interoceptive 
perceptual inference), high-level interoceptive PE is triggered. High-level 
interoceptive PE consists in the difference now between the expected ‘goal state’ of 
homeostatic balance and the current interoceptive percept that constitutes the 
experience or state of thirst. That is, the interoceptive percept that informs that a certain 
homeostatic imbalance is taking place. The main task of the interoceptive system is 
not now forming a percept, but rather bringing physiological variables to their 
expected state by minimizing such high-level interoceptive PE.  
 
Interoceptive internal action consists then in changing physiological inputs so as to fit 
an interoceptive ‘goal state’. In order to achieve this, what I called above ‘automatic 
physiological policies’ (roughly, autonomic reflexes) are engaged. The latter make use 
of resources that are already available within the organism. For example, secreting 
vasopressin, stimulating the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system, reducing renal 
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solute and water excretion, in the case that effective osmotic pressure of plasma 
increases (thirst).  
 
This is directly analogous to the way active inference works in the case of 
proprioception so as to bring about physical action or motor behaviour, as stated in 
Chapter 2. In the proprioceptive case, the difference between a ‘desired’ 
proprioceptive state and the current proprioceptive percept is minimized by engaging 
motor reflex arcs, which bring about actual behaviour. In the interoceptive case, 
autonomic reflexes are executed so as to minimize interoceptive PE and thus maintain 
homeostasis. In other words, during interoceptive internal action, top-down 
interoceptive predictions reflect homeostatic standards relative to which current 
interoceptive activity is compared. This triggers high-level interoceptive PE. In the PP 
framework this means that active inference needs to be engaged: actions must be bring 
forth so as to fulfil predictions. This means that interoceptive models must predict the 
physiological activity that will help to achieve homeostatic balance. Physiological 
policies (roughly, autonomic reflexes) transcribe then such top-down interoceptive 
predictions that reflect homeostatic standards into physiological changes that put the 
organism closer to homeostatic balance. 
 
Remember that for motor behaviour to arise by way of active proprioceptive inference, 
proprioceptive PE signals need to be inferred to have low precision weighting. This 
amounts to the attenuation of attention (sensory attenuation), and is required in order 
to impede that model revision takes place (which would tramp movement). 
Analogously, interoceptive internal actions require decreased attention to interoceptive 
PE, so as to impede model revision that could tramp ‘physiological policies’ (see, 
Barret, 2015). In other words, precisions relative to the ascending high-level 
interoceptive PE must be attenuated to allow top-down, descending homeostatic 
expectations to ‘run the show’, so that autonomic reflex could take place.    
 
“The role of precision and attenuation of interoceptive prediction errors may therefore be 
fundamental in the organization and selection of autonomic reflexes. In other words, 
homoeostatic regulation may require the temporary suspension of interoceptive 
precision—attending away from the current interoceptive state of the body, such that top-
down predictions can elicit peripheral sympathetic and parasympathetic reflexes.” 




Now, interoceptive internal actions, by engaging automatic ‘physiological policies’, 
trigger now another cascade of physiological changes aimed at rectifying homeostasis 
(or to put it this way, interoceptive internal actions trigger ‘inner physiological 
behaviours’, to keep the analogy with motor behaviour). These newly triggered 
physiological changes result in new incoming interoceptive signals that need to be 
‘explained away’ via interoceptive perceptual inference. This in order to form a 
percept that informs the organism how the inner milieu is now faring, after those 
internal actions (or ‘inner physiological behaviours’) took place. This cycle of 
perceptual interoceptive inference and (internal) active interoceptive inference occurs 
continually as the organism struggles to satisfy the imperative towards maintaining 
homeostasis (or keeping ‘surprisal’ levels low).  
 
However, internal interoceptive actions rarely can rectify homeostatic imbalances by 
themselves (Craig, 2015). They trigger compensatory changes that help the organism 
to only momentarily deal with the imbalances in question. Think of the case of thirst. 
We simply lack the physiological resources to re-hydrate ourselves by producing water 
or some other liquid. Behaviour needs to be engaged in order to find some water and 
put it into our mouths, to put it this way. Here is when external interoceptive actions 
come into play.  
 
3.3.2.2.2. External interoceptive actions 
 
The difference between expected interoceptive states compatible with homeostasis and 
the interoceptive percepts that inform the organism about homeostatic deviations can 
be also minimized via external interoceptive actions (allostatic actions)18. As I 
mentioned above, we lack the capacity to rectify physiological imbalances by 
producing the needed physiological resources by ourselves. So behaviour needs to be 
motivated. External interoceptive actions consist precisely in modifying the external 
environment, and your situation in it, in order to rectify homeostasis. For example, 
                                                             
18 These are what Seth (2015a) calls ‘allostatic actions’. ‘Allostasis’ typically refers to the processes 
by which homeostatic balance is regained through behaviour.  
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finding a coat in case of a drop in temperature, or going to the fridge for a snack in the 
case of hunger (these latter motor actions require minimizing proprioceptive PE, as 
discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
As Seth (2015a) remarks, external interoceptive actions require engaging the higher-
levels of the interoceptive hierarchy. At these levels, as I commented in Chapter 2, 
predictive models are multimodal (and amodal), encoding associations between 
interoceptive, exteroceptive and proprioceptive information. These stored associations 
allow predictive models to predict temporal sequences of linked exteroceptive and 
interoceptive signals (also proprioceptive), which can then be generated form the top-
down by modulating the activity of the lower, modality-specific levels of the hierarchy. 
Stored links between exteroceptive and interoceptive signals allow the system to know 
which interoceptive states can be obtained via which exteroceptive (and 
proprioceptive) states. This permits that an action can be found that achieves to cause 
the expected interoceptive state that homeostasis demands. To put it this way, at higher 
levels, predictive models know that if effective osmotic pressure of plasma is high (as 
the thirst-percept achieved via interoceptive perceptual inference informs), and you 
find water and put it in your mouth (exteroceptive and proprioceptive knowledge), this 
will likely trigger the interoceptive signals that will eventually match the ‘desired’ 
interoceptive goal-state (let’s say, normal levels of osmotic pressure) via external 
interoceptive action. Given the mentioned constant cycle of perceptual and active 
inference typical of PP, after such an interoceptive action is executed, and thus new 
interoceptive signals triggered, interoceptive perceptual inference needs to be engaged 
so as to inform the organism about it current physiological condition. Does it fit the 
hard-wired goal of keeping ‘surprisal’ levels low (i.e., maintaining homeostatic 
balance)? 
 
3.3.3. Counterfactual knowledge of the sensory consequences of action: 
representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’  
 
Interestingly, for this kind of inferences to occur, interoceptive predictive models at 
higher levels require to encode, as Seth (2015a) notes, counterfactual knowledge of 
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the sensory consequences of action. More precisely, knowledge of the counterfactual 
relations between, on the one hand, particular exteroceptive states, motors states, and 
changes to the environment, and, on the other hand, the interoceptive activity that they 
would ensue. This is what Seth (2014, 2015a) calls ‘knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies’.  
 
“Counterfactually- equipped predictive models encode not only the likely causes of 
current sensory input, but also the likely causes of fictive sensory inputs conditioned on 
possible but not executed actions. That is, they encode how sensory inputs (and their 
expected precisions) would change on the basis of a repertoire of possible actions 
(expressed as proprioceptive predictions), even if those actions are not performed.” (Seth, 
2015a, p. 17) 
 
3.3.3.2. ‘Active inference for percept formation’ vs ‘active inference for action’ 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, in the case of vision this kind of counterfactual knowledge is 
used during what might be called active inference for percept formation. This kind of 
active inference can be distinguished from what might be called active inference for 
action. The latter consist in minimizing proprioceptive and interoceptive PE via 
classical reflex arcs and autonomic reflexes, respectively. This requires, as we saw, 
transiently reducing expected precision of ascending proprioceptive and interoceptive 
PE. Here the task is getting the body/the inner milieu to move in conformity with 
proprioceptive/interoceptive ‘goal-states’ or expectations. These tasks presuppose that 
the hypotheses in question have world-to-mind direction of fit.  
 
In the visual case, active inference for percept formation is the kind of active inference 
that takes place during perceptual inference in order to gather new visual samples, so 
that the best perceptual hypothesis, among competing ones, can be selected. Here the 
task consist in forming a percept in the first place, rather than bringing about adaptive 
action. Contrary to the above kind of active inference, this task presupposes that the 
relevant perceptual hypotheses have mind-to-world direction of fit. Certainly, in the 
PP framework, motor behaviour always results in new signals that need to be 
suppressed by perceptual hypotheses, so that there is a constant cycle of perceptual 
and active inference. However, there is still a distinction to be made between moving 
so as to put yourself in another place simpliciter, once you already know what is 
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occurring in the world (let’s say, you want to get something you saw), and moving for 
the sake of better determining what is occurring in the world.  
 
The distinction in question is analogous to the distinction between epistemic and 
instrumental active inference (Seth, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
Epistemic (active) inference involves selecting actions that we expect to increase the fit 
between predictive models and hidden causes of sensory signals. This form of inference 
may characterize, for example, saccadic eye movements or exploratory body movements 
to inform self-models. (Seth & Friston, 2016, p. 5).  
 
Instrumental active inference consists in the task of controlling sensory activity in line 
with expectations. This kind of active inference is the one involved in motor behaviour 
and internal interoceptive actions.  
 
3.3.3.2.1. Types of ‘active inference for percept formation’: confirmatory, 
disconfirmatory, and disambiguating actions 
 
Now, Seth (2014, 2015a) identifies three types of action that depend on the kind of 
stored counterfactual knowledge I mentioned above (i.e., representations of 
‘sensorimotor contingencies’). In the visual domain, these types of action can be 
selected so as to gather visual samples that allow to the visual system to put forward 
the best perceptual hypothesis about the causes of sensory input. The three types of 
action that Seth identifies amount to actions that gather samples so as to either confirm, 
disconfirm, or disambiguate hypotheses. For example, given that the visual system has 
stored counterfactual knowledge, when it is considering that the dog-hypothesis makes 
fine predictions regarding the flow of incoming signals, it knows that if it is a dog what 
is causing such signals, and it performs certain saccades or moves in certain way, the 
flow of incoming data should change in such and such expected way, given its 
expected precisions of PE. If the flow of incoming sensory information changes in 
such expected ways, the dog-hypothesis gets confirmed. The signals expected for that 
hypothesis are then generated form the top-down in order to suppress incoming data. 
Let’s say that the latter is achieved: the percept of a dog is formed. But if the flow of 
incoming sensory information does not changes in expected ways, the dog-hypothesis 
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gets disconfirmed, so predictive models need to be updated. On the other hand, the 
visual system might be considering that both the cat-hypothesis and the dog-hypothesis 
are equally good candidate hypotheses, given the current incoming data and priors. In 
this case, given that the visual system has stored counterfactual knowledge, knows that 
if it is cat rather than a dog, and performs certain actions, visual signals should evolve 
in such and such a way, and not in these other ways, which are more expected for a 
dog. In this manner action can be used to disambiguate between both such competing 
perceptual hypotheses.  
 
However, in the case of active inference for interoceptive percept formation (or action 
during interoceptive perceptual inference), these types of epistemic actions seem 
unlikely. They would require triggering physiological changes as a way of gathering 
new samples of interoceptive activity. This would generally involve driving our own 
physiology beyond viability, which is incompatible with the distal goal of keeping 
surprisal levels low (or, roughly, maintaining homeostasis): 
 
“[…] it may not be adaptive (in the long run) for organisms to continually attempt to 
disconfirm current interoceptive predictions, assuming these are compatible with 
homeostatic integrity. To put it colloquially, we do not want to drive our essential 
variables continually close to viability limits, just to check whether they are always 
capable of returning.” (Seth, 2015a, p.20) 
 
During interoceptive percept formation, such (dis)confirmatory and disambiguatory 
sampling ‘experiments’ are ill-advised. Thus, in order to form an interoceptive percept, 
the interoceptive system needs to rely just on model updating on the basis of precision-
weighted actual interoceptive PE. That is, on the basis of standard interoceptive 
perceptual inference. This same worry applies not only to active inference for 
interoceptive percept formation (or action during interoceptive perceptual inference), 
but it also applies to internal and external interoceptive actions.  
 
However, as we saw above, the fact that (dis)confirmatory and disambiguatory actions 
do not readily apply to interoception, does not imply that the interoceptive system does 
not store counterfactual knowledge that links exteroceptive (and motor) and 
interoceptive states. Counterfactual knowledge of this kind seems to be key for 
unfolding adaptive external interoceptive actions so as to reach expected interoceptive 
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states compatible with homeostasis. To put it this way, if you want to rectify a 
subjective feeling state incompatible with homeostasis (e.g., pain, hunger, thirst), you 
better know under what possible external conditions those states are likely to vanish.  
 
The counterfactual knowledge in question is key, because putting the organism in new 
exteroceptive and proprioceptive states able to trigger ‘desired’, expected 
interoceptive activity (i.e., external interoceptive action) is really the only way to 
thoroughly minimize the difference between interoceptive ‘goal-states’ and current 
interoceptive percepts. Let me insist, internal interoceptive actions can be taken to be 
momentary compensatory policies, not viable in the long-run. That is why external 
interoceptive actions are likely to be always motivated, even though in parallel 
autonomic reflexes (internal interoceptive actions) might be also triggered. That is, 
external interoceptive actions are likely to be the default strategy for achieving 
‘desired’ interoceptive states. This seems to be the case considering that it is more 
efficient, in term of energy usage, to exploit the environment rather than depleting 
body’s energy. Moreover, this is also suggested by the fact that, as the case of 
thermoregulation shows, external interoceptive actions are phylogenetically older than 
internal actions (Craig, 2015, p.21). Thus, external actions are likely to be 
automatically motivated, and its selection over internal action does not depend on 
contextual factors.  
 
Now, when an external (or internal) interoceptive action is engaged so as to achieve 
an interoceptive ‘goal-state’, interoceptive perceptual inference takes place in order to 
form an interoceptive percept that tracks the resulting physiological activity. To 
continue with the example of thirst above, let’s say that, for example, the interoceptive 
system puts forward now the ‘satiety-hypothesis’. The interoceptive system generates 
then the expected signals for that hypothesis in order to ‘explain away’ incoming data, 
and it updates hypotheses if needed. This might lead then to another round of active 
interoceptive inference for the purpose of correcting the interoceptive states that are 
now taking place. Homeostasis then requires the interoceptive system to engage in this 




Then, the above begins to suggest that what we feel/perceive consists in the 
consequences of what we do. More precisely, we feel/perceive the interoceptive 
consequences of our interoceptive (external and internal) actions.  
 
3.3.4. The brain basis of interoceptive inference 
 
Seth (Seth, 2013, 2015a; Seth et al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013) suggests that 
interoceptive inferences are mainly realized in a network of regions that likely 
constitute a (loose) perceptual hierarchy. Among them are regions of the brainstem – 
such as the nucleus of the solitary tract, periaqueductal gray, locus coeruleus – limbic 
regions – such as substantia innominata, nucleus accumbens, and the amygdala, and 
cortical regions. Among the latter, particularly relevant structures are the posterior and 
middle insula, the anterior insula, the anterior cingulate, and the orbitofrontal cortex 
(most of them involved in the, so called, ‘salience network’19).  
 
As I mentioned above, the posterior and middle insula realize a primary interoceptive 
cortex, analogous to V1 and A1 in the case of vision and audition, respectively (see 
also Craig, 2015, p.186). The anterior insula (AIC) is particularly relevant for the 
interoceptive inference view. This region is hypothesized to be the main structure 
where comparisons between expected interoceptive signals and incoming 
interoceptive signals take place, constituting a comparator or error-module (Seth et al., 
2011). Taking into account that the AIC is considered to harbour phenomenally 
conscious coherent interoceptive representations of the global condition of the body 
(Critchley et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2009), this region is a fine candidate for being one 
of the main regions that realize interoceptive percepts. Moreover, there is evidence 
showing that the AIC is a region that “integrates” interoceptive and exteroceptive 
signals. This claim, however, should be taken carefully (that is why I used inverted 
commas). I think that AIC “integrates” interoceptive and exteroceptive signals only in 
the sense that it is a site where associations (in a broad sense) between interoceptive 
and exteroceptive information take place, i.e., learned interoceptive activity responses 
for certain exteroceptive activity. I take this to be the case because the evidence 
                                                             
19 See Menon V. (2015). 
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generally used to support the claim that AIC is an “integration” site in that sense consist 
in evidence simply showing that the AIC gets also activated by exteroceptive stimuli 
(see Craig (2015) for a complete review). This only supports the claim that AIC 
harbour associations between certain external stimuli and interoceptive responses—
analogously, for example, to the links between exteroceptive stimuli and bodily 
responses that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex allows in Damasio’s (1994) account). 
This sort of associations likely forms the counterfactual knowledge that is required for 
external interoceptive actions to take place.  
 
Finally, remember that what I called above internal interoceptive actions involve 
generating interoceptive signals that modulate the activity of lower interoceptive 
control regions. This, in order to reach interoceptive ‘goal-states’. These kind of 
actions are realized in regions of the anterior cingulate (ACC). This region together 
with the orbitofrontal cortex are proposed to be involved in the generation of top-down 
interoceptive predictive signals. This seems to be the case, for these regions exhibit 
rich projections to lower-level interoceptive and autonomic control regions, including 
limbic structures, the brainstem, midbrain, and the hypothalamus. The latter is known 
to be key for homeostatic regulation.     
 
Similarly, in their EPIC model of predictive interoceptive inference, Barrett & 
Simmons (2015) identify the mid-cingulate cortex, ACC, posterior vmPFC, posterior 
OFC, and AI, as the main visceromotor cortical regions involved in generating 
predictions during (internal) active interoceptive inference and interoceptive 
perceptual inference. Lower levels of the interoceptive hierarchy include the 
amygdala, the ventral striatum, the hypothalamus, the periaqueductal grey, and spinal 
cord nuclei. These latter regions are especially relevant during (internal) active 
interoceptive inference, as they control internal systems involved in homeostasis. 
Barrett & Simmons (2015) hold that these regions receive predictions during active 
inference from the visceromotor cortices, so that they can execute the “interoceptive 
policies” expected to be useful for the contextual demands. Now, the primary 
interoceptive cortex, constituted by the mid- and posterior insula, are hypothesized to 
serve the role of computing the difference between expected interoceptive signals and 
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actual interoceptive signals (PE), and of propagating the resulting PE signal to higher 
interoceptive levels of the perceptual hierarchy. The EPIC model emphasizes that AI 
should not be taken to be the only region responsible for realizing interoceptive 
percepts, but it is just one of the regions of the interoceptive network mentioned above 
that contributes in realizing interoceptive percepts.  
 
To sum up, interoceptive percepts represent the constantly evolving positive and 
negative physiological changes that occur during homeostasis. They are positive or 
negative relative to standards set by the hard-wired distal goal of maintaining 
homeostasis (roughly, keeping ‘surprisal’ low). Interoceptive percepts are likely to be 
formed by computations that operate under the principles of predictive processing. 
Subjective feeling states arise as an interoceptive percept is formed. This occurs via 
interoceptive perceptual inference. In order to minimize the difference between the 
built-in expectation of homeostasis and the physiological state about which a formed 
interoceptive percept informs. Such high-level interoceptive PE can be minimized by 
way of internal and external interoceptive actions20. The latter involve instrumental 
actions that require counterfactual knowledge of the interoceptive consequences of 
action. All these discussed notions set the main theoretical groundwork needed to 
unfold the coming discussion relative to the PP account of emotion (and valence). I 







                                                             
20 There is something missing in the account of percept formation so far. Features need to be bounded 
together. Roughly, according to one proposal (Hohwy, 2013), in the PP framework, binding occurs as 
a result of the sub-personal top-down expectation that the considered features are likely to belong to 
the same object.  
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4. The interoceptive inference view of emotion: a critique 
 
As we saw in the previous two Chapters, in the PP framework, all what the brain does, 
in all its functions, is to minimize its precision-weighted PE. According to PP, visual 
percepts are formed by minimizing visual PE in a specific manner: via visual 
perceptual inference (Chapter 2). That is, the brain forms visual percepts in a top-down 
fashion by predicting its incoming lower-level sensory signals from higher-level 
models or hypotheses of the likely (hidden) causes of those visual signals. A visual 
percept is formed once a certain content-specifying hypothesis achieves to 
successfully match, and thus supress, current lower-level visual signals. 
 
In the interoceptive inference view of emotion (IIE) (Seth, 2013, 2015; Hohwy, 2013), 
the principles of PP have been extended to account for emotion. IIE holds that, in direct 
analogy to the way in which visual percepts are formed (Seth, 2015; Seth & Friston, 
2016), emotions arise from interoceptive predictions of the causes of current 
interoceptive afferents. In other words, emotions amount to interceptive perceptions 
formed via higher-level, content-specifying emotion-hypotheses. Emotions result then 
via interoceptive perceptual inference, just as visual percepts result via visual 
perceptual inference.   
 
In this Chapter, I will argue that IIE is problematic. I will show that IIE is committed 
to the assumption that there must be different regularities pertaining to different 
emotion types in the physiological domain. However, this is unlikely to be the case. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that emotion models get to encode interoceptive expectations 
in the way required by IIE.   
 
The PP framework seems then to lack the resources to account for emotion. Emotions 
are at the core of our mental life. If PP cannot account for that aspect of mentality, it 
simply fails as an overarching, unifying framework in cognitive science. This is a 
136 
 
major drawback for PP ambitions.  However, in Chapter 7, I will suggest that, if PP is 
on track, interoceptive PE minimization can indeed account for emotion. However, 
this demands amending IIE in a key respect. I will briefly suggest that emotions do not 
arise via interoceptive perceptual inference (as IIE claims), but rather they arise by 
minimizing interoceptive PE in another fashion. That is, emotions arise via external 
interoceptive active inference. This proposal avoids the problematic assumption of IIE. 
Therefore, if the proposed view holds, PP’s ambitions are safe: interoceptive PE 
minimization can account for emotion. 
 
In what follows, I present IIE (Section 4.1). In Section 4.2., I show that IIE is indeed 
committed to the assumption that there must be regularities pertaining to emotion in 
the physiological domain. In Section 4.3., I argue that such an assumption is likely not 
to be the case. Then, in Section 4.4., I reply to possible objections regarding the actual 
commitments of IIE. Among them, the objection that IIE is not committed to the claim 
that there must be different regularities pertaining to different emotion types in the 
physiological domain, since IIE should be read as claiming that all emotion hypotheses 
expect the same physiological states. I also deal with the duck/rabbit objection, and 
with the possible objection that IIE is not committed to the claim in question, because 
IIE should be read as holding that emotions consist in an ‘amalgam’ of several 
multimodal states. I conclude this Chapter with some final remarks (Section 4.5).  
 
4.1. The interoceptive inference view of emotion 
 
PP is already doing explanatory work in a wide variety of psychological domains. 
However, PP was conceived and developed as an account (and re-conceptualization) 
of perceptual processes. That is why its principles have been mainly applied in the 
explanation of mental phenomena that, in some way or another, can be readily 
understood as perceptual in nature – e.g., visual perception, binocular rivalry, illusions 




According to the Jamesian view of emotion (James, 1884), emotions can be understood 
as perceptions of bodily, interoceptive changes. Considering that the Jamesian view 
that emotions can be understood as a perceptual process has recently seen a resurgence 
of interest in emotion research (e.g., Prinz, 2004), an obvious next step for PP’s 
explanatory ambitions is to apply its principles in accounting for emotion. 
 
To date, there is no fully developed PP account of emotion on offer. However, A. Seth 
(Seth, 2013; Seth et al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013) and J. Hohwy (2013, pp. 242-
244; see also Hohwy, 2011) have recently offered a first sketch of how such extension 
might go. Taking into account the fact that PP mainly works as an account of 
perception, these first sketches have suggested a PP version of the perceptual, 
interoceptive view of emotion. According to this kind of view, emotions are 
perceptions of distinct physiological changes. These first PP accounts of emotion then 
see emotion as arising from interoceptive perceptual inferences. This view might be 
called the ‘interoceptive inference view of emotion’ (IIE). 
 
According to IIE, emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE. However, in IIE, 
emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE in a specific sort of way. According to 
IIE, in direct analogy to the way in which visual percepts are formed (Seth, 2015; Seth 
& Friston, 2016), emotions arise from interoceptive predictions of the causes of current 
interoceptive afferents. For an emotion to arise, emotion models/hypotheses need to 
suppress from the top-down incoming interoceptive signals.  
 
In order to achieve this, analogously to the case of vision (Chapter 2), emotion models 
generate expected data in lower layers of interoceptive processing. Informally, 
emotion models can be seen then as putting forward hypotheses about which 
interoceptive activity is more likely given a certain emotion instead of another emotion 
– e.g., “if it is fear, instead of anger, I expect more likely such and such interoceptive 
signals, and not these other ones, because fear tends to cause such signals in contexts 
like this one. Let’s generate those signals. Do they match incoming signals?” 
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Mismatches between predicted interoceptive signals and actual interoceptive signals 
result in interoceptive PE, which causes to replace the considered perceptual 
interoceptive hypothesis. An emotion arises once a certain emotion hypothesis fits 
incoming interoceptive signals, and thus it minimizes interoceptive PE. In other words, 
an emotion is generated as an interoceptive percept is formed, i.e., an interoceptive 
percept that is formed driven by an emotion-hypothesis. Just as visual percepts result 
via visual perceptual inference, emotions result via interoceptive perceptual inference. 
In this view, the content of a certain high-level emotion model/hypotheses—to put it 
in this way, ‘the anger-hypothesis’ or ‘the fear-hypothesis’—determines the content of 
the interoceptive percept that is formed, and consequently, it determines the content of 
the bodily experience that ensues, which according to IIE, constitutes the experience 
of emotion—one experiences anger or fear, to keep the example from above.  
 
Emotion hypotheses then shape interoceptive percepts from the top-down. This solves, 
analogously as in the case of vision mentioned above, the underdetermination between 
emotion types and physiological input. In this sense, emotion differentiation can be 
explained in terms of the content of the high-level hypotheses (e.g., anger-hypothesis 
vs fear-hypothesis) that are brought to bear on the modulation of interoceptive 
perceptions (see Hohwy, 2013).  
 
This aspect of IIE makes it a particularly interesting account of emotion. Insofar as it 
incorporates high-level knowledge into interoceptive perception, and claims that the 
content of interoceptive experience is determined by the content of higher-level 
emotion models, IIE puts together key insights of both, Jamesian and two-factor, 
Schachterian views of emotion21.  
 
                                                             
21 Roughly, Jamesian views of emotion holds that emotions amount to bodily perceptions, while 
Schachterian views hold that emotions amount to cognitive interpretations of current bodily 
experience (‘arousal’ for Schachter). Thus, in Schachterian views, emotions require one more ‘factor’ 
than Jamesian views. Schachterian views exhibit two-factors: bodily perception plus ‘cognition’. 
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However, note that the claim that high-level emotion knowledge shapes interoceptive 
perception does not make IIE a strictly two-factor, Schachterian view. This is the case 
because, in the latter kind of view, ‘cognition’ has the function of merely explaining 
or making sense of current bodily, interoceptive experience. Consequently, an 
interoceptive percept, which in Schachterian views, and contrary to Jamesian views, 
is ambiguous concerning a specific emotion type, has already been formed. Thus, in 
strictly two-factor, Schachterian views, contextual knowledge only merely explains 
(or makes sense of) an already formed percept, without shaping it or playing a role in 
the formation of such percept, as a PP perceptual view must claim. 
 
Now, importantly, analogously to visual percept formation, finding a fitting 
interoceptive hypothesis requires that the whole system constantly contributes to that 
task across all levels of the interoceptive hierarchy. Thus, contrary to other views that 
see emotion as arising from bodily perception (e.g., Prinz, 2004), IIE explicitly 
recognizes the constant influence of other modalities and high-level amodal and 
multimodal knowledge in feeding interoceptive hypotheses. Such non-interoceptive 
activity modulates, across all levels of the perceptual hierarchy, the interoceptive 
predictions involved in the task of suppressing incoming interoceptive signals. In this 
sense, the generation of an emotion can be seen as typically involving an ‘amalgam’ 
(Clark, 2016, p.234) of different kinds of information. The latter must be seen as 
contributing in finding interoceptive data able to explain away incoming interoceptive 
signals, since emotions “arise as interoceptive prediction error is actually explained 
away” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 243) (more on this below).  
 
Interoceptive models need to be integrated with high-level amodal and multimodal 
information for the purpose of linking interoceptive responses with the external and 
contextual cues (e.g., a snake approaching) that could be causally relevant in bringing 
about incoming interoceptive signals. We can assume that such integration helps fix a 
context that can be used as priors for issuing a proper interoceptive hypothesis. 
Determining that some event in the external environment is causally relevant in 
bringing about low-level interoceptive activity might be useful in choosing between 
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competing interoceptive hypotheses. For example, if an individual has two 
interoceptive hypotheses with the same posterior probability about the emotion that 
might be causing certain interoceptive signals. Let’s say the fear-hypothesis and the 
excitement-hypothesis. In this case, she could decide between the two by 
exteroceptively and cognitively determining the nature of the context in which she 
finds herself: Does the context make more likely the fear-hypothesis or the excitement-
hypothesis? Let’s say that, in the case in question, the individual sees that a snake is 
approaching. Thus, the interoceptive hypothesis for fear acquires higher posterior 
probability: the interoceptive signals expected for the fear-hypothesis are generated 
form the top-down, interoceptive PE is appropriately minimized, and fear is perceived 
and experienced.  
 
However, note that during this process of interoceptive PE minimization, amodal and 
multimodal knowledge serve interoceptive ends: finding the better interoceptive 
hypothesis. Such kind of knowledge contributes in influencing the interoceptive data 
that eventually will meet activity in the lower layers of the interoceptive channel, so 
as to minimize interoceptive PE. In other words, forming an interoceptive percept 
requires meeting incoming interoceptive signals alone, and this is achieved by 
generating from the top-down interoceptive signals—i.e., signals proprietary of the 
visual channel won’t do the job of suppressing interoceptive incoming data. Remember 
that IIE’s claim is that, in direct analogy to visual percept formation, an emotion arises 
when interoceptive PE is minimized via interoceptive perceptual inference. This 
requires ‘explaining away’ incoming data in the proprietary code of the interoceptive 
channel alone. Generally speaking, in the PP framework different modalities and high-
level amodal knowledge provide background and contextual knowledge for generating 
a successful perceptual hypothesis that will result in a coherently well-formed percept 
in one specific modality. So, just as visual hypotheses might be disambiguated, for 
example, by auditive information—e.g., a bark might help decide in favour of the 
visual dog-hypothesis instead of the visual wolf-hypothesis—interoceptive hypotheses 
might be disambiguated by information provided by other modalities and background 
knowledge. In the interoceptive inference view of emotion, cognitive and multimodal 




Note that for a certain external cue (a snake approaching) to modulate interoceptive 
activity, the system must built an association between such an exteroceptive, 
contextual cue and certain interoceptive activity (to take the example above, a snake 
approaching and the interoceptive activity relative to fear instead of the interoceptive 
activity relative to another emotion type), so as to be able to predict such interoceptive 
activity from this external cue.  
 
Considering the point remarked by condition C above (Section 2.7.), in order to learn 
such a ‘prediction-enabling’ association, the system must extract from the world the 
regularity linking the event snakes approaching (or danger, more generally) and the 
triggering of certain patterns of physiological changes. In other words, the event snakes 
approaching (or danger, more generally) must predict those patterns of physiological 
changes (i.e., they must not be probabilistically independent phenomena). This also 
applies to relatively slower time-scale or abstract regularities.  
 
Now, according to Seth, top-down interoceptive signals are mainly issued from the 
anterior cingular cortex (also the orbitofrontal cortex is involved). Matches and 
mismatches (prediction error) between autonomic afferents and interoceptive 
inferences are calculated in the anterior insular cortex, a visceral sensory region 
associated with interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2002). In other words, the brain 
network responsible for generating emotions through interoceptive inference amounts 
to what is known as the salience network, which also includes other paralimbic 
structures such as the amygdala and the inferior frontal gyrus (Seth et al., 2012). That 
is, in the interoceptive inference view, emotions are anchored in structures usually 
associated with autonomic representation and visceral sensory processes. 
 
Hohwy (2013, pp. 242-244) has proposed an extension of PP to emotions along the 
same lines as the one proposed by Seth. Both propose an interoceptive inference theory 
of emotion. Following James (1884) and Prinz (2004), Hohwy holds that emotional 
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experience arises from inferences to the causes of the type of interoceptive signals that 
are prompted in a given context. Here emotions are “reduced to basic interoceptive 
states” (Hohwy, 2013, p.243) and our perception of them: “emotion arises as a kind of 
perceptual inference on our own internal states.” (Ibid.) In other words, emotions result 
from interoceptive inferences:  
 
“The key is to view interoceptive signals as internally generated and highly ambiguous 
prediction error, which is explained away by interoceptive expectations in a hierarchical 
manner that can draw on all sorts of statistical regularities in the overall prediction error 
landscape.” (Hohwy, 2013, p.243)  
 
According to Hohwy, interoceptive signals are ambiguous between hypotheses about 
the world. As in Seth’s proposal, background knowledge helps here in choosing 
between competing hypotheses. In this respect, Hohwy offers as an example an 
analogy with visual perception. In the case of the double duck-rabbit (Fig. 1), received 
or activated knowledge that the duck is eating the rabbit disambiguates visual signals 
in favour of that hypothesis. In a PP context, this means that knowledge of that extra 
piece of information results in the top-down generation of the visual signals 
corresponding to that winning hypothesis (and thus incoming visual data is better 
explained away), instead of the top-down generation of the visual signals 
corresponding to a competing hypothesis (let’s say, one rabbit following another 
rabbit). As a result of that, one forms and experiences the visual percept of the duck 
eating the rabbit, and not the visual percept of one rabbit following another rabbit.  
 
Fig. 1  
 
 
In the case of emotion there is an analogous story. Let’s assume that in a certain 
emotionally significant context certain interoceptive signals are prompted. The 
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emotion system considers then two hypotheses, namely, the fear-hypothesis and the 
joy-hypothesis. Receiving or activating an extra piece of contextual knowledge—for 
example, that your boss is approaching, and that she tends to be threatening—makes 
the fear-hypothesis more likely. Consequently, the interoceptive data for that 
hypothesis is generated from the top-down. Let’s say that interoceptive PE is 
successfully minimized by such data, so fear then “[…] arises as interoceptive 
prediction error is actually explained away” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 243)22. 
 
To sum up, according to IIE, emotion arise when a content specifying emotion-
hypothesis minimizes interoceptive PE across the whole interoceptive hierarchy. This 
requires that amodal and multimodal models constantly contributes to that task across 
all levels of the cortical hierarchy. However, as Hohwy remarks, in IIE, emotions are 
“reduced to basic interoceptive states” (Hohwy, 2013, p.243) and our perception of 
them: “emotion arises as a kind of perceptual inference on our own internal states.” 
(Ibid. italics are mine). Emotions result then via interoceptive perceptual inference, 
just as visual percept result via visual perceptual inference. Emotions are interoceptive 
percepts which are formed guided by a content-specifying emotion-hypotheses. 
 
4.2. IIE is problematic  
 
As it stands, IIE exhibits a problematic key assumption. Remember that in the PP 
framework, the generative models from which hypotheses are put forward extract the 
regularities that configure the hierarchical structure of the world. In other words, priors 
are learned from experience (via model/hypothesis selection and revision in light of 
precision-weighted PE), and over time they manage to recapitulate the causal 
regularities in the world at its different time-scales (Hohwy, 2013). This is what allows 
                                                             
22 See Pezzulo (2014) for a proposal on how the interoceptive inference approach is relevant for 
standard cognitive and exteroceptive inferences.   
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models to issue successful predictions about the worldly (hidden) causes of its 
incoming signals.  
 
Now, according to IIE, emotions result from interoceptive predictions—more 
precisely, via interoceptive perceptual inference. Where do interoceptive priors come 
from? From the causal regularities that obtain in the inner physiological world, as 
patterns of changes in the physiological landscape are the kind of thing that causes 
interoceptive input (this is analogous to the platitude that visual priors come from 
regularities involving light-reflecting objects). Thus, IIE is committed to the 
assumption that there must be causal regularities pertaining to emotion in the 
physiological domain.  
 
However, as I will argue below (Section 4.1.), evidence points to the claim that there 
are no regularities pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain (emotion types 
and patterns of physiological changes are statistically independent phenomena). There 
are no distinct bodily, physiological regularities relative anger, fear, joy, sadness, etc. 
In other words, evidence strongly suggests that there is no significant causal regularity 
connecting emotion types and patterns of physiological changes, so that a certain 
emotion type could predict physiological patterns. This is the case simply because, 
contrary to perceptual, interoceptive theories of emotion (Prinz, 2004; James, 1884), 
the physiological landscape does not configure emotions. There are no emotions in the 
inner milieu. Considering that there are no emotions in the physiological landscape, it 
is unlikely that the brain stores expectations about what interoceptive signals to expect 
given a certain emotion type. In other words, taking into account that there are no 
emotions configured in the physiological landscape, the learning of priors relative to 
which interoceptive signals to expect given a certain emotion-hypothesis seems 
unlikely. There are no such regularities to extract so as to build the relevant 
interoceptive expectations. Emotion models (which I am safely taking to be high-level) 
must encode then, primarily, expectations about other sort of information. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that emotion models get to encode interoceptive expectations in the way 
required by IIE. That is, in the way that interoceptive perceptual inference demands—
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the experience of emotions does not arise by minimizing interoceptive PE by 
generating interoceptive signals from emotion-models. IIE should be amended. 
 
This argument is analogous to the following, more familiar argument. Considering that 
there are no regularities pertaining to cloud-types in the auditive domain (or in the 
‘detectable vibrations domain’)—i.e., there are no auditive regularities pertaining to 
cirrus, nor to cumulus, stratus, etc.—it is unlikely that cloud-models encode auditive 
expectations. Without clouds in the auditive domain, it is hard to see how cloud models 
could get to build expectations about which auditive signals to expect given a certain 
cloud-hypothesis. Or to put it this way, given that there are no regularities pertaining 
to clouds in the auditive domain, the experience of clouds does not arise, primarily, by 
minimizing auditive PE by generating auditive signals from cloud-models. If this 
argument works in this cloud case, it should also work in the emotion case. 
 
Let me insist. Remember that, as I commented in Section 2.7., a learnt ‘prediction-
enabling’ association between a certain piece of high-level knowledge about H and 
certain low-level modality specific sensory activity about L is required for that piece 
of high-level knowledge to strongly modulate, and thus shape, percepts in such low-
level modality specific layers of processing. This sort of associations recapitulates 
regularities in the world. Considering that this sort of associations are built from 
experience, by extracting regularities in the world, their formation requires that there 
must be a causal regularity governing H and L, so that the former predicts the latter. 
Now, evidence suggests that there are no regularities governing emotion states and 
physiological patterns, so that the former could predict the latter (see below, Section 
4.1.). Thus, it is unlikely that emotion-models (which I am safely taking to be high-
level) store expectations about which interoceptive signals to expect given a certain 
emotion type. It is unlikely then that emotion-models shape interoceptive percepts, so 




Let me put the argument in question in slightly different terms. The sensory predictions 
about a certain object (or event) O that the model for O encodes are learned from 
exposure to O during training (i.e., experience). Then, if in a certain domain there are 
no O’s, a model cannot get to encode sensory predictions about O’s for that domain. 
There are no emotion types configured in the physiological/interoceptive domain. 
Thus, it is unlikely that emotion-models (which I am safely taking to be high-level) 
encode interoceptive predictions regarding emotion types—i.e., it is unlikely that 
emotion-models are simply in the business of predicting interoceptive signals via 
interoceptive perceptual inference.  Emotion-models, from which it is assumed that 
emotions arise, must then encode, primarily, other sort of information. Below I discuss 
the evidence that points to the claim that there are no regularities pertaining to emotion 
in the physiological domain. There are no emotions to be found in the physiological 
landscape.   
 
4.3. The evidence 
 
Against some versions of the ‘natural kinds’ view of emotion, L.F. Barrett and her 
colleagues have compellingly made the case for the claim that the physiological 
landscape does not exhibit “distinctive sets of correlated properties” (Barret, 2006b, 
p.33) that could configure anger, fear, joy, etc. That is, there are no physiological 
response patterns that instantiate regularities pertaining to emotion (see, e.g., Barrett, 
2006b; Quigley & Barrett, 2014). In this respect, this is mainly the case since statistical 
analyses of meta-analytical studies on emotion evince that there is no robust specificity 
in autonomic activity measures across emotion studies. This is not the place to unfold 
this one-hundred-years-controversy in any detail, so I refer the reader to Barret’s work 
on the matter. However, it is worth mentioning that, within philosophy, her arguments 
to the effect that there are no regularities pertaining to emotion per se in the 
physiological domain have been widely taken to support this conclusion (e.g., 
Carruthers, 2011; Ritchie & Carruthers, 2015; though see Colombetti, 2014, pp.35-
36). Even influential sympathizers of the view that emotions are biological natural 
kinds, which have autonomic ‘signatures’, such as Scarantino (Scarantino, 2009; 
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Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011), have recognized that Barrett (2006b) indeed achieves 
to show that the conclusion in question is the case. Scarantino (2009) recognizes that 
Barrett has shown that there are no physiological response patterns that instantiate 
regularities relative to the kind of mental states that we take emotions to be (anger, 
fear, joy, etc.)—i.e., the kind of mental states that, as we saw in Chapter 1, typically 
constitute the explandum of an emotion theory23.  
 
It could be objected that meta-analytical studies allow us to draw conclusions only for 
individual measures of autonomic responses (see Cacioppo, 2000). Meta-analytical 
studies then have little impact on current versions of interoceptive theories of emotion 
(e.g., Prinz, 2004). This is the case, since a key claim defended by these views is that, 
in the physiological landscape, emotions are configured by several, patterned 
physiological responses. Is there positive evidence for this claim? 
 
To date, the most detailed defence of the interoceptive theory of emotion is due to 
Prinz (2004). Prinz only presents one piece of evidence as evidence for the claim in 
question, namely, the study of Levenson, Ekman, and Friesen (1990). This study is 
then particularly relevant for the claim in question. Let me briefly discuss it.  
 
This study aimed at finding whether there is physiological differentiation between, so-
called ‘basic emotions’. In the study, subjects were instructed to produce facial 
configurations previously associated with specific emotional states, and to report 
which emotion they experienced (if any). At the same time, physiological variables 
such as heart rate, finger temperature, somatic activity, and skin conductance were 
jointly monitored. They found that the reported emotions correlated with autonomic 
                                                             
23 Scarantino goes on to propose, however, that emotion research should change the explanatory target 
of emotion theories. Emotion research should not have as explananda the mental states that we take 
emotions to be. Instead, emotion research should find another explanandum, though similar to the 
mental states that we take emotions to be. However, I think this is not a satisfactory move, as it 
attempts to offer poor substitutes of the mental states that we want to understand in the first place (see 




differences both between negative and positive emotions, and among the negative 
emotions of anger and fear. Differences in autonomic activity between negative and 
positive emotions are not much interesting, because they are straightforwardly 
explained by the fact that valence properties are distinctly realized in the autonomic 
system (Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006a). Thus, they only show that there is a distinctive 
pattern of physiological changes for valence properties. However, differences in 
autonomic activity among negative emotions, which share valence properties, elude 
such straightforward explanation. Accordingly, the reported autonomic differentiation 
between anger and fear is the truly interesting finding on which to focus.  
 
The results in question are not as suggestive of the truth of the claim that there are 
emotions configured in the physiological landscape as it might appear. There is an 
alternative explanation, not considered in the study. The supposedly observed 
emotion-specific autonomic patterns for fear and anger can also be explained by 
another hypothesis. Anger and fear differ not only in that they are different emotions, 
they also differ in a key respect: they differ in, what might be called, ‘coping potential 
properties’, namely, preparatory activity for threat or challenge behaviour. Nothing in 
the study in question discards the possibility that the observed results are driven by 
threat and challenge rather than by fear and anger (see Barrett, 2006b).  
 
“The vascular patterns that differentiate anger and fear also distinguish between threat 
and challenge appraisals (e.g., Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Mendes, Reis, Seery, & 
Blascovich, 2003; Tomaka et al., 1993, 1997). In attempting to generate fear and anger, 
researchers may have inadvertently manipulated threat and challenge appraisals, leading 
to the observed vascular effects. Similarly, skin conductance reactivity is associated with 
increased attention allocation (Blakeslee, 1979; Frith & Allen, 1983), and may have little 
to do with emotional responding per se.” (Barrett, 2006b, p.41) 
 
Now, challenge and threat cut across “basic emotions”. Therefore, the observed 




On the other hand, it is worth considering that autonomic activity measures differ from 
occasion to occasion depending on the method used to trigger emotions in the lab (see 
also, Larsen et al., 2008). Variation in autonomic patterns across studies which differ 
in their triggering methods is the norm. For example, the patterns of autonomic activity 
found in the study of Christie & Friedman (2004), which used films as triggering 
method, vary significantly to the patterns found in the study of Nyklicek et al. (1997), 
which used music as a triggering method. The study of Stemmler et al. (2007) is 
particularly interesting in this respect. Stemmler et al. work looked for specificity in 
autonomic patterns for anger vs. fear. Also, they used two different triggering methods 
(in two different studies). No robust consistency across both studies was found (for a 
critical review of this kind of studies, see Quigley & Barrett, 2014).  
 
Now, as Prinz (2004) (and others) emphasizes, physiological resources are allocated 
according to the kinds of behaviours that the faced situation affords. That is, 
physiological responses prepare for action. This is a widely acknowledged 
phenomenon in emotion research. In light of this phenomenon, the above mentioned 
inconsistency in results across studies makes plenty of sense, considering that it is not 
implausible to assume then that certain triggering methods tend to relate to certain 
kinds of situation more than other triggering methods. This points to a more telling 
argument against the view that the physiological landscape configures emotions.  
 
Physiological resources are allocated according to the nature of the behaviour that the 
faced situation demands. Then, if different emotions usually differ in their associated 
behaviours, but they also usually involve the same kind of behaviour (because not only 
the same type of situation, but also different types of situations might demand the same 
kind of behaviour), and the same type of emotion usually involves quite different 
behaviours, it is expected that the different emotion types are not distinctively 
configured by patterns of physiological responses. Further studies are needed to 
resolve this issue, but current evidence, taken as a whole, does not support the view 
that there are regularities pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain. 
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Consequently, it should not be taken for granted when theorizing about emotional 
processes. 
 
There are no emotion types configured in the physiological/interoceptive domain. 
There are no regularities governing emotion states and physiological patterns, so that 
the former could predict the latter (i.e., they are probabilistically independent). Thus, 
it is unlikely that emotion-models store expectations about which interoceptive signals 
to expect given a certain emotion type. It is unlikely then that emotion-models shape 
interoceptive percepts, so that the latter could constitute emotion. Emotion-models, 
from which it is assumed that emotions arise, must then encode other sort of 
information. 
 
4.4. Reply to possible objections  
 
4.4.1. On the causes of interceptive signals 
 
As I commented above, IIE is the view that, in direct analogy to the way in which 
exteroceptive percepts are formed, emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via 
perceptual inferences of the likely causes of incoming interoceptive signals. Thus, we 
must assume that instead of determining what it is the object or event in the external 
world that is likely causing incoming signals, as in the case of exteroceptive perceptual 
inference, during interoceptive inference the causes that need to be determined amount 
to the causal regularities that obtain in the inner, physiological landscape, as patterns 
of changes in the physiological landscape are the kind of thing that causes 
interoceptive input (I take this to be a platitude). 
 
Now, as long as exteroceptively represented external objects and events can 
consistently cause physiological changes via learned associations between a certain 
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external cue and a certain physiological pattern (e.g., seeing food can cause the 
physiological changes characteristic of hunger), the indirect or distal causes of certain 
current incoming interoceptive signals could be taken to be external. Then, it could be 
argued that the task of interoceptive perceptual inferences is to infer which emotionally 
relevant external event is causing incoming interoceptive signals. As such an external 
cause is successfully inferred, its expected interoceptive signals are generated from the 
top-down, meeting, and thus ‘explaining away’, incoming interoceptive signals. This 
gives rise to the formation of an interoceptive percept: emotion experience thus arises.  
 
In this respect, think of the distinction made by Prinz (2004) between the real and 
nominal contents of emotion. As IIE, Prinz identifies emotions with bodily perception. 
Real contents are external things (‘core relational themes’: danger, loss, etc.) that cause 
emotions; while nominal contents amount to physiological patterns that cause 
emotions. Physiological changes are proximal causes, while external events (core 
relational themes) are distal causes. Bodily, interoceptive percepts have then both, 
physiological causes and its associated external causes. The interoceptive percepts that 
constitute emotion inform about real contents by registering nominal contents, that is, 
via patterns of physiological changes. Importantly, a certain real content has an 
associated nominal content that informs about such real content only insofar as there 
is a causal regularity linking the two (see Chapter 1). According to Prinz, the 
mind/brain can determine then that a certain external situation is dangerous by forming 
an interoceptive percept that informs the organism about danger. In other words, 
‘blindfolded’, an organism can determine that an external situation is dangerous only 
by accessing what interoceptive percepts inform about. In a word, the (distal) causes 
responsible for interoceptive input, and which need to be inferred by interoceptive 
inferences, can be external.  
 
A defender of IIE could argue then that it does not matter that there are no emotions 
in the inner physiological landscape, since interoceptive perceptual inferences are in 
the business of inferring the external causes of interoceptive signals, and there are 
external situations that can be said to be characteristic of a certain emotion instead of 
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another emotion. To put it this way, the signature of an emotion type lies in the external 
environment. For example, an approaching dangerous dog is characteristic of fear, 
while the loss of a loved one is characteristic of sadness24. Certainly, it is ridiculous to 
claim that an interoceptive percept could inform about the external causes that 
typically trigger exteroceptive receptors, such as a dog approaching or a loved one 
dying. ‘Blindfolded’ we cannot tell that there is a pizza on the table by only accessing 
interoceptive percepts, even though food systematically triggers very specific 
interoceptive perceptions (those that constitute hunger). The claim is that 
nutritiousness or dangerousness (which are external things, even though relational 
properties (Prinz, 2004, 2007)) are the external things about which an already formed 
interoceptive percept informs. 
 
Then, in the reading of IIE under consideration, the task of interoceptive perceptual 
inferences is to infer which external event characteristic of emotion (e.g., core 
relational themes: danger, loss, etc.) is causing incoming interoceptive signals.  
 
There is an important point to have in mind at this juncture, so as to avoid becoming 
confused. We are dealing here interoceptive perceptual inference, which according to 
IIE is the manner by which emotions arise. In direct analogy to visual perceptual 
inference, the task of interoceptive perceptual inferences consists in forming a percept. 
In this case, an interoceptive percept. That is, we are not dealing here with the task of 
forming an exteroceptive percept by making use of the information provided by 
incoming interoceptive signals or by already formed interoceptive percepts. For 
example, forming the visual percept of a salad by using interoceptive information 
relative to hunger so as to determine that incoming visual signals are better explained 
                                                             
24 However, as I mentioned above, as Prinz (2004) has argued, an interoceptive theory of emotion 
needs to say that what makes an external situation dangerous (or any other property that characterizes 
an emotion type, such as loss in the case of sadness) is that the representation of that external situation 
is accompanied by the perceived physiological changes that constitute fear. This perceived pattern of 
changes is what makes that that situation is perceived as dangerous in the first place. Thus, in an 
interoceptive theory of emotion, being dangerous is not something that is determined exteroceptively. 




by the salad-hypothesis than by the grass-hypothesis (since in this way the salad-
hypothesis increases its prior probability relative to the grass-hypothesis). This latter 
kind of task is the one with which, for example, Pezzulo (2014) deals (see Pezzulo, 
2014).  
 
On the other hand, we are neither dealing with the non-perceptual task of determining 
the identity of the cause responsible of the already formed percepts that currently 
populate one’s mind. This task consists in explaining (or making sense of) the origin 
of one’s already formed percepts, rather than forming such percepts in the first place. 
In this task, one infers the origin of such percepts so as to make sense of them, without 
shaping their configuration. They become some sort of fixed explanandum, to put it 
this way. The task here is merely explaining or making sense of current bodily, 
interoceptive perceptual experience. Consequently, an interoceptive percept has 
already been formed. Let me exemplify. You (or better, your brain) are undergoing the 
experience of cold. That is, you (or better, your brain) already formed an interoceptive 
percept. That is, an interoceptive perceptual hypothesis was already successful in 
minimizing incoming interoceptive PE. You (or better, your brain) now try to infer 
whether that cold experience (i.e., interoceptive percept) was caused by your drinking 
a lot of cold water a few minutes ago, or by that breeze of air conditioning in the 
library. Both hypotheses amount to external phenomena. Note that whether the cold-
water-hypothesis or the air-conditioning-hypothesis turns out to be selected as the 
better hypothesis, both leave the configuration of the interoceptive percept in question 
(cold) just as already is. Thus, this consists in a case in which a hypothesis is selected 
in order to explain (or make sense of) an already formed interoceptive percept; rather 
than to a case in which the task is attempting to determine what is going on in the inner 
milieu in the first place, since a satisfactory perceptual hypothesis was already found 
(an interoceptive percept was already formed). This is analogous to the following case. 
Imagine that you wake up very early in the morning and your partner is not right next 
to you on the bed. This is very rare. It demands explanation. You then consider two 
possible explanatory hypotheses. The hypothesis that your partner had an early 
meeting and did not tell you, and the hypothesis that your partner went to the 
supermarket to buy milk for the breakfast. Note that any of the considered hypotheses, 
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if selected, will not change the already formed percept of your empty bed. The bed 
looks the same, you are just trying to make sense of this rare situation. This is the kind 
of case that I commented above (p. 139) regarding what I referred to as strict two-
factor, Schachterian views.   
 
Then, in the reading of IIE under consideration, the task of interoceptive perceptual 
inferences is to infer which external event characteristic of emotion (e.g., danger) is 
causing incoming interoceptive signals. As such an external cause is successfully 
inferred, let’s say dangerousness, its expected interoceptive signals are generated from 
the top-down by the fear-model, meeting, and thus ‘explaining away’, incoming 
interoceptive signals. This results in the formation of an interoceptive percept that 
informs about dangerousness: the experience of fear thus arises. 
 
Note that for a hypothesis about something external to be able to ‘explain away’ 
incoming interoceptive signals by generating the latter (and thus form an interoceptive 
percept), it must encode expectations about which interoceptive activity to expect 
given that hypothesis instead of another hypothesis. The danger-hypothesis must 
encode interoceptive expectations which are distinguishable relative to the loss-
hypothesis. More generally, for a hypothesis about something external (danger) to 
modulate interoceptive activity, the system must built an association between such an 
exteroceptive cue and certain interoceptive activity (instead of other interoceptive 
activity), so as to be able to predict such interoceptive activity from this external cue.  
 
Where do such interoceptive priors come from? As I mentioned in Sections 4.2. and 
2.7., in order to learn such a ‘prediction-enabling’ association, the system must extract 
from the world the regularity linking such an external phenomenon (danger) and the 
triggering of certain patterns of physiological changes able to directly trigger 
interoceptive signals (after transduction). In other words, danger must predict those 
patterns of physiological changes—remember the similar point made by Prinz that a 
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certain real content has an associated nominal content that informs about the latter only 
insofar as there is causal regularity linking the two.  
 
Considering the above, this reading of IIE cannot work, and for the exact same reasons 
discussed in Section 4.2. There are no regularities linking the external events that 
characterize emotions (loss, danger, etc.), and certain pattern of physiological changes 
(instead of other patter of physiological changes), so that the latter could be predicted 
from such external cues. That is, the argument and the evidence from Section 4.2. and 
4.3. also apply in this case. The evidence from Section 4.3. directly apply to this case, 
since the external events that characterize emotions (loss, danger, etc.), precisely 
insofar as they characterize emotions, are the kind of stimuli used for triggering 
emotions in the lab in the studies discussed Section 4.1. 
 
4.4.2. The double duck-rabbit objection 
 
There is another similar objection, closely related to the objection above. Think of the 
double duck-rabbit case (fig.1) (see Hohwy, 2013, p. 243). In this case, one single kind 
of very ambiguous stimulus can be perceived as a duck eating a rabbit or as a rabbit 
following another rabbit (among other combinations), depending on which hypothesis 
becomes more likely given context. We could think of physiological changes as highly 
ambiguous in this sense, so close to just noise that this is why it has been so hard to 
find emotions configured in the physiological landscape (section 4.3.). Then, it could 
be argued that a certain emotion arises instead of another emotion as contextual 
knowledge makes one emotion-hypothesis more likely than another emotion-
hypothesis. Then, there is no need there to be non-noisy physiological changes that 
configure emotion types, because emotion differentiation can be accounted for in terms 
of contextual knowledge alone. Contextual, external cues determine which emotion is 




Now, note that in the double duck-rabbit case, when the contextual piece of knowledge 
that the duck is eating the rabbit is activated, it disambiguates visual signals in favour 
of that hypothesis. In a PP context, this means that knowledge of that extra piece of 
information results in the top-down generation of the visual signals corresponding to 
that winning hypothesis, instead of the top-down generation of the visual signals 
corresponding to a competing hypothesis (let’s say, one rabbit following another 
rabbit). At the same time, PE signals relative to the selected hypothesis is given high-
precision, while the ‘portions’ of the incoming signals compatible with the competing 
hypothesis are given less weight. As a result of that, one forms and experiences, for 
example, the visual percept of the duck eating the rabbit (hypothesis A), and not the 
visual percept of one rabbit following another rabbit (hypothesis B).  
 
Thus, in this sort of case, even though the visual stimulus is highly ambiguous, certain 
visual signals are more expected for hypothesis A than for hypothesis B. These 
hypotheses then involve different precision regimes for different ‘portions’ of the total 
incoming signal, and ‘explain away’ then different ‘portions’ of the incoming data. 
More generally, any top-down sensory hypothesis must specify distinguishable 
sensory data relative to another competing top-down sensory hypothesis. This implies 
that these two distinct hypotheses ‘explain away’ different ‘portions’ of the total 
precision-weighted incoming signal. Hypotheses A and B then expect distinct visual 
data to generate from the top-down, and different precision regimes relative to the total 
incoming data (both hypotheses expect different precisions regimes for different 
portion of the total incoming signal). Thus, both hypotheses should minimize different 
aspects of the incoming visual signal. This is what occurs (for the sake of argument) 
in the duck-rabbit example, or in any case of ‘ambiguous figures’, in which two distinct 
percepts can be formed by extracting different regularities in the same input.  
 
Where do those visual priors came from? From regularities pertaining to ducks and 
from regularities pertaining to rabbits in the domain of light-reflecting objects (i.e., the 
visual domain). Since there are indeed regularities pertaining to those animals in the 
visual domain, the visual hierarchy can, via learning, recapitulate these regularities 
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over time. The visual hierarchy can then built expectations regarding which visual data 
is more likely given a duck or a rabbit. When the incoming input is highly ambiguous, 
these learnt visual expectations are then used so as to ‘explain away’ incoming visual 
signals, once contextual knowledge has contributed in deciding which hypothesis is 
more likely.   
 
The same applies in the emotion case above. For example, two interoceptive 
hypotheses about the emotion that might be causing certain highly ambiguous 
interoceptive signals are considered, let’s say, the fear-hypothesis and the excitement-
hypothesis. Exteroceptively perceived contextual cues can be used so as to decide 
between the two hypotheses: does the context make more likely fear or excitement? 
Let’s say that a snake is approaching. Thus, the interoceptive hypothesis for fear 
becomes the better hypothesis. In a PP context, this means that knowledge of such a 
contextual cue results in the top-down generation of the interoceptive signals 
corresponding to that winning hypothesis (the fear-hypothesis), instead of the top-
down generation of the interoceptive signals corresponding to the competing 
hypothesis (the anger-hypothesis). More generally, and as I mentioned above, any top-
down sensory hypothesis must specify distinguishable sensory data relative to another 
competing top-down sensory hypothesis. This implies that they ‘explain away’ 
different ‘portions’ of the total precision-weighted incoming signal. Now, according 
to IIE, emotion-hypotheses are interoceptive in nature (otherwise they could not be 
compared to actual interoceptive data, which is what it is claimed emotion-hypotheses 
need to ‘explain away’ so as to minimize interoceptive PE). Therefore, a certain 
emotion-hypothesis must specify distinguishable interoceptive data relative to another 
competing emotion-hypothesis. Then, in the case being considered, once the fear-
hypothesis becomes (indeed) the better hypothesis, the interoceptive signals expected 
for the fear-hypothesis are generated from the top-down, meeting and thus successfully 
‘explaining away’ their relevant precision-weighted ‘portions’ of the incoming signal. 




Then, just as in the visual case above, in this sort of case, even though the interoceptive 
stimulus is highly ambiguous, certain interoceptive signals are more expected for the 
fear-hypothesis than for anger-hypothesis. Where do these interoceptive prior 
expectations come from? From regularities pertaining to emotion in the inner milieu. 
This reading of IIE also requires then that there must be regularities pertaining to 
emotion in the physiological domain. The argument from Section 4.2. applies to this 
case.  
 
4.4.3. All emotion hypotheses expect the same interoceptive activity 
 
There is another closely related objection. IIE could be read in the following way, 
closer to the way in which Hohwy (2013) presents it. According to this reading, the 
claim that IIE puts forward is that basically all emotion hypotheses expect the same 
interoceptive states. In this respect, perceptual interoceptive hypotheses about which 
emotion might be taking place encode expectations about which affective properties 
should occur given such a considered emotion. The affective properties in question 
can be taken to consist in an arousal state together with its hedonic value, which are 
assumed to be states in the interoceptive system. All emotions involve arousal, and the 
tasks of ‘interoceptive inferences’ is to infer which emotion is causing it. So there is 
an arousal state, and the emotion system needs to infer what is causing it: does the 
situation make more likely that fear, instead of anger, is occurring? Emotions 
differentiate then only in terms of our distinct ‘cognitive’ responses to the same 
expected interoceptive states (Hohwy, 2013, p.243). In this respect, the direct analogy 
with vision does not go, as different visual hypotheses encode different sensory 
expectations; while in this reading of IIE, different emotion-hypotheses all expect 
arousal properties. In other words, different emotion-hypotheses (the joy-hypothesis, 
the fear-hypothesis, etc.) they all predict the interoceptive system to encode the sensory 
states characteristic of arousal (together with its hedonic value). Thus, there is no need 
there to be regularities pertaining to different emotions in the physiological landscape. 
In this respect, it is only required that there must be regularities relative to arousal 
properties in the physiological domain, and it is not controversial to assume that 
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arousal together with its hedonic value are states in the interoceptive system (see, e.g., 
Barrett, 2006b; Quigley & Barrett, 2014). Once these interoceptive states are predicted 
by a certain perceptual emotion-hypothesis, an emotion arises.  
 
Now, note that a state of arousal is typically considered to be a bodily experience, i.e., 
an interoceptive experience. Thus, a state of arousal implies that an interoceptive 
percept (the one that constitutes the felt experience of arousal) has already been 
formed, as phenomenal consciousness is populated by nothing over and above 
percepts. It might seem natural then to consider this reading of IIE along the lines of a 
strict two-factor, Schachterian view. In this sort of view, emotions amount to cognitive 
interpretations of current bodily experience (‘arousal’ for Schachter). Thus, 
Schachterian views exhibit two separate factors: bodily perception plus ‘cognition’. In 
this kind of view, ‘cognition’ has the function of merely explaining or making sense 
of current bodily, interoceptive experience. So, in the first place, a state of arousal 
emerges, and then ‘cognition’ makes sense of the latter in light of current external 
contextual aspects. In strictly Schachterian views, contextual knowledge merely 
contributes in making sense of an already formed interoceptive percept, without 
playing any modulatory role in in the formation of the latter (the first, separate factor), 
as a PP view must claim. Here high-level knowledge does not shape percepts.  
 
However, the reading of IIE in question should not be understood in a strictly two-
factor, Schachterian manner. This, since a PP view of emotion, which takes emotions 
to arise as interoceptive PE is minimized as bodily activity is perceived, must claim 
that higher level emotion-knowledge modulates lower levels of the interoceptive 
hierarchy, thus shaping interoceptive perception from the top-down. This, by 
generating descending interoceptive predictions that meet incoming interoceptive 
signals. In a word, the reading of IIE in question should not be understood along the 




In that sense, to count as a proper PP view in which top-down predictions shape 
percepts, the reading of IIE in question should be understood in roughly the following 
way. A certain event activates interoceptors. This triggers interoceptive activity at 
lower levels. These incoming interoceptive signals need to be ‘explained away’. At the 
same time, in parallel, exteroceptively perceived contextual aspects make the fear-
hypothesis the most promising hypothesis. The interoceptive signals expected for fear 
are then generated from the top-down. These latter signals amount to the interoceptive 
signals expected for a state of arousal (together with its hedonic value), since these are 
the kind of interoceptive state that all emotion hypotheses expect. As the expected 
descending interoceptive predictions successfully ‘explain away’ such incoming 
interoceptive signals, an interoceptive percept is formed. This percept constitutes the 
experience of arousal (together with its hedonic value). However, such percept 
(arousal) was shaped by top-down predictions generated by the ‘fear-model’ (the ‘fear-
model’ expects arousal to take place). Thus, given that such percept is formed driven 
by the fear-hypothesis, in this case such experienced arousal (together with its hedonic 
value) amounts to the experience of fear. The emotion of fear thus arises. Then, 
according to this reading of IIE, at the same time that the experience of arousal 
(together with its hedonic value) is constituted by such descending predictions, the 
experience of fear arises.  
 
This reading of IIE looks plausible, as it does not face the problem highlighted in 
Section 4, and so it is also immune to the counter-arguments discussed in this Section. 
This reading of IIE also significantly departs from a perceptual, interoceptive view of 
emotion along the lines of the James-Lange view, since this reading of IIE does not 
assume that there must be emotions configured in the physiological landscape. This 
reading of IIE is only committed to the claim that the physiological landscape 
configures arousal, together with its hedonic value (i.e., valence). In this sense, this 
reading of IIE is closer to the view defended in this Thesis, according to which valence 
properties (and its degree of “intensity”) are configured in the inner milieu, and they 




However, it might not be the most plausible way to read IIE. Evidence shows that 
firstly the affective properties of stimuli are determined between 120 and 180 ms after 
stimulus onset (i.e., their positive or negative valence and degree of arousal), and only 
then more fine-grained aspects of the content of such stimuli are determined between 
200 and 350 ms after stimulus onset (e.g., sad/loss, fear/danger) (see, Barrett et al., 
2007; Barrett & Bar, 2009; Eimer & Holmes, 2007; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; 
Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). That is, during perceptual tasks, once arousal (together 
with its hedonic value) is constituted, only then emotion experience begins to arise. In 
other words, during emotion, first an interoceptive percept is formed, which constitutes 
the experience of arousal (together with its hedonic value). After that, once such an 
interoceptive percept has already been formed, then an emotion hypothesis needs to 
determine which emotion the situation makes more likely. That is, both factors seem 
to be processed separately. This suggest that it is unlikely that the perception of arousal 
states is shaped by emotion hypotheses. High-level, contextual knowledge plays the 
role of merely explaining or making sense of current bodily, interoceptive experience. 
That is, evidence suggest a two-factor, Schachterian sort of view, where contextual 
knowledge only explains (or makes sense of) an already formed percept, without 
shaping it or playing a role in the formation of such percept, as a PP view must claim. 
In a word, evidence suggest that this reading of IIE might be problematic to some 
degree.   
 
4.4.4. The ‘amalgam’ objection 
 
It could be argued that there is no need there to be regularities pertaining to emotion 
in physiological landscape, since interoceptive perceptual inferences integrate all sorts 
of information, not just interoceptive information, across all levels of the cortical 
hierarchy. Emotions are some sort of ‘amalgam’ of all that kind of information. 
 
This reading of IIE hits the nail on the head in recognizing that in order for an emotion-
hypothesis to be selected, the whole generative model that constitutes an agent needs 
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to be employed. That is, as I commented in Section 4.1. above, in order for an emotion-
hypothesis to be selected among competing emotion-hypotheses, knowledge encoded 
in all sensory modalities, and in higher multimodal/amodal regions, across all levels 
of abstraction (or time-scales), needs to be recruited. However, contrary to this reading 
of IIE, I called attention to the fact that, in IIE, representations encoded in non-
interoceptive sensory modalities, and amodal and multimodal knowledge, serve 
interoceptive ends: finding the better interoceptive hypothesis able to ‘explain away’ 
the incoming signals proprietary of the interoceptive ‘channel’ (Section 4.1).  
 
The problem with the reading of IIE in question then is that it abandons the original 
idea put forward by Seth (and Hohwy) that emotions are a sort of interoceptive 
perception. IIE unambiguously identifies emotion with interoceptive perception of a 
certain sort. That is why Seth insists in claiming that emotions arise from interoceptive 
perception in direct analogy to the way in which visual percepts are formed (Seth, 
2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). Thus, one manner in which ‘the amalgam objection’ can 
be evaluated is by seeing whether an analogous claim can be made in the visual 
domain. I think such a claim cannot be made, as it leads to a rather trivial tenet. In the 
case of vision, high-level amodal, and knowledge from non-visual modalities, 
contribute across all levels of the cortical hierarchy during visual percept formation. 
In this sense, we can then talk of an ‘amalgam’ involved during visual percept 
formation. However, this certainly does not make visual percepts identical to 
multimodal percepts. Of course, there is a rich interaction between modalities and 
contextual knowledge across all levels, but that does not make the visual percept that 
results from this process stop being a visual percept (a representation in the visual 
‘channel’), to put it this way. Knowledge from other modalities contribute by 
constraining the kind of visual activity that is generated from the top-down so as to 
successfully ‘explain away’ the incoming signals proprietary of the visual channel. 
That is, in the case of vision, forming a percept requires meeting incoming visual 
signals alone (to put it this way, one does not need to hear so as to see). Given the 
direct analogy between visual percept formation and emotion generation, just as we do 
not claim that, in the PP framework, visual percepts are identical to an ‘amalgam’, 
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there is no reason for us to read IIE as maintaining that this is what occurs in the 
emotion/interoception case.  
 
There is another, more general worry, closely related to ‘the amalgam objection’. 
Certainly, typical episodes of emotion generation and their regulation are complex, 
most of the time involving many aspects. For example, certain movements, facial 
expressions, thoughts, motivations, concomitant perceptual experiences in different 
modalities, action tendencies, etc. However, as I commented in Chapter 1, the goal of 
an emotion theory is to single out the minimal essential components of emotion, and 
to determine in which way these components interact so as to generate an emotion. 
That is, the goal of an emotion theory is not to determine which aspects typically 
contribute causally to emotion. In other words, the fact that emotions typically involve 
many aspects does not mean that all of them, even though they interact, are proper 
parts of the mechanism that constitutes emotion. At least, something must be said 
about why are all those components jointly required for emotion generation.  
 
Anyway, I do not mean to imply that some sort of amalgam-like, multimodal view of 
emotion is implausible. It could be the case that a PP amalgam-like view is better suited 
to account for emotion than approaches which avoid putting all (or many) components 
associated with emotion as constituent parts of emotion. However, in this Thesis I am 
interested in discussing the interoceptive inference view insofar as it amounts to a PP 
version of the perceptual, interoceptive view of emotion, according to which emotions 
arise in direct analogy to vision.  
 
4.5. Final remarks 
 
Interoceptive, perceptual theories of emotion are indeed problematic—as there are no 
significant regularities pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain. So a PP 
account of emotion should avoid modelling emotion as interoceptive perceptions. 
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Contrary to IIE’s claim, predicting interoceptive signals during perceptual inference 
cannot be then what is primary in emotion generation. Thus, Seth’s (and Hohwy’s) IIE 
lacks a compelling way to account for emotions per se. Interoceptive perceptual 
inferences are not in the driver’s seat when it comes to emotion.  
 
On the other hand, the interoceptive inference approach can also be taken to be an 
account of subjective feeling states in general, rather than as an account of emotions 
per se. That is, the interoceptive inference approach can also be taken to be an account 
of affect. Considering that valence is the essence of affect, in this respect, the claim 
put forward by the interoceptive inference approach is that affective valence arises by 
minimizing interoceptive PE via interoceptive perceptual inference. In the coming 
Chapters (Chapter 5 and 6), I defend this view from criticism and show that it can reply 
to objections.  
 
As I argued in this Chapter, as it stands, IIE cannot account for emotion per se. Even 
though PP can indeed account for valence (affect)—as I argue in the coming 
Chapters—this leaves PP without an account of emotion. This is major drawback for 
PP ambitions. In Chapter 7, I will suggest that the PP approach to interoception can 
indeed be used to account for emotion per se. This requires amending IIE in a key 
respect. I agree with IIE’s claim that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE—
after all, common sense (and also experimental research) indicates that interoception 
is part of emotion generation. I think that this more general claim is on track. However, 
I suggest that, contrary to IIE, emotions do not arise by minimizing interoceptive PE 
in the specific way proposed by IIE. It might be the case that emotions, instead of 
arising via interoceptive perceptual inference, arise via interoceptive active inference. 
In other words, emotions are not about forming an interoceptive percept of a certain 
sort. Rather, emotions are strategies for changing an interoceptive percept that has 
already been formed (via interoceptive perceptual inference). That is, emotions are 
specific strategies for regulating valence (affect). Now, interoceptive percepts (i.e., 
valence) inform about our homeostatic condition. Then, emotions are better seen as 
specific strategies for regulating homeostasis.  
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5. Against non-sensory theories of valence 
 
According to IIE, emotions per se arise by minimizing interoceptive PE. This is the 
more general claim put forward by IIE. IIE’s more specific claim is that emotions arise 
by minimizing interoceptive PE in a specific sort of way, namely, via interoceptive 
perceptual inference. That is, by attempting to find an interoceptive emotion-
hypothesis that fits incoming interoceptive signals. In this respect, in direct analogy to 
the manner by which visual percepts are formed, IIE claims then that emotions are 
interoceptive percepts that result from a content-specifying emotion-hypothesis. As I 
just argued, this more specific claim is problematic.  
 
However, as I commented in the Introduction, and as I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 6, the interoceptive inference approach can also be taken to be an account of 
affective valence, rather than a view on emotion per se exclusively. In this respect, the 
claim put forward by the interoceptive inference approach is that the affective aspect 
of subjective feeling states—i.e., affective valence—arise by minimizing interoceptive 
PE, in direct analogy to the way in which vision operates. That is, affective valence, 
not emotion per se, results from a perceptual, interoceptive process. This is the 
interoceptive inference theory of valence (ITV).  
 
In ITV, perceptual hypotheses, insofar as they are interoceptive perceptual hypotheses, 
predict sensory, interoceptive activity. Thus, valence properties count as sensory, 
interoceptive representations. Also considering that everything in the PP perceptual 
machinery seems to be sensory, in the PP framework valance properties should also 
be taken to be constituted by sensory processing. In ITV, affective valence can be seen 
then as a sensory, perceptual state. The PP framework can be seen as committed then 




However, the view that valence is a sensory phenomenon is controversial. What might 
be called non-sensory signal theories of valence (NSS) (Prinz, 2004, 2010; Carruthers, 
2011) have compellingly showed that valence is not constituted by sensory processing. 
Valence cannot be understood as an interoceptive phenomenon. So any account that 
models valence on perceptual processing seems to be doomed to fail.  
 
Taking into account all the above considerations, and the fact that valence is a 
necessary component of emotion (and the mark of the affective), discussing the nature 
of valence is key for my purposes. In this and the next Chapter, I will do exactly that.  
 
In this Chapter, I focus in showing that NSS is not a compelling view on the nature of 
valence. Therefore, valence is likely not to be a non-sensory item in the furniture of 
the affective mind. Thus, the door is open for the view that valence is a sensory item 
in the furniture of the perceptual predictive machine posited by the PP framework.  
 
In order to show that affective valence is likely to be a perceptual phenomenon, I begin 
by briefly characterizing valence (Section 5.1.), and introduce widely agreed 
desiderata for a theory of valence (Section 5.2.). Then, in Section 5.3., I present Prinz’s 
and Carruthers’s versions of the non-sensory signal theory of valence (NSS) (Sections 
5.3.1. and 5.3.2., respectively), and their explanatory advantages (Section 5.3.3.). As I 
will show in Section 5.4., NSS faces decisive problems on its own (see above), which 
makes NSS a poor candidate for a compelling, plausible theory of valence. Thus, the 
door is open for the view that valence is a sensory item in the furniture of the perceptual 
predictive machine posited by the PP framework.  
 
5.1. Characterizing valence   
 
We strive to have certain kinds of emotions, and we strive to avoid having other kinds 
of emotions. Certain emotions are agreeable, while other emotions are disagreeable. 
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That is, there are positive emotions and negative emotions. For example, joy, pride, 
love, and amusement typically are positive emotions; while anger, fear, guilt, and 
contempt typically are negative emotions. Emotions are classified in this way in virtue 
of the character of its valence. Certain emotions are positive emotions since they have 
as a component positive valence; and certain emotions are negative emotions since 
they have as a component negative valence25. 
 
Valence is not only part of our folk psychological understanding of the nature of 
emotion, but it is also a construct that plays a fundamental role in the scientific study 
of emotion (see, e.g., Barrett, 2006a; Russell, 2003; Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015), 
to the point that, for some theorists, valence is one of the main building blocks of 
emotion (Barrett, 2006a; Russell, 2003). So note that the notion of valence in which I 
am interested in this Chapter is a non-normative notion that plays an explanatory role 
in psychology. Thus, contrary to what a few researchers have pointed out (e.g., 
Charchland, 2005; Picard, 1997; Solomon, 2003), when it is said, in the affective 
sciences, that an emotion is positive or negative (i.e., that it has positive or negative 
valence) it is not being said that such an emotion is positive or negative in the sense of 
being good or bad normatively, in any ethical or prudential sense. Valence is neither 
an ethical nor a prudential construct; it is a psychological construct that plays a role in 
affective sciences.  
 
I am simply assuming then that there is such a thing as valence and that it does play a 
role in our best current theories about emotion. I am aware that Solomon (2003) has 
argued that valence is not a unified construct, and that, consequently, emotion research 
could just simply dispense with the notion of valence. However, if in the literature 
there are many different, orthogonal ways of using the term ‘valence’—as Solomon 
critically remarks—it is simply because we have many competing theories of valence. 
                                                             
25 Note that this way of characterizing valence leaves open the possibility that a certain emotion type 





Just as the fact that there are many different, orthogonal ways of using the term 
‘attention’ (given that there are many competing theories of attention) does not imply 
that psychology should dispense with this construct, the fact that there are many 
competing theories of valence does not imply that there might not be a theory of 
valence that successfully captures the distinction between positive and negative 
emotions. 
 
In fact, making sense of the evaluative polarity captured by the notion of valence 
appears to be mandatory precisely because “valence consistently comes out as the 
primary factor” in statistical analyses of emotion reports (Cochrane, 2009, p. 387). In 
other words, contrary to Solomon, given that valence is ubiquitously present on our 
thinking about affective phenomena, rather than abandon the notion altogether, “it 
would be more appropriate to specify the concept more exactly, so that possible 
differences in interpretation do not confound experimental results.” (Cochrane, 2009, 
p. 387). 
 
Not only emotions have valence as a component. Given that valence is the key 
construct in affect, all affective phenomena are valenced. For example, drives or 
motivations also exhibit such a positive and negative character as, for example, hunger 
and thirst, which are negatively valenced. Also moods are valenced, as depression and 
anxiety, which typically have negative valence as a component.  
 
5.1.1. The evaluative and motivational role of valence 
 
Why psychologists posit the construct of valence? What is the functional role of 
valence? One uncontroversial, straightforward answer is that the role of valence is to 
make things positively or negatively matter for the agent (i.e., endow things with 
positive or negative significance), thus facilitating and impelling behaviour relative to 
now relevant, valued aspects of the environment. Valence makes things matter to us, 
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and consequently urges action. That is, valence plays an evaluative and motivational 
role. Valence impels organisms to act in ways consistent with what they appraise as 
good or bad, as when, for example, negative emotions impel us to get away from 
stimuli appraised as having a negative impact, or to allocate attentional and memory 
resources towards negative events.  
 
The claim that valence is mainly invoked as a construct that plays an evaluative and 
motivational role is evidenced by the way in which it has been characterized 
throughout its history in psychology26. For example, Tolman (1932) understood 
valence as the ‘attracting or repulsive forces’ that objects have for organisms. Lewin 
(1935) understood valence as ‘imperative environmental facts’ that guide behaviour 
and give rise to a world of significance for the organism. Schneirla (1959) understood 
valence in terms of the direction of behaviour toward relevant goals. More recently, 
Fridja (1986) held that valenced objects result attractive or aversive for organisms, 
defining thus the meaning of a situation. Davidson (1993) claimed that valence 
involves approach and avoidance behaviours, which are, according to him, 
intrinsically pleasant and unpleasant, respectively. Views that understand valence as 
evaluations (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988) can also be seen as 
positing valence as a motivational construct, given that evaluative contents, contrary 
to mere indicative contents, recommend courses of action. Valence has also been 
characterized as involving representations of goals (Dyer, 1987; Izard, 1991; 
Panksepp, 2005; Rozin, 2003), which are arguably inherently motivational. Carruthers 
(2011) holds that valence consists in an inner non-sensory signal that confers value 
(good or bad) to attended stimuli, and motivates their pursuit or avoidance. Also Prinz 
(2004, 2010) holds that valence make affective states matter to us, and that it is in the 
business of shaping behaviour. 
 
The evaluative and motivational role of valence is inherited by emotions, insofar as 
the latter contain a valence marker. In this way, the content represented by a certain 
                                                             
26 See Colombetti (2005) for a historical review of the notion of valence. 
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emotion (i.e., its ‘core relational theme’) becomes something that matters for the agent, 
so that the latter is impelled by its emotional state to act in a relevant fashion. This 
evaluative/motivational aspect of emotion, inherited from the valence marker they 
contain, has been highlighted throughout the history of emotion research (see Frijda, 
2008, p.72).  
 
Now, it may be useful to briefly clarify what I mean here by ‘evaluation’ and 
‘motivation’. By ‘evaluation’ I simply refer to a mental item that, when it is associated 
or combined with a certain mental state, makes the latter something positive or 
negative for the agent. Now, since theories of valence are theories of what makes 
positive (negative) affective states positive (negative), the nature of such 
positivity/negativity will depend on the theory of valence that turns out to be true. I 
will argue for one of such theories. By ‘motivational states’ I mean mental states such 
as urges, drives, cravings, the readiness to act that can be felt before selecting a specific 
action in the external environment, etc. In other words, the motivational oomph that 
impel us to regulate affective internal states by changing them (of course, this usually 
take us to figure out how to act in the external environment). Thus, by ‘motivation’ I 
do not mean to refer to reasons for taking specific courses of action in the external 
environment, which result from practical reasoning (i.e., motives). On the other hand, 
considering that we can act not only physically but also mentally, and that it occurs 
previous to selecting an specific set of motor actions, by ‘motivation’ I do not mean to 
refer to motor states involved in the initiation of specific muscle and joints movements. 
 
5.2. Desiderata for a theory of valence  
 
There are certain general properties that it is widely agreed that valence must have. 
These properties are fundamental platitudes that constitute explanatory goals, or 




A theory of valence must satisfy the following desiderata27. Firstly, a theory of valence 
must have sufficient scope so as to apply to all clear cases of emotion (scope 
desideratum). That is, all clear cases of emotion should exhibit the property or 
mechanism that is proposed as accounting for valence. Secondly, a theory of valence 
must accommodate our pre-theoretical taxonomies regarding the emotions that 
typically count as positive and the emotions that typically count as negative (pre-
theoretical taxonomy desideratum). Thirdly, a theory of valence must explain the 
truism that positive emotions feel good and negative emotions feel bad (feeling 
desideratum). Finally, a theory of valence must account for the evaluative and 
motivational role of valence. That is, why valence makes things positive and negative 
to us (evaluative desideratum); and how the property or mechanism that is proposed 
as accounting for valence manages to account for its characteristic motivational role 
(motivation desideratum).  
 
Intuitively, if a certain theory of valence A satisfies more of these desiderata than a 
certain theory B, then A is to be preferred over B. 
 
5.3. Competing theories: non-sensory signal theories of valence 
 
Partially following Prinz (2004, 2010), I distinguish four main families of theories of 
valence: (a) approach/avoidance theories (e.g., (Davidson, 1993; MacLean, 1993). 
These theories identify positive and negative valence with approach and avoidance 
behaviors (or action tendencies), respectively. (b) Evaluative theories (e.g., Ben-
Ze’ev, 2000; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988). According to one version of this 
view, positive and negative valence are identified with the evaluation of a situation as 
goal-congruent or goal-incongruent, respectively (Lazarus, 1991). According to 
another version of this view, positive and negative valence are identified with the 
judgment that the intentional object of the relevant emotion is good or bad, respectively 
                                                             
27 I do not think this list is exhaustive in any way. It is a tentative list. Nonetheless, these desiderata 
capture shared criteria for a theory of valence to count as satisfactory (see Prinz, 2010). 
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(Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Ortony et al., 1988). (c) Hedonic theories (e.g., Barrett, 2006a; 
Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 1993; Schroeder, 2001), according to which positive and 
negative valence are identified with pleasure and displeasure, respectively. (d) What 
might called non-sensory signal theories (NSS) (e.g., Carruthers, 2011; Prinz, 2004, 
2010), which identify valence with inner signals—not grounded in any perceptual 
system—that mark representations as good or bad (wanted or unwanted), so they are 
not representations themselves. 
 
In this Section, I will only discuss NSS for the following reasons. Firstly, I take Prinz’s 
(2004, 2010) arguments against approach/avoidance and evaluative theories to be 
successful in showing that they are no longer tenable (I will comment on this below). 
Secondly, the type of view that I will defend in this Chapter can be taken to be a version 
of a hedonic theory, so I will focus on this view later. Thirdly, NSS is the most recent 
philosophical proposal, it has several explanatory advantages, and for this kind of 
theories the most philosophically careful arguments have been developed. Finally, I 
consider NSS to be the main rival to the view I will be defending, for this kind of 
theories separate valence from sensory, interoceptive representations, contrary to the 
view I defend.  
 
 Non-sensory signal theories of valence 
 
Non-sensory signal theories of valence (NSS) hold that valence amounts to a 
motivating inner signal that ‘marks’ mental states as good or bad, welcome or 
unwelcome. These views also share the claim that valence is not a sensory state, and, 
being just a ‘signal’, it neither amounts to an amodal (or multimodal) representation 
of any kind (e.g., a concept). Recently, Prinz (2004, 2010) and Carruthers (2011) have 
proposed versions of non-sensory signal theories. Since Prinz’s view is much more 




Importantly, these views align with a certain tradition in affective sciences, which 
consists in regarding the affective, valenced aspect of sensory/perceptual experiences 
as something that “attaches” to sensory/perceptual representations. In other words, the 
valenced aspect of a sensory experience is regarded as something ‘extra’ to the sensory 
representations themselves. For example, according to the tradition in question, eating 
a sweet cake feels good because an affective mental item (valence) got attached to the 
sensory representation of sweetness, the latter being a distinct mental item from the 
former. That is, only when sensory/perceptual representations (e.g., sweetness, a 
landscape, music, etc.) have a “hedonic gloss” added by affect is that those 
representations become something that feels good (or bad). Such a “hedonic gloss” is 
considered to be a non-sensory, non-representational item in the furniture of the mind, 
distinct from any sort of sensory/perceptual representation or high-level knowledge 
(see, e.g., Berridge & Kringelbach, 2010, p.9).  
 
5.3.1 Valence as inner reinforcers 
 
Recently, Prinz (2004, 2010) has offered an account of the nature of valence that not 
only accounts for the intuitive plausibility of competing theories, but contrary to 
current proposals, it seems to satisfy all the above desiderata. 
 
Prinz (2004) identifies emotions with perceptions of bodily changes. In Prinz’s 
account, emotions, understood in this way, include a signal for its own cessation or 
continuation. Valence amounts to such a signal. More precisely, according to Prinz, 
valence amounts to what he calls inner reinforcers. Inner reinforces are inner devices 
that signal non-propositionally structured commands. Such commands specify 
whether the considered emotion (i.e., relevant perceived bodily state) should be 
maintained and had it more often in future occasions (positive valence), or whether the 





Prinz illustrates the workings of inner reinforcers with imperatives that, regarding a 
certain emotion, say something like “More of this!” (positive valence) or “Less of 
this!” (negative valence). That is, inner reinforcers are signals which mediate 
behaviour relative to the maintenance or cessation of the relevant perceived bodily 
state (emotion). Thus, in Prinz’s theory of valence, positive emotions are those which 
impel its own maintenance, and negative emotions are those which impel its own 
termination. In this sense, inner reinforcers make their target mental states something 
positive or negative: they make emotions something that matter for the agent (Prinz, 
2004, p.178).  
 
As signals with imperative content, inner reinforcers are inherently motivating: 
“Emotions exert motivating force by means of valence markers” (Prinz, 2004, p.242). 
Inner reinforcers impel agents to do something, namely, change an inner state by 
taking them to figure out how to act in the external environment, i.e., select candidate 
courses of action that could lead to the maintenance or cessation of a certain positive 
or negative emotion, respectively. Note that inner reinforcers do not motivate specific 
courses of action in the external environment, designed to achieve the goal of 
maintaining or terminating a certain emotion, such as, for example, deciding to go to 
a party to terminate a state of sadness. In other words, inner reinforcers do not 
command specific strategies of emotion regulation. Inner reinforcers just urge us to 
modify internal states, they command “Less of this inner state! Do whatever it takes 
to achieve that!”, which can lead then to decide a certain specific regulatory action in 
the external environment, such as, for example, going to a party.  
 
Importantly, inner reinforcers are reward and punishment signals. As such, they serve 
a major role in reinforcement learning and conditioning, besides their motivational role 
commented above. Inner reinforcers allow agents to learn which stimuli count as 
rewards and which stimuli count as punishments. External stimuli encountered in the 
past, and that triggered a certain emotion, will be sought out in the future, since a 
positive valence marker commanding the maintenance of that emotion got attached to 
it. This kind of associations are stored in memory. Thus, stimuli associated in memory 
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with emotions that contain a positive valence marker will increase the probability of 
an “appetitive” response—i.e., those stimuli count as a reward for the agent. The same 
can be said of negative valence markers, mutatis mutandis. In this sense, inner 
reinforcers are learning signals (i.e., learning signals with motivational force).  
 
Crucially, inner reinforcers and perceived bodily changes are dissociable, separate 
components of emotion (Prinz, 2004, pp. 163-164). Thus, inner reinforcers can, in 
principle, be attached to non-emotional mental states. Now, since representations 
constituted by the bodily sensory modalities and inner reinforces are distinct, separate 
entities in the furniture of the mind, and inner reinforcers are neither grounded in 
exteroceptive modalities, valence is a non-sensory signal. Consequently, valence is not 
something that can be felt. However, inner reinforcers and bodily changes go usually 
together, making the latter seem good or bad to the agent.  
 
Instead of presenting empirical evidence for this view (which still needs to be 
produced), Prinz supports IRV by arguing that it has more explanatory advantages than 
competing theories, and by showing that it can account for the most compelling aspects 
of competing theories. I will present these explanatory advantages below, in Section 
5.3.3., and I will discuss his arguments against the hedonic theory of valence in the 
next Chapter.  
 
5.3.2. Carruthers’s view on valence 
 
Recently, Carruthers (2011, p.126-135) has defended an account of the nature of 
valence along very similar lines to Prinz’s view. According to Carruthers, valence 
consists in an inner non-sensory signal that confers value (good or bad) to attended 
stimuli. This non-sensory signal inherently motivates the pursuit or avoidance of such 
stimuli. Nonetheless, according to Carruthers, valence signals get generally attached 
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to representations of external events (e.g., your partner arriving home safe), rather than 
to inner bodily states, as in Prinz’s view.  
 
Carruthers (2011) adheres to the generally accepted view that affect consists in valence 
and arousal, and that emotions have affect as a component. He also adheres to the view 
that affect is to a major extent dependent on inner bodily perception (i.e., 
interoception). Nonetheless, as I mentioned above, in Carruthers’s view, valence-
signals are non-sensory signals. For, according to Carruthers, valence and arousal are 
separate causal mechanisms in the furniture of the affective mind, and represented 
physiological changes constitute arousal, not valence. When we experience 
physiological changes we do not then have the experience of valence, but of arousal. 
Valence only makes attended events good or bad. Furthermore, in Carruthers’s view, 
valence is also a non-conceptual signal. For it confers value without deploying high-
level abstract knowledge, such the concepts GOOD or BAD. In a word, valence is a non-
sensory, non-conceptual indicator of value28.  
 
Carruthers emphasizes the role that valence plays in decision-making. In this account, 
valence drives decision-making. Closely following Damasio (1994), he claims that 
during decision-making valence signals gets attached to representations of considered 
options, making thus the latter attractive or repellent. That is why patients with lesions 
in regions associated with valence, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), show poor 
decision-making capacities (Damasio, 1994). However, contrary to Damasio (1994), 
Carruthers holds that valence does not amount to sensory, interoceptive 
representations.   
 
Carruthers offers no positive evidence or argument for the view that valence is non-
sensory. He does offers evidence for the claim that valence is non-conceptual, namely, 
the famous Bechara et al.’s (1994) Iowa Gambling Task studies, where subjects see 
                                                             
28 Carruthers (2011, p.128) thinks that pleasure and pain consists in a positive or negative valence 
signal that got attached to bodily changes, respectively.  
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some decks as bad, without judging them to be bad. However, since this latter claim is 
not controversial, and I agree with it, I am not going to discuss such evidence. He does 
have arguments against the view that valence is sensory. I discuss these arguments 
below, in the sub-section where I reply to the objections against the view that valence 
amounts to interoceptive perceptions.  
 
5.3.3. Explanatory advantages of NSS 
 
Considering that Prinz, but not Carruthers, discusses how his view compares to 
competing theories in respect to the above desiderata, in this section I will mainly focus 
in IRV. However, since both Prinz’s and Carruthers’s views, being non-sensory 
theories, share all their key commitments, Prinz’s points regarding IRV, in respect to 
the desiderata in question, directly apply to Carruthers’s view.  
 
NSS, if true, accommodates the desiderata presented in Section 5.2. Firstly, 
considering that non-sensory signals are motivating signals, NSS should have no 
problems accommodating the motivation desideratum. Secondly, it does not seem 
implausible to think that all emotions include a motivational component that impels us 
to look for ways to maintain or eliminate them. The single fact that there are emotion 
regulation and dysregulation phenomena speaks in favour of this assumption. Thus, 
IRV satisfies the scope desideratum. This also applies to Carruthers’s view, for nothing 
in this view prevents that non-sensory signals can ‘mark’ emotion themselves, making 
thus the latter welcome or unwelcome. IRV also satisfies the pre-theoretical taxonomy 
desideratum. Clear cases of negative emotions, such as anger, guilt, and fear are 
emotions that we feel motivated to get rid of; and clear cases of positive emotions such 
as joy, elation, and love are emotions that we feel motivated to sustain. Finally, it seems 
that NSS also satisfy the feeling and the evaluative desiderata. Insofar as we are 
impelled to eliminate negative emotions and to maintain positive emotions, valence 
makes emotions something that matter to us, and in this sense we take them to be bad 




Competing accounts fail to accommodate all the desiderata. Take, for example, the 
approach/avoidance view (Davidson, 1993; MacLean, 1993), which identifies positive 
and negative valence with approach and avoidance behaviours (or action tendencies), 
respectively. This view also fails to satisfy the evaluative and the feeling desiderata—
as it not clear what is the link, if any, between approaching (avoiding) something and 
having it as good (bad), and feeling good (bad) about it. Moreover, the 
approach/avoidance view also fails to satisfy the scope desideratum—since not all 
emotions involve distinctive types of behaviour or action tendencies. It also faces 
problems regarding the pre-theoretical taxonomy desideratum, since clear cases of 
negative emotion (e.g., anger) typically involve approach behaviour.  
 
Or consider the evaluative view. According to one version of this view, positive and 
negative valence are identified with the evaluation of a situation as goal-congruent or 
goal-incongruent, respectively (Lazarus, 1991). According to another version of this 
view, positive and negative valence are identified with the judgment that the 
intentional object of the relevant emotion is good or bad, respectively (Ben-Ze’ev, 
2000; Ortony et al., 1988). The evaluative view does not accommodate the scope 
desideratum, since it is uncontroversial that non-human animals have valenced states. 
However, it is unlikely that, let’s say, chaffinches have the conceptual apparatus 
required for evaluations and judgments to take place. It also fails to satisfy the feeling 
desideratum, as it is not clear how evaluations and judgments can feel like something. 
 
IRV can also explain the intuitive plausibility of competing accounts, while avoiding 
their typical problems (Prinz, 2010). Just to take an example, IRV can easily explain 
why we tend to avoid the object of negative emotions. We tend to behave that manner 
because, frequently, an effective way to obey the imperative “Less of this emotion!” 
is to go away from the event that is causing the relevant emotion. At the same time, 
and contrary to the approach/avoidance view, IRV can accommodate the case of anger. 
We tend to approach the object of anger because putting an end to the situation that 
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causes the emotion by intervening on it is an effective way of getting rid of what is 
bringing about the emotion that needs to be eliminated. Finally, given that inner 
reinforcers are mere labels that function as command signals or indicators of value 
(i.e., they are non-conceptual signals), IRV avoids the problem of turning valence into 
something that is cognitively too demanding to be possessed by non-human animals 
and children, as the evaluative view does29.  
 
Considering that NSS can, if true, accommodate more desiderata than competing 
accounts, and it can explain the intuitiveness of the latter, it has an explanatory 
advantage over them.  
 
5.4. Problems for non-sensory theories of valence 
 
However, as I will show in this Section, NSS face decisive problems on their own, 
which also make NSS poor candidates for a compelling, plausible theory of valence. 
 
Remember that this kind of view considers the affective, valenced aspect of 
sensory/perceptual experiences as something that “attaches” to sensory/perceptual 
representations. That is, sensory/perceptual representations (e.g., sweetness, a 
landscape, music, etc.) become something that feels good (or bad), only in case they 
have a “hedonic gloss” added by affect (valence). Such a “hedonic gloss” is considered 
to be a non-sensory, non-representational item in the furniture of the mind, distinct 
from any sort of sensory/perceptual representation (and also distinct from high-level 
knowledge or ‘concepts’). Thus, by showing that NSS are problematic, I aim to show 
that the tradition in affective sciences that considers affect as a non-sensory mental 
item that “attaches” to sensory representations is misguided. This opens the door for 
                                                             
29 Prinz also argues that the hedonic theory of valence cannot accommodate all the desiderata. In the 




the view that valence is a sensory representation on its own. I will defend such a view 
in the coming Chapter.  
 
 5.4.1. Problems for IRV: Valence cannot amount to inner reinforcers 
 
Roughly, according to Prinz’s (2004) account, emotions are constituted by two 
components, namely, perceived bodily changes and valence markers (inner 
reinforcers). These distinct components serve different functions. On the one hand, 
perceived bodily changes are supposed to serve two roles: (1) representing organism-
environment relations (i.e., core relational themes), and (2) allocating physiological 
resources in order to facilitate adaptive action, independently of any kind of 
motivation. On the other hand, inner reinforcers signal an urgency to act to change 
inner bodily states, making such perceived bodily states matter for the agent. That is, 
inner reinforcers play a motivational role; while bodily changes serve a semantic 
function and facilitate action. 
 
Crucially, as I mentioned above (Section 5.3.1), inner reinforcers and perceived bodily 
changes are dissociable components of emotion. That is, during emotion, IRV assumes 
a dissociation between motivation and interoception (i.e., the perception of the 
physiological condition of the entire body). This assumption is rather implausible. Let 
me explain.  
 
Motivation, understood as a sense of urge, as an urgency to change an inner state, is a 
mental state that can be felt, and thus reported. That is why during certain emotional 
episodes we say things like: “I feel less motivated than before to get rid of this stomach 
ache” or “I’m really motivated to stop feeling guilty about my divorce”. I take this to 
be uncontroversial.  
Now, only perceptual representations can be felt. Remember that in this Thesis it is 
assumed that phenomenal consciousness is populated only by percepts, in the sense 
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that there are no phenomenal qualities beyond sensory representations. This 
assumption simply denies that there can be non-sensory representational vehicles with 
qualitative character (see Prinz, 2012). 
 
If such motivational oomph is something that we usually feel, and only perceptual 
representations can be felt, then this sort of motivation is something which takes place 
in some perceptual modality. Obviously, the feeling of motivation in question is not 
something that we have due to olfaction, nor vision, nor any exteroceptive or 
proprioceptive modality—and there is no reason to claim that some mixture of those 
can do the job. The best candidate seems to be the interoceptive system (see, e.g., 
Berman et al., 2013; Naqvi & Bechara, 2010; Noel et al., 2013). That is, in this respect, 
the intuition is that the motivational oomph exhibited by valenced states consists in 
perceiving that our bodies are physiologically (un)prepared to engage in action. If the 
felt motivational component of emotion is grounded in interoception, and valence 
plays such a role of impelling us to act to change an inner state during emotional 
episodes, then there is likely to be no dissociation between interoception and valence, 
as IRV assumes. 
 
The absence of this predicted dissociation gains intuitive support from affective states 
such as motivations or drives, as for example, hunger. Hunger is a felt valenced urge. 
In accordance with the claim that there is likely to be no dissociation between 
interoception and the motivational oomph in question, anatomical and functional 
evidence show that the experience of hunger is exhaustively grounded in interoceptive 
brain structures (see Craig, 2015).  
 
Of course, it could still be argued that the motivational oomph characteristic of 
valenced states arises in the interoceptive system, but only in case interoceptive 
representations become the target of the modulatory action of inner reinforcers. This 
could explain the above intuition. In other words, such motivational oomph arises only 
in case a valence marker attaches to an inner bodily representation, the latter being the 
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only kind of representation that can be the proper target of valence markers. Thus, 
without interoceptive representations, the feeling of motivation in question cannot take 
place; however, interoceptive representations can take place without valence markers. 
Then, Prinz’s view (i.e., dissociation between valence and bodily perception) predicts 
that there can be inner bodily states associated with a certain affective state which 
simply lack valence—i.e., they can be experienced without that state mattering for the 
agent—and that this abnormality is not dependent on abnormalities due to ill-formed 
interoceptive representation, but rather it depends on an abnormality in another 
component with a functional profile along the lines of inner reinforcers.  
 
In the first place, this reply is question begging. The phenomenology of the 
motivational oomph characteristic of valenced states—plus the assumption that 
consciousness is exhausted by sensory/perceptual representations—indicates that the 
feeling of motivation in question is exhausted by interoceptive representations. 
Insisting that another component besides the latter representations needs to be posited 
seems then redundant, without phenomenological considerations or empirical 
evidence that justify speculating about the existence of this other component – inner 
reinforcers – that can modulate interoceptive representations in the required way. That 
is, without a case for the claim that interoceptive representations by themselves are 
motivationally inert, and without positive evidence for the dissociation of motivational 
oomph and interoceptive representations, the above objection begs the question.  
 
There seem to be no cases of feelings grounded in interoception—such as 
drives/motivations—that dissociate from its valence. For example, there seem to be no 
such thing as non-valenced hunger or thirst. However, Prinz (2004) argues that surprise 
is a case in which bodily perception dissociates from valence. The (purported) emotion 
of surprise can be positive or negative. There are positive and negative surprises. 
However, in both cases, Prinz speculates, surprise is constituted by the same pattern 
of bodily changes. In such a case, the same pattern of bodily changes can then exhibit 
different valence. Therefore, so the argument goes, perceived bodily changes and 




I am not convinced by this line of reasoning. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
Prinz is right in claiming that surprise involves a distinctive pattern of bodily changes 
(though see Chapter 4), and that there are positive and negative surprises, there are still 
alternative explanations for this kind of case, in which the same pattern of bodily 
changes can exhibit different valence. Crucially, such alternative explanations can 
account for this kind of case without positing a separate component from bodily 
perception. Rather, they can account for this kind of case by showing that the same 
process by which percepts are standardly formed in the PP framework can operate in 
such a way that different percepts can arise from the same input stimuli. In fact, this is 
a typical phenomenon in the PP framework. There is no reason to deny this for the 
case of percepts of the inner condition of the body. Then, the PP view of percept 
formation can straightforwardly explain how the same pattern of bodily changes (the 
input stimuli) can exhibit different valence values, on the assumption that the latter are 
constituted by interoceptive perceptions.  
 
As I discussed in previous Sections, in the PP framework, the assessment of the 
precision of PE, which is identified with attention, occupies a central role in the whole 
PP inferential machine. Attentional modulation, understood as the differential, 
context-sensitive assignment of precisions, can explain how different percepts can 
result from the same input stimuli.  
 
Our expectations of precision depend on context. Among other things, given certain 
incoming sensory data, this implies that, depending on context, precisions differ within 
the same modality for different sensory features. During percept formation, attentional 
modulation determines which aspects of the incoming sensory signal are given more 
weight, and which aspects of the incoming sensory signal are (relatively) ignored. This 
occurs in a cascading fashion across all levels of the perceptual hierarchy. Then, 
different expected precisions, at different levels of the perceptual hierarchy, determine 
the relative influence that top-down sensory expectations have relative to the incoming 
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input. Importantly, several contextual factors influence such an assignment of weights, 
as for example, evaluations of the situation in light of previous experience. Thus, in 
different occasions and contexts, given different assignment of precisions, the percept 
that results will be composed of different interoceptive features, changing thus the 
configuration of the percept that will eventually be experienced (for example, in 
certain occasions the interoceptive representation in question will have heart activity 
represented and in other occasions not). Thus, by differentially weighting different 
aspects of the same input via attentional mechanisms, the kind of percept of the body 
that (purportedly) individuates positive surprise can differ from the percept of the body 
that (purportedly) individuates negative surprise (remember that I am assuming for the 
sake of argument that Prinz is right in claiming that surprise involves a distinctive 
pattern of bodily changes). Given certain incoming data, the idea is that different 
sensory attributes and precision regimes are expected for the positive-surprise-
hypothesis than for the negative-surprise-hypothesis. For example, once the positive-
surprise-hypothesis is considered to be the best sensory hypothesis given context (let’s 
say that things typically deemed to be good are taking place in the external situation), 
the incoming interoceptive signals associated with negative emotions will be inferred 
to have low precision and will be taken to be noise. The inverse is the case for the 
negative-surprise-hypothesis. This determines that, from the same incoming signal, 
different bounded sensory attributes (i.e., percepts) are predicted by these distinct 
hypotheses. No additional, ‘extra-sensory’ mental item (e.g., some sort of non-sensory 
valence marker) is required to explain differences in valence given the same kind of 
input stimuli from the body.  
 
In fact, different inferred precisions given context are likely to be responsible for 
observed differences in valence in cases such as the placebo effect (Büchel et al., 
2014). When subjects are told that a certain infusion consists in a potent painkiller, 
placebo hypoalgesia is much stronger compared to the case when subjects are told 
ambiguous information about the infusion: it could be a painkiller or just a placebo 
infusion. These different pieces of contextual information regarding the properties of 
the infusion differentially bias the expected precision of the top-down sensory 
expectations regarding pain signals (negative valence). When subjects are told that the 
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infusion is a painkiller, the expected confidence in the hypothesis that the incoming 
signals are better explained by ‘relief’ drives percept formation (positive valence). 
Consequently, the ‘portion’ of the incoming signal that is compatible with the pain-
hypothesis is inferred to be unreliable. It does not then have much influence in the 
process of finding a perceptual solution. However, when subjects are told that the 
infusion could be a painkiller or just a placebo, PE relative to the pain-hypothesis is 
given relatively more weight, having thus more influence in the process of finding a 
perceptual solution (see Büchel et al., 2014). This is a case in which the same input 
stimuli coming from the body can give rise to different valenced percepts given 
different inferred precisions. To put it this way, contextual cues drive attention in such 
a way that different ‘portions’ of the same incoming data can be given more or less 
attention, so that different configurations of features (percepts) can result. Importantly, 
different valenced states can arise from the same input from the body, without positing 
anything alien to the sensory machinery itself: the same stuff that is part of the typical 
process of percept formation accounts for states of different valence given the same 
bodily input. 
 
IRV faces another challenge. Let me consider just the case of positive valence for ease 
of exposition. Positive inner reinforcers are inner devices that not only motivate, but 
also play a role in reinforcement learning. That is, IRV assumes that, in this respect, 
the same inner device that motivates also amounts to a reward learning signal. Now, 
the best candidate neural structures for realizing reward markers are dopamine rich 
structures in the midbrain. More precisely, reward learning signals are likely to be 
realized in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra pars compacta 
(SNpc) (Schroeder, 2004). Not only other researchers have pointed out that these 
dopaminergic structures are fine candidates for realizing Prinz’s positive inner 
reinforcers (Corns, 2014), but they have some properties that seem to nicely fit Prinz’s 
construct: besides being responsible for reward learning signals (Schultz et al., 1997), 
they do not realize hedonic tone (Schroeder, 2004), and more controversially, they also 
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play a role in reward-based motivation (Berridge, 2007). It is not arbitrary then to take 
VTA and SNpc as realizing positive inner reinforcers30. 
 
IRV makes then the following key prediction: if positive valence amounts to an inner 
reward signal, then VTA and SNpc should be consistently active during positive 
emotions. Certainly, current neuroimaging studies on positive emotions are limited. 
However, they clearly show that these structures are not significantly and consistently 
involved during positive emotions (e.g., Lane et al., 1997; Murphy et al., 2003; Phan 
et al., 2002; Vytal & Hamann, 2010). Thus, it is hardly the case that positive valence 
amounts to an inner reward signal. 
 
5.4.2. Problems for Carruthers’s view 
 
On the other hand, Carruthers’s arguments to the effect that valence amounts to a non-
sensory signal are misguided. As I commented above, according to Carruthers, valence 
and arousal are separate causal mechanisms in the furniture of the affective mind. 
While represented physiological changes constitute arousal, valence amounts to a non-
conceptual signal, not grounded in any sensory modality. Let’s call this the 
independence claim. One of the main reasons Carruthers puts forward to support the 
independence claim is that dimensional approaches to emotion arrange emotions in a 
circumplex graph, in which valence and arousal are represented as independent, 
orthogonal dimensions (e.g., Russell, 2003).  Thus, “it is implausible that the former 
should reduce to the latter” (Carruthers, 2011, p.130). Considering that arousal is the 
dimension which is grounded in sensory, interoceptive representations—no argument 
nor evidence is offered for this claim!—valence should then be a non-sensory signal, 
not grounded in interoception.  
                                                             
30 Prinz (2004, p. 161-162) mentions some regions that have been found to activate during some tasks 
that trigger valenced affective states in subjects. He does this in order to give some substance to the 
claim that there is indeed such thing as valence. Valence is a real phenomenon. However, Prinz is not 
explicitly committed to any neural realizers of valence markers. 
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I think this argument mistakenly takes reports of affective states to evince the nature 
of the causal mechanism responsible for affect. Probably because, in some dimensional 
approaches to emotion (e.g., Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006a), linguistic analyses of 
questionnaires and extended reports of valence and arousal are graphically represented 
as orthogonal descriptive dimensions of affect in a circumplex graph (e.g., Russell, 
2003), the above argument mistakenly takes valence and arousal to be independent 
causal components of affect, realized by separate causal mechanisms. That is, it is 
simply a mistake to infer that valence and arousal are realized by independent causal 
mechanisms of affect from the fact that linguistic analyses of reports of affect result in 
a circumplex graph, where valence an arousal figure as orthogonal descriptive 
dimensions. The circumplex model is designed to capture what people say about their 
own psychology, about their own subjective experience regarding affective states. The 
circumplex model does not then track the actual way in which the causal mechanisms 
responsible for those reports are related. Dimensional theorist of emotion explicitly 
recognize this point (e.g., Kuppens et al., 2013; Russell & Barrett, 1999). In fact, 
nothing in the circumplex model of affect, which Carruthers (2011) seems to endorse, 
prevents that valence and arousal are essentially unified at the causal level, both being 
grounded in bodily, interoceptive representations. In other words, nothing prevents 
that, for example, arousal is a component part of the mental state that constitutes 
valence, or that affect amounts to valence at certain levels of arousal, i.e., that the latter 
is not an independent aspect of affect, but it simply amounts to the intensity that 
valence can take. Certainly, as some dimensional theorists have found (Barrett et al., 
2004), one can consciously focus more on one descriptive dimension than the other, 
as Carruthers notes, but nothing in the circumplex model of affect prevents that valence 
and arousal are both constituted by represented physiological changes at the causal 
level. In fact, this is what dimensional theorists seem to endorse (e.g., Russell & 
Barrett, 1999, p. 814-815; Barrett, 2006a; Barrett, 2015, p.45). Carruthers fails to 






“Core affect is a state of pleasure or displeasure with some degree of arousal (Barrett, 
2006b; Russell, 2003; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Together, valence and arousal form a 
unified state, so although it is possible to focus on one property or the other, people cannot 
feel pleasant or unpleasant in a way that is isolated from their degree of arousal.” (Barrett 
& Bliss-Moreau, 2009, p. 171) 
 
For example, it could the case that arousal, instead of being a separate construct than 
valence, simply corresponds to the “intensity” or ‘volume’ taken by the perceived 
physiological changes that constitute valence, so the former cannot take place without 
the latter.  
 
Carruthers is impressed by the fact that people who are better at detecting their own 
heart-beats tend to exhibit more arousal focus than valence focus (Barrett et al., 2004). 
The notions of arousal focus and valence focus simply refer to the emphasis that 
subjects place on words related to arousal and valence during emotion reports, so that 
arousal and valence emerge as important aspects in the verbal descriptions of affect in 
an individual over time (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Then, considering that heart-
beat detection is taken to be an indicator of interoceptive accuracy (see Garfinkel et 
al., 2015), one might be lead to conclude that arousal, rather than valence, is the aspect 
of affect that is grounded in interoceptive perception (see also Dunn et al., 2010). 
 
However, notice that I am not disputing the claim that arousal consists in bodily 
perception. The above argument only suggests that that claim might be the case. That 
is, the above argument does not speak against the claim that valence could also consists 
in bodily perception. More precisely, the above evidence is consistent with the claim 
that valence consists in the perception of a pattern of inner bodily changes, which 
includes several changes besides changes in hear-rate, which are likely to be valence-
neutral by themselves. In other words, such evidence is consistent with the claim that 
valence value is determined by the overall whole-body shape taken by the evolving 
inner bodily landscape, in which several physiological dimensions interact (e.g., 
Damasio, 1994, 2003); while arousal is determined only by heart-rate perception (or 
the perception of a small sub-set of physiological changes). Thus, this kind of evidence 
won’t do the job for the defender of NSS. Of course, heart-rate seems to be a reliable 
189 
 
indicator of arousal, as I defended in Chapter 1. However, heart-rate is but one 
dimension of a pattern of changes in the inner physiological milieu. Thus, considering 
that changes in heart-rate might be critical for arousal but not much for valence value, 
it is certainly expected that people who are good at paying effortful attention to their 
heartbeats also exhibit an emphasis in the descriptive dimension of arousal during 
verbal reports. But this fact, let me insist, is silent with respect to whether valence is 
non-sensory.  
 
It could be argued that the claim that valence consists in the perception of such pattern 
of inner bodily changes rest on a confusion, because arousal, but not valence, is the 
aspect of affect that consists in such a pattern of bodily changes. Carruthers endorses 
this view:  
 
“arousal is constitutive of the “fight or flight” preparations undertaken by the body in 
response to threat. […] It consists of a variety of autonomic changes in heart-rate, blood 
pressure, activity in the sweat glands, and levels of adrenaline and other chemicals in the 
bloodstream, as well as behavioral changes in posture, muscle tension, breathing rate, and 
so on.” (Carruthers, 2011, p.127) 
 
As I commented above, this claim is precisely what arousal theory proposed under the 
label ‘general sympathetic arousal’. However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, even though 
this conception of the notion of ‘arousal’ it is still uncritically endorsed in some corners 
of psychology, that conception of arousal is not tenable anymore. Remember that 
according to arousal theory, general sympathetic arousal underlies “fight-or-flight” 
responses via a single mechanism that controls several measures of 
sympathetic/autonomic effectors. This conception of arousal emerged from mid-
twenty century research on the brainstem reticular formation, which it was 
hypothesized that it realized the so-called ascending reticular activating system, basis 
of the sort of activation (arousal) responsible of “fight-or-flight” responses that 
Carruthers has in mind. It was thought that the brain structure in question was a 
functionally homogenous structure, and that it had activational (arousal) effects 
without any sort of specificity.  
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This conception of arousal is deeply problematic. A key prediction of this approach is 
that physiological measures of sympathetic activity (such as electro-dermal response 
and heartrate) should significantly co-vary within and across individuals. However, 
that turns out not to be the case (Bernston & Cacioppo, 2007; Cacioppo et al., 1991; 
Lacey, 1959, 1967). On the other hand, the many variables involved during autonomic 
control do not exhibit some sort of single continuum of activation or arousal properties 
that could be involved in a simple “fight or flight” mechanism (Bernston & Cacioppo, 
2007). In other words, there is no patterned set of autonomic responses that constitutes 
a unified arousal system. In fact, the reticular formation, the supposedly key 
functionally homogeneous neural basis of the arousal system, is compose of several 
structures, each of them with its own functional profile (Sarter et al., 2003). The notion 
of ‘arousal’ on which Carruthers relies is simple outdated. In fact, it has been shown 
that certain autonomic measures do not reflect arousal at all, but rather they reflect 
valence properties. For example, cardiac activity, heart rate, blood pressure, and skin 
conductance duration reflect affective valence (see Cacioppo et al., 2000). Also the 
startle response and also facial EMG indicate valence rather than arousal (Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, remember that one of the reasons that Carruthers puts forward for 
the independence claim—i.e., the claim that valence and arousal are separate causal 
mechanisms, being arousal the one constituted by represented physiological 
changes—is that interoceptively accurate people (Garfinkel et al., 2015) tend to 
exhibit more arousal focus than valence focus (Barrett et al., 2004).  
 
As I mentioned above, interoceptive accuracy is typically measured by heartbeat 
detection tasks. On one version of this task, subjects are asked to determine whether 
or not their own heartbeats are synchronized with a metronome (Barrett et al, 2004). 
Interoceptive accuracy is also measured by asking subjects to count their heartbeats, 
and then their responses are compared to the actual number heartbeats as measured by 
ECG (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Schandry, 1982). Thus, interoceptive accuracy only tells 
us how good an individual is in effortfully attending and keeping track of the 
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consciously accessible outputs of interoceptive processing (i.e., already formed 
interoceptive percepts). In this sense, this kind of task is meta-representational: 
subjects must form ‘beliefs’ about already formed interoceptive representations or 
percepts. Thus, interoceptive accuracy tells us nothing about the causal mechanism of 
interoceptive percept formation, or whether it is working properly or not (i.e., 
delivering proper interoceptive percepts), neither whether it is hyperfunctioning or 
hypofunctioning. In addition to that, arousal focus only tell us about linguistic 
emphases in questionnaires. Thus, arousal focus tell us nothing about the workings, 
nor the nature, of the causal mechanism responsible for arousal. It neither tells us 
whether the causal mechanism responsible for arousal is hyperfunctioning (nor 
hypofunctioning) in individuals high in arousal focus. These aspects are the relevant 
ones, if the goal is to determine whether either arousal or valence (or both) are 
constituted, at the causal level, by perception of the physiological inner milieu. In order 
to conclude that arousal, but not valence, is constituted by interoceptive perception, 
Carruthers needs to show, at least, that interventions in the functionings of the causal 
mechanism responsible for interoception give rise to modifications in arousal, but not 
in valence, and that triggering an state of arousal determines modifications is the 
interoceptive system, without altering valence properties. Considering what the 
construct of interoceptive accuracy really tell us, it is not much useful for the defender 
of the independence claim.  
 
It is worth also considering that, insofar as it is operationalized by heartbeat detection 
tasks, interoceptive accuracy does not reflect general interoceptive accuracy. That is, 
accuracy not only with respect to heartbeat activity, but with respect to the activity of 
the whole pattern of physiological variables that constitute the physiological landscape 
of an organism. A more interesting correlation for the defender of the independence 
claim—even though not much useful for the reasons presented in the above 
paragraph—would be then that between general interoceptive accuracy and arousal 
focus. This is the case since, as I mentioned above, the claim that arousal is determined 
only by heart-rate perception is compatible with the claim that valence is grounded in 
interoceptive perception. The idea here is that heart-rate perception is critical for 
arousal, while valence is constituted by the perception of a whole pattern of 
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physiological changes, and not just the single variable of heart-rate.  Thus, the fact that 
good heart-beat detectors exhibit high arousal focus does not points towards the 
independence claim. The defender of the latter would prefer to find a correlation 
between good whole-body perceivers and arousal focus. There is no such evidence. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether consciously monitoring heart-beats indicates 
interoceptive accuracy or a somatic, exteroceptive capacity: The ‘beats’ that are 
monitored by subjects during the heartbeat detection task could simply be reflecting 
the activation of somatic, non-interoceptive receptors on the chest wall. 
 
Carruthers (2011, p.130) puts forward another argument for the independence claim. 
As it is well-known, after the lesion, OFC/vmPFC patients lose their capacity to 
respond appropriately to rewards and punishers, which has severe consequences for 
their personal lives and social interactions (Damasio, 2003). However, they retain their 
ability for cold reasoning. The standard explanation of the behaviour of OFC/vmPFC 
patients is that they lose the capacity to associate valenced responses with 
representations of behavioural options, which is key for normal decision-making. The 
upshot of this is that valenced responses are required for decision-making, and that 
malfunctioning of OFC/vmPFC compromises the ability to use such responses to guide 
decision-making. Carruthers thinks that if valence were grounded in representations of 
bodily changes, people who tend not to explicitly focus attention on their heart-rate 
would show aberrant decision-making abilities in the way shown by patients with 
OFC/vmPFC lesions. But they do not. Then, so the argument goes, valence is not 
grounded in representations of bodily changes. Valence should then amount to a non-
sensory signal, while arousal is the aspect of affect that is grounded in patterns of 
bodily changes.  
 
There are several problems with this argument. Let me point to two of the most 
worrying of them. In the first place, the fact that OFC/vmPFC patients show poor 
decision-making abilities seems to favour the view that valence is grounded in 
representations of the body. Let me briefly explain. Determining that something is 
positive or negative, beneficial or harmful, is key for decision-making. It is generally 
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assumed that bodily responses inform about whether something is beneficial or 
harmful: positively valenced bodily responses assign positive value to considered 
behavioural options, while negatively valenced bodily responses assign negative value 
to them. Given its rich connections with regions involved in visceral representation 
and control, the OFC/vmPFC, during decision-making, plays the role of linking 
representations of external situations with representations of bodily responses. Insofar 
as OFC/vmPFC patients fail to link the input from the body that informs about value 
with their considered options, they fail to behave appropriately. That is, the standard 
explanation of the pattern of behaviour shown by these patients assumes that bodily 
responses determine valence value (Damasio, 1994). 
 
In the second place, it is simply a mistake to infer that a certain mechanism is 
malfunctioning from the fact that its outputs tend not to be explicitly attended. Then, 
just as the fact that some people do not tend to explicitly focus on the phonetic 
properties of their spoken language does not imply that their mechanism of language 
production is malfunctioning, the fact that some people fail to explicitly focus on their 
heart-rate does not implies that their mechanism responsible for bodily representation 
is malfunctioning. Then, it not surprising that such people do not behave as 
OFC/vmPFC patients.  
  
Carruthers also argues for the independence claim by remarking that when the so 
called affective (valenced) component of pain is ‘switch off’ by administering 
morphine to a subject, the so called sensory aspect of pain, supposedly grounded in 
the somatosensory cortex (so not grounded in interoceptive modalities), still remains 
intact, so that subjects still sense pain. From this Carruthers infers that valence is not 
grounded in a sensory modality. However, this argument does not get off the ground. 
Without stating why the so called affective component of pain is not also grounded in 
sensory representations, distinct from the ones anchored in the somatosensory cortex 
(e.g., interoceptive representations), Carruthers’s claim that the affective component 
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is not sensory simply begs the question. Carruthers’s view that valence is non-sensory 
is then not well motivated31. 
 
Finally, I would like to call attention to a more general worry regarding NSS. It is 
certainly the case that NSS can meet the feeling desideratum, as I mentioned above 
(Section 5.3.3.). According to the feeling desideratum, a satisfactory theory of valence 
must explain the truism that positive emotions feel good and negative emotions feel 
bad. There is something, valence, which endows emotions with a positive or negative 
qualitative character. NSS account for this platitude by claiming that positive 
(negative) emotions are good (bad) feelings. That is, for NSS positive emotions feel 
good only in the sense that they are good feelings, i.e., feelings that we want to have 
(or are impelled to maintain). In other words, NSS accounts for the feeling desideratum 
rather indirectly, by claiming that we take positive emotions to feel good because they 
are good experiences, experiences that we are motivated to maintain. In this account, 
once a bodily experience is painted by the “hedonic gloss” of a non-sensory, 
motivating valence marker, it becomes desired, and thus a positive (negative) feeling 
emerges.   
 
I think this move is not a satisfactory way to meet the feeling desideratum. It makes 
little sense to hold that because valence markers “gloss” percepts is that the latter feel 
good (bad). If there are no phenomenal qualities beyond the features that configure 
sensory representations (i.e., there is no cognitive phenomenology), then if valence 
markers are not themselves something sensory, it is hard to see how the positiveness 
of a feeling could be part of the phenomenology of emotion, without an account of 
how such a “gloss” becomes part of the sensory features that configure percepts. 
 
                                                             
31 Closely following Schroeder (2004), Carruthers also argues that valence cannot be equated with 
interoceptive, bodily representations, based on cases such as skydiving, where supposedly the same 
physiological changes can give rise to both positive and negative experiences. This cases are covered 




NSS exhibits then several difficulties. The positive claim made by NSS could still be 
the case. However, as I attempted to show, their negative arguments to the effect that 
valence is not grounded in bodily perception are not compelling. Considering that their 
view rests upon such negative arguments, the case for NSS seems to be undermined. 
Thus, the door is open for the view that valence is a sensory item in the furniture of 
the perceptual predictive machine posited by the PP framework. In the coming 
Chapter, I argue that once affective valence is taken to arise via interoceptive 
inference, the view that valence is a sensory phenomenon can reply to the objections 
made by defenders of NSS to the view that valence is a sensory representation. 
Considering that NSS is problematic on their own, as I argued in this Chapter, affective 










































6. Valence and interoceptive perceptual inference 
 
As we saw in the previous Chapter, the view that valence itself cannot be a sensory 
phenomenon, in both its versions, exhibits several problems. Thus, the door is open 
for the view that valence is a sensory phenomenon. Nonetheless, it could still be the 
case that the view that valence itself is indeed a sensory phenomenon is also untenable. 
In fact, defenders of NSS have compellingly argued that, independently of the truth of 
their view, assuming that valence is a sensory item in furniture of the mind is 
implausible. This poses a major challenge to the interoceptive inference theory of 
valence (ITV). That is, the view that identifies valence, the defining construct of affect 
(i.e., subjective feeling states), with interoceptive perceptions formed via interoceptive 
inference.  
 
In this Chapter, I defend the view that valence is indeed a sensory, interoceptive 
phenomenon. More precisely, valence can be seen as an interoceptive percept that 
represents positive and negative homeostatic changes, which is formed via 
interoceptive perceptual inference. Once affective valence is taken to arise via 
interoceptive inference, the view that valence is a sensory phenomenon can reply to 
the objections made by defenders of NSS. Thus, affective valence is likely to be a 
perceptual phenomenon. ITV seems to hold. 
 
In what follows, I begin by critically discussing some of the main possible ways in 
which valence can be understood in the PP framework (6.1.). Even though each of 
these views exhibits some difficulties, they all point towards a more global PP view 
on the nature of valence. All these views point towards the claim that valence amounts 
to an interoceptive percept, formed via interoceptive perceptual inference, that informs 
about positive and negative homeostatic changes. I present this claim in Section 6.2. 
Then, in Section 6.3., I discuss some theoretical and empirical considerations that 
suggest that the different aspects involved in this claim might be the case. In Section 
6.4., I show that the view in question can reply to the objections typically faced by 
198 
 
views that, as the one defended here, identify valence with mental states that can be 
felt—e.g., (dis)pleasure. Finally, in Section 6.5, I show that this view on the nature of 
valence satisfies desiderata for a theory of valence.  
 
6.1. Valence and predictive processing 
 
There are various ways in which valence can be taken to be part of the perceptual PP 
machinery. With the exception of the view proposed by Joffily and Coricelli (Joffily 
& Coricelli, 2013), these approaches to the nature of valence have not been put forward 
in a completely explicit manner as such in the literature (i.e., as careful, specially 
dedicated treatments of how valence per se should be understood in the PP 
framework). However, as we will see, these approaches to the nature of valence can 
be clearly discerned in the PP literature relative to the affective domain. Interestingly, 
as soon as some of the more problematic aspects of these views are left aside, all these 
views point towards the same claim. This claim is that valence amounts to an 
interoceptive percept, formed via interoceptive perceptual inference, which informs 
about positive and negative homeostatic changes.  
 
6.1.1. Valence as valuable, ‘(un)familiar’ states 
 
One possible way of understanding valence in the PP framework is to equate affective 
valence with valuable states for the organism. In fact, the move of equating affective 
valence with that which is valuable for the organism is not arbitrary at all. For example, 
the close link between affective valence and value is emphasized by views such those 
of Carruthers (2011) and Panksepp (1998). Remember that, according to Carruthers, 
valence consists in an (non-sensory/non-conceptual) indicator of value. In this view, 
valence confers value to attended stimuli, making the latter attractive or repellent. 
Valence indicates that which is good or bad for the organism. Similarly, for Panksepp, 
mammals have different emotion systems, each of which attributes value to external 
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events. In this sense, in this view valence can also be seen as mental item that indicates 
that which is valuable for the organism32. 
 
Now, remember that, in the PP framework, minimizing PE is a strategy for complying 
with the free energy principle (Friston 2005, 2009, 2010) (see Chapter 2). According 
to the latter, organisms must ensure that they maintain themselves within expected 
bounds of ‘surprisal’. Organisms avoid ‘surprising’ states, and seek ‘non-surprising’ 
events. An organism is in a ‘surprising’ state in case it is outside the subset of possible 
states that are most probable for such organism to be in, given its constitution. Then, 
“the consequences of minimizing free energy are that some states are occupied more 
frequently than others—and these states can be labelled as valuable.” (Friston et al., 
2013, p.2) (Italics are mine). In other words, ‘familiar states’ are valuable states. 
‘Surprising’ states reflect conditions incompatible with homeostasis. Therefore, “the 
long-term (distal) imperative—of maintaining states within physiological bounds—
translates into a short-term (proximal) avoidance of surprise” (Friston, 2010, p.2), so 
that “low free-energy systems will look like they are responding adaptively to changes 
in the external or internal milieu, to maintain a homeostatic exchange with the 
environment” (Friston & Stephan, 2007, p. 48). As Joffily and Coricelli (2013) remark, 
 
“In the free-energy principle, value is the complement of free-energy in the sense that 
minimizing free-energy corresponds to maximizing the probability that an agent will visit 
valuable states, where the evolutionary value of a phenotype is the negative surprise 
averaged over all the (interoceptive and exteroceptive) sensory states it experiences [2]. 
This formulation parallels a recently proposed reinforcement learning theory for 
homeostatic regulation [44], which attempts to integrate reward (valence) maximization 
with the minimization of departures from homeostasis (free-energy).” (Joffily & 
Coricelli, 2013, p. 10) 
 
Then, one way in which valence can be understood in the PP framework is to equate 
affective valence with valuable states of the organism. In this view, valence indicates 
that which is good or bad for the organism. In other words, that which is familiar or 
unfamiliar, respectively. Familiar states feel good, while unfamiliar states feel bad. In 
                                                             
32 For the close relation between valence and value, see Higgins (2007).  
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that sense, positive feelings indicate that the organism finds itself in a familiar state, 
while negative feelings indicate that the organism finds itself in an unfamiliar state. 
 
At first sight, this seems quite plausible. Given our constitution, states that are not 
frequently occupied by organisms like us typically feel bad. For example, being at five 
thousand meters high feels awfully, breaking a bone feels terribly bad, and so on. In 
these sort of cases, as this view expects, our built-in expectation of low-surprisal is not 
satisfied. 
 
However, this view cannot be quite right. There are many cases of familiar states that 
do not exhibit their corresponding positive valence. Just to take an example, one can 
find oneself sitting on one’s desk, without any sort of needs (hunger, thirst, etc.), 
simply daydreaming about some random stuff. In this sort of case, one finds oneself in 
a familiar, low-surprisal state. Nonetheless, intuitively, in this sort of cases the valence 
value is neutral, rather than positive. Certainly, this argument does not show this view 
to be wrong. In fact, I think there is a lot of truth in it. However, this view can be 
refined so as to become more compelling (Section 6.2).  
 
6.1.2. Valence as high-level perceptual hypotheses  
 
Another possible way of understanding valence in the PP framework is to hold that 
valence arises from high-level perceptual hypotheses. More precisely, from high-level 
interoceptive perceptual hypotheses.  Seth’s view on subjective feeling states can be 
read in this way (Seth, 2013).  
 
Before presenting this way of reading Seth’s ‘interoceptive inference’ approach to 
interoception, let me make a few remarks. The notion of ‘interoceptive inference’ is 
most of the time put forward by Seth (and Hohwy) as the claim that emotions arise 
201 
 
from successfully minimizing interoceptive PE via interoceptive perceptual inference. 
However, it is clear that Seth does not exclusively use ‘emotion’ in the restricted sense 
in which ‘emotion’ is understood in this Thesis, and in the philosophical literature 
more generally (see Chapter 1). By ‘emotion’ he mainly refers to the subjective feeling 
states that are typically taken to result from bodily perception (e.g., Damasio, 2003). 
Then, Seth’s ‘interoceptive inference’ approach to interoception can also be 
understood as the claim that subjective feeling states (or ‘interoceptive feelings’) arise 
by minimizing interoceptive PE; rather than the claim that emotions per se arise by 
minimizing interoceptive PE33. Now, remember that subjective feeling states amount 
to affective states, i.e., mental states that feel good or bad at a certain intensity level. 
Moods, emotions, ‘homeostatic motivations’, etc. are cases of subjective feeling states. 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, valence (at a certain intensity level) is what makes 
affective states affective in the first place. To put it this way, valence is the essence of 
affect. Thus, Seth’s ‘interoceptive inference’ view on subjective feeling states can be 
understood as a view on the way in which valenced states arise. This is confirmed by 
the work of Quattrocki and Friston on the role of interoception and the 
neurotransmitter oxytocin in the generation of some of the features of autism 
(Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). In this work, they make use of Seth’s ‘interoceptive 
inference’ approach to interoceptive processing and subjective feeling states. 
Quattrocki and Friston propose that, in the interoceptive system, precisions are realized 
by the neurotransmitter oxytocin. Thus, oxytocin permits proper learning (i.e., the 
proper building of a generative model) of those aspect of social communication which 
are impaired in autism (see, Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). They describe an aspect of 
Seth’s view as one in which valence is seen as identical to an interoceptive feeling 
(‘gut feeling’) that is constituted by high-level descending interoceptive predictions.  
 
                                                             
33 Seth also claims that what he calls the ‘sense of presence’ arises by minimizing interoceptive PE 
(Seth, 2013; Seth et al, 2012; Seth & Critchley, 2013). However, Seth (2015) seems to have changed 
his view in this latter respect: the sense of presence, instead of arising be minimizing interoceptive PE, 
arises when the generative models that underlie prediction are counterfactually rich. Considering that 
the sense of presence, i.e., “the sense of the subjective reality of the contents of perception” (Seth, 
2015, p.2), is arguably a sort of subjective feeling state, Seth’s ‘interoceptive inference’ approach to 
interoception can also be understood as the claim that ‘subjective feeling states’ arise from minimizing 





“The expectations from these higher level representations then furnish the basis for top-
down predictions – that endow perceptual inferences with an affective valence – literally 
‘gut’ feelings – that are thought to be a key component of emotional salience and self-
awareness (Critchley and Seth, 2012; Seth, 2013; Seth et al., 2011).” (Quattrocki & 
Friston, 2014, p. 413) 
 
Let’s get down to business. In the PP framework, valenced states could also be 
understood then as arising from high-level interoceptive perceptual hypotheses. That 
is, just in the way subjective feeling states arise as described in Chapter 3. As we saw, 
in direct analogy to the way in which exteroceptive percepts are formed, subjective 
feeling states arise by way of interoceptive perceptual inference. Then, in this view, 
valenced states arise via interoceptive inferences of the likely causes of incoming 
interoceptive signals. That is, via interoceptive perceptual inference. The latter consists 
in updating hypotheses so that the generated predictions fit the incoming signal. The 
task here consists then in forming an interoceptive percept. In this view, valence 
amounts to a high-level interoceptive expectations about which valence value is more 
likely given incoming interoceptive signals and contextual aspects of the situation. The 
interoceptive expectations in question are encoded at the top of the interoceptive 
hierarchy. Then, they generate descending interoceptive predictions that constrain 
activity in levels of the interoceptive hierarchy that encode both relatively variant and 
invariant aspects of interoception, such as the physiological condition of the whole 
body and the activity of single organs and part of the body, respectively (see Chapter 
3). The idea is roughly the following. Let’s say that a certain situation triggers certain 
physiological changes. Contextual factors, such as for example, your partner suddenly 
entering the room, make the interoceptive expectation that something positive is 
occurring to the organism the most likely hypothesis. The interoceptive activity 
expected for that hypothesis is generated from the top-down. Let’s say that these 
descending predictions achieve to match and thus suppress incoming interoceptive 
activity. An interoceptive percept is thus formed: A positive feeling arises.  
 
Note that the problem faced by IIE relative to the fact that there are no regularities 
pertaining to emotion in the physiological domain (Chapter 4) does not apply to the 
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view of valence in question. There are regularities pertaining to valence in the 
physiological domain (Caccioppo, 1991, 2000) (more on this below).  
 
Importantly, the view presented above (Section 6.1.1.) identified valence with 
‘familiar states’, i.e., states that are more frequently occupied by organisms. Note that 
‘familiar states’ become expected states or ‘beliefs’ about which sensory data the 
organism should be encountering. That is, organisms have a built-in high-level 
expectation of low-surprisal. The satisfaction of the latter determines valence value. 
Then, both in that view and in the view presented in this subsection valence is 
identified with interoceptive expectations. However, there are two key differences 
between this view and the one presented above (Section 6.1.1.). In the first place, there 
is a difference in direction of fit. On the one hand, the view of valence as familiar states 
has world-to-mind direction of fit: positive (negative) valence arises as current states 
conform to the ‘goal state’ of low-surprisal. On the other hand, as long as valenced 
states arise via interoceptive perceptual inference, Seth’s view on valence has mind-
to-world direction of fit. In the second place, the view of valence as ‘familiar states’ 
does involve high-level interoceptive expectations, but these expectations are long-
term expectations. That is, in the long run it is expected that organisms occupy low-
surprisal states. Note that this, however, is compatible with, for example, transient 
states of thirst or hunger. The latter can be expected, for example, considering that it 
is already 1pm, and one has not had lunch yet. But as long as such transient states are 
incompatible with the long term expectation of low-surprisal, such states are not 
valuable, even though transiently expected. Transient expectations are not relevant in 
this account. On the contrary, the view that valence amounts to a high-level 
interoceptive perceptual hypotheses can involve the expectation that states 
incompatible with the ‘goal’ of low-surprisal should take place, given context. This is 
the case since perceptual hypotheses attempt to determine the nature of the causes of 
current, transient incoming signals. On occasions, the expected states that should be 
taking place (selected perceptual hypotheses) can be incompatible with the goal of 
keeping low surprisal states, as the organism needs to be informed whether such goal 
is being satisfied or not. That is precisely the task of perceptual inferences.  
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I think this view on valence is on the right track. However, it leaves an open question: 
what makes the resulting interoceptive percept a percept that constitutes a positive 
(negative) feeling? Certainly, in the PP framework, the content of the hypothesis 
determines the content of the resulting percept/experience. Thus, as the standard 
answer goes, the resulting percept constitutes a feeling of positiveness/negativeness 
because it was formed driven by a positiveness/negativeness hypothesis, to put it this 
way. However, this answer obscures a more fundamental question, namely, why such 
a hypothesis, and consequently the resulting percept, counts as a hypothesis of 
something positive/negative in the first place. In other words, what makes such a 
representation (hypothesis) a representation of a positive/negative state? 
 
6.1.3. Valence as a sign of homeostatic states  
 
Another possible way of understanding valence in the PP framework is by making a 
little twist on the above account. The above account can be extended so as to better 
emphasize the role of interoceptive inferences in homeostatic processes and, relatedly, 
in decision-making. Valence properties could be understood as interoceptive percepts 
that signal positive and negative homeostatic states, conveying thus information about 
what is homeostatically positive or negative to other systems involved in decision 
making. Gu and Fitzgerald have proposed such an account (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014). 
They have used Seth’s ‘interoceptive inference’ approach to interoception so as to 
account for the role of bodily perception in informing decision-making in this manner. 
More precisely, they place Damasio’s ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ (Damasio, 1996) 
within the framework provided by the ‘interoceptive inference’ approach to 
interoception. Very roughly, according to the ‘somatic markers hypothesis’, during 
decision-making, representations of the inner milieu constitute valence properties. 
That is, good and bad ‘gut feelings’. These representations are combined (or 
“integrated”) in the vmPFC with exteroceptive representations. In this process, the 
former ‘tag’ or ‘mark’ the latter as positive or negative, guiding thus value-based 
choices. In Gu and Fitzgerald’s extension of this view, interoceptive percepts formed 
via interoceptive perceptual inference inform about the homeostatic, physiological 
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condition of the body. These interoceptive percepts inform decision-making by 
signalling that which is homeostatically good or bad for the organism as in Damasio’s 
account. That is, interoceptive percepts realized in the insular cortex, 
 
 “[…] encode and represent interoceptive information and, in so doing, acts to 
contextualise choice behaviour by informing other neural systems about the internal state 
of the body. In other words, the insula computes a ‘state’ variable of the internal world of 
the agent and passes it to other neural systems that carry out other computations in 
decision-making.” (Gu & Fitzgerald, 2014, p.269) 
 
I think that this way of understanding valence in the PP framework is on track. It 
successfully deals with the above problem of what makes an interoceptive perceptual 
hypothesis a representation of a positive/negative state. It deals with this problem by 
highlighting the fact that such hypothesis has a positive/negative character given the 
positivity/negativity of the homeostatic process that it tracks. Before unfolding the 
philosophical commitments of this view in more detail in Section 6.2., and motivate 
such commitments (Section 6.3.), let me briefly discuss one last way in which valence 
has been understood in the PP framework. This, in order to highlight a key aspect of 
the view on valence defended in this Chapter.  
 
6.1.4. Valence as the rate of change of free-energy over time 
  
In this Section, I discuss the view on the nature of valence proposed by Joffily and 
Coricelli (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013). To date, this view is the only view on the nature 
of valence that has been put forward in a completely explicit manner as such in the 
literature (i.e., as careful, specially dedicated treatments of how valence per se should 
be understood in the PP framework).  
 
According to Joffily and Coricelli, valence can be identified with the rate of change of 
free-energy (or PE) over time. A shift from a high free-energy to a lower free-energy 
state gives rise to positive valence, which is identified with pleasure. While a shift 
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from a low free-energy to a higher-free energy state gives rise to negative valence, 
which is identified with displeasure. In other words, going from a high surprisal 
state—so a less familiar state—to a lower surprisal state—so to a more familiar state—
constitutes positive valence. A shift in the other direction constitutes negative valence. 
Interestingly, note that instead of identifying valence with (un)familiar states 
simpliciter, as the view presented in Section 6.1.1., the view in question identifies 
valence with a shift in (un)familiar states. That is, positive and negative valence are 
identified with a decrease and increase of PE (free-energy) over time, respectively. 
 
According to our definition of emotional valence, when Fi’(t) is positive (i.e., free-energy 
is increasing over time at level i of the hierarchy) the valence of the state at this level i is 
negative at time t. When Fi ‘(t) is negative (i.e., free-energy is decreasing over time at 
level i) the valence of the state at this level i is positive at time t. (Joffily & Coricelli, 
2013, p.3) 
 
Now, remember that PE (roughly, free-energy) is minimized separately at each level 
of the perceptual hierarchy. Note that in this quote such hierarchical nature of the PP 
regime is nicely emphasized. This means that “positive and negative valence can be 
independently attributed to each state in the model” (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013, p.3). It 
is implied here then that, at a certain time, an organism can entertain different, 
opposing valence values. While a certain situation can result ‘unfamiliar’ at lower 
levels of the perceptual hierarchy, it can be ‘familiar’ at higher levels, and vice-versa. 
To take an example from Joffily and Coricelli (2013), think of the case of an old friend 
who suddenly steps in your door. While the event of such a friend suddenly stepping 
through the door violates the rather variant expectation about the visual causes of 
sensations, it fulfils the more invariant expectation of being close to our friends. As 
Joffily and Coricelli remark, in the view in question, in this kind of case such shift in 
the familiarity of that visual state should involve unpleasantness (negative valence) at 
lower, more variant levels. However, the event in question should trigger pleasantness 
(positive valence) at higher, more invariant levels (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013, p.11). It 
must be noted that this example makes patent that this view assumes that valence 
properties take place at higher levels of the perceptual hierarchy (Joffily & Coricelli, 
2013, p.11): The old friend example is a case where the affective state that intuitively 
207 
 
takes place is pleasure (positive valence), even though low-level variant expectations 
were violated; but, higher-level, relatively invariant expectations were satisfied.  
 
As it can be inferred from the above, in this view, valence properties play the role of 
informing the agent whether the hard-wired goal of keeping surprise levels low is 
being satisfied or not. Positive valence signals that the agent is on her way towards 
that goal, while negative valence signals that the agent is deviating from that goal. 
However, even though the interoceptive domain is important in this respect (as I 
showed in the previous Chapter), Joffily and Coricelli stress that surprisal can be kept 
low by minimizing PE in any modality. Then, their proposal “treats interoceptive and 
exteroceptive predictions (and their uncertainty) on an equal footing” (Joffily & 
Coricelli, 2013, p.10) in respect to valence. A shift from a familiar state to a more 
unfamiliar state in any modality gives rise to negative valence, while a shift from an 
unfamiliar state to a more familiar state in any modality gives rise to positive valence. 
 
This latter aspect is another respect in which this view differs from the one presented 
in 6.1.1., which identifies valence with (un)familiar states simpliciter. The latter view 
emphasizes the close link between surprising states and their incompatibility with 
homeostasis/interoception, as “the long-term (distal) imperative—of maintaining 
states within physiological bounds—translates into a short-term (proximal) avoidance 
of surprise” (Friston, 2010, p.2). That is, valence emerges in the interoceptive system. 
On the other hand, the view presented in this Section holds that a shift in the rate of 
change of free-energy (or PE) over time in any modality is what makes affective 
valence emerge.  
 
The view presented in this Section also differs from the view presented in Section 
6.1.2. The latter view understands valence as a high-level perceptual hypothesis about 
the causes of interoceptive input. However, in the present account, valence is not 
represented explicitly, but rather it simply emerges as the shift in the ‘familiarity’ of a 




“According to our scheme, emotional valence is not estimated itself by the agent but 
emerges naturally from the process of estimating hidden states by means of free-energy 
minimization. One could eventually hypothesize that some living organisms, such as 
humans, explicitly represent valence as one of the causes of their sensations. This means 
that these agents should also estimate valence (and its uncertainty) like any other hidden 
state in their generative model. Nevertheless, the explicit representation of valence is not 
a requirement for emotional valence to exist in our scheme and to play an important role 
in the adaptation of biological agents to unexpected changes in their world.” (Joffily & 
Coricelli, 2013, p.8) 
 
As an account of valence, Joffily and Coricelli’s account faces a key problem. As we 
saw, according to their view, a shift in the ‘familiarity’ of a state gives rise to valence. 
Such a shift can occur in any modality, as this view “treats interoceptive and 
exteroceptive predictions (and their uncertainty) on an equal footing” (Joffily & 
Coricelli, 2013, p.10). Thus, to take the case of vision, a change from an unexpected 
visual state to a more expected visual state gives rise to positive valence, independently 
of what occurs in other modalities. For example, visually perceiving what initially 
looks (illusorily) in the mirror as a grey piece of your hair rapidly shifting to its typical 
brown shades should give rise to a good feeling, independently of the states occurring 
in other modalities. This is rather implausible. Think of the case of the anhedonia 
involved in major depression. A depressed person can certainly undergo such a visual 
shift in visual expectations and have such a visual experience. However, insofar as she 
exhibits anhedonia, that experience likely feels hedonically indifferent to the depressed 
person. It does not involve positive valence. A shift in expectations simpliciter cannot 
be the whole story of how valence emerges. Interestingly, anhedonia has being linked 
to aberrant functioning of the interoceptive system (see, e.g., Dunn et al., 2009; 
Furman et al., 2013; Harshaw, 2015; Naqvi and Bechara, 2010). This supports the idea 
that affectivity is a matter of interoceptive processing, rather than to processing in 
exteroceptive modalities in isolation of the interoceptive system (more on this below). 
This is why Friston prefers to present Joffily and Coricelli’s account on affective 
valence as a process that occurs in the interoceptive system, rather than as a process 




Joffily and Coricelli’s account faces another potential problem. As I have been 
insisting throughout this Thesis, phenomenal consciousness is populated by nothing 
over and above formed percepts.  In the PP framework, percepts are formed once, 
during perceptual inference, PE is successfully minimized. The content of such an 
experience is given by the content of the perceptual hypothesis that achieved to 
successfully minimize PE. PE as such is not then something that can be felt (Hohwy, 
2013). The rate of change of PE is, obviously, a property of PE as such. Valence, the 
positive or negative character of feelings, is part of the content of affective experience. 
Intuitively, valence is then something that can be felt, particularly if valence is 
identified with (dis)pleasure, as Joffily and Coricelli do (though, see discussion below, 
Section 6.4.). It is hard to see then that valence can be constituted by something that is 
not part of the content of a perceptual hypothesis, but rather of PE as such, which 
cannot be felt. Or to put it in a slightly different way, if the content of formed percepts, 
and thus of experience, is given by top-down perceptual hypotheses, it is hard to see 
how valence could emerge from something distinct than a perceptual hypothesis and 
its content.  
 
However, Joffily and Coricelli’s account is quite successful in pointing towards a key 
aspect. If we read their view as Friston does, i.e., as equating valence with the rate of 
change of interoceptive PE, such an emphasis on change is key, because, as we saw in 
Section 3.1.8., interoceptors track changes in the physiological, homeostatic condition 
of the organism, rather that physiological states as such.  
 
Let me digress. Joffily and Coricelli also offer an account of some aspects of emotion 
per se, along the same lines of their view on the nature of valence (Joffily & Coricelli, 
2013). However, there are several reasons to circumvent this view during my 
exposition. So, in this Thesis, I will not consider it as a competing view on the nature 




Joffily and Coricelli hold that their view on valence can be extended so as to account 
for some aspects of the dynamics of the, so called, ‘factive’ and ‘epistemic’ emotions 
(Gordon, 1987). While the latter are related to uncertain beliefs, the former are related 
to certain beliefs. More precisely, epistemic emotions are directed at outcomes which 
are significantly uncertain for the individual. For example, one can fear or hope for 
events that might or might not occur, such as the development of a treatment for eternal 
youth. According to Joffily and Coricelli, hope and fear are typical cases of epistemic 
emotions. On the other hand, factive emotions are directed at events which the 
individual has a significant degree of certainty that such events are the case. For 
example, happiness towards the arrival of a loved one. According to Joffily and 
Coricelli, typical cases of factive emotions are happiness, unhappiness, relief, and 
disappointment.  
 
Importantly, Joffily and Coricelli replace the notion of (un)certainty in play in the 
characterization of epistemic and factive emotions made by Gordon (1987). They 
replace it by the notion, commented above, of the rate of change of PE (or the dynamics 
of free-energy). Thus, they individuate, for example, the emotions of hope, happiness, 
fear, and unhappiness in the following way: 
 
“Our proposal stands on the assumption that, when both Fi’ (t) and Fi’’(t) are negative 
(i.e., free-energy Fi(t) is decreasing ‘faster and faster’ over time) the agent hopes to be 
visiting a state of lower free-energy in the near future at this level i. However, when Fi’(t) 
is negative and Fi’’(t) is positive (i.e., free-energy is decreasing ‘slower and slower’ over 
time) the agent is happy to be currently visiting a state of lower free-energy than the 
previous one at this level i. Equivalently, when Fi’(t) and Fi’’(t) are positive (i.e., free-
energy is increasing ‘faster and faster’ over time) the agent fears to be visiting a state of 
greater free-energy in the near future at this level i. However, when Fi’(t) is positive and 
Fi’’(t) is negative (i.e., free-energy is increasing ‘slower and slower’ over time) the agent 
is unhappy to be currently visiting a state of higher free-energy than the previous one at 
this level i.” (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013, p. 3-4) 
 
As it is patent from the quote above, in this view, emotions are conceived as directed 
at ‘free-energy states’, which are internal states to the organism. In this sense, 
according to this view, emotions inform organisms about changes in the rate of PE 
minimization. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, emotions are uncontroversially 
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directed at external events (i.e., core relational themes). Insofar as they take emotions 
to track internal states, their view might be better suited to account for other kinds of 
affective phenomena, not directed at external events, rather than to account for emotion 
per se (such as, e.g., valence).  
 
However, insofar as changes in the rate of PE minimization at higher-levels of the 
cortical hierarchy typically result from the satisfaction or violation of high-level 
exteroceptive expectations about external events, the claim put forward by Joffily and 
Coricelli has the resources to avoid the above worry. It could be argued, for example, 
that the high-level exteroceptive expectation of being away from snakes, once violated, 
results in a ‘faster-and-faster’ increase of free-energy over time. Thus, when an 
organism is close to snakes, such an exteroceptively represented mental state is about 
something dangerous for the organism (remember that dangerousness is the core 
relational theme of fear), because it triggers the dynamics of free-energy that 
individuate fear. In other words, given that ‘faster-and-faster’ increases of free-energy 
over time are consistently caused by dangerousness, when a high-level expectation 
about an external event triggers such free-energy dynamics, the latter makes that which 
is represented by the exteroceptive high-level expectation in question count as 
dangerous. In this manner, a state of fear can be constituted.  
 
Nonetheless, the proposal on emotions per se made by Joffily and Coricelli still 
exhibits a couple of pitfalls. In the first place, as we just saw above, the free-energy 
dynamics that they consider are the free-energy dynamics which take place in any 
modality (Joffily & Coricelli, 2013, p.10). Thus, to keep the example from above, once 
the exteroceptive expectation of staying away from snakes is violated, the free-energy 
dynamics that individuate fear occur, independently of what occurs in other modalities. 
Just as we saw above in respect to valence, the problem with this view is that the 
interoceptive modality is privileged in respect to affective states. Thus, imagine an 
anhedonic, depressed person (or someone with some sort of limbic lesion) who find 
herself in front of a snake, violating thus her high-level exteroceptive expectation of 
being away from snakes. As the individual in question finds herself close to a snake, 
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in this case, the free-energy dynamics that individuate fear take place: free-energy 
begins to increase ‘faster-and-faster’ over time. According to the view put forward by 
Joffily and Coricelli, as long as the individual in question visually (exteroceptively) 
represents being close to a snake—which violates her high-level expectation of being 
away from snakes—she should then experience fear. The anhedonic, depressed subject 
in question (or someone with some sort of limbic lesion, e.g., in insular regions) can 
certainly have the stored high expectation of being away from snakes, and she can 
certainly visually represent being close to a snake. However, considering that her 
interoceptive processing regions are compromised, it is unlikely that she undergoes 
fear (or a non-aberrant experience of fear), as limbic regions are privileged in respect 
to affective states. This might be why, for example, patients with lesions in the anterior 
insula exhibit diminished fear (see, e.g., Devinsky et al., 1995). This also supports the 
idea that affectivity is a matter of interoceptive processing, rather than to processing 
in exteroceptive modalities in isolation of the interoceptive system. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that dynamics of free-energy simpliciter suffice for an emotion to arise. 
Moreover, emotions are bodily felt. As long as the free-energy dynamics in, for 
example, the visual modality (or in amodal levels of the cortical hierarchy) cannot 
account for this non-negotiable aspect of emotion, the view on emotion per se 
advanced by Joffily and Coricelli is not thoroughly compelling.  
 
Certainly, the view in question could be amended by holding that the relevant 
dynamics of free-energy are the ones which occur in the interoceptive system. 
Nonetheless, this view still faces a key obstacle. The proposed dynamics of free-energy 
by themselves cannot account for emotion differentiation. Different emotions can 
involve the same free-energy dynamics. For example, not only fear can involve a 
‘faster-and-faster’ increase of free-energy, but also anger. Intuitively, in typical cases 
of fear, the agent does not expect (‘desires’) to find herself in a certain situation (e.g., 
being close to a snake), but she, actually or imaginatively, finds herself in that 
situation. This triggers an increase in free-energy at higher-levels of the cortical 
hierarchy. The non-expected situation is still there, in fact it is more imminent (e.g., 
the snake is even closer), so free-energy keeps increasing. The agent now expects, at 
lower levels of the cortical hierarchy, that the situation will remain (the snake is not 
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going anywhere). Free-energy keeps increasing. In this manner, fear takes place. Now, 
the same free-energy story can straightforwardly apply to the case of anger. Intuitively, 
in typical cases of anger, the agent does not expect (‘desire’) to find herself in a certain 
situation (e.g., in prison for her political views), but she, actually or imaginatively, 
finds herself in that situation. This triggers an increase in free-energy at higher-levels 
of the cortical hierarchy. The non-expected situation is still there, in fact it is now even 
worst (e.g., the police officer tells her that she is going to be in prison for a really long 
time), so free-energy keeps increasing. The agent now expects, at lower levels of the 
cortical hierarchy, that the situation will remain (she is still behind bars). Free-energy 
keeps increasing. In fact, this sort of story in which free energy increases ‘faster-and-
faster’ over time can be applied to several negative emotions. Considering that 
accounting for emotion differentiation is a non-negotiable aspect of any philosophical 
view on the nature of emotion, this is a major issue which makes this free-energy 
dynamics view on emotion uncompelling. End of digression. 
 
6.1.5. Tacking stock 
 
The first view commented above (6.1.1.) identifies valence with (un)familiar states 
simpliciter. Familiar states feel good, while unfamiliar states feel bad. In this view, 
valence indicates that which is ‘familiar’ or ‘unfamiliar’, indicating thus that which is 
good or bad for the organism, respectively. Moreover, in this view, it is emphasized 
that ‘unfamiliar’ states reflect conditions incompatible with homeostasis. In one way 
or another, all views commented above concur in holding that (in)compatibility with 
homeostasis—or the (un)familiarity of a state—is key for valence. Now, ‘familiar 
states’ become expected states or ‘beliefs’ about which sensory data the organism 
should be encountering. That is, organisms have a built-in high-level expectation of 
low-surprisal. The satisfaction of the latter determines valence value. This insight is 
also shared among the views commented above. Expectations about maintaining the 
organism within ‘familiarity’ limits, or limit of homeostatic viability, seems to be key 
for a PP account of valence. However, unlike the view of Joffily and Coricelli, the 
view of valence as ‘(un)familiar’ states failed to highlight the fact that shifts in the 
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‘familiarity’ of a state is what matters for valence, rather than ‘(un)familiarity’ 
simpliciter. This indicates that shifts in homeostatic states—‘(un)familiar states’—are 
key for understanding valence in the PP framework. The view of valence as 
‘(un)familiar’ states also fails, however, in remarking that, given that phenomenal 
consciousness is populated by nothing over and above percepts, valence must result 
then via perceptual inference. Perceptual inference must be then part of the PP story 
on valence. The second view holds that valence arises from high-level interoceptive 
perceptual hypotheses about incoming, transient physiological sates. This view has the 
problem of being silent about what makes the interoceptive percepts that constitute 
valenced states percepts that constitute positive (negative) feelings. However, when 
this view is complemented with the insights of the view above, we can begin to 
understand valence properties as interoceptive percepts that signal positive and 
negative homeostatic states. The latter is that which confers the positive and negative 
character to the content of the interoceptive percepts that constitute valence. This is 
precisely the view commented in 6.1.3. Finally, the view presented in 6.1.4., which 
identifies valence with the rate of change of PE over time, is successful in emphasizing 
that shifts in the (un)familiarity of states are key. However, it failed to recognize that 
interoception is special in respect to valence. The interoceptive system seems to be the 
sensory system responsible for the generation of valenced states.  
 
Even though each of these views exhibits some difficulties, it is clear that they all point 
towards a more global PP view on the nature of valence. From the above 
considerations we have then that a PP view on valence must hold that valence arises 
from perceptual inference. More precisely, from interoceptive perceptual inference. 
Furthermore, the content of the percepts that result from such a process is given by 
shifts in physiological, homeostatic states (i.e., (un)familiar states). Valence indicates 
those shifts in physiological states which are good or bad for the organism. In other 
words, all these views point towards the claim that valence amounts to an interoceptive 
percept, formed via interoceptive perceptual inference, that informs about positive and 




6.2. Valence as an interoceptive percept formed via interoceptive perceptual 
inference 
 
The view on the nature of valence that emerges from the PP framework holds then that 
valence is a representation in a sensory system, namely the interoceptive system. 
Insofar as valence is taken to be a sensory representation, it counts as a mental state 
that can be felt. Now, the claim that valence can be felt is typically put forward by 
views that identify valence with (dis)pleasure (e.g., Barrett, 2006a; Frijda, 1993; 
Russell, 2003; Schroeder, 2006). In this sense, this view is somehow committed to the 
view that valence is (dis)pleasure, at least in that respect. In fact, Joffly and Coricelli 
(2013) describe their view on valence as a view on (dis)pleasure: “Our suggestion is 
that pleasure is elicited in the transition from a state of high to low surprise.” (Joffly 
& Coricelli, 2013, p.8). In this sense, the view on valence that emerges from the PP 
framework can be taken to be a version of the hedonic theory of valence, which 
identifies valence with (dis)pleasure.  
 
What is the nature of valence/(dis)pleasure? As I mentioned above, an answer worth 
exploring is that certain represented bundles of bounded interoceptive features 
constitute positive valence (pleasure) and other represented bundles of bounded 
interoceptive features constitute negative valence (displeasure). In other words, certain 
interoceptive representations or percepts constitute positive valence and others 
negative valence. This kind of view, as Schroeder (2004, p. 84) puts it, “has some 
distinguished advocates”. For example, an influential version of this view was put 
forward by Damasio (1994). According to Damasio, (dis)pleasure, or valence, is a 
“particular body landscape that our brains are perceiving” (Damasio, 1994, p.263), 
which is triggered by cascading and mutually constraining physiological changes, as 
described in Chapter 3. This kind of approach can be called an interoceptive theory of 




Now, here is the bold claim defended in this Chapter. Valence arises when 
interoceptive PE is successfully minimized via interoceptive perceptual inference. 
That is, valence, or (dis)pleasure, amounts to an interoceptive percept. Note that the 
claim is not that valence arises when interoceptive PE is minimized tout court. 
Remember that there are three ways by which interoceptive PE can be minimized: 
interoceptive perceptual inference, and internal and external interoceptive actions 
(Chapter 3). The claim is that valence arises only when interoceptive PE is minimized 
via interoceptive perceptual inference: valence is an interoceptive percept. Let’s call 
this view the ‘interoceptive theory of valence’ (ITV) (which, as I mentioned above, 
can be taken to be a version of the hedonic theory of valence). 
 
Put more precisely, ITV’s claim—valence/(dis)pleasure amounts to an interoceptive 
percept—is the following. When an interoceptive percept is formed, it can either 
constitute pleasure or displeasure, i.e., positive or negative valence, respectively. As 
we saw above (Section 3.1.7.), interoceptive percepts have a certain kind of content. 
Now, it is widely accepted that perceptual mental states can be individuated by their 
content (e.g., Prinz, 2002). Then, the claim in question amounts to the following: when 
an interoceptive percept is formed, it constitutes positive valence in case it represents 
positive physiological changes, and it constitutes negative valence in case it represents 
negative physiological changes. Remember that physiological changes can be taken to 
be positive or negative, according to whether they tend to shift in a certain way. 
Physiological changes can be taken to be positive or negative, according to whether 
they tend to approach or deviate from the aimed-at regulatory level of homeostasis 
maintenance, respectively. Thus, (dis)pleasure informs us about how we are faring in 
dealing with the hard-wired goal of maintaining homeostasis (keeping ‘surprisal’ low). 
 
Note that this is an individuation claim, not a claim about what accounts for the 
qualitative character of (dis)pleasure. That is, the claim is that when an interoceptive 
percept is formed, it counts as positive valence/pleasure (negative valence/displeasure) 
in case it represents physiological changes that approach (deviates from) homeostasis. 
The claim in question is not a version of a representationalist approach to phenomenal 
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consciousness (e.g., Byrne, 2001; Dretske, 1995; Harman, 1990; Lycan, 1987; Tye, 
1995) as applied to valence/(dis)pleasure—i.e., valence/(dis)pleasure feels the way it 
feels because it has homeostatically relevant physiological changes as its content34. 
Now, contrary to the way the notion of ‘content’ (as applied to (dis)pleasure) is 
understood in some representationalist quarters (e.g., Bain, 2013), I do not take the 
notion of ‘content’ as demanding that the subject has “personal-level” access to it. 
Very roughly, by ‘content’ I refer to the familiar notion that plays an explanatory role 
in the cognitive sciences, where mental states consist in computational states which 
are said to possess certain representational properties or content. That is, by ‘content’ 
I mean “sub-personal” informational content. 
 
6.3. Motivating the claim 
 
The claim in question is then committed to three main tenets. Firstly, it holds that 
valence amounts to an interoceptive percept. This might be called the interoception 
tenet. Secondly, ITV’s claim holds that, consequently, valence has content. Let’s call 
this the content tenet. Thirdly, it holds that such content amounts to physiological 
changes than can be either positive or negative, given homeostatic standards. That is, 
valence informs us about our homeostatic, physiological condition. Let’s call this the 
homeostasis tenet. Let me motivate these tenets.  
 
6.3.1. Motivating ‘the interoception tenet’ 
 
The claim that (dis)pleasure amounts to an interoceptive percept is motivated by the 
following platitude: (dis)pleasure can be felt. That is, (dis)pleasure can take place in 
phenomenal consciousness. As I commented above, phenomenal consciousness is 
populated by nothing over and above percepts. Therefore, (dis)pleasure must be a 
percept of some sort. Intuitively, (dis)pleasure is not grounded in vision, audition, nor 
                                                             
34 For a representationalist theory of the phenomenal character of (dis)pleasure, see Bain (2003).  
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in any exteroceptive modality. It is also not grounded in motor/proprioceptive 
representations. The best candidate seems to be interoception, i.e., the perception of 
our own bodily changes.  
 
This intuition is not only supported by common sense—every time we undergo a 
distinctively clear experience of pleasure our body is found to be reacting in different 
ways—but it is also shared by scientific practice. For example, as the psychologist and 
cognitive scientists L.F. Barrett remarks: “affective properties such as pleasure, 
displeasure and arousal — which are thought to be rooted in interoception — are 
fundamental properties of conscious experience” (Italics are mine) (Barrett, 2015, 
p.425). This intuition is also indirectly supported by various established facts. For 
example, in the literature on the psychophysics of music experience, piloerection, 
which consistently occurs driven by certain physiological changes, is used as a 
standard, reliable measure of pleasure (Guhn et al., 2007; Konečni, Wanic, & Brown, 
2007). Moreover, meta-analytic studies show that patterns of physiological changes 
consistently configure for pleasure and displeasure under certain experimental 
conditions (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Lang et al., 1993), which supports the idea that 
representations of such physiological changes (i.e., interoceptive percepts) are suitable 
candidates for constituting positive and negative valence. Then, by observing (under 
certain conditions) the pattern of physiological changes that a subject is undergoing, it 
is possible, in principle, to predict whether she is having pleasure or displeasure. Also 
supporting the intuition in question, using fMRI, Critchley and colleagues (Critchley 
et al., 2004) measured brain activity during interoceptive performance—as measured 
by a heartbeat detection task—and rated subject’s affective experiences. They found 
that the right anterior insula is not only key for the experience of bodily changes, but 
it also grounds a representation of physiological changes that realize pleasant and 
unpleasant feelings:  
 
“The observed interrelationship among right anterior insula activity, interoceptive 
accuracy and subjective negative emotional experience supports the proposal that 
affective feeling states reflect information concerning bodily responses represented in 
right anterior insula” (Craig et al., 2004, p. 193). 
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Considering that the insula is key for realizing interoceptive percepts, the hypothesis 
that (dis)pleasure is constituted by interoceptive percepts predicts that insula 
activation, and consequently interoceptive performance, should be found to be good a 
predictor of whether a subject is undergoing a valenced state. Critchley and colleagues’ 
study support this prediction.  
 
On the other hand, after insula damage, tobacco addicts become tobacco-anhedonics 
(Navqi & Bechara, 2010). Considering that the insula is a key region for the realization 
of interoceptive percepts, this fact supports the idea that (dis)pleasure is constituted by 
percepts in the interoceptive system. Relatedly, if valence is constituted by an 
interoceptive percept, and valence is an essential component of emotion, then, the 
anterior insula, which is key in realizing interoceptive percepts (Section 3.1.5. and 
3.3.4), should be consistently activated during emotions. This is precisely what 
evidence suggests (e.g., Murphy et al., 2003).  
 
Moreover, it has been shown that autonomic measures such cardiac activity, heart rate, 
blood pressure, and skin conductance duration reflect affective valence, rather than 
simply sympathetic activation (Cacioppo et al., 2000) (see Chapter 1). Also the startle 
response indicates valence (Mauss & Robinson, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the so-called ‘homeostatic motivations’ or ‘drives’, such as for 
example, hunger, thirst and orgasm, are intrinsically (un)pleasant experiences. Indeed, 
they are the most primitive, fundamental cases of (dis)pleasure. Crucially, they are 
exhaustively constituted by dedicated perceptual representations in the interoceptive 
system. So the pleasantness of those experiences does not seem to be dependent on 
other kind of perceptual representations. Having already excluded the possibility that 
valence is something extra-bodily, some sort of non-sensory signal that “attaches” to 
interoceptive representations (Section 5.4. above)—making thus the latter something 
that matters for the agent (something that feels good or bad)—it seems then that 
(dis)pleasure must be grounded in interoception alone. 
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6.3.2. Motivating ‘the content tenet’ 
 
The claim that (dis)pleasure is a content-involving mental state might strike some as 
rather unintuitive. This is because some might have the impression that there is an 
important respect in which standard perceptual states—which clearly have content—
and hedonic states differ35. That is, contrary to, for example, visual and auditive 
perceptual states, hedonic experiences seem to be responses to representations of 
objects and events, rather than themselves representations that inform us about the 
properties of objects and events. In other words, whereas vision has obvious objective 
contents (e.g., colours, shapes, textures, faces, etc.), it is very hard to see what is being 
represented by hedonic experiences—see Block (1995, p. 234); McGinn (1982, p. 8), 
O’Shaughnessy (1980, pp. 169-70). After all, when someone has an orgasm, it does 
not seem that she is representing things external to the mind to be in a certain way, in 
the same way as it occurs in the case when someone activates ORGASM or sees 
someone having an orgasm. The pleasure we undergo during an orgasm does not seem 
to be informing us about anything, it seems to simply occur as a free-floating 
experience that merely “glosses” the content-involving experiences that it 
accompanies, such as the experience of muscle contractions. 
 
However, as I discussed above (Sections 3.1.2. and 3.1.7.), perceptual systems 
represent. Therefore, the claim that (dis)pleasure has content directly follows from the 
claim that (dis)pleasure is a perceptual representation in a dedicated input system, 
namely, the interoceptive system. Then, if the latter claim is the case (i.e., the 
interoception tenet), the claim in question should look more than tempting, even 
though the content of hedonic experiences is not obvious in the way that the content 
of other mental states are.  
 
                                                             
35 By ‘standard perceptual states’ I simply refer to the (online) perceptual states that take place in the 
sensory modalities typically discussed in the philosophical literature, e.g., vision.  
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Certainly, this is an assumption that still needs to be more thoroughly justified. 
However, the idea that (dis)pleasure is a content-involving mental state looks also 
tempting for reasons independent from the claim that (dis)pleasure amounts to an 
interoceptive representation. 
 
Firstly, all experiences have associated contents, think of vision, audition, olfaction, 
etc. Then, it seems arbitrary to exclude (dis)pleasure from the class of content-
involving mental states that can be experienced36.  
 
Secondly, the view that (dis)pleasure has content straightforwardly makes sense of the 
platitude that pleasure and displeasure are opposites: they are opposites since they have 
opposite contents. On the account on offer, such contents amount to positive and 
negative physiological changes.  Then the opposition in question is due to the 
uncontroversial opposition between the latter polarities: the positivity and negativity 
that physiological changes can take given homeostatic standards. In other words, the 
polarity characteristic of pleasure and displeasure is inherited from the more 
fundamental polarity between positive and negative physiological changes. On the 
other hand, the view that takes (dis)pleasure to be a “free-floating” mental state seems 
to lack a way of straightforwardly making sense of this phenomenon.    
 
Thirdly, related to the point above, as Schroeder (2004) remarks, if we take 
(dis)pleasure to be a content-involving mental state, we can readily make sense of the 
fact that the opposite states of pleasure and displeasure do not occur simultaneously 
(or that it is extremely rare that that occurs). They generally cancel each other out: the 
displeasure of being hungry stops as the pleasure of eating takes place; the pleasure of 
live music stops as the displeasure of having to go to the toilet begins. The 
representational view readily makes sense of this: Given that pleasure and displeasure 
inform us about contradictory events (i.e., they have contradictory contents), and that 
                                                             
36 See Schroeder (2001, pp. 510-511) for a similar line of reasoning.  
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the mind avoids simultaneously entertaining mutually inconsistent pairs of 
representations, it is expected that simultaneously having pleasure and displeasure 
should not occur (or that that should be extremely rare). In turn, the view that 
(dis)pleasure is a “free-floating” mental state that merely results as a response to 
mental states that do have content has no resources to account for this sort of mutual 
inhibition (more on this below).   
 
Fourthly, common sense acknowledges that certain instances of (dis)pleasure are not 
proper instances of (dis)pleasure, but rather “false (dis)pleasures”. For example, the 
pleasure induced by recreational drugs such as MDMA; or pain in a phantom limb; or 
the pleasure induced by a neurosurgeon that electrically stimulates the brain of a 
patient; or the case of a hungry, hypnotized subject that, automatically responding to 
the instructions of the hypnotist, experiences displeasure after tasting her favourite 
food. That is, common sense recognizes the existence of hedonic illusions. 
Considering that illusions are uncontroversially characterized as involving 
misrepresentation, the view that (dis)pleasure is a content-involving mental state is 
especially well-suited to account for the existence of hedonic illusions (or to put it 
more strongly, it seems to be the only type of view able to make sense of hedonic 
illusions).  
 
Finally, if we take (dis)pleasure to be a content-involving mental state, we can readily 
explain the rationality typically involved in hedonic experiences. Hedonic experiences 
can be said to be rational in the sense that they provide us with reasons for action. 
More precisely, given that it is good to have pleasure and bad to have displeasure, 
those hedonic states provide us with good reasons for seeking and avoidance 
behaviours, respectively. Consequently, you can properly justify your trying yet 
another bite of pizza in terms of the pleasure that it brings you, i.e., in terms of the 
reason you had to act in such a way. If (dis)pleasure is a mental state that lacks content, 
it is hard to see how it can provide a reason that informs action by interacting in a 
logically relevant way with other metal states that we take to have contents, such as 
beliefs, desires and intentions. To put it in other words, experience puts epistemic 
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constrains on belief and action (or intentions): if you see a dog on the tree, you are 
justified in forming the belief that there is a dog on the tree, but you are not justified 
in forming the belief that there is a cat on the tree. In the latter case, you are not so 
justified since the content of your visual experience logically differs in relevant 
respects from the content of your belief. Similarly, in the pizza case above, the pleasure 
that it causes you does not provide you with a reason for avoiding another slice (or 
intending to avoid another slice)—but it does provide with a reason for having another 
slice (or intending to have another slice)—since pleasure represents certain events as 
good, and you intent (we can safely assume) what you take to be good.  Certainly, the 
view that (dis)pleasure is a “free-floating” mental item that “attaches” to content-
involving mental states can easily accommodate the sort of rationality exhibited by 
(dis)pleasure—e.g., by holding that (dis)pleasure provides us with reasons only insofar 
as it “attaches” to truly content involving mental states. However, taken together, the 
above considerations strongly suggest that, as any other mental state that can populate 
phenomenal consciousness, (dis)pleasure also has content.  
 
6.3.3. Motivating the ‘homeostasis tenet’ 
 
So what is being represented by valence/(dis)pleasure? Considering that I identify 
valence/(dis)pleasure with interoceptive percepts, I am committed to the view that 
valence/(dis)pleasure represents what interoceptive percepts represent, namely, 
positive and negative physiological changes (see Section 3.1. above). This could sound 
a bit odd to some ears, after all when we introspect during an episode of pleasure, we 
do not seem to be aware that our physiology is changing in a homeostatically positive 
direction. We just feel good37. Compare this to visual experience. When we introspect 
during vision, we are not only aware of the content of our percepts, but their content 
                                                             
37 Certainly, we feel good about the external trigger of our pleasure. You are stressed and suddenly 
run into a beautiful landscape, so you now feel good, in a certain sense, about that. However, note that 
this aboutness does not imply that the content of your experience of pleasure amounts to the external 
stimulus that contributed to trigger your hedonic state, i.e., the beautiful landscape. In this case, the 
beautiful landscape is the content of the visual experience that accompanies your hedonic state and 
that contributed to trigger the latter.  
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can be immediately and readily spelled out (at least roughly): if you introspect during 
a visual experience of a dog, you are readily aware that there is a dog in front of you. 
Even though there is no need for informational content to be accessible in that way, 
from a pre-theoretical point of view it does look introspectively odd to claim that, 
unlike other kinds of experience, (dis)pleasure has as its content such an unfamiliar 
and abstract-sounding content. Perhaps, the worry goes, (dis)pleasure, if any, exhibits 
then a less odd sort of content. 
 
However, leaving pre-theoretical intuitions aside, interoceptive percepts only 
represent homeostatically positive and negative physiological changes (Section 3.1.). 
Thus, if the view that (dis)pleasure amounts to an interoceptive percept holds, 
(dis)pleasure should have this sort of “abstract-sounding” content. Interestingly, as we 
will see below, several reasons point towards the claim that valence/(dis)pleasure does 
represents homeostatically positive and negative physiological changes. In fact, 
contrary to the pre-theoretical worry above, this claim turns out to be quite intuitive.    
 
The homeostasis tenet is motivated by four main considerations. Firstly, at least since 
Plato and Aristotle, this claim has been a default view in the affective sciences, not yet 
truly dismissed by naturalistically inclined approaches. For example, Plato, in the 
Philebus, held that pleasure arises when one perceives (aisthēsis) the replenishment of 
a lack to a state of natural balance. Think of, for instance, the pleasure that you get 
when you are thirsty and drink water. Even though Aristotle (De Sensu) thought that 
Plato’s view did not generalize—since cases such as the pleasure of smelling a flower 
do not seem to be cases that depend on any sort of replenishment in Plato’s sense—he 
did recognized the existence of pleasures that are indeed contingent on inner 
physiological states. In these cases, just as in Plato’s view, pleasure arises when the 
cause of a pleasant sensation achieves to restore physiological balance. Fechner (1873) 
also exploited the insight that physiological balance is key for understanding 
(dis)pleasure. Taking into account the Mayer-Helmholtz principle of conservation of 
energy, Fechner held that when an organism’s physiological system excessively 
increases its energy levels (given a certain set-point), a physiological imbalance takes 
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place, which needs to be rectified so as to keep the organism within its limits of 
viability. According to Fechner, the physiological imbalance implied by an excess of 
energy gives rise to displeasure, and the return to balance implied by the dissipation 
of energy gives rise to pleasure. Most famously, these insights are further developed 
by the psychophysiologist Michel Cabanac (1971, 1979). Aware of the dependency 
relation between pleasure and the physiological usefulness of the stimulus in 
maintaining homeostatic balance, Cabanac put forward the notion of alliesthesia. The 
latter describes the common-sensical, and scientifically well-established phenomenon 
that, given a certain type of stimulus that is held constant, the polarity of affect changes 
as a function of the previous physiological condition of the organism’s body: the same 
degree of heat can give rise to pleasure or displeasure as a function of the organism’s 
current core temperature (see Cabanac, 1971, 1979; Panskepp, 1998) (more on this 
below). According to these views, (dis)pleasure is constitutively dependent on 
(represented) homeostatic usefulness.    
 
Considering (dis)pleasure as constitutively dependent on (represented) homeostatic 
usefulness has been a default view in biological approaches to (dis)pleasure (see, e.g., 
Panskepp, 1998), and in early philosophical approaches to affective phenomena. This 
view has proven to be experimentally productive in its most recent versions. This, and 
the fact that it is a default view, suggests that the link between (dis)pleasure and 
homeostatic usefulness is by no means arbitrary, and that the close connection between 
(dis)pleasure and homeostatic usefulness might turn out to show that homeostatic 
usefulness is that to which (dis)pleasure responds, if philosophical inquiry develops 
further. This kind of view is then worth exploring, and careful philosophical discussion 
is certainly needed. However, the kind of view in question has practically not taken 
part in philosophical discussion (outside ancient philosophy), probably because it has 
not yet been put forward explicitly in the philosophy of mind, where naturalistic 
approaches to its affective dimension are still rare.  I think this kind of view can be 




Secondly, as I mentioned above, basic (dis)pleasures strongly suggest that there is a 
direct causal relation between homeostatic usefulness and (dis)pleasure, a 
phenomenon known as alliesthesia. By ‘basic (dis)pleasures’ I simply refer to those 
(dis)pleasures that are typically assumed to be shared with other mammals, such as the 
(dis)pleasures of eating, drinking, copulating, pain, hunger, thirst, etc. Basic 
displeasures are the kind of (dis)pleasures for which most scientific research has been 
conducted (likely because they can be operationalized without much difficulty, and 
they can be studied in some detail by carrying out invasive interventions in non-human 
animals). As I mentioned above, alliesthesia consists in the scientifically well-
established phenomenon that, given a certain type of stimulus that is held constant, the 
polarity of affect changes as a function of the evolving physiological condition of the 
organism’s body. In other words, alliesthesia amounts to the process by which the 
current homeostatic condition of the body determines the (un)pleasantness of 
incoming stimuli, insofar as such stimuli modify the organism’s physiological 
landscape (Cabanac, 1971, 1979). As Cabanac puts it: “when the milieu intérieur 
varies, pleasure changes according to the stimulus usefulness for the body.” (Cabanac, 
2010, p.117). By ‘usefulness’ it is meant here physiological homeostatic utility. So the 
basic idea is that certain stimuli cause pleasure in case they re-establish homeostasis, 
while certain stimuli cause displeasure in case they diminish homeostatic balance. 
Alliesthesia is a robust phenomenon for all sorts of basic pleasures, including sex and 
affective touch (see e.g., Beauchamp & Cowart, 1985; Berridge et al., 1984; Cabanac, 
1971; Gottfried et al., 2003; Jacobs et al., 1988; Johnson, 2007; LaBar et al., 2001; 
McCaughey & Tordoff, 2002; McCaughey et al., 2005; Panksepp, 1998; Rolls et al., 
1981). For example, induced hypoglycaemia and induced hypoglucy (via insulin and 
2-deoxyglucose administration, respectively) increases pleasure for sweet food; while 
after consuming sugar, sweet stimuli become less pleasant (Cabanac et al., 1968; 
Cabanac & Duclaux, 1970). Moreover, after immersing a hypothermic subject in a 
warm bath, and thus changing her condition to a hyperthermic state, warm stimuli 
previously experienced by the subject as pleasant become unpleasant, and cold stimuli 
previously experienced by the subject as unpleasant become pleasant. On the other 
hand, when a subject is immersed in a cool bath, and consequently deep body 
temperature drops, cold stimuli are progressively experienced by the subject as 
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unpleasant, while warm stimuli are experienced as pleasant (Bleichert et al., 1973; 
Cabanac, 1971; Cunningham & Cabanac, 1971). Interestingly, once a physiological 
disturbance that gives rise to pain begins to be rectified, so that the pain experience 
vanishes, pleasure takes place. That is, relief from pain, just as the relief from cold, 
itch, hunger and thirst, involves pleasure. This is exactly what is expected if pleasure 
arises as a physiological imbalance is rectified (or, more precisely, as a representation 
of such physiological replenishment is activated) (Andreatta et al. 2010; Grill & 
Coghill 2002; Leknes & Bastian, 2014; Seymour et al. 2005). Examples like these 
abound in the literature on ‘basic pleasures’. In fact, as Panksepp puts it, “one can 
readily predict the affective consequences of various external stimuli in humans from 
a knowledge of bodily imbalances” (Panksepp, 1998, p.181). In a word, the 
phenomenon of alliesthesia strongly suggests that (dis)pleasure informs us about the 
homeostatic usefulness of a stimulus (see also Veldhuizen et al., 2010)—i.e., about the 
homeostatic impact that some stimulus has in the inner milieu (the nature of the 
stimulus thus being irrelevant).  
 
Thirdly, at least in the case of ‘basic (dis)pleasures’, (dis)pleasure’s evolutionary 
function is likely to be the fostering of homeostatically useful behaviour by monitoring 
homeostatically relevant physiological changes. Considering that, according to 
naturalistic approaches to content (e.g., Dretske, 1981, 1986), the function of a mental 
state is critical for fixing its content, this also suggests that (dis)pleasure signals 
homeostatic usefulness (more on this below).  
 
(Dis)pleasure is likely to have a function, rather than being a mere evolutionary by-
product. As K.C. Berridge remarks:  
 
“Brain evolution cannot afford to wastefully dispense the massive amounts of neural 
machinery that process pleasure on major psychological processes that have no fitness 
benefit. It is difficult to imagine an evolutionary scenario that would have led to such 
prominent and similar limbic brains in so many species if pleasure were not adaptive.” 




So (dis)pleasure is likely to have a function. Now, taking into account the discussion 
on ‘basic pleasures’ above, the function of (dis)pleasure seems to be guiding behaviour 
by signalling which stimuli and actions promote or threaten the viability of the 
organism (and the organism’s group, in the case of social animals). In order to keep 
itself within its limits of viability, the most fundamental task an organism needs to 
solve consists in optimally maintaining its physiological functioning. In this regard, 
during decision-making, (dis)pleasure likely informs about how the organism is faring 
in achieving this hard-wired goal. That is, (dis)pleasure informs about the impact that 
stimuli and actions have for survival, i.e., the impact that they have for the 
physiological, homeostatic condition of the body. In this sense, pleasure can be seen 
as providing a sense of relief or accomplishment relative to a certain homeostatic goal, 
allowing thus the re-allocation of attention, and cognitive and motivational resources 
to other goals: once you have satisfied your hunger, you can keep writing that paper 
(see also Carver & Scheier 1990; Carver 2003). This view is certainly hard to establish, 
as it is the case with many evolutionary hypotheses. However, it is worth noting that 
this claim, namely, that the evolutionary function of pleasure consists in signalling 
progress relative to homeostatic goals, so as to guide survival behaviour, is a default 
view in affective sciences (see Kringelbach & Berridge (eds)., 2010, p. 13-14). This 
claim should not then come as a controversial tenet.  
 
Finally, naturalistic theories of content suggest that, if any, homeostatic, physiological 
changes should be the content of paradigmatic cases of (dis)pleasure (i.e., ‘basic 
(dis)pleasures). According to naturalistic theories of content (e.g., Dretske, 1981, 
1986), a mental state C represents c in virtue of the fact that c causally co-varies with 
C in a reliable fashion, and has the function (by evolutionary or learning history) of 
causally co-varying in that way. Therefore, in order to show that paradigmatic cases 
of (dis)pleasure have as content homeostatic, physiological changes it needs to be 
shown (a) that the latter causally co-vary with the former, and (b) that (dis)pleasure 
has the function of doing so. The phenomenon of alliesthesia discussed above shows 
that (a) obtains, and the considerations above regarding the evolutionary functions of 
(dis)pleasure—i.e., tracking homeostatic states—suggests that (b) also obtains.  
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On the other hand, let me insist on this point, if (dis)pleasure amounts to an 
interoceptive percept (the interoception tenet), then (dis)pleasure has the content that 
interoceptive percepts have. As we saw above (Section 6.3.2.), such content amounts 
to physiological changes that can be either positive or negative, given homeostatic 
standards. Now, it could still be the case that interoceptive percepts, besides 
representing positive and negative homeostatic changes, represent also distal, external 
properties and events (see also Section 4.4.1.). Prinz (2004) argues for this view: 
interoceptive percepts besides proximally representing physiological changes, they 
also distally represent core relational themes. However, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 
4, that view is rather problematic. Therefore, if (dis)pleasure is constituted by an 
interoceptive percepts, it represents only positive and negative physiological changes.  
 
Let me briefly digress. Note that this does not imply that interoceptive percepts, 
understood in this way, cannot be associated with representations of external events 
via learning. Thus, it might be the case that when a represented external event is 
associated with an interoceptive percept that informs about a negative (positive) 
homeostatic state, such an external event is taken to be negative (positive) (decision-
making likely operates along these lines). In this sense, interoceptive percepts can say 
to agents “this external thing is bad (good)”. It could be argued, then, that interoceptive 
percepts, in some sense, inform the agent about those aspect of the external world 
which are good or bad. However, note that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fall short of constituting 
core relations themes (‘demeaning offenses’, ‘dangers’, ‘transgressions’, ‘losses’, 
etc.). Thus, interoceptive percepts do not constitute by themselves emotions per se, 
which inform about core relational themes (Chapter 1). End of digression.  
 
Finally, it is worth also taking into account that even though the claim that 
(dis)pleasure represents, or informs about homeostatic changes is rather a 
philosophical claim, it is usually explicitly maintained outside philosophy. For 
example, Panksepp holds that “pleasure indicates something is biologically useful” 
(Panksepp, 1998, p.182) (italics are mine); and Cabanac claims that “sensory pleasure 
is both the sign of the presence of a useful stimulus and also the motivation (or drive) 
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[…]” (Cabanac, 1979, p. 2) (italics are mine). Also Craig remarks that “feelings from 
the body in humans reflect its homeostatic condition” (Craig, 2015, p. 177).  
 
Corns (2014) claims that the homeostatic view on the nature of pleasure cannot 
account for all sorts of pleasures, because there are types of pleasures that do not seem 
to have homeostatically specified ‘desired’ levels. Insofar as there are, let’s say, 
‘desired’ glucose levels, the homeostatic restitution of glucose by eating can certainly 
account for the pleasure of eating. However, the argument goes, insofar as there are no 
music levels, the homeostatic view cannot account for the pleasure of music (and the 
like).  
 
Even though this argument looks intuitive at first sight, it is not very compelling. 
Remember that the homeostatic system has a network-like nature (Section 3.1.9.). That 
is, homeostasis does not operate in a “thermostat-like” fashion: single, segregated 
variables (e.g., glucose) each being separately regulated to a certain static built-in 
value. Rather, during homeostasis, once a local physiological change relative to a 
certain variable takes place, cascading changes are triggered in the activity of many 
variables and effectors all over the body landscape, which mutually constrain each 
other in a network-like fashion. This, in order to maintain an adaptive whole-body 
physiological state. Now, music causes physiological changes. For example, changes 
in heart-rate in line with the tempo of music (e.g., Edworthy & Waring, 2010; 
Karageorghis et al., 2006; Trappe, 2010). Given the network-like nature of 
homeostasis, those physiological changes can trigger compensatory changes in several 
physiological variables and effectors (e.g., blood circulation and temperature). In 
certain contexts, the resulting body landscape can result adaptive or maladaptive, 
having thus a homeostatic impact. For example, in certain kinds of contexts, achieving 
certain heart-rate levels is adaptive, given the task at hand: When an agent needs to be 
particularly active, in need to engage in physical action, increased heart-rate levels 
result adaptive. Think of the case of running or cleaning the flat. In these cases, people 
enjoy listening to up-tempo music, and slow-tempo music results annoying. The 
opposite also seems to be the case. When an agent needs to rest after excessive activity, 
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slow-tempo music is enjoyable, but up-tempo music is annoying. The pleasure of 
music, at least in these cases, does seem to have its basis on homeostatic processes 
(see Edworthy & Waring, 2010; Karageorghis et al., 2006). Even more, as Habibi and 
Damasio have compelling showed, the pleasure of music seems to have its basis on 
homeostasis in general, not only in the above cases (Habibi & Damasio, 2014). Even 
in the less intuitive case, namely, the pleasure of sad music, the pleasure of music 
seems to have its basis on homeostasis (Sachs et al., 2015). Music does seem to play a 
homeostatic role. The point raised by Corns certainly requires much more discussion. 
Taking into account that the topic of this Thesis is not the nature of pleasure, I leave 
that discussion for another occasion, as it demands a longer, dedicated treatment.  
 
It has also been argued that (dis)pleasure cannot amount to bodily perception, because 
cases such as skydiving suggest that the same physiological changes (those that 
skydiving supposedly typically triggers) occur in both, someone who enjoys the 
experience, and in someone who dislikes the experience (Schroeder, 2004).  
 
As we saw in Section 5.4.1., regarding the PP account of some aspects of placebo 
hypoalgesia, the PP framework has the resources to straightforwardly reply to this sort 
of objection. As we saw, in the PP framework, the same input from the body can give 
rise to different kinds of percepts, depending on different assignments of precision-
weighting. Thus, given different high-level expectations about valence value, different 
‘portions’ of the incoming interoceptive PE are attended and ignored, given the 
different assignment of precisions which such different expectations determine. This 
results in different interoceptive percepts of the physiological, homeostatic condition 
of the organism, just as we saw regarding placebo hypoalgesia (see Section 5.4.1.). 
Thus, cases such skydiving are no threat for a PP-based interoceptive view on the 
nature of valence.   
 
Finally, it could also be argued that subjects can represent their bodily, physiological 
state without having a valenced state. Thus, the argument goes, interoceptive percepts 
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do not constitute valence. For example, someone can perceive her heart raising, but 
feel neither good nor bad. Or, to give a more typical example, someone can perceive 
tissue damage without feeling bad (pain asymbolia). This is certainly the case. 
However, this fact does not imply that interoceptive percepts formed via interoceptive 
perceptual inference do not constitute valence. In the view suggested in this Chapter, 
interoceptive percepts represent whole-body positive/negative physiological changes. 
Remember that whole-body positive/negative physiological changes are represented at 
higher levels of the interoceptive hierarchy (Section 3.1.5.). A key interoceptive high-
level region is the anterior insula. As I mentioned in Section 3.3.4., it is hypothesized 
that the anterior insula functions as a comparator between expected and incoming 
interoceptive signals, during interoceptive percept formation, among other functions 
(Seth et al., 2011). In other words, the anterior insula functions as an interoceptive PE 
calculator module. To put it colloquially, this region is key then for telling the system 
“this whole-body physiological landscape deviates from (approaches) the expectation 
of homeostasis”. Thus, it is only after this comparison has taken place that 
interoceptive percepts get to represent bodily changes which are positive or negative, 
given homeostatic standards. As I discussed in this Chapter, this is the sort of content 
that matters for constituting valence. Then, it is certainly the case that bodily changes 
can get to be represented without the latter being represented as positive/negative in 
that sense. This occurs at lower levels of the interoceptive hierarchy (e.g., in the mid-
insula, see Craig, 2015). In this case, the comparison between expected and incoming 
interoceptive signals has not taken place at the relevant hierarchical level, which 
occurs in the anterior insula. However, the claim defended in this Chapter is that 
represented bodily changes constitute valence, only insofar as they are represented as 
positive or negative, given the high-level expectation of homeostasis maintenance.  
 
To sum up, several reasons motivate the three main commitments of the claim that 
(dis)pleasure consists in an interoceptive percept that informs us about how we are 
faring in dealing with the hard-wired goal of maintaining homeostasis (keeping 
‘surprisal’ low). Firstly, the fact that (dis)pleasure is a mental state that can be felt 
strongly suggests that (dis)pleasure must be a percept of some sort, and the best 
candidate seems to be a percept in the interoceptive system (the interoception tenet). 
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This intuition is also supported by certain strands of empirical evidence. Secondly, 
contrary to what might be initially thought, that fact also suggests that (dis)pleasure is 
a content-involving mental state (the content tenet), since percepts typically have 
content. The content tenet is also suggested from the fact that all experiences have 
content, and from the fact that this tenet makes sense of key platitudes regarding 
(dis)pleasure: the platitude that pleasure and displeasure are opposites, that there are 
“false” (dis)pleasures, and that hedonic states exhibit a certain rationality. Finally, the 
tenet that the content of (dis)pleasure amounts to homeostatically positive or negative 
physiological changes (the homeostasis tenet) is motivated by the following reasons. 
In the first place, historically speaking, holding that there is a direct causal relation 
between homeostatic usefulness and (dis)pleasure has been a default view in the 
affective sciences. This shows that endorsing such a link is by no means arbitrary. In 
the second place, the phenomenon of alliesthesia strongly suggests that there is indeed 
such a direct causal relation between homeostatic usefulness and (dis)pleasure, at least 
in the case of ‘basic (dis)pleasures’. In the third place, there are reasons that lead us to 
speculate that the evolutionary function of (dis)pleasure is precisely monitoring 
homeostatically relevant physiological changes so as to guide behaviour. Finally, 
naturalistic theories of content suggest that, if any, homeostatic, physiological changes 
should be the content of paradigmatic cases of (dis)pleasure.  
 
Taken together, these considerations strongly suggest the plausibility of the claim in 
question: when an interoceptive percept is formed, it constitutes positive 
valence/pleasure in case it represents homeostatically positive physiological changes, 
and it constitutes negative valence/displeasure in case it represents homeostatically 
negative physiological changes. Moreover, as we saw in Section 3.2., several strands 
of evidence points towards the claim that, during homeostatic regulation, interoceptive 
percepts are formed by a process that operates under the principles of PP. Certainly, I 
do not take these considerations as conclusive in any case. But they do show that the 
view defended in this Chapter is a plausible, tenable view, which can result 




Then, in the view defended in this Chapter—i.e., ITV— the valence properties which 
(partially) constitute emotion count as sensory, interoceptive representations of 
homeostatic changes. The above suggest that this view might be the case. However, as 
Prinz (2004, 2010) and others have argued, theories which identify valence with 
mental states that can be felt—e.g., (dis)pleasure/perceptual representations—face 
several problems. In the coming Section I will argue that such criticism is misguided. 
I will show that ITV can reply to the objections typically faced by this kind of views. 
Consequently, ITV constitutes itself as a promising view.  
 
6.4. Replying to objections 
 
The view on the nature of valence that emerges from the PP framework claims then 
that valence is a representation in a sensory system. According to ITV, the valence 
properties which (partially) constitute emotion count as sensory, interoceptive 
representations of homeostatic changes. Insofar as valence is taken to be a sensory 
representation, it is a mental state that can be felt. As I mentioned above, the claim that 
valence can be felt is typically put forward by views that identify valence with 
(dis)pleasure. In this sense, ITV is somehow committed to the view that valence is 
(dis)pleasure, at least in that respect. This is emphasized in the view on valence put 
forward by Joffly and Coricelli (2013, p.8). Thus, the view on valence that emerges 
from the PP framework can be taken to be a version of the hedonic theory of valence, 
which identifies valence with (dis)pleasure. However, as Prinz (2004, 2010) and others 
have argued, theories which identify valence with mental states that can be felt—e.g., 
(dis)pleasure/perceptual representations—face several problems. I discuss them 
below.  
 




Remember that ITV is somehow committed to the view that valence is (dis)pleasure, 
at least in the sense that it holds that valence can be felt, insofar as valence amounts to 
a sensory, interoceptive representation. Thus, ITV also counts as a version of the 
hedonic theory of valence, so ITV is also target of the objections raised against this 
kind of view. 
 
Firstly, it has been argued that hedonic theories of valence, or theories that hold that 
valence is a felt component part of emotion, do not satisfy the scope desideratum. This 
desideratum states that all clear cases of emotion should exhibit the property or 
mechanism that is proposed as accounting for valence. It has been argued that these 
views do not satisfy the scope desideratum, since not all positive or negative emotions 
are pleasant or unpleasant, feel good or bad, respectively. For example, it has been 
claimed that it is not clear in what way a negative emotion like anger involves 
displeasure (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, p. 15).  
 
I do not think that such an intuition poses a real challenge to ITV. I am not convinced 
by it. Try as I may, I cannot remember any time I felt anger without also feeling 
hedonically bad at the same time. A bit of experimental philosophy could solve this 
point. Nonetheless, intuitions about cases won’t let us go far. The issue is not about 
the folk concept of positive and negative emotions; it is about valence as a natural 
kind. Anyway, ITV does not need to commit to the strong claim that all emotion types 
have a distinctive ‘hedonic tone’, either pleasure or displeasure, a good or bad feeling. 
ITV only needs to be committed to the weaker claim that every time an emotion takes 
place it has valence, be it positive (pleasure), negative (displeasure), or mixed (both 
pleasure and displeasure). Then, it could be the case that sometimes anger is negatively 
valenced and other times positively valenced (or has a mixed valence), which could 






6.4.2. Not all negative (or positive) emotions feel the same 
 
Secondly, it has been argued on phenomenological grounds that ITV fails satisfy the 
scope desideratum in another way. It has been argued that negative valence cannot be 
identical to the feeling of displeasure, because not all negative emotions feel the 
same.38 Negative emotions, it is argued, feel bad in different ways, so they cannot share 
a common felt aspect, namely, the specific ‘hedonic tone’ of displeasure (Prinz, 2010; 
Solomon, 2003). There seems that negative emotions do not have “a common 
phenomenological denominator” (Prinz, 2010, p.7). Therefore, the feeling of 
displeasure cannot be present in the many different negatively valenced emotions. 
Displeasure cannot be identical to negative valence. In other words, the wide variation 
in the way in which negative (or positive) feelings feel indicates that they do not share 
a common perceived felt aspect, namely, negative (or positive) valence. Thus, valence 
is not something perceptual, i.e., something that can be felt. 
 
This objection is quite compelling. However, it could only work if ITV were 
committed to the following two claims: 
 
(a) The phenomenology of an emotion is exhausted by its valence 
component. 
 
 (b) Displeasure consists in a single type of distinctive, narrowly 
circumscribed feeling, which is the exact same type of narrowly 
circumscribed feeling across every instance of any negative emotion.   
 
                                                             




If the phenomenology of an emotion is exhausted by its valence component (which is 
identified with an interoceptive percept or (dis)pleasure by ITV)—(a)—and 
displeasure amounts to just one type of narrowly circumscribed feeling—(b)—one can 
certainly conclude that variations in the phenomenology of negative emotions 
undermines the hypothesis that negative valence is the feeling of displeasure. 
However, ITV does not need to be committed neither to (a) nor to (b). Let me begin 
with (b).  
 
6.4.2.1. Displeasure is a circumscribed, uniform feeling 
 
The claim that negative valence consists in an interoceptive percept tout court or to 
displeasure tout court, and that all negative emotions have such a percept or 
displeasure as a component, is distinct from the much stronger claim (b) above. That 
is, the claim that negative valence consists in a single, narrowly circumscribed type of 
interoceptive percept or displeasure, and that such single, narrowly circumscribed type 
of percept or displeasure is shared by all instances of negative emotions. ITV needs 
only be committed to the first, weaker claim. 
 
To put it this way, (b) is analogous to the quite implausible claim, (b’), that the 
experience of red that is a component part of our visual experiences of mammalian 
blood is the exact same type of narrowly circumscribed experience across every 
instance of the visual experience of mammalian blood, let’s say, the experience of 
red24: when one visually experiences dog blood in contexts c1, c2, and cn, the 
experience of red involved in such an experience is the experience of red24; when one 
experiences cat blood in contexts c1, c2, and cn, the experience of red involved in such 
an experience is also the experience of red24, and so on. Such claim differs from the 
much weaker, plausible claim that, in normal conditions, every instance of the visual 
experience of mammalian blood has as a component the experience of red tout court. 
This allows that when one visually experiences blood samples from different mammals 
the experience of red involved in those experiences varies: in one case it could be red24, 
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in another case red27, in another case red22, and so on. In this latter case, even if it is 
the case that experience varies, the claim that the visual experience of mammalian 
blood has as a component the experience of red still holds. This analogy could be 
extended to other kinds of experience and to other modalities besides vision, mutatis 
mutandis. I see no reason why it should not also be extended to the case of the 
experience of displeasure, especially considering that, as ITV holds, displeasure or 
negative valence is grounded in a perceptual modality (interoception). Thus, even if it 
is the case that displeasure experiences varies across instances of negative emotions, 
the claim that negative valence consists in displeasure tout court still holds.  
 
On the other hand, if displeasure or negative valence amounts to an interoceptive 
representation, as ITV holds, variability in the experience of displeasure is actually to 
be expected. As I discussed in Section 3.1., interoceptive percepts bind together several 
physiological/interoceptive features. In other words, interoceptive percepts can be seen 
as an ‘amalgam’ of different physiological features. It is not implausible to suppose 
that in different occasions and contexts such an ‘amalgam’ will be composed of 
different homeostatic, physiological features (analogously to vision), changing thus 
the configuration of the percept that will eventually be experienced (for example, in 
certain occasions the interoceptive representation in question will have heart activity 
represented and in other occasions not). Thus, it is unlikely that the experience of 
displeasure is uniform in any way.      
 
In fact, this follows naturally from the PP framework. As I mentioned above, in the PP 
framework, the assessment of the precision of PE, which is identified with attention, 
occupies a central role in the whole PP inferential machine. Now, our expectations of 
precision depend on context. This implies that, during percept formation, and 
depending on context, the assignment of precision-weighting can differ within the 
same modality for different sensory features. Thus, ITV can straightforwardly explain 
the rich variation in our experience of positive (and negative) feelings by appealing to 
the context-dependent variation of precision-weighting for different sensory attributes 
during interoceptive percept formation. For example, let’s take the case of hunger, as 
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it is an uncontroversial case of an affective state grounded in interoception. Hunger 
involves a distinctive set of physiological changes. Among them, a decrease in blood 
sugar levels, a decrease in blood levels of amino acids, and the fluctuation of leptin 
and ghrelin hormone levels. Now, let’s say that you just played an especially tough 
football game. So, besides the physiological changes characteristic of hunger, a set of 
physiological changes relative to the usual injuries of sport are also taking place at the 
same time. For example, pain in your legs, increased heart-rate, and inflammation. 
However, given the time of the day, and all that energy expenditure during the game, 
the expectation that hungry should be taking place drives interoceptive percept 
formation. This implies that, on the one hand, precisions of interoceptive PE for the 
interoceptive attributes expected for the perceptual hypothesis of hunger are highly 
weighted. On the other hand, precisions of interoceptive PE relative to the features 
characteristic of pain in your legs, increased heart-rate, and inflammation are ignored 
to a certain extent. In other words, the latter interoceptive signals are not much 
attended; while the interoceptive signals relative to hunger are highly attended. 
However, let’s say that now you need to walk to the kitchen to make you a sandwich, 
even though you are hurt. Then, precisions of interoceptive PE relative to the features 
characteristic of pain in your legs, increased heart-rate, and inflammation it is inferred 
now to have high precision-weighting. These interoceptive attributes are now also 
highly attended and become salient. That is, your conscious perception of your inner 
milieu includes now such attributes in a more distinct fashion. Thus, during 
interoceptive perception, expectations of precisions determine which features become 
more salient. Thus, on the assumption that valence is constituted by an interoceptive 
percept, the wide variation in the way in which negative (or positive) feelings feel can 
also be accounted for by way of the context-sensitive, differentially weighted 
assignment of precisions during interoceptive percept formation.  
 
Furthermore, the PP framework offers another reply to the objection in question. 
Remember that PP proposes a hierarchical architecture of the mind. Perceptual systems 
are constituted by several levels of processing, in which one level attempts to predict 
the activity of the level below so as to minimize precision-weighted PE. Lower levels 
of the hierarchy encode regularities that operate at fast time-scales, which capture 
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variant aspects of experience. On the other hand, higher levels encode increasingly 
more complex regularities that operate at slow time-scales, which capture relatively 
more invariant aspects of experience. Interestingly, precisions can be differentially 
assigned at each level of the perceptual hierarchy. Thus, the same bounded 
interoceptive features that compose an interoceptive percept can be, depending on 
context, differentially attended. In this manner, bodily experience can exhibit some 
variation.  
 
6.4.2.2. The phenomenology of an emotion is exhausted by its valence component 
 
Let’s now consider (a), the claim that the phenomenology of an emotion is exhausted 
by its valence component. One might still not be convinced that ITV is not committed 
to (b). However, generally speaking, when one component of experience remains the 
same, while the other components vary, experience as a whole varies. Insofar as 
emotion is built out of components, being valence one of them, it is not implausible to 
suppose that the same goes for the experience of emotion. Thus, even if negative 
valence or displeasure is a uniform, narrowly circumscribed experience, it could still 
be the case that we experience negative emotions differently simply because the 
context in which they tend to arise varies, and, during emotions, represented aspects 
of such context are also experienced along with valence, which supposedly remains 
uniform. Among such contextual aspects one could include, for example, imagery 
associated to the thoughts that take place during emotions, imagery associated to 
episodic memories relative to previous emotional episodes, motor imagery associated 
to the simulation of actions for coping, etc. There is no reason that supports the claim 
that all that we experience during a certain emotion is only one of its many 
components, namely, valence (and certainly ITV does not need to commit to such a 
claim). Thus, negative emotions feel different because the experienced context in 
which they tend to arise varies, while their hedonic tone remains the same (if we have 
to assume that). If this is the case, variation in the phenomenology of negative 
emotions does not count against the claim that all negative emotions share one 
common felt aspect, namely, displeasure, as ITV claims. Let me make the following 
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analogy. Consider the following chords: Em11b5, A7, and Dm7. A7 and Dm7 are 
composed of four pitches and Em11b5 is composed of five pitches. However, these 
three chords only share a single, narrowly circumscribed exact pitch, namely, A; while 
they differ with respect to the other pitches. Even though they share one exact common 
felt aspect, namely, the pitch A, they certainly feel quite differently. Generally 
speaking, when one component of experience remains the same, while the other 
components vary, experience as a whole varies. Insofar as emotion is built out of 
components, being valence one of them, it is not implausible to suppose that the same 
goes for the experience of emotion.  
 
To sum up, ITV does not need to be committed neither to (a) nor to (b). Therefore, the 
fact that the phenomenology of negative emotions varies is no objection to ITV. The 
latter fact can be easily accommodated by ITV.  
 
6.4.3. Valence can be non-conscious  
 
Thirdly, Prinz (2004) has argued that valence cannot be identified with pleasure and 
displeasure, because pleasure and displeasure are necessarily always conscious (in the 
phenomenal sense of ‘conscious’): there seems to be no such thing as non-conscious 
pleasures or displeasures. However, emotions can be non-conscious (Ledoux, 1996; 
Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Winkielman et al., 2005). So, if emotions are always 
valenced, and emotions can be non-conscious, the construct of valence needs to be 
able to occur outside consciousness. Therefore, Prinz concludes, we cannot identify 
valence with pleasure and displeasure. Remember that the claim that valence can be 
felt is typically put forward by views that identify valence with (dis)pleasure. In this 
sense, ITV is somehow committed to the view that valence is (dis)pleasure (Joffly & 




This objection only works if the claim endorsed by ITV were that positive and negative 
valence amount to the folk concepts of pleasure and displeasure, respectively. 
However, scientific enquiry deals with natural kinds, not with our concepts for those 
kinds. Given that ITV is a scientific hypothesis about the nature of one of the 
components of the mechanism of emotion, the claim in question cannot concern the 
folk concept of pleasure and displeasure, but rather the natural kinds to which 
‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ refer. Certainly, according to the current folk conception, 
‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ refer exclusively to conscious states, but the natural kinds 
pleasure and displeasure do not need to be as the folk conception dictates. It is already 
common knowledge that usually our folk conception about the properties of a certain 
target phenomenon C ends up differing significantly from what scientific research tell 
us about the nature of C. I see no reason why the case of pleasure and displeasure 
should escape this trend. In fact, in the scientific literature on valence, one can already 
begin to see scientist willing to talk of pleasure as not necessarily conscious (see, e.g., 
Berridge & Kringelbach, 2010, p.7-8).  
 
This makes plenty of sense. As I argued above, under the view defended in this 
Chapter, representations of negative valence or displeasure are perceptual 
representations. Now, perceptual states do not become immediately conscious. Some 
additional process must intervene for a perceptual representation to become a 
conscious perceptual representation. For example, some claim that such a perceptual 
state must be represented by another, higher level state (Lycan, 1996; Rosenthal, 
2005), or that it must be globally broadcast (Baars, 2002), or that it must be modulated 
by attention (Prinz, 2012).  
 
Hohwy (2012) has proposed a compelling view on the relation between attention 
(precisions), model accuracy, and conscious perception in the PP framework that is 
relevant for this matter, and that it can be used so as to deal with the objection in 
question. The idea is that perceptual states get to be conscious when the exhibit a 
relatively high degree of accuracy and precision. Let me briefly explain. In statistical 
terms, ‘accuracy’ refers to the inverse amplitude of PE per se. That is, under some 
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simplifications, models from which perceptual hypotheses are put forward exhibit 
more accuracy in case they better represent the causal structure of the world, as the 
more PE is minimized. Remember that precisions refer to the variability of, or 
uncertainty about PE. In the PP framework, precision is attention. Now, accuracy and 
precision double dissociate:  
 
“It is a trivial point that precision and accuracy can come apart: a measurement can be 
accurate but imprecise, as in feeling the child’s fever with a hand on the forehead or it 
can be very precise but inaccurate, as when using an ill calibrated thermometer. This 
yields two broad dimensions for perceptual inference in terms of predictive coding: 
accuracy (via expectation of sensory input) and precision (via expectation of variability 
of sensory input). These can also come apart. Some of the states and parameters of an 
internal model can be inaccurate and yet precise (being confident that the sound comes 
from in front of you when it really comes from behind, Jack and Thurlow, 1973). Or they 
can be accurate and yet, imprecise (correctly detecting a faint sound but being uncertain 
about what to conclude given a noisy background).” (Hohwy, 2012, p. 4). 
 
Given this dissociation between precisions and accuracy, and depending on context, a 
certain perceptual state can exhibit relatively high accuracy and high precision. 
However, they can also be accurate but imprecise (at different degrees of accuracy and 
precision), and vice versa.  
 
The PP notions of accuracy and precisions offer a nice solution to the objection that 
valence should be able to occur outside consciousness. Sensory states can be non-
conscious in cases were their accuracy and precision are both relatively low (Hohwy, 
2012). Insofar as, under the hypothesis of ITV, negative valence or displeasure is 
represented in the brain as any other piece of sensory or perceptual information is 
represented, there mere fact that the brain entertains a representation of negative 
valence or displeasure does not make such a representation a conscious representation. 
It should tend to have, under this view, relatively high accuracy and precision. If this 
is the case, displeasure or negative valence can be non-conscious, just as any 
perceptual representation. Accordingly, non-conscious displeasure amounts to a 
representation of displeasure that does not exhibit the required degree of accuracy and 
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precision; while conscious displeasure amount to a representation of displeasure that 
does exhibits a relatively significant degree of accuracy and precision.  
 
6.5. Satisfying desiderata 
 
ITV seems to satisfy all the desiderata for a theory of valence. Firstly, as we saw in 
Section 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, contrary to what has been claimed, ITV can successfully 
accommodate the scope desideratum. On the one hand, intuitively, all clear cases of 
positive (negative) emotions feel pleasant (unpleasant), and counterexamples to this 
view fail, as ITV does not need to commit to the strong claim that all emotion types 
have a distinctive ‘hedonic tone’, either pleasure or displeasure, a good or bad feeling. 
On the other hand, the fact that not all negative (positive) emotions feel the same fails 
to show that all clear cases of positive (negative) emotions feel pleasant (unpleasant). 
This is the case since the phenomenology of an emotion is not exhausted by its valence 
component, and ITV does not need to hold that valence or (dis)pleasure consists in a 
single type of distinctive, narrowly circumscribed feeling. Moreover, if hedonic 
feelings are grounded in interoceptive perception, as ITV clams, emotions should have 
an interoceptive component. As we saw in Section 6.3.1., this is precisely what certain 
strands of evidence suggest.  
 
Secondly, ITV can easily accommodate the pre-theoretical taxonomy desideratum. 
Clear cases of positive emotions, such as joy are pleasant or feel good, and also clear 
cases of negative emotions, such as fear and guilt, are certainly unpleasant or feel bad. 
Furthermore, during clear cases of emotion we certainly feel our bodies fluctuating in 
pleasant and unpleasant ways. This suggest that clear cases of emotion do involve a 
valenced interoceptive component.  
 
Thirdly, ITV straightforwardly accounts for the feeling and evaluative desiderata. 
Organisms have the hard-wired expectation of maintaining homeostasis. Positive 
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emotions feel good and negative emotions feel bad (feeling desideratum) since their 
valence component represents positive and negative homeostatic changes, respectively 
(Section 6.3.3). Interoceptive percepts make things positive and negative to us (they 
make things matter to us) since they indicate the objects and events which are likely 
to promote or threaten homeostasis (evaluative desideratum).  
 
Finally, remember that the interoceptive system grounds inherently motivational states 
by way of what I called internal and external actions—think of hunger and thirst—
(Sections 3.1.9.1. and 3.3.2.2.). The idea is that, as an interoceptive percept informs 
about the homeostatic condition of the organism, interoceptive actions are 
automatically, and by default, motivated so as to rectify the homeostatic state about 
which such a percept informs. This seems to be a characteristic property of the 
interoceptive system (Craig, 2014). This explains the fact that neuroimaging studies 
show that the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate activate in an intertwined 
manner during emotion (Murphy et al., 2003). The anterior cingulate plays the role of 
triggering interoceptive and proprioceptive ‘policies’ during homeostasis maintenance 
(Craig, 2014). Thus, the view that identifies valence with interoceptive perceptions 
straightforwardly accounts for the motivation desideratum.  
 
In this Chapter, I argued that, contrary to the arguments of defenders of the view that 
valence cannot be a sensory phenomenon (as the ‘interoceptive inference’ approach 
must claim), ITV can successfully reply to these pressing objections. Moreover, as I 
argued in Chapter 5, the view that valence amounts to a non-sensory signal faces 
decisive problems. Thus, the view that valence arises by way of interoceptive 
perceptual inferences of the causes of interoceptive afferents emerges as a promising 
view. However, as we saw in Chapter 4, the interoceptive inference view of emotion 
per se is problematic. This leaves the PP framework without an account of emotion. 
This is major drawback for PP ambitions, as the principles of PP promise to give us a 
unifying account of all the seemingly disparate variety of mental phenomena, ranging 
from perception to action, and everything in between. This includes emotion. 
However, in the coming Chapter, I will argue that the PP approach to interoception 
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can indeed be used to account for emotion per se. This requires amending IIE. I will 
argue that, rather than via interoceptive perceptual inference, as IIE holds, emotions 
arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via external interoceptive actions. If this view is 
on track, PP’s ambitions are safe: interoceptive PE minimization can account for affect 






















7. Concluding Chapter: Emotion as active interoceptive inference 
 
In the previous Chapter, I defended the view that affective valence can be taken to be 
constituted by an interoceptive percept, formed via interoceptive perceptual inference, 
which represents positive and negative homeostatic changes (ITV). This view, which 
maintains that valence amounts to a sensory phenomenon, can reply to the objections 
made by defenders of non-sensory theories of valence (and satisfies agreed desiderata 
for a theory of valence). ITV constitutes itself then as a promising view.  
 
However, as I discussed in Chapter 4, interoceptive, perceptual theories of emotion are 
indeed doomed to fail—as there are no emotions configured in the physiological 
landscape. Perceiving/feeling our physiology cannot be then the whole story about 
emotion per se. Contrary to IIE’s claim, predicting interoceptive signals during 
perceptual inference cannot be what is primary in emotion generation. Thus, Seth’s 
(and Hohwy’s) IIE lacks a thoroughly compelling way to account for emotion per se. 
 
Then, even though PP can account for affective valence, the PP framework is left 
without a compelling view on the nature of emotion. This is a major drawback for PP 
ambitions. Remember that the PP framework promises to give us a unifying account 
of all the seemingly disparate variety of mental phenomena, ranging from perception 
to action, and everything in between. This includes emotion.  
 
However, allegedly in line with IIE, common sense (and also experimental research) 
tells us that every time we experience an emotion, this experience is accompanied by 
interoceptive feelings. This suggests that, even though having an emotion does not 
simply consist in perceiving interoceptive changes, as IIE claims, having an emotion 
does involve some type of process that must be intertwined with interoception. In other 
words, something more that interoceptive percept formation is needed so as to account 
248 
 
for emotion, and it must be something closely intertwined with interoceptive, bodily 
perception.  
 
In this concluding Chapter, I suggest that, by amending IIE in a key respect, the PP 
approach to interoception can indeed be used to account for emotion per se. As I 
argued in Chapter 4, interoceptive perceptual inference cannot be the primary driving 
component of emotion. However, as I mentioned above, interoceptive perception must 
be a central part of the story about emotion generation. Therefore, assuming that the 
PP framework is on track, emotions must arise by minimizing interoceptive prediction 
error, and in another fashion than as IIE proposes. If it is not simply via perceptual 
inference, we are left then with active inference. Emotions must arise then via 
interoceptive active inference, instead of via interoceptive perceptual inference.  
 
In this Chapter, I will explore this insight. Emotions are not about forming an 
interoceptive percept of a certain sort. Rather, emotions are strategies for changing an 
interoceptive percept that has already been formed (via interoceptive perceptual 
inference). This percept constitutes affective valence (Chapter 6). That is, emotions 
are specific strategies for regulating affective valence. Now, interoceptive percepts 
(i.e., valence) inform about our homeostatic condition. Then, emotions are better seen 
as specific strategies for regulating homeostasis.  
 
More precisely, the idea is that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via 
external interoceptive actions. Here the task consists in minimizing the discrepancy 
between already formed interoceptive percepts and the hard-wired expectation (or 
‘goal’) of stable homeostasis. As we saw in Chapter 3, external interoceptive actions 
require stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. In this Chapter, I propose 
the view that a certain emotion E amounts to a strategy for minimizing interoceptive 
PE by way of a specific set of representations of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. That 
is, by way of stored knowledge of the counterfactual relations that obtain between 
(possible) actions and its prospective interoceptive, sensory consequences. An emotion 
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arises when such knowledge is applied in order to regulate valence. In this sense, 
emotions are specific strategies for regulating affect by way of specific forms of 
action-guiding stored knowledge. According to this view, emotions are then 
individuated by the kind of stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ that is 
brought to bear in the control of valence—plus by what they represent. As long as 
emotions are not identified here with interoceptive perceptions, this view does not 
require there to be regularities pertaining to emotion in the inner milieu. Therefore, if 
the proposed view holds, PP’s ambitions are safe: interoceptive PE minimization can 
account for affect and emotion, the core of our mental life. 
 
I begin this Chapter by briefly motivating the view that emotions might be forms of 
action (rather than forms of perception) (Section, 7.1.). Then, after presenting the claim 
that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE via external interoceptive actions 
(Section 7.2.), I discuss the idea that the kind of stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’ required for external interoceptive actions can be taken to consist in 
emotion-specific action-oriented representations, encoded at higher levels of the 
cortical hierarchy. Insofar as these representations (or ‘chunks’ of the generative 
model) encode abstract (Section 7.3.) sets of knowledge about the same category in 
the world, they can be taken to consist in emotion ‘concepts’ (Section 7.2.2). The latter 
have both, mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit (Section 7.4.). In Section 
7.5., I highlight the way in which the suggested expansion of IIE can account for those 
aspects that should be taken into account when developing a satisfactory view on the 
nature of emotion.  
 
7.1. Emotion as ‘active’ interoceptive inference? 
 
Emotions have motivational force. Emotions are motivational states that urge us to act 
in different ways. I take this to be rather uncontroversial. Many common sense 
phenomena point towards the centrality of motivated action in emotion. Let me 
mention just a couple of such phenomena. In the first place, the very existence of 
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virtues speaks of the quintessentially motivational character of emotion. Virtues such 
as self-discipline, resilience, prudence, and temperance, amount precisely to the ability 
to control the motivational force of emotions. These character traits would not be 
virtues in the first place, if emotions lack motivational power in their very constitution. 
In the second place, we commonly appeal to the motivational force of emotions for the 
sake of explanation: “Christine rapidly hid her bottle of gin because she was scared of 
the police”, “Michelle made loud noises in the middle of the night because she was 
secretly angry at her husband John”. People have the urgency to retaliate in burst of 
anger, to kiss out of love, and to repair damage out of guilt. As I mentioned in Chapter 
1, sometimes these urges also impel us to do little or nothing at all—which are also 
things we do. For example, freezing out of fear, napping out of sadness, lying hours 
on the couch out of shame. All this sorts of action exhibit a sense of urge, a 
‘motivational oomph’, which is accompanied by the expectation that such an urge will 
vanish after action completion.  
 
In a word, during emotion, motivated action turns out to be quite fundamental. That is 
why, as we saw in Chapter 1, throughout the history of emotion research, the 
motivational, action-oriented aspect of emotion has been regarded by some researchers 
to be the primary aspect of emotion. Other kinds of families of emotion theory identify 
emotion (or take as the primary, driving aspect of emotion) with other aspects typically 
involved during emotion, such as feelings/perceptions and judgments. As we also saw 
in Chapter 1, both these kinds of theories (and also hybrid theories) struggle with 
accounting for key phenomena involved during emotion. Thus, action looks as a more 
than promising place at which to look in order to better understand emotion. It is worth 
then exploring whether the action-oriented aspect of emotion might be the ‘essence’ 
of emotion, to put it this way.  
  
On the other hand, there is a strong folk-psychological intuition that emotion does 
consist in feeling/perceiving our physiology reacting in some sort of way. This 
intuition is suggestively supported by scientific research, as meta-analytic studies 
show that brain regions involved in interoception are consistently active during 
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emotion, and, besides that, other measures that reliably indicate interoceptive activity 
are found to occur during emotion (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2000; Murphy et al., 2003).  
 
Thus, we have that both, action and physiological perception look as central aspects of 
the generation of emotion episodes. This suggests that both aspects are somehow 
intertwined during emotion generation.  
 
Interestingly, as I discussed in Chapter 3, interoception takes place as the organism 
attempts to regulate homeostasis. Interoceptive percepts inform the organism about its 
current homeostatic condition. However, given the fact that inner physiological 
‘policies’ (e.g., releasing vasopressin in the case of thirst) can rarely rectify 
homeostatic imbalances by triggering inner physiological resources alone (i.e., we 
simply lack the physiological resources to re-hydrate ourselves by producing water), 
the interoceptive system engages actions in the external environment in order to rectify 
homeostatic imbalances (e.g., looking for some water). Motivating action is part of 
what the interceptive system does, to put it this way (see Craig, 2015; Devinsky et al., 
1995). This is what I called in Chapter 3 external interoceptive actions (allostatic 
actions). In other words, the interoceptive system amounts to a perceptual system, 
which is also inherently motivational. Interoception is the action-oriented perceptual 
system par excellence.  
 
The above suggests that external interoceptive active inference might be the primary 
aspect during the generation of emotion episodes. Furthermore, on the assumption that 
interoception is key during emotion, this is also suggested by the fact that interoceptive 
perceptual inference cannot be the whole story as to how emotions arise (Chapter 4). 
Consequently, and as I mentioned above, assuming that the PP framework is on track, 
and that there are only two ways of minimizing interoceptive PE, we must embrace 
the other horn, namely, interoceptive active inference. It is worth then considering the 
hypothesis that emotions arise as interoceptive PE is minimized via external 
interoceptive active inference. 
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7.2. The claim: emotion and stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’  
 
I suggest that emotions arise via external interoceptive active inference: by sampling 
and modifying the external environment in order to change an already formed 
interoceptive percept (which has been formed via interoceptive perceptual inference). 
This percept constitutes valence, and informs about homeostatic imbalances (Chapter 
6). Thus, emotions are specific strategies for regulating affective valence, and 
consequently, homeostasis. More precisely, a certain emotion E amounts to a strategy 
for minimizing high-level interoceptive PE by way of a specific set of stored 
knowledge of the counterfactual relations that obtain between (possible) actions and 
its prospective interoceptive, sensory consequences (“if I act in this manner, 
interoceptive signals should evolve in such-and-such way”). An emotion is generated 
when such knowledge is applied in order to regulate valence (i.e., affect). When high-
level interoceptive PE is minimized via the set of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ that 
corresponds to stored knowledge about emotion E, the emotion E is generated. 
Emotions are specific strategies for regulating affect by way of specific forms of 
action-oriented stored knowledge. 
 
The idea is that, initially, a certain event triggers physiological changes in the 
organism. This event is typically triggered by an exteroceptively perceived external 
event. For example, a letter stating that your landlord needs to take back the property. 
However, the event in question can also be internally triggered. For example, the 
physiological changes that result from a bad posture, or a poor night of sleep. The 
physiological changes that have been triggered by some external (or internal) event are 
interoceptively perceived as positive or negative physiological changes, given 
homeostatic standards—i.e., given the hard-wired expectation of stable homeostasis 
(Chapters 3 and 6). These percepts are formed via interoceptive perceptual inference, 
as described in Chapters 3 and 6. Remember that physiological changes can be taken 
to be good or bad, positive or negative, according to whether they tend to approach or 
deviate from the aimed-at (flexible) regulatory level of homeostasis maintenance, 
respectively (Chapter 3). In case an interoceptive percept represents homeostatically 
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positive physiological changes, positive valence (or pleasure) takes place. In case an 
interoceptive percept represents homeostatically negative physiological changes, 
negative valence (or displeasure) takes place (Chapter 6).  
 
The discrepancy between an already formed interoceptive percept that informs about 
current homeostatic condition and the hard-wired expectation (or ‘goal’) of stable 
homeostasis constitutes high-level interoceptive PE. In other words, negative valence 
reflects states which are incompatible with the high-level expectation (or ‘goal’) of 
maintaining homeostasis. Note that, in a certain sense, positive valence also reflects 
states which are incompatible with the high-level expectation of homeostasis 
maintenance. This is the case since positive physiological changes amount to changes 
which are approaching the ‘goal’ set by homeostatic standards. That is, such 
physiological changes are not yet quite in line with the standard in question. The 
phenomenon of allostasis shows that this is the case (Cabanac, 1971). Pleasure 
typically takes place as a homeostatic imbalance begins to be rectified. However, 
pleasure stops as such an imbalance has already being rectified (Cabanac, 1971, 1979). 
Think of the ‘homeostatic motivation’ of hunger, and its corresponding process of 
satiation. When an organism is hungry and eats something nutritious, the pleasure 
obtained from that stimulus is significant. However, as the organism in question 
already begins to be satiated, the hedonic value of food decreases, to the point that, as 
the organism is already satiated, food tends to become aversive (Cabanac, 1979). In 
this sense, pleasure is a form of ‘ongoing relief’.  
 
Now, we have then that high-level interoceptive PE is triggered in case that, after 
comparison, current perceived physiological changes differ from the expected ‘goal’ 
state of physiological balance. Such perceived physiological changes constitute 
valence (i.e., affect). As I discussed in Chapter 3, the main task of the interoceptive 
system is not now forming a percept, but rather bringing physiological variables to 
their expected state by minimizing such high-level interoceptive PE. In the PP 
framework, this means that active inference needs to be engaged: actions must be bring 
forth so as to fulfil predictions. Taking into account the fact that the organism cannot 
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minimize high-level interoceptive PE via internal interoceptive actions (Chapter 3), 
external interoceptive actions are motivated. As I discussed in Chapter 3, external 
interoceptive actions consists in changing the external environment in order to change 
an interoceptive percept that constitutes valence. Insofar as external interoceptive 
actions are a form of active inference, they require representations of ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’: counterfactual knowledge of the way in which interoceptive signals 
would evolve, if certain actions ensue. 
 
As I am proposing that emotions are driven by external interoceptive actions, the 
models for emotions need to store such kind of knowledge. The view I am suggesting 
is that when high-level interoceptive PE is triggered by any sort of event, and it is 
minimized via the set of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ which is stored in the, let’ say, 
‘anger-model’, the emotion of anger arises and it is experienced—it is experienced in 
case there is a significant degree for accuracy and precision, as discussed in Chapter 
6. The ‘anger-model’ can be taken to be that ‘chunk’ of the generative model of the 
organism that stores expectations about anger (more on this below). Then, when such 
knowledge is activated in order to minimize high-level interoceptive PE, the emotion 
of anger unfolds. 
 
7.2.1. Emotions as ‘homeostatic motivations’ 
 
Note that this view sees emotion in analogy with ‘homeostatic motivations’ or drives, 
such as for example, hunger. Hunger amounts to a mental state that is constituted by 
both, the negatively valenced state of an empty stomach, plus the motivation to act in 
the world in such a way so as to change such a bad feeling. Analogously, emotions, if 
the suggested view is on track, are also constituted by both, a valenced state, plus the 
motivation to act in such a way as to change such state. However, there is an important 
difference between emotions per se and homeostatic motivations. While ‘homeostatic 
motivations’ are directed at inner states: the negatively valenced lack of nutrients, 
emotions are directed at external events, namely, core relational themes (Chapter 1). 
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More precisely, emotions exhibit two layers of content. On the one hand, their valence 
component represents inner states, namely, positive or negative homeostatic changes 
(Chapters 3 and 6). On the other hand, the emotion-specific action-oriented knowledge 
that is brought to change valenced states, and thus minimize high-level interoceptive 
PE, represents core relational themes.  
 
7.2.2. Representing core relational themes 
 
As I have been claiming, such emotion-specific action-oriented knowledge—
knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’—specifies actions through which 
interoceptive PE can be minimized. Active inference has world-to-mind direction of 
fit. How is it, then, that such knowledge can get to represent the world, i.e., core 
relational themes? In other words, how is it that emotions, understood as forms of 
action, can inform about states of the world, having thus mind-to-world direction of 
fit?  
 
As I mentioned above, emotion models (‘anger-model’, ‘fear-model’, ‘guilt-model’, 
etc.) can be seen as different ‘chunks’ of the organism’s generative model. These 
‘chunks’ encode expectations about emotion. Different emotions encode different 
expectations relative to emotion-specific ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. At higher 
levels of the cortical hierarchy, such emotion-specific expectations are relatively 
abstract, encoding slow time-scale expectations (Chapter 2). Insofar as such 
knowledge encodes expectations about distinct categories (‘anger, ‘fear’, ‘guilt’, etc.), 
and such expectations are abstract, it is not arbitrary then to consider such ‘chunks’ of 
knowledge as concepts, i.e., emotion concepts (see Hohwy, 2013, pp. 72-73). Concepts 
have mind-to-world direction of fit. Emotion concepts should be no exception to this 
(see, e.g., Barrett, 2006a). Thus, the distinct ‘chunks’ of knowledge which encode 
emotion-specific expectations relative to ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ can also be 
taken to have, besides world-to-mind direction of fit, also mind-to-world direction of 
256 
 
fit. Let me expand this point below, and discuss the key aspects of the claim presented 
in this subsection which have not been discussed in previous Chapters.  
 
7.2.2.1. Knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ and emotion ‘concepts’ 
 
The view suggested in this Chapter can then be put in the following way. Emotions 
arise as emotion-specific action-oriented representations, encoded at higher levels of 
the cortical hierarchy, are used to minimize high-level interoceptive PE. In other 
words, a certain emotion E arises as the action-oriented emotion ‘concept’ for E is used 
to control valence.  
 
In this view, emotion concepts can be understood as those representations of 
‘sensorimotor contingencies’ which are encoded at higher levels of the cortical 
hierarchy. Remember from Chapter 2 that, in the PP framework, lower levels of the 
hierarchy encode regularities that operate at fast time-scales, which capture variant 
aspects of experience. On the other hand, higher levels encode increasingly more 
complex regularities that operate at slow time-scales, which capture relatively more 
invariant aspects of experience. The higher-levels of the hierarchy are not modality 
specific (i.e., amodal and multimodal), and encode even more abstract, slow time-scale 
regularities, not directly related to regularities pertaining to the domain of just one 
modality. In a word, higher levels encode relatively abstract expectations. This 
suggests that, in the PP framework, the traditional distinction between perceptual 
representations and conceptual representation dissolves into the distinctions regarding 
the levels at which expectations are encoded (see Hohwy, 2013, pp. 72-73).  
 
The high-level ‘chunks’ of stored knowledge that encode expectations relative to the 
same category, for example, the category dog, can then be taken to constitute the 
‘concept’ DOG. Now, as I remarked in Chapters 2 and 3, implicit in the PP framework 
is the idea that, particularly at higher levels of processing, stored representations 
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relative to a certain category must encode knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ 
relevant to that category (see also Seth, 2015). Thus, the ‘chunks’ of stored knowledge 
that constitute a ‘concept’ for a certain category must then encode knowledge of 
‘sensorimotor contingencies’. In other words, the ‘concept’ for a certain category 
specify actions relevant for that category. For example, DOG includes knowledge 
relative to ways of actively interacting with dogs in appropriate ways, given that 
category. More precisely, it includes knowledge about which evolving sensory states 
to expect, across all levels of the perceptual hierarchies, if one would interact with a 
dog in such-and-such a way. ‘Concepts’ for emotions should be no exception to this 
(see, e.g., Barrett, 2006a; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). 
 
This approach to ‘concepts’ in the PP framework is by no means arbitrary. This view 
is directly in line with the situated view on the nature of concepts (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 
2009). In fact, the latter has been articulated in terms of the PP framework (Barsalou, 
2009). Roughly, the view on categorical inference put forward by Barsalou (Barsalou, 
2009) can be put in the following way. The categorical inferences that a certain concept 
permits take place by way of the top-down activation of the stored sensory/perceptual 
and motor states which constitute the concept. Let’s call these perceptual and motor 
states ‘sensorimotor states’. Such sensorimotor states can be taken to be the ‘features’ 
of the concept. These sensorimotor states get to be constituent ‘features’ of a concept 
through exposure. That is, as the agent encounters instances of a certain category c in 
the world, the relevant sensorimotor states that consistently occur during the worldly 
interaction with c are stored. In this manner, such sensorimotor states become stored 
priors about which sensory states to expect, given the hypothesis that an instance of c 
is taking place. The concept C is thus formed. Then, during categorical inference, the 
sensorimotor states in question are generated from the top-down in order to guide 
adaptive behaviour. Let me briefly illustrate an important aspect of this way of 
understanding categorical inference.  
 
Considering that a concept consists here in a set of sensorimotor states that consistently 
occur during interaction with instances of the relevant category, once activated, such 
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concepts allow the generation of predictions or “educated guesses about what might 
occur next” (Barsalou, 2009, p. 1284). This takes place via pattern completion. For 
example, let’s imagine an agent, Sophie, who sees a dog from her window, and, at t1, 
activates the visual ‘parts’ or ‘features’ of the model/concept for dogs. Given that 
certain kinds of sounds—i.e., barks—tended to consistently co-occur with instances of 
dog previously experienced by Sophie, when the ‘auditive part’ of her model/concept 
for dog activates at t2 via pattern completion, her brain can now predict the kind of 
sound that this dog will likely make. Considering that certain kinds of canine 
behaviours tended to co-occur with certain food odours, when the motor, visual, and 
auditive ‘parts’ of her model/concept for dog activates at t3, her brain can predict how 
this dog will likely react to the sausage odour that comes out of her flat. Even more, 
given that certain kinds of human-dog interaction tended to consistently co-occur with 
instances of dog previously experienced by Sophie, her brain can predict how to 
properly interact with this dog. Categorical inferences based on stored expectations 
about sensorimotor states, once activated, control subsequent actions via pattern-
completion. This should also apply to emotion concepts (and concepts for any 
category) (see, e.g., Barrett, 2006a; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). 
 
In the case of emotion concepts, they can be taken to be constituted by the sensorimotor 
states that consistently occur during the encounters of the agent with instances of an 
emotion type. By ‘instances of an emotion type’ I mean the kinds of situations which 
the culture to which the agent belongs typically refers as characteristic of the emotion 
type in question (see Barrett, 2006a). For example, let’s take the case of anger. In 
western culture, anger typically involves a demeaning offense. This is the core 
relational theme of anger (Chapter 1) (Lazarus, 1991). In situations in which 
demeaning offenses take place, people tend to do things that eliminate the origin of the 
offense in question. For example, people tend to raise their tone of voice, threaten other 
people with physical violence, move their faces in certain ways to express disproval, 
etc. The high-level sensorimotor states that consistently tend to occur during the kind 
of situation that we recognize as characteristic of anger become then stored priors. In 
this manner, ANGER— i.e., the high-level ‘chunk’ of stored knowledge that encodes 
expectations relative to anger—is formed. Then, during categorical inference, the 
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sensorimotor states in question are generated from the top-down in order to guide 
adaptive behaviour. This means that such knowledge is used in order to minimize high-
level interoceptive PE, so as to maintain the organism within viability limits. In other 
words, the system knows that, in a situation characteristic of anger, if certain actions 
are performed, interoceptive signals should evolve in such a way as to reduce the 
difference between the expectation of stable homeostasis and the current perceived 
physiological state. Emotion ‘concepts’—i.e., that ‘chunk’ of the generative model 
which encodes high-level knowledge relative to a certain emotion category—encode 
then knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. 
 
7.3. ‘Sensorimotor contingencies’ and the cortical hierarchy: active inference and its 
levels of granularity 
 
The architecture posited by the PP framework is inherently hierarchical. Thus, 
knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ must also be found across all levels of the 
cortical hierarchy (Chapter 2). As we saw in Chapter 2, representations of 
‘sensorimotor contingencies’ can be low-level or high-level depending on how variant 
or invariant are the regularities that they encode, respectively. For example, low-level, 
fast-changing actions include movements such as microsaccades. Slower time-scale 
actions include arm movements, or walking. Even more ‘abstract’, slower-timescale 
actions can include actions such as waiting for the night to fall, doing a PhD, or 
working as a Lecturer.  
 
In the PP framework, higher-level precision-weighted expectations of action constrain 
and modulate lower-level proprioceptive predictions. If the system has the high-level 
expectation (or ‘goal’) of eating, this can be achieved, depending on context, by several 
different cascades of lower-level precision-weighted proprioceptive predictions. For 
example, and depending on context, the system can achieve the expectation of eating 
by extending the arm, walking to the fridge, cycling to the supermarket, etc. In turn, 
these lower-level predictions (or ‘sub-goals’) can be fulfilled in several different ways 
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depending on context. In fact, the lower in the proprioceptive hierarchy, the more the 
context-dependent variability of the precision-weighted predictions in question: the 
relatively low-level expectation (or ‘goal’) of grasping your mug, can be fulfilled via 
very distinct predictions about shoulder and wrist micro-movements, depending on 
what the context affords—e.g., your initial position, room temperature, metabolic 
resources, etc. Higher levels constrain and modulate lower levels. Higher levels encode 
expectations of action which are coarse-grained, while lower levels encode 
expectations of action which are fine-grained (the latter seem to be rather automatic, 
while he former seem to be more ‘intentional’). 
 
It follows from the above paragraphs that the expectations of action that each emotion 
model/concept encodes so as to minimize high-level interoceptive PE must also be 
seen as represented at different time-scales or levels of abstraction. That is, the actions 
specified by the sensorimotor contingencies encoded by emotion concepts/models 
exhibit different degrees of granularity. There are expectations of action relative to 
emotion which are very abstract. For example, and to keep the example of anger above, 
the expectation (or ‘goal’) of eliminating the origin of a demeaning offense. There are 
also expectations of action which are relatively lower level. The latter amount to 
context-sensitive ways of fulfilling the high-level expectation (or ‘goal’) in question. 
In this case, the abstract prediction in question can be fulfilled by several distinct 
lower-level expectations (or ‘sub-goals’). For example, attacking, making a phone call, 
making an ironic joke, sighing, etc. In turn, these lower-level expectations can be 
fulfilled by an even richer array of relatively lower-level proprioceptive predictions. 
For example, attacking can be fulfilled by running towards the offender, or by slowly 
walking towards the offender while expanding the chest, etc. In turn, these latter 
expectations of action can be fulfilled by several lower-level proprioceptive 
predictions, and so on and so forth. In a word, knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies exhibit different degrees of granularity. The same high-level expectation 
of action can be fulfilled by several distinct lower-level predictions. Such high-level 
expectations constrain and modulate lower-level proprioceptive predictions in a 




This distinction between levels of abstraction relative to the expectations (or ‘goals’) 
that emotion models/concepts encode is thoroughly compatible, mutatis mutandis, 
with the distinction between relational goals and situated goals made by Scarantino 
(2014): 
 
“[…] relational goals are abstract goals that need to be situated in a concrete context in 
order to guide bodily changes. This is typical of most goal-oriented processes, including 
non-emotional intentional actions. When we decide to get to school by 10am in order to 
attend a talk, the overarching action goal of getting to school by 10am can be achieved 
through a variety of situated goals (e.g., taking a bus at 9:20am, taking the subway at 
9:30am) (cf. Pacherie 2008). Each of these situated goals can in turn be achieved by a 
variety of motor goals that directly guide bodily changes. For simplicity of reference, I 
will distinguish between the relational goal of an emotion and its relational sub-goals, 
understood as the collection of situated and motoric goals by which the relational goal 
can be achieved.” (Scarantino, 2014, p. 169) 
 
In this Chapter I suggest the view that emotions arise as emotion-specific action-
oriented representations (i.e., emotion ‘concepts’), encoded at higher levels of the 
cortical hierarchy, are used to minimize high-level interoceptive PE. These 
representations encode knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. When high-level 
interoceptive PE is minimized via the set of sensorimotor contingencies that 
corresponds to stored knowledge about emotion E, the emotion E is generated. The 
claim is that the kind of knowledge in question is high-level. That is, it specifies action 
expectations which are abstract (i.e., ‘relational goals’). For example, in the case of 
anger, the expectation of eliminating the origin of a demeaning offense. In this view, 








7.4. Emotion ‘concepts’ as ‘pushmi-pullyu’ expectations 
 
Importantly, emotion concepts/models, understood as the high-level ‘chunks’ of stored 
knowledge that encode action expectations relative to emotion categories, exhibit two 
intertwined representational aspects. Remember that emotion concepts track the 
external conditions that consistently occur during the encounters of the agent with 
instances of an emotion type. Such external conditions consist in situations which the 
culture to which the agent belongs typically refers as characteristic of the emotion type 
in question (e.g., “that’s anger”, “you are feeling shame”, etc.) (see Barrett, 2006a). 
For example, anger typically occurs when a demeaning offense takes place. This is the 
core relational theme of anger (Chapter 1) (Lazarus, 1991). However, in situations in 
which demeaning offenses take place, people also tend to do things that eliminate the 
origin of the offense in question. It is likely then that such regularities also get to be 
encoded by emotion models. Thus, emotion concepts/models get to represent core 
relational themes as they jointly encode “educated guesses” as to which actions 
correspond to that kind of situation (core relational theme), in order to deal with latter 
(Section 7.3.). 
 
In other words, emotion concepts get to represent core relational themes as they encode 
action expectations relative to which action should take place in order to obtain the 
evolving interoceptive signals that would minimize high-level interoceptive PE, given 
such core relational theme. In this sense, emotion concepts have both, mind-to-world 
and world-to-mind directions of fit. They represent descriptively the way in which the 
world is (i.e., core relational themes), and how the world is to be. That is, the high-
level ‘chunks’ of knowledge that encode emotion-specific ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies’ count as pushmi-pullyu representations: representations that jointly 





7.5. Explanatory advantages 
 
In this Section, I highlight the way in which the expansion of IIE suggested in this 
Chapter can account for those aspects that should be taken into account when 
developing a satisfactory view on the nature of emotion, as stated in Chapter 1. That 
is, in this Section, I show how the view in question can satisfy the discussed desiderata 
for a theory of emotion (Chapter 1). Remember that there are three main general 
approaches to emotion theories, namely, perceptual theories, cognitive theories, and 
agential theories. The view suggested in this Chapter has the resources to account for 
those aspects in which the main three general approaches to emotion theories result 
satisfactory, and those aspect in which they result satisfactory. As I commented in 
Chapter 1, insofar as the PP framework dissolves to an important extent the division 
of perception, cognition, and action, the expansion of IIE suggested in this Chapter is 
then particularly well positioned to integrate the insights of these three approaches, 
while avoiding their typical problems. 
 
Let’s get down to business. As we saw in Chapter 1, a theory of emotion must explain 
how emotions are meaningful. That is, it must explain how emotions can represent 
core relational themes. Emotions exhibit intentionality. While cognitive theories 
straightforwardly account for the meaningfulness of emotion, as they identify 
emotions with judgments, perceptual and agential theories have difficulties in 
accounting for this phenomenon. Interestingly, being an agential theory, the view 
suggested in this Chapter accounts for the meaningfulness of emotion in a similar way 
as cognitive theories, without turning into a version of this kind of theory. In the view 
suggested in this Chapter, emotions are about core relational themes, since emotions 
are constituted by emotions concepts/models. The latter, as any other kind of concept, 
have mind-to-world direction of fit. That is, they represent the world as having certain 
properties. Given that emotion concepts/models track the external conditions that 
consistently occur during the encounters of the agent with instances of an emotion 
type, and that core relational themes consistently occur during emotions, emotion 
concepts represent core relational themes.  
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Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 1, a theory of emotion must explain how emotions 
can arise without there being emotions configured in the physiological landscape, 
taking into account the fact that there typically is a bodily aspect to the phenomenology 
of emotion, and that phenomenal consciousness is populated by nothing over and 
above percepts. 
 
The expansion of IIE suggested in this Chapter accounts for the bodily aspect 
characteristic of the phenomenology of emotion by appealing to its valence 
component. Remember that, in the view suggested in this Chapter, emotions arise as 
high-level, emotion-specific knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies is used in order 
to minimize high-level interoceptive PE. The latter amounts to the difference between 
the expectation of stable homeostasis and the perceived physiological condition of the 
organism. Valence is the construct that informs organisms about their current 
physiological condition. As it was discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, valence arises by 
way of interoceptive perceptual inferences of the internal causes of interoceptive 
signals. Valence amounts to the perception of such physiological changes. As valence 
is a different affective construct than emotion, this view on the nature of valence does 
not require there to be emotions configured in the physiological landscape. This view 
only requires there to be physiological changes which are positive or negative in some 
sense. As it was discussed in Chapters 3, 5, and 6, as valence is coarser-grained than 
emotion, and that there are patterns of physiological changes that distinguish between 
valence properties, this is an assumption which should not be taken to be controversial. 
Then, the interoceptive system can extract regularities regarding valence properties 
from the physiological landscape, so as to use them later for the sake of perceptual 
inference. Thus, the expansion of IIE suggested in this Chapter satisfies the 
desideratum in question: valence is an interceptive percept, and it is a component part 
of emotion. Valence understood in this way does not require there to be physiological 
regularities relative to emotion. Moreover, given that valence is a component part of 
emotion, and that, being a percept, it can be felt, the view proposed in this Chapter can 
account for another desideratum discussed in Chapter 1: A theory of emotion must 
account for the fact that emotions are intrinsically bodily felt. 
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Thirdly, as discussed in Chapter 1, a theory of emotion must explain the fact that 
emotions can occur outside consciousness. As it has been claimed in number of 
occasions throughout this Thesis, I am assuming that phenomenal consciousness is 
only populated by percepts. Then, emotions must be a perceptual phenomenon of some 
sort, as long as they can be felt (and this is certainly the case). Now, as we saw in 
Chapter 6, Hohwy (2012) suggests that perceptual states get to be conscious when the 
exhibit a relatively high degree of accuracy and precision. Remember that, roughly, 
models from which perceptual hypotheses are put forward exhibit more accuracy in 
case they better represent the causal structure of the world, as the more PE is 
minimized. Remember that precisions refer to the variability of, or uncertainty about 
PE. Depending on context, a certain perceptual state can exhibit relatively high 
accuracy and high precision. However, they can also be accurate but imprecise (at 
different degrees of accuracy and precision), and vice versa. Importantly, as Hohwy 
(2012) suggests, perceptual states can be non-conscious in cases were their accuracy 
and precision are both relatively low (Hohwy, 2012). Now, in Chapters 5 and 6, I 
argued for the view that valence arises as interoceptive PE is minimized via 
interoceptive perceptual inference. Valence consists in an interoceptive percept. If this 
view is on track, valence can be non-conscious, just as any perceptual representation. 
Non-conscious valence is a sensory representation of the inner milieu, which does not 
exhibit the required degree of accuracy and precision. 
 
However, in the expansion of IIE suggested in this Chapter, besides valence, emotions 
are constituted by high-level knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. An emotion 
arises when such knowledge is applied in order to regulate valence. In fact, in this 
view, the driving component of emotion generation is that kind of emotion-specific 
action expectations. Interoceptive active inference is the driving component of 
emotion. Thus, considering that only formed percepts populate phenomenal 
consciousness, this component itself cannot be felt. Only its interoceptive, sensory 
consequences can be felt, once they are ‘explained away’ via interoceptive perceptual 
inference. Valence is the component of emotion that can be felt. This means that, in 
the suggested expansion of IIE, emotions can take place outside consciousness, only 
insofar as their valence component can be non-conscious.  
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Now, haven’t I argued in Section 6.4.2. that the phenomenology of an emotion is not 
exhausted by its valence component? In a certain sense, this is the case, as I argued in 
that Section. However, in another sense, all that which is felt during an emotion 
episode is its valence component. Certainly, as an episode of emotion generation takes 
place, many different sorts of mental states and processes accompany such an episode, 
and many of them can be felt. For example, during an episode of emotion, besides the 
perception of some physiological changes, we also seem to think and reason in certain 
kinds of ways. We also move our limbs in some ways, and say things to ourselves in 
inner speech. We also focus our visual and auditive attention in certain features of the 
environment more than in others features of the environment, among other 
accompanying mental states and processes. Insofar as these aspects, which do not 
constitute proper component parts of emotion (Chapter 1), occur together with an 
emotion, the experience as a whole goes beyond the sole experience of valence 
(perceived bodily changes). In this sense, the phenomenology of an emotion is not 
exhausted by its valence component (Section 6.4.2.) However, as it is suggested in this 
Chapter, if emotion has only two constituent components, namely, valence and 
expectations of action, and valence is the only component which is inherently 
perceptual, then only valence is the proper component part of emotion that can be felt. 
Certainly, the emotion-specific expectations of action which are used to minimize 
high-level interoceptive PE can have associated imagery. However, the latter is not 
inherent to the former.  
 
Fourthly, as we saw in Chapter 1, a theory of emotion must account for the fact that 
emotions have motivational force. As a version of the agential theory of emotion, in 
which emotion generation is driven by action expectations dependent on the 
interoceptive system, the view suggested in this Chapter straightforwardly satisfies this 
desideratum. As we saw in Section 6.5., the interoceptive system grounds inherently 
motivational states by way of what I called external actions (Sections 3.1.9.1. and 
3.3.2.2.). The idea is that, as an interoceptive percept informs about the homeostatic 
condition of the organism, interoceptive actions are automatically, and by default, 
motivated. This, in order to rectify the homeostatic state about which such a percept 
informs—think of hunger and thirst. This seems to be a characteristic property of the 
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interoceptive system (Craig, 2014). This explains the fact that neuroimaging studies 
show that the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate activate in an intertwined 
manner during emotion (Murphy et al., 2003). The anterior cingulate plays the role of 
triggering interoceptive and proprioceptive ‘policies’ during homeostasis maintenance 
(Craig, 2014). The motivational character of the interoceptive system also explains the 
fact that lesions to the anterior insula significantly impact motivation (e.g., Devinsky 
et al., 1995). Thus, the view that identifies emotion with the external interoceptive 
actions driven by the perceived homeostatic condition of the organism directly 
accounts for the ‘motivational oomph’ characteristic of emotion.  
 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, a theory of emotion must explain the close 
connection between emotion and action, without identifying emotion types with 
specific sets of instrumental behaviours. As I just mentioned above, the link between 
emotion and action is straightforward in the view suggested in this Chapter. Now, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, a typical problem of agential theories of emotion is that, in 
emphasizing the action-oriented, motivational aspect of emotion, agential theories tend 
to be committed to the claim that each emotion type has a characteristic set of 
instrumental behaviours. However, as it was discussed in Chapter 1, emotions cannot 
be individuated by sets of instrumental behaviours. Different sets of instrumental 
behaviours are involved in the same emotion type, and the same type of behaviour is 
involved in different types of emotion.  
 
Closely following Frijda (1986, 2010), the view suggested in this Chapter avoids this 
problem by holding that the expectations of action which individuate emotion types 
are encoded at higher levels of the cortical hierarchy. At these levels, models encode 
slow time-scale regularities, which exhibit a rather abstract level of granularity. That 
is, these levels do not encode specific sorts of instrumental behaviour and motor 




The emotion-specific knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ that individuate 
emotions encodes expectations (‘goals’) relative to the types of problem with which a 
certain emotion type consistently needs to deal. Following Frijda (1986, 2010), the 
emotion-specific knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ that individuate anger 
can be taken to consist in expectations relative to the task of regaining control of action 
to remove obstruction (see Frijda, 1986, p. 88). In the case of fear, the emotion-specific 
knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ that individuate it can be taken to consist 
in expectations relative to the task of making oneself inaccessible to the relevant 
stimulus so as to avoid it. These actions are engaged since the system predicts that, 
given the core relational theme which is considered to be taking place, the actions in 
question will achieve to trigger interoceptive signals compatible with the expectation 
of homeostatic balance.  
 
The expansion of IIE suggested in this Chapter exhibits another explanatory 
advantage. Remember from Chapter 4 the reading of IIE according to which the claim 
that IIE puts forward is that basically all emotion hypotheses expect the same 
interoceptive states. In this reading of IIE, perceptual interoceptive hypotheses about 
which emotion might be taking place encode expectations about which affective 
properties should occur given such a considered emotion. The affective properties in 
question can be taken to consist in an arousal state together with its hedonic value (i.e., 
valence), which are assumed to be states in the interoceptive system. All emotions 
involve arousal, and the task of interoceptive inferences is to infer which emotion is 
causing such an arousal state. The reason for doubting this reading of IIE is that 
evidence suggests that, during perceptual tasks relative to emotion processing, first an 
interoceptive percept is formed, which constitutes the experience of affect (i.e., arousal 
together with its hedonic value, or valence at a certain level of intensity), and only then 
the processes involved in the generation of emotion per se begin to occur (see Barrett 
et al., 2007). The expansion of IIE suggested in this Chapter directly makes sense of 
this key piece of evidence. In this view, once the organism is informed about a 
homeostatic change by an already formed interoceptive percept, then action-oriented 
emotion knowledge is brought to do the further processing required for fulfilling the 
expectation of stable homeostasis.  
269 
 
On the other hand, the agential view suggested in this Chapter straightforwardly 
accounts for those aspects which are left unexplained by the current philosophically 
more developed agential theory of emotion, namely, the motivational theory of 
emotion (MTE) (Scarantino, 2014) (Chapter 1). 
 
In the first place, as we saw in Chapter 1, MTE leaves unexplained an aspect that any 
agential theory must explain, insofar as it gives to action a primary role in the 
generation of emotion episodes. Agential theories, insofar as they are action theories, 
should say something about why emotions have the motivational force that they have, 
by appealing to the resources that the proposed theory itself provides. MTE is silent in 
this respect. The agential theory that, as it is suggested in this concluding Chapter, 
emerges out of the PP framework has a straightforward answer. Emotions have the 
motivational force that they have, because they are grounded in the interoceptive 
system. The latter, as we saw, motivates action so as to maintain the organism within 
viability limits.  
 
In the second place, the resources that MTE itself provides give no answer to the 
problem of valence. That is, what is it that makes certain emotions positive and other 
emotions negative? The agential theory suggested in this Chapter, as we saw, puts 
valence at the centre of emotion. Emotions are nothing but ways of dealing with 
valence. In this view, certain emotions are positive (negative) emotions because they 
contain a bodily representation that informs the organism that the physiological 
landscape is approaching (deviating form) the expectation of homeostasis.  
 
7.6. Final remarks 
 
In this Thesis I aimed at systematizing, clarifying, and problematizing the 
interoceptive inference approach to interoception in such a way so as to be able to 
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make a case for two claims relevant for the philosophy of emotion and the affective 
sciences.   
 
In the first place, there are different possible ways in which valence can be understood 
in the PP framework. In some way or another, all these views point towards the same 
more global PP view on the nature of valence. All these views point towards the claim 
that valence amounts to an interoceptive percept, formed via interoceptive perceptual 
inference, that informs about positive and negative homeostatic changes. This is what 
I called ‘the interoceptive theory of valence’ (ITV). I defended this claim from non-
sensory theories of valence (NSS). The latter is the view that valence does not amount 
to a sensory phenomenon of any kind, but it rather consists in a non-sensory signal that 
merely “attaches” to sensory representations. As I argued, besides the fact that ITV 
can reply to the objections made defenders of NSS to the claim that valence amounts 
to a sensory phenomenon, NSS fail to show their tenets to be true. This leaves the door 
open for the view that interoceptive percepts formed via interoceptive perceptual 
inference can indeed account for affective valence. In fact, several strands of empirical 
evidence (and some theoretical considerations) suggest that this is the case. ITV can 
reply to objections, and satisfies agreed desiderata for a theory of valence. Thus, ITV 
stands out as a promising view on the nature of valence. 
 
In the second place, I discussed and problematized the interoceptive inference view of 
emotion (IIE). This view holds that emotions per se are a forms of perception. More 
precisely, according to IIE, in direct analogy to visual perception, emotions arise by 
minimizing interoceptive prediction error (PE) via interoceptive perceptual inference. 
I argued that this view exhibits a problematic assumption. However, I think that the 
more general claim put forward by IIE is on track. Emotions do arise by minimizing 
interoceptive PE. That is why I concluded this Thesis by suggesting one way in which 
emotions can be understood along the lines of the interoceptive PE minimization 
approach. I suggested that emotions arise by minimizing interoceptive PE in a manner 
distinct from the way IIE claims. I concluded by suggesting that emotions are primarily 
a form of action, not of perception. That is, emotions arise via external interoceptive 
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active inference: by sampling and modifying the external environment in order to 
change an already formed interoceptive percept. That is, emotions are specific 
strategies for regulating affective valence. More precisely, I suggested the view that a 
certain emotion E amounts to a specific strategy for minimizing interoceptive PE by 
way of a specific set of stored knowledge of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’. An emotion 
arises when such knowledge is applied in order to regulate valence. 
 
As I argued in this concluding Chapter, the suggested view turns out to be a promising 
view, insofar as it avoids the problems of the main kinds of theories of emotion, and it 
satisfies the desiderata discussed in Chapter 1. Then, the discussion presented in this 
Chapter sets the basis for an especially dedicated, focused treatment of the view that 
emotions arise via external interoceptive active inference, together with the 
development of its philosophical implications. Future research on PP and the 
generation of emotions per se should focus on these affairs. In this Thesis, I focused 
on the first part of that project: the systematization, clarification, and discussion of the 
interoceptive inference approach to interoception as applied to valence and emotion. I 
expect to have shown relevant ways in which the emerging PP account of emotion and 
valence can be philosophically problematized. I also expect to have made a compelling 
case for the views of valence and emotions per se that emerge from the PP perceptual 
machinery, and that they constitute themselves as promising views, worthy of further 
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